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F O R E WO R D

Categorizing Peter Elbow is impossible: he is a medievalist, a teacher, a lecturer, a writer, and, we could even say, a rhetorician; but not one of these designations could serve as a rubric for what those who value his work would want
to set forth. But perhaps he can be characterized.
Peter Elbow knows more than most about the composing process because
he knows what a composition is and he knows that the process by which it is
arrived at is neither merely rule-governed nor merely inspiration-guided. His
incomparably useful idea of free-writing—so terrifying to linear thinkers, so
comforting to those without fear of chaos—exercises the power of ﬂuency,
without which learning to write is not, shall we say, a pleasurable activity.
Because he is devoted to actuality—to bringing words to the page, to enlisting
the heuristic power of discourse—we could call him a pragmatist, but I think
of him also as the heir of those Romantics who believed that making sense,
making meaning, is less like ﬁlling containers (mufﬁn tins, oil drums) than it is
like encouraging a plant to grow. Peter has always been friendly to the teaching
of English as a mode of organic gardening.
Peter Elbow’s understanding of the composing process is apparently based
not on psycholinguistic principles or the learning theories of cognitive psychologists but on a sturdy Jamesian psychology—I’m thinking of Talks to
Teachers—updated in terms of Vygotsky’s conceptions of the social matrix of
all learning and teaching. His understanding that writing is dialectical and dialogical (the author of Embracing Contraries would not want, as some do, to
make them antithetical modes) has been nourished by a literary sensibility: he
has from the start seen reading as a dialogue with the author and writing as a
dialogue with the author who is one’s self and the surrogates who constitute
audiences—primary, virtual, real.
For as long as I’ve known Peter, I have admired his lively pedagogical imagination. His openness to new ideas, new points of departure, new theories
would be notable in any case, but it’s what he does with them that has made
this Romantic Pragmatist (is that a category we could agree on?) such an
important guide for a generation of writing teachers. He has been inﬂuential
because he knows how to transform philosophical and psychological insights
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so that they can be acted on, so that they can help us defend ourselves against
gangster theories. He knows how to make such ideas accessible to others,
encouraging them to go on from there, as he does himself, continually.
Peter Elbow knows what it means to say “Begin with where they are.” He
takes that to mean “Begin with where they are as language animals—as human
beings who can learn to call upon the powers of language.” That he knows how
to teach writers how to do so is a contribution to “English,” as this collection of
essays attests.
Ann E. Berthoff

P R E FA C E
To Our Readers

At one point in the process of editing this collection of essays, we thought we
were going to have to create a section devoted entirely to “When I Met Peter”
stories. With few exceptions, the essays we received began with an account of
the author’s first meeting with Peter—at CCCC, in a classroom, at a conference, in a workshop, or in a book. Whether the meeting was casual or formal,
the experience was recounted with humor, affection, and, in some cases, awe.
Peter, we concluded, is not a person to go unnoticed, much less a person to
ignore. In fact, Peter Elbow may be the only composition theorist we know
with what amounts to a core of academic groupies, all wanting to meet him,
all wanting to know him. Many people feel they do know Peter, whether
they’ve met him or not. The accessibility of his writing creates the illusion
that he’s talking directly to his reader, an illusion that pulls most of us into his
discussion. Peter is also a member of the teachers’ club, not pretending to
understand fully the pedagogy or the practice that he writes about. For Peter,
the processes of learning to write and learning to teach never end. He’s not
one of those theorists burdened with the need for closure, convinced that
there is one true method that will unfailingly produce the perfect article,
book, or comment on a student paper. This awareness of the impossibility
(and even the potential pitfalls) of creating the apparently perfect theory or
practice makes him both credible and endearing to practicing teachers of
writing, who struggle to help student writers discover what they think and
compose their thoughts for an audience.
Each of the four of us has been a colleague of Peter Elbow’s at one point or
another. Each of us has collaborated with him—shared writing, editing, program administration—in an ongoing attempt to understand better the business of composition and of English studies in general. Because collaboration
often leads to friendship, we all have spent time with Peter and with each other
talking, arguing, traveling to conferences, eating, and hiking. For all of us, in
truth, our personal connections to Peter are primary; as a consequence, our
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own contributions (which we have called “Intersections”) are quite diverse. We
consciously decided not to impose uniformity on ourselves.
And even though we may not always be in agreement with what he says and
writes, each of us has learned that Peter and his work make possible a starting
place for our own ideas and practices. From that starting place, our paths occasionally curve back to his, frequently curve away, sometimes more parallel,
sometimes cross at odd angles. Many times our practices break and run from
him altogether, heading for the outer territories, going in an entirely different
direction from the one Peter took. But regardless of where we end up, Peter’s
ideas provide a place for us to return when we want to debate or discuss or even
whine about our journey. It is this potentiality that we hope to suggest by labeling our contributions as “Intersections.”
We know that others have had the same experiences with Peter and his
work—even those who have never met him personally. Therefore, our aim in
putting together this collection is to demonstrate the diversity of responses to
“Elbow and Elbowisms” within the discipline of Composition and Rhetoric.
To do so, we have assembled and juxtaposed scholars and teachers who agree
wholeheartedly with Peter, who agree only partially with his theory or practice,
who ﬁnd much to criticize in his thinking and practice, and who merely feel a
need to explain Peter’s inﬂuence upon them and upon the discipline. We’re
pleased by the diversity of structure and language this combination of voices
generated. This collection includes poems, collages, and multi-voiced pieces, as
well as what has come to be known as academic, critical essays. As a result,
some pieces fairly bristle with theoretical language; other pieces exemplify
highly personal language; and still other pieces mix the personal with the theoretical with nary a trace of discord.
As might be obvious, the diversity of form and style is anything but an accident. From the outset, we decided that a collection focused on the productiveness of thinking with and about Peter Elbow’s theory and practice could not be
a straight and customary collection of academic pieces. It seemed hardly a
valid way to honor the thinking of a theorist who has written so much about
the negative aspects of focusing students’ attention solely on academic essays.
We even withdrew the manuscript from the ﬁrst publisher who contacted us
because he was willing to accept the formal essays but insisted we cut everything else—especially the pieces that concerned classroom practice. How, we
asked, can a collection of responses to Peter Elbow’s work not include writing
by teachers about classroom practice?
We hope that this collection shows the multiplicity of ways that Peter
Elbow—teacher, mentor, colleague, peer, and friend—has inﬂuenced those
who have read and listened to his words. Even more importantly, we hope that
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this collection will prove an impetus for your own continuing conversations in
this ﬁeld to which Peter has so generously applied his energy and his talents
and above all, his open-minded intellectual commitment.
Pat Belanoff
Marcia Dickson
Sheryl I. Fontaine
Charles Moran

A PRECISE MACHINE FOR THINKERS
A Review of Embracing Contraries
Ken Macrorie

(Reprinted from Impact, Albuquerque Journal Magazine, 1985.)

Ostensibly a collection of articles on teaching and learning, this book is
actually a manual on how to be wise. It’s the darnedest thing—a self-help book
whose central model for thinking requires you to keep turning ideas over and
over until they often look good standing on their heads.
In it, Peter Elbow relates how as a student, scholar, and teacher he was led,
again and again, to understandings by bringing polar opposites together so they
illuminated rather than annihilated each other. For example, for many years he
was hung up on writing. He came to believe he just couldn’t do the job. Then he
realized that school’s way of indoctrinating you to get the words right at the
moment of composing is antithetical to starting ideas and words ﬂowing so they
call forth other good ideas and words. Freely composing and editing are opposites. Both are needed but must be performed separately—an obvious truth to
professional writers, but not to most English teachers, who themselves have seldom written for publication and even more rarely been paid for their writing.
Elbow’s career turned from near failure to success when he began embracing contraries. He wrote a Ph.D. thesis, “Oppositions in Chaucer,” that was
published by Wesleyan University Press and an inﬂuential book called Writing
With Power. He is now director of the Writing Program at the State University
of New York at Stony Brook.
In one chapter, Elbow extends the applications of his Doubting and
Believing Game that he introduced in his earlier book Writing Without
Teachers. He says that universities teach people to adopt the habit of reﬂexively
taking the opposite side of every argument in order to test it. But the Believing
Game is also needed. To play it, you must try to believe in another person’s
argument, see why he or she believes it, and produce evidence and reasoning to
support it—before you decide whether or not to accept it. He devised this
game for workshops where critics of a piece of writing presented to the group
often destroy writers by playing only the Doubting Game. The Believing Game
he ﬁnds useful here and in scores of other human interactions.

A Precice Machine for Thinkers
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Elbow faces some of the most painful problems in academia. Grading students and evaluating faculty, he came to see that evaluating people’s performance and enabling them to perform well are often contraries that ﬁght against
each other. He wondered if there could be a method of making judgments
without making judgments—so that the usual roiling incapacitating feelings
don’t arise. Elbow determined that the way out was for the evaluator to record
the “movies of his mind,” jotting down his own responses (what this or that act
or word from the other person made him feel) rather than judgments, which
are necessarily high jumps of abstraction. From that sort of report, the person
being evaluated can see how his performance made the evaluator respond and
why. Then the person evaluated feels more enlightened than attacked. Elbow
writes a case history of experiencing that kind of evaluation by a colleague and
of doing the same himself for another professor.
I suggest you read the ﬁrst chapter of [Embracing Contraries] last. It was
written before Elbow got over his writing troubles. After that, he wrote disarmingly; for example: “But it’s no good . . . trying to give students only what’s true
and trying to make them get it right—trying to keep them from mucking it up
as they chew on it. Instead of worrying that they muddy one thing as they
make it part of themselves (and perhaps not letting them go on to learn the
second thing till they get the ﬁrst thing right), we need to get them to make
more things part of themselves—particularly contrary things.”
Those words epitomize [Embracing Contraries]. It demonstrates that good
writing and thinking are accessible to all people, if they will only let their brains
do their natural thing and then later contrarily disengage and see where they can
be more or less general or speciﬁc, more or less logical or emotional, or whatever.
Elbow makes thinking playful and testing it rigorous. He seems to have invented
a precisely tooled, gleaming little machine for turning out insights.

VISION
A Poem For Peter

He can see with both eyes, he says,
though one goes east, the other west.
Sometimes, he closes one,
narrowing the ﬁeld, to see
what we see.
What is out there,
on the peripheries,
at the edge of our vision?
Does he see, with the horse’s bi-lateral vision,
paddock in one eye, prairie in the other,
bridle and wind,
fence and freedom?
Or, with the dragonﬂy’s prismatic kaleidoscope
of sky, water, predator, prey, cloud, reﬂection,
rainripple, sundazzle?
Can he see
cruelty in one eye, mercy in the other,
shackle in one eye, key in the other,
brick and wrecking ball,
stone and kite?
When he offers his vision to us,
we try it on, go dizzy from the breadth,
and the missing center,
where we so comfortably live.

Lucile Burt

C LU S T E R I
Contextualizing and Categorizing

INTERSECTION
Pat Belanoff

Our aim in grouping these four essays together is not to have the ﬁnal say on
the categorization or labeling of Peter Elbow. Our aim, in fact, is much the
opposite. We think that these essays demonstrate that any theorist or practitioner can be viewed from multiple spots and that each viewing angle produces a valid reading. No more than any other theorist, no more than any
piece of discourse, can Elbow be ﬁnally ﬁt into some slot comfortably. There’s
always leakage; there’s always a new way of seeing. The very difﬁculty of thinking about Peter’s thinking and how to characterize it is exactly what has provided fertile ground for many of us. And the ﬁnal truth about why Peter is so
difﬁcult to pin down as one thing or another is that he never sits still long
enough for any one of us to draw ﬁrm conclusions.
One thing, in fact, I discovered when Peter and I started working together at
Stony Brook is that Peter has trouble pinning himself down. Two personal stories in this regard. After he and I had decided to collaborate on a textbook, we
opted to exchange rough drafts of workshops. Shock was my reaction to reading the ﬁrst draft he gave me. It rambled, it leaped, it luxuriated in complex
and often illogical metaphors, it broke off in the middle of sentences and
thoughts, it was alternately breathtaking and horriﬁc. How, I thought, did
Peter ever produce the clarity and incisiveness of thought for which I admired
his writing? He, of course, could not resist breaking up my long, formal, academic sentences with their excess of nominalizations and prepositional phrases.
As we all know, he ﬁnally does pin himself down through practicing his own
advice. But, he is also quite likely to unpin what he has pinned down when he
starts on his next round of drafts.
The second story. I had already collaboratively (with Betsy Rorschach and
Mia Oberlink) written a grammar book in which my coauthors and I had
worked hard to explain the rationale behind a multitude of grammar dos and
don’ts. When, however, Peter and I got to writing our little grammar sections
for the textbook, he was tactful, but deﬁnite, about my prior work. “We don’t
need to explain,” said he. “Just tell them this is how it is!”
Through these and other experiences I began to understand that one must
be wary of categorizing Peter Elbow. He has this seemingly innate tendency to
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slip into the other end of one of his binaries whenever one seeks to characterize
him. But, of course, thinking necessitates both categorizing and contextualizing, and Peter has certainly been the “categorizee” of many taxonomies:
Fulkerson and Berlin come immediately to mind. Taxonomy is, we know, a twoedged sword: we need to classify in order to get through the business of the day;
but, as we know from peoples’ response to skin color, classiﬁcation can become
prelude to misunderstanding, marginalization, and worse. Once a given taxonomy is constructed, it tends to stiﬂe thinking. For example, Peter has most
famously been labeled as an expressivist and then dismissed as apolitical,
romantic, solipsistic, a servant of established power. It is this taxonomic move
that each of the writers in this section attempts to understand and, in different
ways, to undo. Ultimately, we must make such moves in our thinking in order
to forestall the stiﬂing potential of categorization.
Richard Boyd opens the section by relooking at the events of the sixties and
how Peter grew in and out of them. Like others, Boyd connects Elbow to the liberalizing trends of this decade, but unlike others before him Boyd recognizes
that Elbow developed his practices as tools for enabling young men to have an
impact on the society around them. Far from being the romantic solitary some
would characterize him as, Elbow is fully immersed in the social and political
turmoils of the 1960s and is passionately engaged in ﬁnding a way to make an
individual’s writing bring about results in the “real” world. One of the strong
reasons for Peter’s being labeled an expressivist is that he developed his theories
about freewriting, private writing, messy writing, and so forth out of his own
struggles to write in graduate school. But Boyd unearths a history that places
Elbow’s approaches to improving written discourse against a background of
absolute teacher authority. Writing Without Teachers, when examined against
that history, becomes a radical social document. “Elbow’s description of a
‘teacherless writing class,’ in which students no longer have need of an institutionally sanctioned instructor giving advice or explaining theories of ‘good and
bad writing’ strikes boldly at a fundamental cornerstone of those notions of
university faculty as authoritative experts deserving grateful ‘deference’ from
their ‘immature’ students” (35).
Peter’s being characterized as an expressivist enables Tom Newkirk to revalue
what has been devalued by those who use this label pejoratively. Speciﬁcally,
Newkirk focuses on how the “sentimental” becomes an undifferentiated quality
that (whether effective or ineffective) gets relegated out of the classroom, particularly out of the college classroom, because it presumes to arouse emotions in
individual readers. As academics, most of us are conditioned to be emotionless
in our critical approaches. We’re not supposed to be passionate about what we
teach; we’re not supposed to laugh, cry, get angry at what we read. Above all,
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we’re not supposed to think it’s great, wonderful, inspiring. I remember the ﬁrst
time in a classroom that I confessed to my students that a particular poem made
me cry because it was so hauntingly beautiful. One of the students told me after
class that she had never heard an English professor say that. Frankly, I picked my
literary ﬁeld of Old English language and literature because I loved translating
the language: I want my students to know that.
Such a dismissal of all sentimental discourse can (and has) alienated us from
the public—but even worse—from our own students. “[T]he culture of English
Studies,” Newkirk states, “creates its own sense of elitism and professionalism by
treating as a defective ‘other’ the popular discourses—particularly sentimental
discourse—in the wider culture. As a result we have opened up a gap between
the way we and this wider culture perceive discursive power—and by extension,
the way we and our students perceive discursive power” (52–53). What Newkirk
doesn’t mention, but that I see in our culture, is that, even though we are now
beginning to admit “popular” works into our curriculum, we do so to subject
them to the same scrutiny we exercise on the so-called canonical texts of our
profession. Sentiment has nothing to do with our study of these texts; we still
cannot cry, laugh, or get angry because of their content. In fact, we subject these
reactions by the public to further ideological analysis. We don’t allow ourselves
to feel the emotion, only to study it dispassionately.
Elizabeth Flynn confronts the negative implications of characterizing Elbow
as an expressivist by considering the development of his thinking in conjunction
with major developments in the ﬁeld of English Studies: modernism, antimodernism, and postmodernism. “Relating Elbow’s work to these three different perspectives, all of which have epistemological, pedagogical, and political
implications, is a challenge since Elbow himself carefully avoids labels and since
his work is complex and often deﬁes easy classiﬁcation. “I,” says Flynn, “nevertheless take the risk of doing so in order to make evident that his work is neither
politically moderate nor an unchanging manifestation of expressivism” (61).
Newkirk essentially says it’s all right to be sentimental, romantic, passionate, belief-oriented; Flynn may or may not agree, but she would go on to say
that Peter is all of these and more. Grounding her conclusions in many of the
same ways Boyd grounds his, she sees Elbow as a radical: his work “has its roots
in the Romantic Movement, and can be usefully compared to feminist expressivist composition. And given that he moves, especially in his later work,
toward an acceptance of both subjective and objective epistemologies, his work
becomes increasingly postmodern in orientation. Rather than espousing
beliefs that are hopelessly out of date, Elbow’s earlier work is radical, and his
later work parallels the autobiographical and postmodern turns within composition studies, feminist studies, and the humanities as a whole” (77).
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And, ﬁnally, Ed White and Shane Borrowman’s dialogue lays out a process
of creating and uncreating an icon, of placing Elbow into a category and then
unplacing him from that category. They begin their construction/deconstruction by recognizing the tendency of many in the discipline to see Peter as an
iconic representation of expressivism and then to attach to him every quality
they see as embodied in expressivism. Who and what Peter is can get lost in
this process. In the ensuing dialogue, the two authors of this piece examine
how and why they allowed Peter to slip into being an icon and present the
thinking that led each of them to move later to a different place. In the process
of recording their thinking, they demonstrate quite literally how thinking can
be enriched by standing back and reﬂecting on how and why one has reached a
particular judgment. Their words demonstrate that taxonomizing, contextualizing, and the subsequent inventing of icons can provide powerful stimuli for
all of us to reconsider and reﬂect on our own stances. As Borrowman recognizes in his concluding words, “The icons are terribly oversimpliﬁed but are
useful as both a mnemonic device and a place to begin discussion, and probably cannot be discarded for those reasons” (93). This essay thus recognizes the
binary: icons are necessary, but icons must be starting points for our thinking,
not ending points.
All four of these essays encourage us both to reexamine Elbow and to move
beyond that reexamination on the basis of the roads opened up by Elbow and
his explicators. In the process of these reexaminations, the authors of these
pieces demonstrate how crucial contextualization and categorization are to
our thinking; but they demonstrate just as strongly that the context we select
for our examination and the category into which we place what we are examining are not neutral choices at all, but choices that provide a lens for viewing,
a lens that colors what we see.

1 WRITING WITHOUT TEACHERS,
W R I T I N G A G A I N S T T H E PA S T ?
Richard Boyd

I began to work in the ﬁeld of composition studies at a time when it seemed that
the label of “expressivist” was something to be avoided rather than embraced.
During the late 1980s, it often appeared to me that texts like Writing Without
Teachers (1973) and Writing with Power (1981) would eventually be read only as
relics of a bygone era or forever regarded as politically suspect for their uncritical
endorsement of the unencumbered self. I must confess that the term evoked for
me images of an out-of-fashion romanticism that had been revealed by critics like
James Berlin and James Catano to be irretrievably “co-opted by the very capitalist
forces it opposes” (Berlin, “Rhetoric and Ideology” 487). While my ﬁrsthand
experiences of Peter Elbow’s graciousness and generosity should have prompted
caution about such harsh conclusions, Berlin’s argument seemed to me a powerful one, and I happily placed myself within that “social-epistemic” camp of writing teachers dedicated to progressive values and genuinely liberatory education.
Of course, those who style themselves as critical intellectuals are wise to at
some point interrogate their own most favored axioms, and the past years have
taught me that my judgment about the professional and political meaning of
Elbow’s early work might very well be one of those conclusions most in need of
reassessment. Sherrie L. Gradin’s revisionist study of what she terms the “social
expressivist” school (which claims Elbow as a leading ﬁgure) has shown us that
we need not accept without question Berlin’s account of an “expressionistic”
rhetoric so focused on the individual that it cuts short any possibility of collective action against “corporate-sponsored thought” and instead often works “to
reinforce the entrepreneurial virtues capitalism most values” (486–87). Even
more signiﬁcantly for my own thinking, the historicist orientation I try to foreground in my own scholarship has taught me to be wary of any easy conclusions
or quick assumptions about the cultural work performed by any text. As regards
Peter Elbow’s early work and the complex cultural and institutional histories
from which it emerged, such a caveat concerning the danger of overly hasty
determinations seems especially pertinent. This essay will therefore seek to consider the place of some of Peter Elbow’s initial publications within their own speciﬁc cultural moment and also within the relatively much longer history of
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teaching composition in a university setting; for I believe that such an investigation can contribute much to our understanding of Elbow’s place in our discipline’s ongoing debate over the nature and function of teaching writing.
In some ways many of the basic questions in such an inquiry have already
been established by those critical commentators who have called Elbow to task
for promulgating a “myth of the self-made man” (Catano 421) that works to
encourage in students a blindness to historical realities and to the ideological
positioning inherent within the call to writing as self-discovery and self-expression (Berlin, “Rhetoric and Ideology” 484). As James Catano remarks, the
notion of a private self championed by Elbow and other expressivists “implies
that a true self is available to the select individual who achieves the necessary
economic power or the truly expressive voice” and that such a “mythic” representation primarily functions to “mask the disturbing presence of corporate
power” in the lives of student writers in search of their true voices (421). While
Elbow’s pedagogy seems to promise students an escape from those institutional
powers that would restrict individual freedom, it ﬁnally offers them nothing
that would support a critical analysis of how those powers constrain them nor
the means to develop modes of collective action against the powers that be. In
such a reading, Elbow reduces all to a question of self-expression and one’s
“willingness to pursue [one’s] private vision” (Berlin, “Rhetoric and Ideology”
487), to the goal of freeing the private self of institutional restraint. A sense of
history, and especially a sense of “the boundaries of origins (sex, race, class) and
institutions,” are the fundamental realities absent from the approach to writing
instruction endorsed by Elbow in his important early writings (Catano 422).
But if these are the crucial questions to ask of Elbow’s work (and I believe
that they are), then I would ask an additional one: what has become of that
imperative to historicize every text and every teaching practice, an omission in
Elbow’s early writings, which critics regard as such a shortcoming in his pedagogy, yet one which they themselves seem to disregard in their evaluations of
his work? It appears to me that many of the most inﬂuential attacks on the
expressivist camp lack the very component that they accuse Elbow of denying
to his students. James Catano, for example, writes as if that ﬁgure of the “selfmade man,” supposedly present in Elbow’s early work, only has afﬁnities to
notions of late nineteenth-century rugged individualism and to mythic creations like Horatio Alger. Reading these critiques provides one with an incomplete sense of how Elbow’s ideas emerged out of the particular cultural and
political events of the 1960s. What is unfortunate about this state of affairs is
that there is so little need for it; Elbow himself has given us enough information about the origins and evolution of his thinking to be able to construct a
rather different rendition of the historical record.
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I begin therefore with “A Method for Teaching Writing,” written in 1968 for
College English. In this essay Elbow reveals that an important part of his thinking about what it means to help students toward a notion of writing that foregrounds “the self revealed in words” (119) emerged out of his experiences as a
draft counselor supporting conscientious objectors in their efforts to convince
draft boards of their sincere opposition to serving in the military (120–21).
The quest to ﬁnd one’s “true” self through writing had little or nothing to do
with embracing the myth of the “self-made man;” rather, it had everything to
do with developing a method of generating a persuasive text that carried the
most signiﬁcant of personal and political consequences. For Elbow, to discover
one’s convictions about an issue (including the morality of war) is to overturn
what schools have taught students about articulating only what may make
sense to others and is instead to allow the experience of how “belief is what you
call on when action is required and knowledge and evidence do not provide
certainty” (121). Thus, his understanding of writing cannot be divorced from
the social and the political, no matter how susceptible his rhetoric of individuality may seem to the attacks of critics.
Such a conclusion is even more obvious when one turns to his essay on draft
resistance (referenced in the College English piece), which was published by The
Christian Century and aimed at encouraging young draft-age men to pursue the
option of conscientious objector status. Within the manifestly activist agenda of
this essay are all the familiar urgings to “work out and articulate what [one’s]
‘inner’ or ‘ultimate’ beliefs are” (“Who” 989). Yet here the message of translating
the goals of writing-as-discovery into concrete political action is unmistakable,
for clearly such a theme drives the entire essay. As Elbow explains, the necessity
to develop the means to convince draft boards of one’s conscientious objections
to military service is crucial in the cultural climate of 1968 because only by
learning to express one’s beliefs can an individual become fully aware of those
convictions in himself. Furthermore, this process is not meant to encourage
quietism or solipsism, but rather to serve as “a beginning, an opening out into
new modes of action and involvement” (992). Moving in a direction that
sounds much more like Berlin’s “social-epistemic” rhetoric than the critic’s version of the expressionistic camp, Elbow’s essay goes on to assert:
[w]hen you make genuinely available to a person a vehicle [the means for writing
the application for conscientious objector status] for saying No—a language, a
medium, or genre for actually standing up to his government—he is then able to
feel the possibility of appropriating it; but operationally he is then no longer the
same person. Once he is aware of himself in this new posture, new things can begin
to happen to him; he is now open to feeling other circumstances in which he would
say No. (992)
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In contrast to Berlin’s assertion that for the expressivists’ “solitary activity is
always promising, group activity always dangerous” (Rhetoric 145), Elbow is
also very clear in this essay that this kind of self-transformation must look outside the self to the wider resistance community and hear the call for collective
action. Indeed, one of the primary reasons to pursue conscientious objector
status is that it can inspire others to do the same; it can create a sense of community among resistors that will support all in the efforts to say “No” to the
government (“Who” 922).1 The individual self is, despite all the emphasis on
self-reﬂection and “inner” convictions, ﬁnally rendered as deeply social and
inextricably bound to the requirements of political responsibility. As the concluding words of the essay make clear, it is through the task of self-exploration
that draft-age men will be “set free to feel more deeply, to think more cogently,
and above all, to act more courageously” (“Who” 993).
I believe that such a context provides a most interesting gloss on the opening
words of Writing Without Teachers wherein Elbow declares that “Many people
are now trying to become less helpless, both personally and politically, trying to
claim more control over their own lives” (vii).2 The book itself does not seem to
have much to say about the political half of Elbow’s two realms of experience (I
will have much more to say on this question momentarily), so it is not surprising
that critics have focused on Elbow’s apparent enshrinement of the unfettered
individual. Yet, to recognize that several of the key ideas about writing and writing pedagogy found in Writing Without Teachers took shape within the political
struggle of the draft resistance movement and that for Elbow the exploration of
the self had been carefully represented as a political gesture of great import
surely must cause us to reconsider some of our evaluations of the political and
ideological meaning of Elbow’s philosophy of composition. When we ignore the
very real historical contexts of his early work, we fail to understand what the
privileging of the self meant in those contexts out of which they originally
emerged. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a radical insistence on the self
recalled theoreticians of the New Left much more than they harkened back to
stories of the unfettered “self-made man” (Catano 421). In point of fact, it was
the New Left that was chieﬂy responsible for what Lawrence Lader terms the
“mystique of individualism” animating progressive political movements of the
era (179). Opposing what it saw as the institutionalized rigidity of the Old Left,
the New Left and speciﬁcally groups like SDS embraced “the primacy of personal
experience” and nonhierarchical, decision making processes (Lader 179; Gitlin
157). While a critic might argue that Elbow and SDS were ﬂawed in their adoption of an individualism that was ultimately middle-class in its origins (Lader
174), such a case can be made only if one reads Elbow’s work within the highly
charged political context in which it appeared. To ignore this background is to
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fall victim to the very same blindness to history that many have laid at the
doorstep of expressivists like Peter Elbow.
As a writing instructor rather far removed from the struggles of the 1960s, I
recognize that efforts to deﬁne the precise political meaning of Elbow’s early
work may seem somewhat tangential to our daily activities in the contemporary writing classroom. I ﬁnd it therefore especially signiﬁcant that Elbow’s
critics have offered considerable commentary on the impact of an expressivist
“ideology”(to use Berlin’s terminology [“Rhetoric and Ideology” 477]) on the
organization of the classroom and on the teacher-student dynamic in particular. At ﬁrst glance, such notable innovations as using student writings as the
primary texts of the course and the transfer of primary responsibility for learning from teacher to students (Murray 118) would seem to be rather obvious
steps forward from the rigid teaching methods and focus on error that deﬁned
the current-traditional era. Berlin acknowledges that certain proponents of
expressionistic rhetoric during the 1960s overtly aligned their teaching practices to support the goals of “alter[ing] political consciousness through challenging ofﬁcial versions of reality.” But Berlin assigns Elbow (and Murray and
Coles and Macrorie) to the “moderate wing” of the camp that opposed such
overt politicalization of the classroom and instead sought to render all power
as “vested in the individual” (“Rhetoric and Ideology” 485). He characterizes
their efforts to develop teaching strategies that would support a student’s discovery of his or her own authentic voice away and apart from the dehumanizing effects of institutions as offering students little more than a “private
vision”—one that leads only to a resistance that “is always construed in individual terms” and hence does little to destabilize the institutions (including
school itself) that have generated such self-alienation in the ﬁrst place (487).
The expressivist classroom, just like the expressivist politics of self, succumbs to
an unacknowledged and ultimately fatal tie to the very capitalist ideology it
would claim to resist. As Catano most provocatively argues, “a writing pedagogy that privileges ‘true individuality’. . . may actually reassert the power of the
academy and the student’s subordinate role within it by unintentionally
obscuring the social framework that surrounds all classroom activity” (422).
Catano’s words are difﬁcult words, for they go to the very heart of the teaching enterprise and ask the most challenging of questions about the ethical
meaning of the teacher’s function in the classroom. Claims of a “student-centered classroom” are no more than hollow afﬁrmations if they cannot answer
the charge that such a pedagogy ultimately conceals more than it reveals,
reproduces more of the dominant institutional structure than it undermines.
One might even argue that expressivist pedagogy is more inimical to an emancipatory agenda than the current-traditional rhetoric it seeks to overthrow,
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since the former works to mislead students into believing their exercises in
self-expression constitute authentic acts of empowerment and liberation from
institutional constraint.3 Such stark questions cannot be ignored, particularly
if one takes seriously (as I believe all of us must) Jane Tompkins’s reminder
that “what we do in the classroom is our politics. No matter what we may say
about Third World this or feminist that, our actions and interactions with our
students week-in week-out prove what we are for and what we are against in
the long run” (660). If our politics reside most deeply in the teacher-student
dynamics we enact in our writing classrooms, then what might an examination of Peter Elbow’s links to the traditions of composition instruction tell us
about this most critical of issues? It is to just such an investigation that this
essay now turns, for I believe that critical accounts of Elbow’s work have again
misrepresented the meaning of his pedagogy by not giving sufﬁcient attention
to the relation of his “teacherless” writing class to the history of composition
instruction in this country.
In the early 1960s, only a few years before Elbow began to develop his theories of teaching writing, Clark Kerr, Chancellor of the University of California,
Berkeley, described the university in America as “the focal point for national
growth, . . . [a place] at the center of the knowledge process” (cited in Anderson
96). Such sentiments seem equally popular today—a not particularly surprising state of affairs since the university has long been ﬁgured in this culture as
the primary site for the production and dissemination of knowledge.
Beginning roughly around the end of the Civil War (a date that coincides,
interestingly enough, with the development of composition as a central component in the undergraduate curriculum), the university came to displace the
more traditional and highly localized learned society as the generally acknowledged source of knowledge within the culture (Oleson and Voss vii). More to
the point, given my concern with the ways classroom practices enact political
agendas, one notes the contemporaneous phenomenon of the rise of the college professor as an object of national attention and respect. This ﬁgure, who
epitomized the specialist in this age of specialization, superceded the multifaceted independent scholar of antebellum days as the primary repository of
knowledge in the culture. College faculty were, for the ﬁrst time, represented as
experts invested by the general populace with the cultural authority to function as the essential producers of knowledge and as expert arbiters deserving of
great deference in matters of common concern. They were, as the social historian Neil Harris remarks, coming to occupy positions as “national jurymen
whose control of the learning process granted them special status” (438) as
authoritative spokespersons on any number of matters. Richard Meade Bache
was thus not alone when, in his 1868 grammar handbook, Vulgarisms and
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Other Errors of Speech, he informed his non-academic readership that in matters of language usage, the college and its representatives should be looked to
by the general public with grateful “deference” (ix). This era witnessed a profound shift in cultural notions of “legitimacy” and of who possessed the right
to speak authoritatively on the question of what constituted real knowledge.
Increasingly, it became the “expert” who was said to hold an essential mastery
of the ﬁeld and thus had the prerogative to render conclusive judgments about
everything from English grammar to economic policy (Harris 434).
This evolution in the role of university faculty in American culture is
important in large part because “in the decades between 1860 and 1920, the
organization of knowledge in America was transformed, and institutionalized
patterns were established that persist to this day” (Oleson and Voss vii). For
those of us in composition, who have our disciplinary roots in precisely this
part of American history and who teach classes that originated at a time coincident with the university’s ever closer orientation to the needs of the newly
emergent professional class and the business community it served (Berlin
Writing 60; Ohmann 73), the lessons seem especially difﬁcult to ignore. For if,
as Marguerite Helmers suggests, we have collectively tended to construct students as fundamentally “‘those who lack’” and faculty as experts endowed with
the capacity “to initiate change” in these deﬁcient writers, then such a disposition seems to stretch back a very long way in our disciplinary history and is
linked to broader trends in the culture at large (2, 22).4
It is thus critical to any consideration of the politics of Elbow’s pedagogy to
understand that a trope of mastery has been associated with the university writing instructor from almost the beginning of the profession in the late Victorian
era. Many of the most widely read textbooks and popular essays that helped
deﬁne the new ﬁeld of composition described its teachers not simply as instructors but as expert authorities on the linguistic knowledge they sought to communicate to students. For example, Arlo Bates, Professor of English at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a leading voice in the new, “practical” approach to composition, included in his Talks on Writing English, Second
Series (1901) strong assertions that the writing instructor should be viewed as
an “absolute master” of his subject and that there existed a fundamental distinction between the “mastery of thought” embodied by the teacher and the naive,
untrained mind of the student (167, 169). Bates explained that to teachers, and
not to students, were given the “good gifts and graces . . . to explain, to justify, to
make clear relations, and to impart the whole [subject] matter,” and “[w]hoever
has taught understands how completely different is the attitude of the teacher
from that of the pupil” (167). Similarly, Adams Sherman Hill, Professor at
Harvard College and the driving force behind the new English A writing course
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that would be widely imitated across the nation during the late Victorian era,
often represented himself as the embodiment of masterly expertise, as a marker
of authority who exempliﬁed the ideal of rhetorical ﬂuency. Albert Kitzhaber
comments that in Hill’s famous textbook, The Principles of Rhetoric (1878,
1895), the Harvard professor handed down judgments about questions of stylistic etiquette and word usage as if from on high, proclaiming his linguistic rulings “ex cathedra . . . in such a way as to suggest that there was only one rational
answer, and here it was” (62). The most visible representation of the composition instructor during the current-traditional era was as a ﬁgure of authority
and authoritative judgments (Brereton 18–19), presiding over a classroom of
what Charles T. Copeland and H. M. Rideout would describe in their 1901 text,
Freshman English and Theme-Correcting in Harvard College, as “immature” students, who should be regarded as “beginners” and “novices” (30, 45, 46). This
kind of strictly hierarchical teacher-student dynamic has maintained itself for a
very long time now, and if Marguerite Helmers is correct, it seems to have been
integral to our sense of our pedagogical mission for almost as long as the discipline has existed on university campuses.
It is precisely this state of affairs that makes a text like Writing Without
Teachers so signiﬁcant, even if the magnitude of its import remains somewhat
obscured even thirty years after the fact. For to insert Elbow’s book into that
long tradition of the cultivation of teacherly expertise and authority is to grasp
immediately how its construction or deconstruction of the writing instructor
struggles against the discipline’s past and in fact initiates the kind of political
project that critics have decried as absent from Elbow’s work. Elbow’s description of a “teacherless writing class,” (76) in which students no longer have need
of an institutionally sanctioned instructor giving advice or explaining theories
of “good and bad writing” (77) strikes boldly at a fundamental cornerstone of
those notions of university faculty as authoritative experts deserving grateful
“deference” from their “immature” students. When instructors no longer are
called upon to provide a conclusive synthesis of how a revision should proceed
(112) and when the goal of composing in accordance with the teacher’s model
of “good writing” is described as a notion counterproductive to “real” growth
in student writers (109), we encounter a ﬁgure of the teacher radically different
from the one that emerged from the pens of Arlo Bates and A. S. Hill and that
seems to have maintained itself in signiﬁcant ways even until today.
To underscore this change, Elbow uses Writing Without Teachers to subvert
perhaps the two most dominant elements in the current-traditional instructor’s repertoire of authority: the insistence on mechanical correctness and the
awarding of grades. Current-traditional rhetoric had been substantially shaped
by an emphasis on sentence-level correctness that was regarded as essential to
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the evaluation of student writing (Connors, “Mechanical Correctness”); Elbow
overturns such assumptions about as completely as one could. Rather than
insisting on grammatical precision as the special purview of the masterful
instructor who would carefully “correct” student essays ﬁlled with “error,”
Elbow offers instead the advice that each writer should decide for him or herself the necessity of learning grammar, basing such a decision not on the words
of an instructor but on the reactions of various readers (137). He goes on to
undermine the “ex cathedra” pronouncements of ﬁgures like A. S. Hill by
informing us that grammatical correctness has been highlighted in writing
instruction because it is the only part of writing “that can be straightforwardly
taught” by an expert to a class of presumed novices (138). And should this
kind of assault be insufﬁcient to strip that cloak of mastery from the ﬁgure of
the writing teacher, Elbow also reveals that grading, the traditional centerpiece
of the writing instructor’s performance as “gatekeeper” (Berlin, Writing 72), is
nothing more than a highly subjective process that reveals the teacher to be
simply another reader, and a ﬂawed one at that (127, 129). Contra the old
rhetoric, Elbow explains that there is no agreement as to what constitutes
“good writing” and that teachers cannot claim some special access to it that
would justify their insistence that students follow their pronouncements about
what writing should look like (133). According to Elbow, composition teachers
are commonly guilty of misleading students by offering feedback that is based
in reactions that are not revealed to the student and on theories of writing that
are not true (133–134). Each writer must instead become conﬁdent in “deciding for yourself whether your words are any good” (105).
What makes Elbow’s deconstruction of the writing instructor so interesting
is the degree to which it so insistently overturns that long-standing representation of the masterful teacher. His aim seems to go well beyond any “moderate,”
to use Berlin’s adjective, re-vision of the teacher’s role in the writing course.
For whereas Arlo Bates had elevated the teacher to the preeminent position in
the classroom by declaring that “[w]hoever has taught understands how completely different is the attitude of the teacher from that of the pupil” (167),
Elbow states that his class can work only if his actions as teacher “follow all the
same procedures as everyone else. . . . I can only set up something like a teacherless class in my own class if I adopt more the role of the learner and less the
role of a teacher” (ix). In fact, Elbow’s refusal of the mantle of expertise stands
at the very center of his project, for he begins Writing Without Teachers with
the claim that the text’s authority resides solely in its author’s struggles as a
writer: “The authority I call upon in writing a book about writing is my own
long-standing difﬁculty in writing” (viii). Thus, while Elbow does resemble
Bates and Hill and other current-traditional predecessors in his localizing
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within the self the authority to speak about writing, he profoundly differs from
them in his grounding of this authority not in the teacher’s mastery and expertise but in his weakness and even failure. I believe that it is for this reason and
this reason only that Elbow’s repeated insistence that his readers decide for
themselves the validity of his methods can be more than simply hollow
rhetoric. When he tells his readers, “I am only asking you to try on this way of
looking at the writing process to see if it helps your writing. That’s the only
valid way you can judge it” (16), he is also telling them that one of the most
prominent and persistent tropes deﬁning the role of the writing instructor
scarcely has a place in his new classroom. And without a masterful instructor
presiding over all, the possibilities for a genuinely student-centered classroom
seem considerably more substantial.
This reading of Elbow’s early work in the context of composition’s currenttraditional past—and especially in relation to the discipline’s persistent afﬁliation
of the writing instructor with a mantle of expertise—can help us to grasp more
completely the implications of the what Sherrie L. Gradin terms the expressivists’s links to the “revolutionary spirit of the 1960s” (17). Gradin bases her
characterization of Elbow and other expressivists on their work as “champions
for educational change” and their “dismantl[ing]” of the dominant writing pedagogies of the period (17). Certainly Elbow’s critique of the trope of the masterful
instructor performed a critical function in this revision of the current-traditional
classroom. Yet, I think that we can also see within this new version of the writing
teacher the genesis of a more overt political meaning to Elbow’s pedagogy that is
even more signiﬁcant than the alleged afﬁliations between his ideology of unfettered individualism and a complacent middle-class culture. His assault on the
ﬁgure of the expert teacher not only seeks to overturn the status quo within the
teaching of writing but also calls into question a dominant equation of expertise
and cultural authority that had been in place for well over one hundred years.
The politics of Writing Without Teachers must surely be understood in relation to Jane Tompkins’s words about the classroom stage on which we most tangibly enact our ideological agendas. Yet this stage must be seen in its full relation
to the social organization of knowledge in American culture. As theorists like Jim
Merod have argued, “intellectual authority derives from the state to begin with,”
and the reiﬁcation of that expert authority in institutions like colleges mystiﬁes
the process by which knowledge is constructed and erodes the belief that nonexpert individuals can take responsibility for their own political decision making
(101, 104). Thus, when Elbow proposes his “teacherless writing class,” he is doing
more than offering a new approach to gaining proﬁciency in writing; he is simultaneously resisting long-standing cultural assumptions about what the sociologist Magali Sarfatti Larsen terms a “monopolized expertise” in this culture, which
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has persisted since the late Victorian era (37) in large part because it closely supports conditions of class stratiﬁcation and “corporate-sponsored thought” condemned (rightly, I think) by critics of Elbow (Berlin, “Rhetoric and Ideology”
486). We miss vital components of the politics of a “teacherless writing class” if
we fail to recognize how working against the traditionally rigid hierarchy
between teacher and student also serves to contest the presumption that only
experts have the right to speak (and be heard) about their domains of knowledge
(Larson 37). It is precisely because Elbow’s text does not invoke “the usual
authoritarian pedagogy, [where] the teacher, as the representative of expertise, is
the master of certitude” that one can point to it as an exemplary challenge to that
“monopoly over discourse” claimed by teachers and other institutionally designated experts (Larsen 54, 35). And this is such a critical political gesture because
it directly challenges “the authority of instruction,” a power that, as Evan Watkins
reminds us, has enormous sociopolitical consequences:
The classroom is, of course, part of a universe whose position in the social life of the
United States is a crucial one for a country whose world dominance begins to be
exercised less through direct ‘imperialism’ than by the propagation of ‘how to do
things,’ that is, by its role as instructor. (364)

For Watkins, and, I would argue, for Elbow as well, the teacher-student relationship enacted in the classroom is a decisive moment in the education of students. The teacher-student dynamic is the “situation where students learn the
sociopolitical power of instruction as a central and organizing activity in the
shaping of adult relationships, and thus it is not an exaggeration to say that the
meaning of ‘dominant’ and ‘subordinate’ come to them as a relation of instructor
and instructed” (Watkins 364). One could scarcely imagine a more serious political meaning for Elbow’s “teacherless writing class,” nor could one point to many
other pedagogical approaches more deserving of approbation for their “explicit
critique of economic, political, and social arrangements” (Berlin, “Rhetoric and
Ideology” 490).5 I believe Watkins’s words also provide an especially useful commentary on the following passage from Writing Without Teachers, a bit of text
that seems extraordinarily rich in its suggestion of the political meaning of the
book: “Although you cannot entirely change the world or transform people at a
stroke, this class makes it perfectly obvious that you can change instantaneously
the way eight or ten people act toward you for a couple of hours a week” (114).
The writing classroom as social and political laboratory, indeed.
One ﬁnal, and somewhat more personal, comment concerning the politics of
Elbow’s early pedagogy needs mention. As noted above, most criticism of Elbow’s
expressivist ideology has come from the left, from those, myself included, who
did not think his critique of the dominant ideology was sufﬁciently pointed to be
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considered legitimately transformative. Yet on the all-important matter of the
politics one enacts in one’s own classroom, and speciﬁcally on how one seeks to
deﬁne the teacher-student dynamic in one’s classroom, it is Elbow who would
seem to have the more radical pedagogy. I believe that Elbow’s version of the
“teacherless writing class” has much to show those of us who ﬁgure ourselves as
critical teachers and intellectuals, for it is upon this issue of the teacher’s authority that so very many of us fail to enact our own ideological agendas. Mary Rose
O’Reilly once lamented the all too typical scene of the democratic writing
instructor forcing his or her students to sit in circles (rather than the traditional
rows) as part of their lessons in becoming democratic citizens themselves. Can a
classroom agenda be “democratic” if it is the instructor who determines the
agenda and deﬁnes what constitutes appropriate (i.e., democratic) behaviors by
students? Certainly the important work of Paul Bove on the “genealogy of critical
humanism” has shown us that claiming the mantle of expertise is both a familiar
and deeply problematic gesture for most critical intellectuals and teachers. The
dilemma resides in the fact that “even the most revisionist, adversarial, and oppositional humanistic intellectuals—no matter what their avowed ideologies—
operate within a network of discourses, institutions, and desires that . . . always
reproduce themselves in essentially antidemocratic forms and practices” (1–2).
Such a paradoxical situation occurs because when the critical intellectual
assumes the perogative to speak for the oppressed or deﬁne what is genuinely
democratic, the “ﬁgure of the masterful or leading intellectual is repeatedly reinscribed” (2). When we presume to designate for our students what constitutes
critical consciousness (and many of us, including myself, who fashion ourselves
as transformative teachers do just that), we are most susceptible to the charge of
doing little more than giving students more instruction in the fundamental
meaning in this culture of instructor and instructed, expert and deferential
novice (Bove 225).6 The trope of the expert seems ubiquitous in composition
pedagogy, on the right and on the left, and to miss the ways Elbow’s early work
directly confronts the power of this ﬁgure is to misread signiﬁcantly the political
meaning and implications of his writings.
To be sure, the preceding account of Elbow’s relation to the politics and history of our discipline does not do justice to the complexity of a thinker capable
of producing a book entitled Embracing Contraries (1986). Elbow’s early work is
ﬁlled with paradox, ambiguity, and echoes of composition’s Victorian past; witness, for example, the repeated deployment of imagery that conjoins power and
violence in ways more reminiscent of the current-traditional emphasis on
“masculine” strength in writing than what one typically would expect to ﬁnd in
the draft resistance movement.7 Even as regards the sociopolitical function of
the self in these texts, the case remains difﬁcult, for the afﬁliations of Elbow’s
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pedagogy with what Berlin terms “the entrepreneurial virtues capitalism most
values” (“Rhetoric and Ideology” 487) remain; these too are part of Elbow’s
links to his cultural and disciplinary past. Thus, my aim has not been to overturn those critical accounts of Berlin and Catano so much as it has been to historicize Elbow in order that we might better understand something of his
complex relation to the past and to the present. I hope such an approach allows
us to read Berlin’s conclusion that in Elbow “the personal is the political” in a
manner that does justice to the intense and very overt political struggles in
Elbow’s early work, struggles that go well beyond any simple equation of “selfexpression” inevitably “lead[ing] to a better social order” (Rhetoric 155).
However, I would not go so far as to claim that a better grasp of the historical context of Writing Without Teachers allows us to explicate fully all the enigmatic gestures found in the text. Such a project seems well beyond the purview
of this brief essay. So I would conclude by returning us to the preface of
Writing Without Teachers. In these initial remarks to his readers, Elbow
informs us that “I particularly want this book to help students not enrolled in a
writing class and people out of school altogether” (vii). Perhaps these are the
most important, yet enigmatic, words in the entire text, given the institutionalizing of Elbow’s pedagogy in textbooks and writing programs, a state of affairs
that has unquestionably muted many of the more radical elements in his work.
To establish a “teacherless writing class” in a university setting, where the
expert continues to reign supreme and where grades and placement examinations play an ever more signiﬁcant role in the professional lives of writing
instructors, seems perhaps the most paradoxical of all gestures. Might not have
Elbow been intimating this from the very beginning of Writing Without
Teachers, and might he not still be articulating for us a most powerful political
lesson about the real meaning of teaching writing without teachers?

NOTES

1. Such a position is consistent with the opinion of the historian Charles
DeBenedetti, who remarks that “[r]adical paciﬁsts [of the 1960s] concluded that
draft resistance involved more than an individual act of conscience or even a collective moral witness” (166).
2. Berlin also cites this sentence, though he challenges Elbow’s remark by asserting
that the power Elbow describes in his book “is not political in any overt sense”
(Rhetoric 154). It is, according to Berlin, a power conceived entirely in the personal terms of gaining control over one’s life through a mastery of language.
3. This is essentially Berlin’s judgment concerning the politics of Writing Without
Teachers (“Rhetoric and Ideology” 485).
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4. Robert Connors argues that “[m]ore than any other college subject, composition
has been shaped by perceived social and cultural needs,” for it “grew out of and
interacted with concurrent cultural trends, as American college and university
teaching were shaped by pressures that were economic, political, and theoretical”
(Composition 112, 4).
5. Of course, Berlin is using these words to describe the social-epistemic camp,
which he sees as carrying forward a critique that had remained merely “implicit”
in expressionistic rhetoric (“Rhetoric and Ideology” 490).
6. Bove here follows the critique of the critical intellectual initiated by Foucault.
7. Compare, for example, William Mathews’s praise offered in 1876 for the rhetorical power of “a Webster or a Calhoun,” whose “words fell upon his adversary, battering down the entrenchments of sophistry like shot from heavy ordnance”
(14), with Elbow’s description of an effective voice in writing that “is the force
that will make a reader listen to you, the energy that drives the meanings through
his thick skull” (Writing 6). See also Catano for an effective critique of Elbow’s
tendency to deploy patriarchal and violent imagery in his early works.

2 S E N T I M E N TA L J O U R N E Y S
Anti-Romanticism and Academic Identity
Thomas Newkirk

My doctoral advisor, the late James Kinneavy, once said that his original ideas
were those for which he had forgotten the source. I think of this uncomfortable
piece of wisdom when I recall, vividly and with some mortiﬁcation, the time I
picked Peter Elbow up at the Boston airport around 1980. It was the ﬁrst time
I’d met Peter, and on the way up to Durham, he characteristically got me talking
about my teaching. I explained to him about how my students seemed blocked
by their prior academic training, how they had an overly formalized sense of
what writing should be, how activities like, well, “free-writing” and small supportive writing groups, worked quite well. Peter, to his credit, responded with
his “oh really’s.” It seemed like news to him. Then, about the time I got to
Newburyport, I recalled where I got those ideas.
So I’ll begin with the admission that this chapter can be viewed as a gloss on
his great essay on the believing and doubting game. Elbow works to create
space for belief in much the same way William James did in his essays on pragmatism. Writing almost exactly a century before Writing Without Teachers was
published, James made the case for faith as an active and necessary component
of knowing. Faith provided a form of energetic direction necessary to break
out of the “sophistical net” (36) of dogmatic positivism:
For again and again success depends on energy of act; energy again depends on faith
that we shall not fail; and that faith in turn on the faith that we are right—which
faith thus veriﬁes itself. (27)

Elbow, it seems to me, joins James in challenging the “fastidious vetoes” (36)
of those bound up in ultrarational systems. James challenged the positivists
who questioned any form of assent to unproven “truths.” For Elbow the target is
an academic culture that overvalues skepticism and critique—where the ultimate term of rebuke is to be called “naive.” Like James he argued for the pragmatic potential of belief, the ways in which belief discloses possibilities that
remain forever hidden by the “Doubting Game.” To believe in the signiﬁcance
and meaningfulness of an object of study (say, sentimentality) allows for understandings that skepticism would foreclose. Belief, in this way, is self-reinforcing.
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His essay seems even more relevant—and radical—as we move into the new
millenium. Skepticism has been elevated to such a First Principle that any
deviation from social constructionism earns the rebuke of “essentialism.” Since
all knowledge, we are reminded, is socially constructed, doubting or deconstructing our belief systems becomes the primary intellectual enterprise.
Critique becomes the only means we have of escaping the barely visible shaping forces around us. And, to put the matter frankly, those who advocate
unconditional belief systems (sometimes encoded in moral commonplaces)
strike us as dogmatic, unreﬂecting, and embarrassing. This elevation of skepticism to a First Principle creates the sort of imbalance that Elbow would always
criticize. To use one of his most memorable phrases, belief should have “half
the bed.” Elbow’s willingness to stand up for belief and his willingness to challenge academic bias are, I feel, among the great acts of courage and imagination in our ﬁeld.
His famous essay is doubly useful in an investigation of sentimentality, ﬁrst
because sentimentality entails belief, afﬁrmation, wholeheartedness—all of
which are frequently, sometimes instinctively, met by skepticism on the part of
academics. Indeed, a major function of academic training may be to inculcate
that sense of skepticism, what a colleague has called “messianic agnosticism.”
And secondly, believing is a central method of inquiry; it requires a form of
imagination to step outside what Herbert Gans calls our “taste culture” (11)
and sense, provisionally and experimentally, the meaningfulness of sentimental discourse for those not acculturated to our standards.
While I may use a collective “we” to designate the orthodox reaction of academics to sentimental discourse, I hope readers will feel free to withdraw from
that “we” at any point. But my guess is that even those who have resisted the
implicit strictures concerning inappropriate emotionalism have felt the power
of these norms. One of my female colleagues once spoke of the effort it took to
monitor every overt reaction—to be careful not to sigh, blush, laugh too
loudly, or, worst of all, cry. Without this monitoring she felt she would be perceived as overly emotional, even motherly, and not be taken seriously as an
intellectual. But, I will argue that even academics cannot stay within the lines
and that the attempt to do so results in psychic disconnection and denial.
I’ll explore this topic through a series of stories. The ﬁrst has to do with a
cup that was passed out to participants at an “Editors’ Summit” at Heinemann
Books a couple of years ago. The company had undergone a difﬁcult period of
editorial turnover and author dissatisfaction, and Mike Gibbons, the company
president, had ﬁnally put in place his new set of editors. As a part-time editor, I
was invited and consequently got a cup. It is from Successories of Illinois, and it
features a photo of an eight rowing on a river; the message reads:
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T E A M WO R K

Teamwork is the ability to work together
Toward a common vision. The ability
To direct individual accomplishment
Toward organizational objectives.
It is the fuel that allows common
People to achieve uncommon results.

In fact, we did talk a lot about common goals and ways of using the talent in
that room. And, let me add, the talent was impressive, certainly the intellectual
match of my colleagues at the University of New Hampshire. This was a company with books by Nancie Atwell, Shelly Harwayne, and Linda Rief in the
works, one that had published Moffett, Britton, Macrorie, Graves. The very
need I feel to vouch for the intelligence of this group begins to demonstrate this
tendency to associate the discourse of exhortation with intellectual weakness.
At any rate we all had these cups. At ﬁrst I felt an embarrassment; I wondered if I would even take it home. (Then realizing how cheap I am, that all of
our cups were freebies with some slogan on them, I knew I would take it
home.) Then I began to become interested in my own embarrassment. I fantasized what would happen if my new department chair, who needed teamwork
as desperately as Heinemann did, passed out such a cup. It would be, at least in
my department, unthinkable, except, perhaps, as an ironic joke. Other departments may be different—you may be sipping from such a cup as you read this.
But somehow I doubt it.
The reason for this rejection would be the sheer conventional clichéd nature
of the message, “common people attaining uncommon results.” Yet there are
cliches, conventionalities in the writing that we accept—and these don’t seem to
bother us nearly as much. Surely “problematical” is a cliché by now. And
“undertheorized” seems on its way to becoming one. How many times have we
read about “the Banking concept of education” or “expressivism”? Academic
writing is quite tolerant of some cliches. The teamwork mug is troublesome,
not because it is cliched, but because it has the wrong clichés.
The issue, it seems to me, is more profound than a matter of preference. I
would argue that those of us in the ﬁeld of English have constructed our identities upon a rejection of sentimental discourse. It is the “other.” Our sense of
elitism, the cultural capital we possess, rests upon a capacity to see through
sentimentalism. In this regard we distance ourselves from popular culture in
which sentimentality is a real force. We possess a large lexicon of pejoratives
for this discourse—mawkish, manipulative, corny, trite, gushy, tearjerker, simplistic, mushy, romantic, touchy-feely, soft, naive, and, to go back several
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decades, womanish. For as Jane Tompkins has shown, the assault on sentimental writing in the early part of this century led to the virtual elimination of
women writers from the canon.
So when David Bartholomae, in his pivotal essay “Inventing the University,”
accuses expressivists, like Elbow, of promoting “sentimental realism,” he knows
that he can count on the demolition work that came before. He is throwing
down a gauntlet he is sure no one will pick up. After all these years, after Freud
demolished the pieties of the Victorian family, after Eliot made his case for the
objective correlative, after the warnings of I.A. Richards about “stock responses”
and other emotions that are not artfully or appropriately invoked by literature,
after the long appropriation of sentimentality by capitalism (think of the longdistance commercials or the way sentimentalism has screwed up the coverage of
the Olympics), who in his right mind would pick up this challenge?
Yet because this rejection is such an automatic reaction of the intellectual
caste we belong to, I believe there can be value in exploring this bias—But with a
couple of provisos. I want to use the term sentimental or sentimentalism as a neutral term; that is, in the same way we use the term ﬁction or academic discourse.
There can be effective sentimental discourse—and there can be ineffective sentimental discourse. A book like Tuesdays with Morrie may be emotionally successful, even for some hardened academics. Terms like mawkish and sappy designate
ineffective, formulaic sentimental discourse.
And I will deﬁne this discourse as that which seeks to activate compassion, to
extend sympathy, to create conviction, to inspire courage—in effect to work
against moral and emotional sluggishness. It is wholehearted, sincere, intentionally uncomplicated. It is the language of conviction. It has strong roots in oral
speech and speechmaking. It depends on a small number of conventional narrative tropes (e.g., that of overcoming diversity through extraordinary effort),
which despite their familiarity can be effectively employed. To put the issue
another way, this discourse sets itself against irony, doubt, displacement of emotion, ambivalence, critique, unreliable narration, and, to some degree, originality.
Historically, the term sentimental has undergone an inversion in connotation;
it was a term of praise in the 18th and ﬁrst half of the 19th centuries, at which
point it began to be used pejoratively to indicate insincerity and unstable and
undisciplined emotional (even anti-intellectual) responsiveness. More recently,
literary scholars such as Jane Tompkins, Fred Kaplan, and Laura Korobkin,
attracted by the moral power of the great sentimental writers, have begun to use
sentimentality nonpejoratively. Kaplan points out that sentimentality might be
viewed as a reaction against the pessimistic, deterministic biological and social
theories that took hold in the 19th century. Sentimental writers claimed that,
while human natures are “mixed,” we all possess innate moral sentiments, which,
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when appealed to in books like Dombey and Son or Uncle Tom’s Cabin, can move
us to moral action.
To be sure, sentimental discourse can easily be co-opted by the conservative
right because of its focus on individual effort and its seeming blindness to the
ways in which systematic governmental and economic policy can close off
options. This disconnection between individual morality and public policy
was most evident in the career of Ronald Reagan, who kept a checkbook in his
desk to write checks to individuals in need—while at the same time slashing
their government beneﬁts.
Yet having said this, I want to stress my thesis that we academics pay a huge
price for this “othering” of sentimentality. We can lose touch with the way discourse operates in the wider culture and, most tellingly, fail to recognize how it
operates in our own lives once we leave our ofﬁces and listen to the radio or
attend the graduations of our children. Our allegiance to the Doubting Game
can leave us alienated not only from popular culture, but from our own emotional responsiveness.
S E N T I M E N TA L I T Y A N D T H E L A N G UA G E O F P O W E R

Kurt Vonnegut once said that he was so relieved to go to college. In high
school it was social cliques, assistant principals, pep rallies, and cheerleaders. In
college he could talk about ideas and philosophy, about books. Then in the real
world he found it was high school all over again. This may be a somewhat negative way of making my point that there is a mismatch between the way discourse
is taught and valued in the university and the way it operates in the wider culture. While those of us who work in English departments have a heritage of antisentimentalism, that heritage is not shared by the wider public. We can proclaim
this a postmodern age—yet the movie Titanic has grossed over a billion dollars.
I was reminded of this disparity at a recent NCTE conference. I was on the
“research strand” of the conference, normally a powerful warning label. For
some reason we had been scheduled for one of the big ballrooms. The presenters gathered near the front of the ballroom, and when the session was about to
start, we were only slightly outnumbered by the audience. We set ourselves up
in a corner of the room, but each of us who spoke had to confront literally a
thousand empty chairs.
In the discussion that followed our talks one of the speakers challenged me
that we should not be teaching personal writing. Instead, we should be teaching the conventions of the “language of power.” I remember looking out over
those empty seats and wondering if we really knew what the language of power
was. If we ourselves possessed that key, why had all but twenty NCTE registrants chosen to skip our session?
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And I knew that in some other ballroom, one that would be ﬁlled, Donald
Graves would be speaking. And those who heard him would be moved, inspired
to try new things, in large part because of his mastery of sentimental discourse.
We used to kid Don about how after each of his speeches, woman after woman
would come up to him, literally touch him—his forearm, his elbow, two hands
surrounding his one—and say how it seemed he was speaking directly to her. One
after the other. Don spoke (and speaks) to their frustration, to their loneliness in
school systems, to their belief in children, in literacy, in the reasons they got into
teaching in the ﬁrst place. They leave ready to persevere, even to transform themselves as teachers. This is sentimentality (at its best)—and this is power.
T H E W R I T I N G C L A S S A S C O N TA C T Z O N E

In the past few years I served on doctoral admissions committees and found
that easily the most high-risk document in the application ﬁles was the personal
statement, always a tricky (to use Elbow’s favorite term) presentation of self.
Some applicants began with a short literacy narrative, something that showed
their love of reading, sometimes using the romantic trope—reading in bed,
with a ﬂashlight, escaping into the world of the book. I’m sure the intent here is
to demonstrate their passion for literature, something that to my mind was not
irrelevant to the application. Yet invariably the committee found these openings
not just ineffective, but offensive. In fact, there was a visceral reaction to them—
“saccharine,”“sappy.” There was a feeling of affront, of impropriety, a signal that
the writer did not know an important social rule, did not know, in fact, that she
was invoking a tradition that this very scholarly enterprise was set up to oppose.
While it may be reasonable to expect doctoral candidates to understand the
antiromanticism so central to academic identity (though I would dispute
that), it is questionable to confront young writers with this visceral bias. As a
case in point I want to draw on an excerpt from David Bartholomae and Tony
Petrosky’s inﬂuential book, Facts, Artifacts, and Counterfacts. The ﬁrst assignment in the basic writing sequence asked students to write about a transforming experience and to reﬂect on the change he or she underwent. Here is one of
the papers they received:
When I went to South Catholic I became friends with my Spanish teacher, his
name was Brother Lawrence Dempsey. He was a great teacher and also assistant
Coach to the wrestling team. One day he invited me down to the weight-traning
room, he showed me a few of his machines and how to use them. Since he was just
starting to lift weights I wanted to start too. That October he wanted me to go out
for the wrestling team. I was scared to death a pudgy kid like me.
He had such spirit and drive that I stuck with it. He always boosted me by saying “ﬁre up.” I really got into weights after the season and running. I became more
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conﬁdent. As fast as it went the next year came I was down a weight class and ready
to go. I beat 5 kids for the position and went ﬁrst string varsity the rest of my junior
year. At the end of the year we all got word that brother Larry was going to Jersey
City. I was very disappointed because I know I’d miss him. I was losing conﬁdence
and almost gave up the sport. I then had to decide what to do. I was determined
now more than before but this time make it on my own the next year I became
team captain.
If you work hard and follow rules things will get better and better. (33–34)

This paper, according to Bartholomae and Petrosky, is a “Boy’s Life narrative,” in which the writer does not have the “muscularity of mind” to work
against the ready-made commonplaces of adult authority. They conclude:
To the student who wrote the paper above, we can only say, “No, that’s not it,” and
then do what we can to characterize what it is that he has done that we can’t accept.
(34)

Now it seems to me that there is more we can say. We can learn more about
the coach; we can learn more about how he was able to go on when the coach
left; we can learn more about what he means by following the rules. We can
show a form of human curiosity to a student who is telling us his version of
how his life has changed.
Two things strike me about the response “No, that’s not it” and “What it is
that . . . we can’t accept.” I think there is a sense of social impropriety: this language of exhortation is categorically inappropriate, a telltale sign of an unmuscular mind. And there is a lack of ethnographic interest on the part of the
authors. The ethnographer asks why the writer chose to use this language. Is it
possible that the student’s concluding statement was not a passive acceptance
of adult language, but rather the afﬁrmation of a code of belief that has paid
off for him—and anyone who knows anything about wrestling must appreciate this transformation? Why in the world would he want to ﬁght against truisms, against a code of effort, that has turned him into who he is? And how in
the world could he know that this is what we want of him?
I would suggest that the teacher of this student is in what Mary Louise Pratt
(1996) has famously termed a “contact zone.” A confrontation occurs when a
marginalized discourse (that of exhortation) intrudes into an academic setting
with its dominant antiromantic ethos. As I read Pratt, our ﬁrst responsibility is
reﬂexivity, the obligation of those in power to “turn back” and reﬂect on their
own biases. We need to recognize that in this zone there is a power imbalance
toward the side of the teacher; consequently, those possessing power need to
step imaginatively outside a set of habitual preferences to appreciate the significance of the marginalized discourse form. This act of empathy is nonexistent

28

W r i t i n g Wi t h E l b ow

in the response to the Brother Lawrence paper. For example, the teacher could
work within what seems the intent of the paper—to show the inﬂuence of
Brother Lawrence—and help the writer “earn” the ﬁnal claim. I think we can
also expand the repertoire to show other means of self-presentation that may
complicate this ethic of self-development, though that must be a slow and
diplomatic process. And I think it must be one that recognizes the developmental function of these narratives of transformation-through-disciplinedeffort in the lives of eighteen-year-olds.
R O M A N T I C I S M A N D T H E D I V I D E D P S YC H E O F E N G L I S H S T U D I E S

To this point I have tried to suggest, if not thoroughly argue, that the culture of English Studies creates its own sense of elitism and professionalism by
treating as a defective “other” the popular discourses—particularly sentimental
discourse—in the wider culture. As a result we have opened up a gap between
the way we and this wider culture perceive discursive power—and by extension, the way we and our students perceive discursive power. This form of selfidentiﬁcation also places a strain on those within the English Studies culture,
for we too live in that wider culture that we deﬁne ourselves against. The
result, I often think, is that we fail to connect (to borrow E.M. Forster’s term)
the intellectual positions we take to the conduct of our lives. Marxists check
their TIAA-CREF statements. We motivate ourselves with the same commonplaces we dismiss in the classroom as unreﬂective. Those who argue for the
death of authorship sign their essays and negotiate for better royalty deals. Bob
Connors’s favorite example occurred when Victor Vitanza, the ultimate postmodernist in composition studies, once claimed in frustration that a questioner had misunderstood his work—even though his philosophic position
denied the possibility of such a determinate meaning.
The contradiction concerning sentimentalism usually takes a particular
grammatical form, with a “but” at the hinge of the reaction.
“I usually ﬁnd country music sappy, but I felt sad to see a clip of Tammy
Wynette singing ‘Stand by Your Man.’”
“Titanic has the standard sentimental plot, but it’s worth seeing.”
This “but” construction provides two forms of justiﬁcation. It can be used to
signify that while the speaker has been powerfully affected, the reaction was
artistically invoked (and not a response to a sentimental appeal). Or, the speaker
can admit “leakage,” the appeal was in fact sentimental, but the response was
only a momentary lapse.
We can see the ﬁrst form of the construction in a letter that appeared in the
New Yorker in response to several photographs from the war in Kosovo, including those of several Kosovo Albanians executed by Serb militia:
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I am not a sentimentalist. And, being at the early end of Generation X, I am a member of a generation that has seen it all and is cynical about the media—news footage
especially. But Gilles Peress’s pictures do not lie. Perhaps, as Philip Gourevich writes
in the accompanying text, it is because “none of the people in these pictures appear
to notice the camera” that the photographs begin to cut through our culture of
voyeuristic montage. (Smith 8)

While the writer wants to claim an emotional reaction to these powerful
pictures, he can do so only with a fairly long preamble (and one wonders if the
letter would have been published if it had been a more straightforward reaction). The writer must distance himself from the manipulative, “voyeuristic”
mass media that is available to everyone; rather he is reacting to the art of a
New Yorker photograph. In other words, the writer can distinguish between the
sentimental, manipulative forms of mass media (and wouldn’t fall for that
kind of appeal) and the aesthetically appropriate response to these photographs. In fact, as Bourdieu would predict, he begins by attributing the
power of the photographs not to the manifest subject matter (e.g., executed
human beings) but to a formal quality—the focus of the subjects being photographed. The letter writer, then, is capable of emotional self-surveillance, of
being sure that his emotional response was artfully evoked.
My second example is leakage pure and simple. It occurs in Nick Hornby’s
wonderful novel High Fidelity. The main character, Rob, is a music junkie who
runs a barely proﬁtable record shop that specializes in nonmainstream music.
In fact, his identity is so geared to a particular taste in contemporary music
that he will quit seeing a woman if he ﬁnds a Simon and Garfunkel album in
her collection. As the book begins he is trying to recover from the breakup
with his girlfriend Laura. In the section I will quote he is attending the concert
of an American folksinger Marie Lasalle:
There are many songs that I’ve been trying to avoid since Laura went, but the
song Marie LaSalle opens with, the song that makes me cry, is not one of them. The
song that makes me cry has never made me cry before; in fact, the song that makes
me cry used to make me puke. When it was a hit, I was in college, and Charlie and I
used to roll our eyes and stick our ﬁngers down our throats when somebody—
invariably a geography student, or a girl training to be a primary school teacher
(and I don’t see how I can be accused of being snobbish if all you’re doing is stating
the plain and simple truth)—put it on the jukebox in the bar. The song that makes
me cry is Marie LaSalle’s version of Peter Frampton’s “Baby I Love Your Way.”
Imagine standing there with Barry and Dick, in his Lemonheads T-shirt, and listening to a cover version of a Peter Frampton song, and blubbering. Peter Frampton!
“Show Me the Way”! That perm. That stupid bag thing he used to blow into, which
made his guitar sound like Donald Duck! Frampton Comes Alive, top of the American
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charts for something like seven hundred and twenty years, and bought, presumably,
by every brain-dead, coke-addled airhead in L.A. I understand that I was in dire need
of symptoms to help me understand that I had been traumatized by recent events,
but did they have to be this extreme? Couldn’t God have settled for something mildly
awful—an old Diana Ross hit, or an Elton John original? (61)

When Marie ﬁnishes the song she says, signiﬁcantly, “I know I’m not supposed to like that song, but I do.”
S E N T I M E N TA L I T Y A N D T H E L A N G UA G E O F C O N S O L AT I O N

In almost every bookstore, there is a section variably called “Self-Help” or
“Healing,” or “Inspiration.” While not overtly religious, many of the books in
these sections serve their readers in the same way that religious tracts, pastoral
counsel, and aids to religious reﬂection once served church members. In my
experience, few forms of writing are less congenial to the academic than the
books in these sections (even some of Elbow’s books take on the ﬂavor of selfhelp—and may seem academically suspect for that reason). These books seem
profoundly conservative, unanalytic, homiletic, resting on established commonplaces; consequently they seem an affront to rationalism, an acquiescence
to moral authority, a seeming denial of the capacity of language to create
meaning through original expression. These books seem “soft,” entirely too
unmuscular.
Yet, to the person in need of consolation, the academic insistence on critique
and rationality provides little comfort. The commonplace (our commonplace)
that “meaning” is nothing more than a transitory human construction denies
the foundational yearning that sends people to this section of the bookstore.
This conﬂict was dramatized for me in Susan Zimmerman’s book, Grief
Dancers: A Journey into the Depths of the Soul. The book describes the slow discovery that her second child, Kat, suffered from a little known, but profound
disability called Rett’s Syndrome. The child develops normally until about age
one; then mental development stops, though the body continues to grow. The
child loses control of her hands, which gesture spastically; she never can become
toilet trained, her spine begins to curve; there is constant teeth grinding, spitting
of food, and poor circulation in the extremities. I met Kat when she was about
thirteen. Her wheelchair was located at the center of a large plastic ﬂoor covering that was spattered with her food. Zimmerman, a Yale-educated lawyer,
described the extensive steps she and her husband took to gain a diagnosis and
to secure treatment, even to the desperate point of nonmedical quackery.
In the conclusion to her book, Zimmerman admits that she came to the
limits of rationality and had to move to acceptance of her situation and face
the challenge of loving a daughter who could never love her back:
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With Kat, I wanted to move on, to ﬁnd answers and be gone. She stopped me.
Like a sharp rock solidly wedged in a stream bed, always there as the river ﬂows over
it, she taught me about inescapable sorrow. She showed me that there are some
things I can do and some things I can’t. There are some things we choose in life and
some things that choose us.
Quietly, she presented me with the ultimate test. Her deafening question rang in
my ears year after year. Sometimes I tried to ignore it, to act as if it and she weren’t
there. But it always was, and she waited patiently for me to respond to it: did I have it
in me to love without dreams—to love simply for the sake of love with no look to
the future, no promises given, nothing expected in return? (241)

I maintain that this form of expressiveness is profoundly distasteful to the
academic. The analogy between the natural world (the rock in the stream)
and the human condition seems romantic and dated. Expressions like “soul,”
“inescapable sorrow,” “to love without dreams” seem to evoke another century and sensibility. We resist the homiletic style, the way she seems to rest on
the commonplace—“There are some things we choose in life, and there are
some things that choose us.” Isn’t this the kind of “wrap-up” we want students
to avoid. But in fairness, we also need to ask, “What language do we use when
we reach bottom, when the nightmare becomes real?” Do we create “new
meaning” or do we seek out commonplaces from the very folk tradition that
we so easily denigrate? Discourse of this type recognizes the limits of originality and ingenuity. Paradoxically, Zimmerman is driven to write to make sense
of her grief, but the consolation comes in a rejection of rationality. At the end
of the book, she returns to a starkly simple formulation of her dilemma:
could she love this child who could never love her, never even know her. The
wonder, she concludes, is that the challenge was always there and she had
failed to see it. What the situation required was not intellectual complexity
(which drew her away from the real situation) but a form of moral fortitude—
“Do I have it in me?”
A L A N G UA G E F O R L I V I N G A N D D Y I N G

Last summer, I was visiting my parents, both in their eighties. In fact, my
mother was born only a few months after the Titanic sank, a month before
Woodrow Wilson was elected President. She is, as she says, getting her affairs in
order. She and my father recently bought their cemetery plot, and on this visit
she asked me to go and see it with her, a trip I had been dreading. In fact, it was
not the heart wrenching moment I imagined. We looked at the stones around
her plot (“Look, the Weyrichs—would that be Sam’s parents? He was on our
track team.”) And for an illuminating instant I had a sense of the memorial
function of cemeteries.
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Later that day, we were sitting at the kitchen table and somehow the conversation turned to poetry (my Mom had taught high school English for years).
“No one, of course, reads William Cullen Bryant these days,” she said. Then my
mother, who now has trouble remembering the movie she saw last week,
recited, without faltering, the last stanza of “Thanatopsis,” which she had
memorized as a young schoolgirl:
So live, that when thy summons comes to join
The innumerable caravan, which moves
To the mysterious realm, where each shall take
His chamber in the silent halls of death,
Thou go not, like a quarry slave at night,
Scourged to his dungeon, but sustained and soothed
By an unfaltering trust, approach thy grave,
Like one who wraps the drapery of his couch
About him, and lies down to pleasant dreams.

Then she said almost ﬁercely, “I know the poem is trite, but it speaks to
me—about living and dying.”
I am not trying to claim that Bryant should be added to the canon or that
we, at the beginning of this century, can read him the way my mother read him
at the beginning of the last. But I do want to make a claim for what Jane
Tompkins calls the cultural work, even the moral work, such language performs. Attention must be paid to any form of language so powerful that it can
reconcile someone to the loss of life itself.
In cases like this, one seems to come to the limits of the believing game
because we are confronted with belief itself, unconditional by its very nature.
Powerful because it is unconditional. A few weeks ago I visited a high school
friend, whose wife had just ﬁnished a grueling program in Christian counseling at the local Brethren college. I asked her if her certiﬁcate would allow her to
work in a non-Christian setting, a school or a private practice. “Yes,” she said,
“but that’s not how I want to work. If I’m working with someone, I want to tell
them that they’re not alone. That they have help in God. And we’ll get down on
our knees and pray. That’s the strength of Christian counseling—you’re not
alone. To give up the religious part doesn’t make sense to me. It’s the basis of
what I do.”
Another high school friend agreed, “Like when my father was dying of cancer. It was so hard, but I can’t imagine how people can go through that alone,
without the church or belief.” I listened, as if across a great divide, envious of
an assurance that I don’t feel and unable to feel what it must be like to have
that assurance.
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The believing game, for all its power, is still an intellectual stance, a vantage
point, and a partner to doubt. While the believing game can help us become
more open to belief, it differs fundamentally from belief itself, particularly religious belief, which is far more than a stance and hardly the coequal partner of
doubt. Religious belief is the antithesis of doubt, the surmounting of doubt.
Consequently, the believing game still keeps the knower on the outside of
belief, since the belief Elbow calls for is provisional and strategic, rather than
foundational. The same could be said for James, who always seems outside the
house of faith, peeking in.
I propose that one great challenge for composition teachers is to continue
to struggle with the polarities, what Elbow calls the contraries, of doubt and
belief. How do we reconcile our need to be skeptical—in a culture that markets
images and desires—with our equal need for locating a ground of belief, what
Tillich called a “ground of being”? This, I think, is one difﬁcult and noble
assignment Elbow has passed on to us.

3 E L B OW ’ S R A D I C A L A N D
POSTMODERN POLITICS
Elizabeth A. Flynn

The work of expressivist (sometimes referred to as expressionist) compositionists
in general and Peter Elbow in particular has been criticized for its attention to
the personal dimensions of writing and to the individual rather than to social or
political dimensions of reality, often by critics with a Marxist or Marxist feminist
orientation. James Berlin in “Rhetoric and Ideology in the Writing Class,” for
instance, ﬁnds that, for Elbow, power resides within the individual. And
although Berlin admits that Elbow’s pedagogy includes a denunciation of economic, political, and social pressures to conform, Berlin sees that the form of
resistance implied by Elbow’s world view is limited because it is always construed
in individual terms (486–87). Collective action, a strategy that Berlin supports
given his Marxist orientation, poses a threat to individual integrity in Elbow’s
work, according to Berlin (487). Lester Faigley, citing Berlin, speaks of Elbow as
belonging to the “moderate wing” of expressivists because he deﬁnes power in
terms of the individual (58). Susan Jarrett in “Feminism and Composition: The
Case for Conﬂict,” also drawing on Berlin’s analysis of Elbow, asserts that the
emphasis on the individual in expressive pedagogy such as that of Peter Elbow
and others has “cooptive potential.” She says, “The complexities of social differentiation and inequity in late-twentieth-century capitalist society are thrown
into the shadows by the bright spotlight focused on the individual” (109). Jarrett
also sees Elbow’s perspective as a form of naive expressivism that associates
teaching with maternal nurturing, associations that fail to make any reference to
“the psychological complexities around the conjunction of mothering and
teaching” (112). Elbow and other expressivists, according to Jarrett, also fail to
recognize that our culture regards mothers with “deep ambivalence” (113).1
Although Elbow’s work is often associated with pedagogies that ignore social
difference and social inequities, I argue here that his work is actually considerably more politically progressive than it might at ﬁrst seem. His earlier work is
in many ways more radical than moderate, and his later work moves in the
direction of postmodernism. I suggest that his earlier work is radical in that it
critiques modernist Enlightenment epistemologies and it challenges structures
that are deeply embedded in our culture. This work can be usefully situated
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within the contexts of nineteenth-century Romanticism and twentieth-century
feminist expressivist composition and contrasted with nineteenth- and twentieth-century manifestations of Marxism, a perspective that accepts rather than
challenges modernist Enlightenment thought. In his early work, Elbow repudiates modernist academic structures, methods, and discourse and calls for a
reduction in the authority of teachers. I also argue, however, that Elbow is careful, especially in his later work, to acknowledge that modernist structures and
approaches can coexist with radical ones, and hence his perspective in some
ways moves in the direction of postmodernism. Surely representations of him
as a naive idealist or as one unconcerned about diversity or inclusivity are inaccurate.2 To demonstrate that Elbow’s earlier work is politically radical, I will discuss it within the contexts of early nineteenth-century Romanticism and
expressivist feminist composition and contrast it with late nineteenth-century
Marxism. To demonstrate that his later work moves in the direction of postmodernism, I will situate it within the context of Bakhtinian postformalism and
postmodern feminism.
First, though, I will contrast the three perspectives that inform my argument: (1) modernism, especially modernist Marxism as a late nineteenth-century inheritor of the Enlightenment as well as a perspective that still informs
work in the present; (2) antimodernism, including early nineteenth-century
Romanticism and late twentieth-century feminist expressivist composition;
(3) late twentieth-century postmodernism, including postmodern feminism,
as a critique of modernism rather than an opponent of it.3
Relating Elbow’s work to these three different perspectives, all of which
have epistemological, pedagogical, and political implications, is a challenge
since Elbow himself carefully avoids labels and since his work is complex and
often deﬁes easy classiﬁcation. I nevertheless take the risk of doing so in order
to make evident that his work is neither politically moderate nor an unchanging manifestation of expressivism. I also demonstrate that Elbow does not
always focus exclusively on individuals. Situating Elbow’s work in relation to
political and intellectual traditions such as the Enlightenment, romanticism,
Marxism, and postmodernism is crucial at this moment in the development of
the ﬁeld of rhetoric and composition because the histories of the ﬁeld are too
often insular, disciplinary, and unconnected to larger political and intellectual
movements within other ﬁelds.
MODERN, ANTIMODERN, POSTMODERN

Modernism derives from the Enlightenment with its commitments to
empiricism and rationalism. A key ﬁgure in the development of Enlightenment
thought is Descartes, who associates human essence with disembodied thought.
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For Descartes, the search for truth begins with skepticism and is accomplished
through cultivation of the mind. The Enlightenment also gave rise to the scientiﬁc revolution and the scientiﬁc method, with its belief in the objectivity and
value neutrality of the observer. As numerous contemporary thinkers have
pointed out, however, the Enlightenment is also associated with such reprehensible developments as colonialism, racism, and imperialism and with the development of repressive social and pedagogical structures and institutions. Michel
Foucault makes clear in Discipline and Punish, for instance, that the
Enlightenment resulted in the development of penal structures and academic
disciplines and disciplinary structures that are punitive, coercive, and elitist.
It is common to associate late nineteenth-century Marxism and its twentieth-century manifestations with Enlightenment modernism. John Trimbur in
“Agency and the Death of the Author: A Partial Defense of Modernism,” for
example, speaks of “Marxism’s modernist metanarrative” (289). Working
against the widespread perception among postmodernists that the
Enlightenment was politically reactionary, his essay suggests that there are
aspects of the Enlightenment, namely the French Revolution, that were valuable. He associates the Revolution with “the emergence of the masses as subjects
of their own history” (294). Trimbur considers the work of Marx himself to be
modernist, as well as the work of twentieth-century Marxists such as Walter
Benjamin, Berthold Brecht, and others (296).
Like Trimbur, I see Marxism as deriving from eighteenth-century modernist
Enlightenment commitments to scientiﬁc inquiry and to rationality and thus as
a late nineteenth-century manifestation of modernism. For Marxists, inequity is
a structural problem caused by an economic system that oppresses the proletariat and favors those who control the means of production. In a pedagogical
context, teachers become intellectuals committed to changing the social and economic order through a process of making students aware of inequities and sending them forth to make changes beyond the classroom. Marx’s extensive writings
form the basis for modern social scientiﬁc research, and Marx makes clear in his
work that he values objective scientiﬁc methods and rationality. Marx and Engels
in The German Ideology speak of the inquiry as a study of people in “their actual,
empirically perceptible process of development under deﬁnite conditions” (119).
They are optimistic about the possibility for progress and improvement and link
that progress to scientiﬁc and technological advancement. “It is only possible to
achieve real liberation in the real world by employing real means, that slavery
cannot be abolished without the steam-engine and the mule and spinning-jenny,
serfdom cannot be abolished without improved agriculture” (133).
Marxist and Marxist feminist pedagogies of the kind advocated by Berlin,
Faigley, and Jarrett aim to make students aware of social inequities and
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encourage them to become participants in social transformation. These pedagogies aim to teach students methods of social critique, including critique of
the university with its inevitable commitments to capitalism and its inevitable
support of hierarchical structures. Change will be accomplished by redeploying the methods and procedures advocated by the modern university for progressive political ends. The transformative strategy of Marxist pedagogue
Paolo Freire, for instance, is to teach middle-class, well-educated, and highly
literate social activists how to enable the rural poor of South America to
become literate. In a Marxist pedagogy, the teacher plays a crucial role because
it is the teacher who is an intellectual and critic, responsible for enlightening
uninformed and uncritical students.
Romanticism is antimodern in that it reacted against Enlightenment
thought by challenging the authority of scientiﬁc knowledge and the
Enlightenment belief that technological development is necessarily beneﬁcial
and progressive. The Romantic Movement resisted scientiﬁc and technological
advancement with its concomitant commitments to objectivity and rationality,
and called for a return to nature and to contemplation as a way of healing individual depression and social alienation. The Romantic poets dwell upon themes
of dejection, melancholy, isolation from nature and from others, industrialization, urbanization, and overpopulation and see a return to a simpler past as a
way of dealing with a present and future dominated by uncontrolled scientiﬁc
and technological advancement. Common settings for Romantic poems are
often medieval castles and remote islands, and common characters are rustics,
shepherds, and individuals educated through communion with nature rather
than through formal educational systems and structures.
Romanticism does have a politics, but it differs from that of traditions inﬂuenced by Enlightenment thought. Wordsworth and other Romantics saw
promise in revolutionary movements like the French Revolution with its (failed)
attempt to replace monarchy with democracy. But instead of welcoming scientiﬁc and technological development as the instrument of change, the Romantic
Movement opposed it, seeing such development as the cause of individual and
social problems and advocating withdrawal, resistance, and the return to a simpler economy and lifestyle. For Romantics, social institutions impede progress
and growth. The child is the father of the man because the child is closer to
nature, less tainted by the alienating effects of education and work.4
Feminist expressivist composition is a late twentieth-century manifestation
of antimodernism. Feminist expressivist compositionists see modernist educational institutions, with their emphasis on evaluation and objective assessment,
as impeding the development of writers. Feminist expressivist compositionists
emphasize, instead, that good writing is the expression of a relatively
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autonomous self. For them, writers will develop best in encouraging environments that emphasize the process of writing and rewriting over criticism of the
ﬁnal product. Feminist expressivist compositionists, including Wendy
Goulston, Mary A. Quinn, Rebecca Faery, and Cinthia Gannett, advocate listening to the student writer and encouraging student writers to shape and reshape
their work until it is understandable to a reader. They often recommend pedagogical strategies such as journals, freewriting, and preliminary writing activities that foster free association and digression. Their work has been inﬂuenced
by feminists Nancy Chodorow, Mary Belenky (coauthor of Women’s Ways of
Knowing), Carol Gilligan, and Sara Ruddick, scholars who identify and valorize
women’s different developmental, intellectual, and ethical perspectives and who
advocate collaborative learning and the creation of nurturing environments
where connection rather than competition is emphasized. If modern perspectives are androcentric, emphasizing detachment, objectivity, and judgment,
antimodern ones are gynocentric, emphasizing engagement, subjectivity, and
nurturing.
While antimodernisn opposes modernism directly, postmodernism critiques modernism without directly opposing it. It looks for alternatives to
Enlightenment commitments to objectivity, detachment, and the scientific
method, without resorting to antimodern subjectivity and opposition to science. A good example is Bakhtinian dialogism. Bakhtin is careful to distinguish his position from a Romantic one. He is not advocating individualistic
expression. Rather, he describes speakers as engaging in dialogue in complex
intertextual situations with other speakers and writers, past and present.
These dialogues are multivoiced, heteroglossic, and hence dialogic. For
Bakhtin, such dialogue disrupts static, univocal authoritative discourse and
thereby serves a democratizing function. Within a pedagogical context, postmodernists attempt to find alternatives to traditional academic discourse,
sometimes recommending the creation of hybrid forms that interweave
objective and subjective elements. Another strategy is to introduce students to
traditional academic discourse while pointing out its limitations, namely its
disembodiedness and its situatedness, despite its attempt to appear value neutral and objective.
One manifestation of a shift toward a postmodern perspective within the
humanities is what is often referred to as the autobiographical-turn characteristic of discourse in a variety of ﬁelds, a turn that is often postmodern feminist
in orientation. Suzanne Fleischman in “Gender, the Personal, and the Voice of
Scholarship: A Viewpoint,” for example, describes the widespread attempt in a
variety of ﬁelds such as such as law, art history, media studies, anthropology,
sociology, women’s studies, literature, and even the hard sciences, to restore to

E l b o w ’s R a d i c a l a n d P o s t m o d e r n P o l i t i c s

39

scholarship the person of the scholar. She observes, as have numerous others,
that scholarly writing arose out of the context of rationalism and empiricism
and aims at objectivity, transparency, and authority (977). It is believed to be a
transparent transmitter of natural facts. Fleischman ﬁnds that the term scientiﬁc voice is synonymous with scholarly voice (978). According to Fleischman,
academic writing is characterized by (1) salient use of the passive voice; (2)
heavy use of nominalizations; (3) use of the preposition in rather than by for
citing authorities; (4) use of authors’ initials in place of ﬁrst names (979-81).
She provides numerous examples of attempts to disrupt traditional academic
discourse by inserting the personal into it in a variety of ways. She observes
that some disciplines, especially the social sciences, history, and cultural studies, lend themselves to personalized writing, but that it is in literary studies that
the “autobiographical turn” has had the greatest impact. Here personalized
writing takes the form of personal writing, autobiographical writing, performative writing, or narrative criticism (996). According to Fleischman, personalized writing alters the founding metaphor for writing from the lecture to the
conversation (983). Some work by postmodern feminist compositionists deals
explicitly with ways of having students incorporate personal narrative into
their writing. Lillian Bridwell-Bowles in “Discourse and Diversity: Experimental Writing Within the Academy,” inﬂuenced by Kristeva and other French
feminists, explores ways in which teachers can invite students to imagine new
forms of discourse, new kinds of academic essays. According to BridwellBowles, these new forms include “a more personal voice, an expanded use of
metaphor, a less rigid methodological framework.” Such a writing process
allows for a combination of hypothesizing and reporting data and the expression of multiple truths (44).
Each perspective—modernist, antimodernist, and postmodernist—has a
different politics (and a different epistemology and a different rhetoric).
Modernism gave rise to the creation of democratic institutions, the scientiﬁc
method, and traditional academic discourse, as well as to the development of
oppressive institutions and structures such as racism, colonialism, and imperialism. Antimodernism, in contrast, reacts against modernist disembodiedness,
skepticism, and objectivism by emphasizing spirituality, psychic renewal, and
subjective creation and observation. Postmodernism does not oppose modernism but recognizes its considerable limitations and attempts to ﬁnd alternatives to its structures, institutions, and genres. I argue, then, that it is useful
to situate Elbow’s work and his political orientation within the contexts of
both antimodernism and postmodernism. Doing so illuminates his political
and intellectual orientations and clariﬁes important traditions within the ﬁeld
of rhetoric and composition.

40

W r i t i n g Wi t h E l b ow

E L B OW ’ S R A D I C A L E X P R E S S I V I S M

Elbow’s earlier work is antimodern and hence radical in that it directly challenges deeply entrenched ways of thinking, rooted in Enlightenment epistemologies. In describing what he calls “the doubting game” and “the believing
game” as opposing perspectives and privileging the latter, he calls for a pedagogy that attempts to minimize the oppressive authority of teachers and
encourage the development of cooperative, collective, and relational ways of
thinking and being. If a modern pedagogical perspective is committed to
objectivist detachment, skepticism, and faith in scientiﬁc development and
technological progress, an antimodern one is rooted in subjective expression,
believing, and emotional commitment. If modernists, including Marxists, see
that change is best accomplished through a transformation of existing structures, antimodernists like the early Elbow call for resisting the alienating effects
of traditional structures, including educational ones, by attempting to work
outside them or at least attempting to mitigate their damaging effects.
The title of Writing Without Teachers makes evident Elbow’s radical expressivist conviction that learning is best accomplished outside of modernist educational structures and without the aid of teachers. Students need to learn how to
write independent of their teachers, who may inhibit them by giving them
intimidating models and constraining rules. What students need to learn to do,
at least initially, is to write freely, on their own. They need to be able to make
mistakes, take risks, generate imperfect text. Elbow explains in the preface to the
book that he is writing primarily for individuals attempting to learn to write
outside a classroom context (viii). If his methods are used within a classroom
context, he explains, the teacher’s authority must be reduced, if not eliminated
entirely. Elbow minimizes his own authority by writing along with his students
and, in a sense, becoming a student.“I can only set up something like the
teacherless class in my own class if I adopt more the role of a learner and less the
role of a teacher.” Elbow explains, further, that good writing teachers are exceedingly rare. Students, he says, do not need teachers in order to learn (ix).
Although Elbow, in his early work, does tend to focus on the individual as
opposed to the social dimensions of writing, there are foreshadowings of his
turn toward postmodern social perspectives on writing as early as Writing
Without Teachers (1973). The book was published well before social construction was in vogue in the field of composition studies; he nevertheless
describes a meaning-making process that is communal. He sees that meaning
is constantly “curbed” by the speech community of the speaker (154). He recognizes, however, that there is never only one speech community but many
overlapping ones (155).
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Meaning in ordinary language consists of delicate, ﬂexible transactions among people in overlapping speech communities—peculiar transactions governed by unspoken agreements to abide by unspeciﬁed, constantly changing rules as to what
meaning to build into what words and phrases. (156)

Words, then, though capable of extreme precision among capable players,
“nevertheless ﬂoat and drift all the time” (156). He speaks appreciatively of the
work of Thomas Kuhn and sees perception and thinking as acts of construction (172).
The antimodern philosophical and political foundation of the views that
inform Elbow’s radical perspective is clearest in the essay appended to Writing
without Teachers, “The Doubting Game and the Believing Game—An Analysis
of the Intellectual Enterprise.” Elbow ultimately afﬁrms that the doubting
game, which he associates with Enlightenment thought, and the believing
game, which is described as opposing Enlightenment thought, are, though
entirely different, both necessary and interdependent. His position is a radical
one, however, in that he is primarily concerned with pointing out limitations
of the doubting game and strengths of the believing game. He feels that the
doubting game has dominated our culture for centuries, and so efforts must be
made to reinstate the believing game and to diminish the authority of the
doubting game. His ideal seems to be a balance between the two, something he
thinks we have not achieved at the present.
In pointing out the limitations of the doubting game, Elbow is actually
pointing out the limitations of Enlightenment rationality and empiricism,
given that he makes a direct connection between the doubting game and a
Cartesian world view. For him, Descartes is the ultimate doubter. He says of
Descartes, “He felt the way to proceed to the truth was to doubt everything.
This spirit has remained the central tradition in western civilization’s notion of
the rational process” (150). According to Elbow, the scientiﬁc method depends
on falsiﬁcation and on dividing things into classes (165). It is a dialectic of
propositions. It attacks the problem of the self-interest of the perceiver by
attempting to “weed out the self ” (171). The goals are to make thinking mechanistic and impersonal, and to achieve objectivity (172). Its counterpart in literary studies is the New Criticism, in which meaning is located entirely in the
text and a work of art is characterized by coherence among elements (159).
The believing game, in contrast, deals not with universals but with the particular, the unique (165). It is the opposite of the doubting game in that its
method is to afﬁrm, believe, not to argue (165). In literary criticism, this
amounts to making better readings available rather than discrediting bad readings (166). If the doubting game is a dialectic of propositions, the believing
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game is a dialectic of experience (171). It proceeds by indirection, by believing
in all assertions presented (148). It is not adversarial in that there is an attempt
to consider and believe in all perspectives one at a time rather than to compare
and rank them. The believer looks not for errors but for truths and then commits herself to them, tries to see things from the perspective of the proponent
of the truth. The self is not extricated as it is in the doubting game but is
inserted, projected. An assertion is not analyzed logically but extended through
metaphor, analogy, and associations (149).
Elbow’s doubting game, associated as it is with modernist science, technology, rationality, empiricism, and with Enlightenment ideals and procedures,
involves an acceptance of the dominant values within our culture. The believing game, in contrast, with its opposition to Enlightenment ideals, is radical
and resistant. Although Elbow does not emphasize the gendered nature of the
two games, the doubting game seems to have a masculine valence, the believing game a feminine one. The extent to which the two perspectives are
dichotomous and oppositional becomes clear in Elbow’s list of their characteristics (178–79):
Doubting Game
extrication, disengagement
detachment, perspective
rejecting or fending off what is new
closing, clenching
literal
rigid
stubborn, hanging on
impulse for security
centered, unmoving self
learning to be sharper, ﬁner, more
piercing, harder, tougher
aggressive: meeting threat by
beating id down
deﬂating
competitive
solitary or adversary activity
talking, noise, arguing

Believing Game
involvement
projection, commitment
willingness to explore what is new
opening, loosening
metaphorical
ﬂexible
yielding
impulse for risk
ﬂoating self
learning to be larger, more encompassing,
softer, more absorbent
nonaggressive: meeting threat by bending,
incorporating; nonviolent
supporting
cooperative
working in a group
listening, silence, agreeing

Elbow is clearly promoting the terms on the right and making evident the
limitations of the terms on the left. The terms on the left are negative in tone;
those on the right are considerably more positive. Society will be improved,
Elbow suggests, if it embraces antimodern communal and collective values
that result in cooperation, listening, agreeing, and nonaggression, qualities that
are associated with women’s ways of knowing by the Women’s Ways of Knowing
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collective, Chodorow, Gilligan, and others. In addition to learning to disengage
and detach—modernist activities promoted by the scientiﬁc method—we
need to learn to become involved and committed. In addition to learning to
develop literal approaches to language and closed interpretations, as in a modernist pedagogy, we need to learn to appreciate metaphorical language and
open-ended interpretations. In addition to developing modernist conceptions
of the self that are centered, we need to learn antimodernist processes of
decentering. Elbow makes clear that he is not calling for an elimination of the
modernist doubting characteristics. Both believing and doubting are important and necessary. What he ultimately afﬁrms is coexistence of the two, and
such coexistence anticipates his later movement in the direction of postmodern epistemologies and politics.
Elbow’s characterization of the believing game as the opposite of the doubting game as discussed above reveals his Romantic propensities, as does his use
of metaphors that suggest natural growth and organic processes. He speaks in
Writing Without Teachers of “growing your meaning” (21) or trying to “help
words grow” (23) or treating words “as though they are potentially able to
grow” (24). He compares writing to riding a horse, “which is constantly changing beneath you,” or to Proteus, “changing while you hang on to him” (25). He
says, “It is characteristic of living organisms, cell creatures, to unfold according
to a set of stages that must come in order” (43). Writing, for Elbow, is a natural
process that necessitates careful nurturing. It will be unsuccessful if it is forced
or coerced. There are no rules that can be followed and no procedure that will
be the same for everyone. The successful writing class is a “culture to be preserved. Yogurt” (139).
Elbow’s antimodern radical political views are often implied rather than
directly stated in Writing Without Teachers. In What is English? a description of
the 1987 English Coalition Conference, they are also often implied, given that
he is frequently describing the opinions of other participants at the conference.
In many ways, however, the book is a reﬂection of his own pedagogical and
political perspectives, perspectives that are evolving and that sometimes differ
in emphasis from his earlier work. In What is English? Elbow more often brings
up political issues, no doubt because they were on the ofﬁcial agenda and in
the air. He speaks, for instance, of language-oriented teaching and learning as
aimed at making students better citizens (32). He also attends to issues regarding linguistic differences and focuses on the issue of tracking, which he clearly
sees, as do other conference attendees, as elitist and counterproductive. “As
experienced teachers in tracked and nontracked situations, conference participants asserted that the same educational approach is right for both the best
and the worst students: a learned-focused, interactive approach” (35).5
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What is English? provides Elbow an opportunity to discuss the similarities and
differences between his own pedagogical and political perspective and that of colleagues who have a Marxist or cultural orientation. Elbow describes an exchange
between himself and Gary Waller, in which Waller suggested that Elbow wasn’t
doing enough justice to the constraints and limits on human beings; he saw
Elbow as implying naively that we write, whereas Waller emphasizes that we are
written. Elbow responds, characteristically, that he prefers to deﬁne the student as
a subject rather than an object (19). Later in the book, he reﬂects on differences
between his own position and that of Waller and Kathleen McCormick. He sees
McCormick as emphasizing that “our interpretations are a product of our situatedness—our class, gender, interests, culture, and so forth; we don’t write, we are
written on.” Elbow works out a compromise. We are at once free and bound. He
attempts to ﬁnd language that does justice to both sides of the contradiction (83).
Antimodern expressivists such as Elbow are not Romantic poets; they are
working in a different era and a different context. It is useful nevertheless to
point out their commonalities with the Romantic Movement and with the perspectives of individual Romantic poets. Expressivists are committed to democratic principles and to social and political equality, but their vision of why
inequality exists differs from that of Marxists, as do their solutions to the problem. For expressivists such as Elbow, the educational institution within which
the teacher works is a repressive structure, with its uncritical acceptance of the
promise of scientiﬁc and technological progress, its concomitant commitment
to industrialization and urbanization, and the inevitable alienation that results
from such acceptance and commitment. From an expressivist perspective,
teachers are the representatives of the modernist educational system and thus
reinforce its values and socialization processes. Students will be better off if the
authority of teachers is limited. For an expressivist, the educational structure
works against the development of writing abilities because it is alienating and
intimidating. The expressivist sometimes suggests that the best thing a teacher
can do, given the debilitating nature of the modern university, is to absent herself, allow students to ﬁnd their inner voices, their own emotional and spiritual
depths. Students will accomplish this through reﬂection, contemplation,
removal from the pressures and considerable constraints of modern educational structures and processes. Marxists, in contrast, tend to emphasize the
importance of the teacher since the teacher is the enlightened intellectual who
can awaken students to the realities of political and social inequities. Marxists
tend to see the transformative potential of teachers and educational institutions, whereas radicals like Elbow tend not to.
As I have suggested, contrary to a widespread view within the ﬁeld of composition studies, the work of Peter Elbow is neither politically moderate nor
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entirely individualistic. Rather, it is in many ways radical and can usefully be
compared to the ideals of the Romantic Movement and of expressivist feminist
compositionists and can also be contrasted with Marxist political perspectives.
In privileging the believing game over the doubting game, Elbow challenges
pervasive modernist Enlightenment thinking and structures and calls for antimodern approaches that emphasize relationality and connectedness. His early
work evolves and matures, however, in response to reactions of individuals to
these early perspectives, as well as to his experience as a scholar and teacher,
and a changing climate within the ﬁeld as a whole that focuses directly and
explicitly on the political dimensions of writing.
E L B OW A N D P O S T M O D E R N I S M

As Elbow’s work matures, it moves in the direction of a politics that has
more of a postmodern cast, a perspective that is anticipated in Elbow’s discussion of the importance of both the doubting and the believing games in
Writing Without Teachers and in his attention to the social, as well as the individual, nature of writing. A good example of his evolving perspective is the
introduction to his 1994 collection, Landmark Essays on Voice and Writing,
entitled “About Voice and Writing.” Unlike Writing Without Teachers and
Writing With Power, the essay makes use of traditional academic style and is
clearly aimed at other academics. He also provides a more fully developed
explanation of how his perspective relates to other intellectual traditions than
he did in Writing Without Teachers. He does not label what he calls “discourse
as voiced utterance” expressivist or “discourse as semiotic text” objectivist (xii).
Nor does he associate the two perspectives with the doubting or the believing
game. Clearly, though, “discourse as voiced utterance” can be associated with
the believing game and with subjectivist epistemologies; “discourse as text or
semiosis” with the doubting game and with objectivist epistemologies. He also
makes even clearer here than he does in his discussion of the doubting and the
believing games that both perspectives are important and necessary. He is not
calling for the elimination of objectivist perspectives.
In the objectivist perspective, which he associates in Writing Without
Teachers with Enlightenment thought and which he now associates with the
New Criticism and with structuralism and semiotics, discourse is seen as text,
and language is disembodied (xii). Through this lens, people, the historical
drama, the body, the actual person is removed. Elbow fully admits that it can be
useful to look at natural language as pure disembodied meaning. He acknowledges that the New Critics made us better readers. He ﬁnds that semiotics, sign
theory, and structuralism in linguistics and literary criticism also showed us
how to see impersonal patterns in literature or other forms of discourse (xiii).
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The textuality metaphor, he says, highlights the visual and spatial features of
language and emphasizes language as an abstract, universal system (xiv). It calls
attention to the commonalities between one person’s discourse and that of others and of the culture (xiv).
But Elbow’s primary aim, of course, is to demonstrate that the other lens,
the one that emphasizes that discourse is always historically situated and
always comes from persons and is addressed to others, is also extremely useful
(xiii). And here he departs from his earlier position in Writing Without
Teachers by associating his preferred perspective with the work of Russian post
formalist Mikhail Bakhtin. From the “discourse as voiced utterance” perspective, sound and hearing are emphasized over vision, and linguistic meaning is
seen as moving historically through time rather than existing simultaneously
in space. Seeing discourse as voiced utterance calls attention to the differences
from one person to another (xiv). There is a problem, he thinks, if discourse is
always referred to as “text” and never as “voice” (xiii). He invokes Bakhtin, who
he says describes discourse in terms of “voices” and “speakers” and “listeners.”
He leaves no doubt that he is primarily concerned with celebrating the “discourse-as-voice lens” but he also makes clear that he is not trying to eliminate
the “discourse-as-text lens.” (xiv). “About Voice and Writing” makes evident
Elbow’s movement in the direction of a postmodern epistemology and politics. In the essay, it becomes clear that the doubting game is related to intellectual traditions such as semiotics and structuralism. It also becomes clear that
the believing game is related to Bakhtinian post-formalism.
C O N C LU S I O N

Elbow’s work has been misunderstood because its intellectual, cultural, and
political underpinnings have not been sufﬁciently elaborated. He has been
characterized as being concerned only with the individual divorced from social
and political context and hence as politically moderate. It is certainly true that
his politics are not Marxist or Marxist feminist in orientation. He does not
share the political framework that informs the work of James Berlin, Lester
Faigley, and Susan Jarrett. His work is nevertheless informed by a progressive
and often a radical political perspective that is antimodern, has its roots in the
Romantic Movement, and can be usefully compared to feminist expressivist
composition. And given that he moves, especially in his later work, toward an
acceptance of both subjective and objective epistemologies, his work becomes
increasingly postmodern in orientation. Rather than espousing beliefs that are
hopelessly out of date, Elbow’s earlier work is radical, and his later work parallels the autobiographical and postmodern turns within composition studies,
feminist studies, and the humanities as a whole.
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NOTES

1. Miriam Brody in Manly Writing, in contrast, associates Elbow’s work with male
aggression rather than female nurturing. She argues that Elbow associates doubt
with femininity and belief with masculinity, privileging the latter, and ﬁnds that
Elbow valued “masculine control and force of meaning” in writing (183). Brody
concludes her discussion of Elbow by associating him with “phallic writing” and
with initiating the writer into “the power of the fun” (187). It would seem that
Elbow cannot win. He is criticized for associating teaching with female nurturing and for associating writing with male aggression.
2. Elbow is not a naive idealist, but he does see himself as a visionary, as his title
“Writing Assessment in the 21st Century: A Utopian View” makes clear.
3. I provide fuller explanations of these perspectives in “Rescuing Postmodernism”
and in Feminism Beyond Modernism.
4. There is by no means consensus within the scholarly community about the
nature of the politics of the Romantic Movement or about its relationship to
Marxism. Forest Pyle in The Ideology of Imagination makes a connection
between Marxist concern for the contradiction between matter and spirit and
this contradiction as addressed and thematized by the Romantic imagination
(11). John Williams in Wordsworth: Romantic Poetry and Revolution Politics, in
contrast, establishes a connection between Wordsworth’s politics and eighteenth-century political protest, ﬁnding that “his reiterated appeal through
nature to a transcendent, unifying moral authority governing political action . . .
suggest the absorption of political principles rehearsed and ﬁercely debated in
the shadow of the Glorious Revolution” (8). I ﬁnd more compelling, however,
Carl Woodring’s characterization of the Romantics in Politics in English
Romantic Poetry as emphasizing “private emotion, the individual, the particular,
the local; organic growth, organic unity, imagination, symbol, and myth” (326).
Nicholas Roe in The Politics of Nature speaks of the disillusionment that resulted
from the failure of the French Revolution and the extent to which this turned the
Romantics toward a politics of nature, a politics that emphasized the private
experiences of friendship and love (153).
5. Elbow makes clear his opposition to tracking in “Writing Assessment in the 21st
Century: A Utopian View.”

4 E L B OW A S I C O N
Edward M. White
Shane Borrowman
This dialogue is between an emeritus faculty member with long
acquaintance with Peter Elbow and his work (White) and a graduate
student (Borrowman) completing his doctorate, in a ﬁeld shaped in part
by Elbow’s work. The old and the new, so to speak.

White: Fred was a big blustery graduate student, without wisdom or knowledge, but knowing in all the wrong ways. For instance, he knew the names of
professional books and regularly brought them up in class discussion but had
never read any of them “personally.” All show and no substance. Our program
in California is, like most English M.A. programs, dominated by a canny group
of women, most of them teachers, mature, supportive, and kind. But Fred,
with his overbearing manner, was too much for them, and they kept trying to
puncture his posturing with a small series of practical jokes.
So I was not surprised when Fred burst into my ofﬁce late one afternoon with
astonishing news. “Did you know,” he said breathlessly, “there is no Peter Elbow?”
I had learned, as had his fellow graduate students, that Fred had absolutely
no sense of humor.
“Well, that is a surprise,” I replied. I told him that I had known someone
named Peter Elbow ever since we had brieﬂy crossed paths as graduate students at Harvard. Who could that have been? I wondered aloud, and who
could have written all those books and articles signed by him? And I had just
ﬁnished editing two collections of essays, each including one by Elbow. “Seems
a little hard to believe,” I concluded.
Fred was not put off in the least by my narrative. “Don’t you see,” he went
on, under full throttle, “whenever someone wants to write about expressive
writing, they just use that name. It’s just a convenience, not a person.”
Fred was so proud of his insider information that I had to admire him. He
knew what “Elbow” meant even if he was clueless about who Elbow really is.
“Tell you what,” I said, “suppose I e-mail the person I think is Peter Elbow
and ask him if he exists? Maybe he can clear up this little mystery.”
Fred was dubious, but I sent a quick post on the spot to Peter, asking him if
he were real or not. Seemed the least I could do.
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Peter’s response was, as always, quick. After an amused glance at the gullibility and nervous competitiveness of graduate students, he allowed that he
probably did exist. “And if I didn’t,” he went on, “they’d have to invent me.” He
had something there. For “Peter Elbow” has indeed become more—and other
and sometimes much less—than the pleasant man we have come to know, the
charming human being with so much to say about writing and English in general. He has become a locus for an approach to writing instruction and writing
assessment, an icon of sorts, almost indispensable to our discussions of pedagogy. When we point and click on the “Elbow” icon, just what do we get?
Borrowman: As an undergraduate, I was an English major in a program with a
very clear sense of its own purpose: preparing future teachers for work at the
primary and secondary levels of education. I took my fair share of literature
courses, but because of the clear-sightedness of those who guided the program, professors such as Drs. Dana Elder and Larry Beason, I came to composition very early in my education. Strangely enough, I don’t seem to have met
Peter Elbow’s work directly.
Like most long-time graduate students, I have amassed a mountain of
books on my ﬁeld, all of which have followed me from house to house, state to
state, bachelorhood to marriage. Because of my lengthy history with these texts
I can, with a fair degree of certainty, pinpoint the textual moment at which I
ﬁrst encountered “Peter Elbow.”
In their article “A Variation on Peer Critiquing: Peer Editing as the
Integration of Language Skills,” Sandra Sellers Hanson and Leonard Vogt write
that “During the social changes of the 1960s, students had wanted more autonomy over their educations, and books like Peter Elbow’s Writing Without
Teachers . . . showed they were able to evaluate each other’s writing. Under careful
guidance, students became their own teachers, often giving teachers a second or
third draft for a ﬁrst reading and evaluation” (emphasis mine, 575). It’s clear
that this passage caught my inexperienced eye when I ﬁrst read it. The two italicized phrases, the ﬁrst circled in red ink and the second highlighted in green
on my much-marked copy, represent my introduction to “Elbow” the icon.
From Hanson and Vogt I learned that Elbow was a product of the turbulent
1960s. He was also a proponent of peer critiquing and writing as revision, two
developments in teaching writing that I had rarely encountered as a student
and was unsure how to employ as a new teacher. Since I was uncertain, at a
time in my career when I didn’t feel comfortable with experimentation, I
found Elbow to be a convenient representative of those fears and uncertainties.
For me, everything that seemed strange or “touchy-feely,” to use the term I
employed then, could be clipped to my fuzzy image of Elbow; he represented
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those things about writing that I had never experienced—and would never
truly understand until I began teaching writing for a living years later.
Although my understanding of Elbow’s ideas has expanded with my own academic growth and experience, I ﬁnd that I still use him as a locus for argumentation rather than thinking of him as a person.
Early in 2000, WPA published my article “The Trinity of Portfolio
Placement: Validity, Reliability, and Curriculum Reform.” I was proud of this
work. Still am. But as I look at the essay now, I notice that I was using “Elbow”
instead of engaging Elbow. Instead of addressing his theories about writing
assessment in all of their rich complexity, I relegated them to the status of weak
partner in the binary of my argument. I made Elbow into a straw man. A single
example serves to represent the “Elbow” I used:
Elbow’s contention is that any attempt to force agreement among readers invalidates
the reading, and thus the scoring, process by making the reading of the student’s
work an unnatural one. What Elbow fails to recognize, though, is that an unreliable
assessment system, one which produces inconsistent scores for a single piece of
writing, invalidates itself by being so unreliable. (11)

This is, I think, an accurate summary of the argument Elbow makes in the
foreword to Portfolios: Process and Product. What my reading of Elbow leaves
out is the depth. Rather than acknowledging and exploring Elbow’s concerns
about reliability and unnatural readings of student writing, I set him up to
knock down. However, in other places in my argument, I set him up to prop
myself up, especially when discussing validity and the “inherently personal”
nature of portfolios. Both rhetorical moves represent an invocation of the
“Elbow” icon.
White: During the same year that Fred learned the secret about “Peter Elbow,” I
was working with a group of graduate student interns, ﬁrst-time teachers eager
to learn our craft. Responding to student writing was the topic of the day, and
we were going through the interesting variety of responding models published
in Straub and Lunsford’s Twelve Readers Reading. Elbow’s model is particularly
interesting, since he makes almost no marks on student papers; instead he
writes response essays to his students, sometimes longer than the original.
“What puzzles me here,” observed Raymond, a retired accountant with a
sharp and orderly mind, “is what the student is supposed to do. How do these
comments help students write better?”
Since none of us could answer that question, I posted it to Peter. A few days
later, I received his troubled reply. “This has bothered me for a long time,” he
said. I could tell that he was wrestling with the apparent contradiction between
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his job as a teacher (to respond, advise, coach, grade) and his view of writing as
an intensely personal discovery activity. His conclusion was unequivocal: “I don’t
actually ask my students to write better. I just want them to write differently.”
Raymond snorted, a bit disrespectfully. “Does his dean know about that?”
he asked. “It is a required course, isn’t it?”
I was torn. Everyone in the room was nodding in agreement with
Raymond: if we weren’t helping students to write better, we were frauds. I
myself had been making that argument throughout the term. What on earth
could Peter mean by interrogating that easy agreement? “Maybe,” I said tentatively, “we had better stop and deﬁne what we mean by better.”
Nobody’s mind was really changed by the discussion that followed, but we
all were humbled by how complicated the issue had become. One deﬁnition of
“better” that emerged quickly had to do with a more successful accomplishment of the assignment. When the task is clearly set out, we can help students
complete that task, in accordance with the criteria we have established—and
that accounts for a great deal of the work, probably most of the work, in composition courses. But Elbow proposes that the more important work of writing
has to do with discovery, indeed with self-discovery. And he argues that teacher
interference with that process is more likely to hurt than to help, since we tend
to substitute our goals for the students’ goals.
“That is all very well,” Raymond said after a while, “but we should respond
even to discovery papers by telling our students where they communicate successfully with us and where they don’t.” We looked closely at Peter’s entries in
Twelve Readers Reading and wound up convinced that Peter does in fact do
that—yet always refuses to generalize from his own reaction to the abstract
concept of “better.” That, he maintains everywhere in his writing, is the writer’s
task, not the teacher’s.
Peter and I have disagreed about this matter for several decades, though we
are much closer in our practice than either of us readily admits. In 1999, at an
NCTE conference in Florida, that disagreement was nicely focused. We had
been invited to give a joint keynote address, which turned out to be an enjoyable exercise, I think, for both of us. But I maintained that assessment of writing was central to the job of a writing teacher, while Peter argued that
responding was central while assessment was peripheral. During the question
period we were asked to expand on that difference.
I argued that assessment is central to the teaching of writing, since revision is
central to writing. Without assessment—that is, without the student writer
gaining the ability to assess what is strong and what is not in a draft—we get
tinkering but no revision. One major difference between expert and novice
writers, I declared, is that the experts know how to assess their work and hence
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make it better. The novices, innocent of assessment, tend to think (like an earlier Creator) that whatever they create must be very good. (Dare we suggest that
evolution is the revision process?) So novices might edit, if pushed by their
teachers, but they don’t really revise until they learn how to read their own work
with an assessor’s eye. Peter, however, consistent as always, held to the position
that the writer must discover where the writing is going and not be subject to
the outsider, however well-intentioned the teacher may be. I replied that if we
followed his approach, obviously worse writing might be considered to be better; furthermore, the students want us to help them write better, by academic
standards, and have much less interest in self-discovery than we do. Aren’t we
really obliged to give our students the help they want and need?
And that is where the issue remained, at the Florida conference and now.
Peter writes about assessment, often with great insight. “Do it better; do it less,”
he repeats, and who can dispute the good sense of that? That is, he is happy with
responding but deeply distressed at evaluating. At heart, he dislikes the whole
business. Many years ago I heard him tell a large audience that the only reason a
teacher should ever put a grade on a piece of writing is to keep his or her job. He
has moved some from that iconic position, but his heart remains at Evergreen
State College, with written comments, lots of them, but no grades. No wonder
he dislikes holistic scoring so much, with readers agreeing to agree on quality
levels, for the sake of reliable scoring, rather than using merely personal reactions. For Peter, personal reactions (and personal writing) are at the heart of the
teaching of writing, and his insistence on this has been one of his principal contributions to the pedagogical dialogue. His arguments are not taken seriously by
the assessment community, which, after all, must try for consistent, fair, and reliable scoring so that assessment results can be meaningful. But everywhere teachers are faced with the conﬂict between the necessarily reductive nature of most
assessment and the inﬁnite variations of human ability, Peter’s arguments are
acclaimed as a rebellion of the individual against the incessant sorting and evaluating that besets American education. I’m glad that Peter is around to make
that argument and to make it so well. Otherwise, I might have to try it myself.
Borrowman: I taught my ﬁrst composition courses in a program that was assessment-heavy. Physically, it was not too far from Evergreen; philosophically, the two
could not have been more opposed. When students came to the university for
orientation during the summer before their ﬁrst year, they were herded into a
crowded auditorium and given a multiple-choice test of grammar and usage.
Along with their SAT or ACT score, this test of edited American English determined their placement into ﬁrst-year composition. On the ﬁrst day of class, students were given a ﬁll-in-the-blank grammar test. Students who did exceptionally
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well or badly were bumped up or down the composition sequence based upon
the results of this “grammar diagnostic,” as we unimaginatively yet accurately
named it. For students placed into the second—and ﬁnal—composition course,
their formal, programmatic assessment ended. For those students in English 101,
the assessment was only beginning.
At midterm, students spent three class days writing an argumentative essay
to a common prompt; these essays were scored in four areas (focus, organization, development and support, and mechanics) on a six-point scale by someone other than the students’ own classroom instructor. The results of the
midterm were not binding, however. They simply served as conﬁrmation of
writing ability or a warning about the upcoming ﬁnal exam. Over the ﬁnal three
days of class, students were again required to write an argumentative essay to a
common prompt. These essays were scored by two outside instructors—or
three, in the case of signiﬁcant disagreement. Students who failed this ﬁnal
exam failed the course. All of this assessment, including the sudden-death ﬁnal
exam, was in addition to the three to ﬁve major writing assignments, daily journal writing, and weekly two-page essay writing that were required of students.
All of this writing, including the daily journal, was assessed.
I taught composition in this program for three years. Looking back, one
thing immediately becomes apparent: there was a hell of a lot of assessment
going on. In this assessment-rich environment, I would expect to see little of
Peter Elbow. However, he is present—although his presence is more ﬁgurative,
that of an icon rather than an actual person.
In English 101 at this time, I used Writing to Write: Process, Collaboration,
Communication, a very ﬁne ﬁrst-year composition rhetoric. On a literal level,
Elbow makes only a single appearance in this book, in a section on “The Role
of the Writer in an Editorial Relationship”:
When reading or hearing advice from an editor, the writer should overcome the
temptation to make excuses. Peter Elbow, another expert on teaching writing, made
this observation years ago. It is natural to respond to an editor with comments like,
“What I meant to say was . . .” or “I wrote this Sunday at midnight, so what do you
expect?” These kinds of responses are not helpful. The writer should listen to the
editor and perhaps note down some of the editor’s comments, but he or she should
not be defensive or argumentative. (Elder 115)

Here Elbow appears, as most ﬁgures do in textbooks written for ﬁrst-year
students, as an expert whose opinion bolsters the sound advice given in the text.
Ethos boost for the author aside, the invocation of “Elbow” is completely in
line with arguments Elbow himself makes. In Writing With Power, in a chapter
about revision, Elbow offers this ideal scenario:
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You start by producing a draft. . . . It probably has serious problems of structure and
consistency. But it must be readable. You get two friends to read it and then you sit
down with them. You are more interested in their thoughts on the whole matter
than their criticism of your writing. . . . The conversation with them helps you see
the whole thing in better perspective, gives you new ideas, and helps you make up
your own mind what you think. (140)

Although he does not emphasize the need to listen without being defensive
in the same way Dana Elder, the author of Writing to Write, does, clearly the
two are in agreement. We could probably say the same thing—Elbow’s inﬂuence is everywhere—about most modern composition textbooks.
This agreement is even more apparent in a section titled “Subjective Bullshit”
from Writing Without Teachers. Elbow writes, while discussing feedback in the
teacherless class, “You must put your own responses out on the table, you must
offer up your own reactions as pure data—not defend or justify or even discuss
them—just reveal them and let the other person use them for his own private
purposes” (140). Elbow’s inﬂuence permeates Writing to Write, from the practical, down-to-business tone, to the metaphor of writing and cooking. As Elder
states, “Writing Without Teachers was the ﬁrst comp pedagogy book I ever read,
and it remains a favorite. Elbow . . . allowed access to process model, audience,
and expressive writing to my generation of graduate students. Writing to Write
shares underlying assumptions about pre-writing as discovery and building ﬂuency with Elbow’s early work.” Yet the book was used (required, in fact) in a program that was obsessed with assessment—an example of what Elbow calls the
“cultural hunger for ranking and evaluation” (“Writing Assessment” 85).
The paradoxical situation in which I ﬁrst taught composition—inﬂuenced by
Elbow yet burdened with almost continuous assessment of student writing—is
probably not unique. The goal of the composition program—or of Writing to
Write, anyway—was to produce strong academic writers, capable of constructively editing their own work and collaborating effectively with others. Yet the
major assessment in English 101, the sudden-death ﬁnal exam, directly contradicted this goal. Students were made to write to a common prompt in a limited
time (ﬁfty minutes per day for three consecutive days). To ensure that no cheating took place—and no collaboration, either—students were required to give
their draft to the instructor at the end of each class period. This is a version of the
nightmare scenario Elbow describes in Portfolios: Process and Product:
I can’t resist . . . pointing out that the “actual writing” that [most writing exams] call
for is almost invariably done in response to a question that the student has never
seen before; that there is no time for mulling the topic over beforehand, reading
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about it, discussing it with others, or writing exploratory drafts; that there is no time
for feedback on drafts; and worst of all, that there is no time for substantive rethinking and revising. In short, not only do most writing assessments give us an unsatisfactory picture of the student’s skill, the picture they give us is of the student using a
skill that most of us would not really call writing. (xiii–xiv)

For three years, I lived this situation, requiring my students to write continuously for ten weeks and evaluating nearly everything they produced. Yet when
the end of the quarter came, my assessment of the students’ writing was largely
moot. Outside evaluators—all of whom were teaching other sections of composition—decided whether or not my students wrote well enough to pass my
class, just as I made that decision for their students.
This assessment situation was traumatic for both the students and the
instructors. It was possible, and it happened with some regularity, for students to do well in their coursework and then fail the final—thereby failing
the entire class if a successful appeal could not be mounted. To keep this from
happening, I (like most instructors) taught to the test; my students learned
how to write quick and reasonably clean essays that were focused, organized,
developed, and mechanically sound. They learned to adopt a pseudo-academic tone to convince their audience of the validity of their claims, claims
carefully supported by quotations from outside experts and properly cited in
MLA format. The writing they produced was as unnatural as the constant
need to evaluate it. But it was better writing, according to the standards the
program set and assessed.
In the fall semester of 1998, I taught advanced composition for the ﬁrst
time. The syllabi I inherited from my immediate predecessors varied in focus
and emphasis, but all of them agreed on a single point: Writing With Power had
to be one of the students’ textbooks. I read the book, liked its focus on revision
and developing voice, and required my students to read just about the entire
text over the course of the semester.
The students—all juniors or seniors, mostly English majors—liked “Elbow”
immediately. His advice about writing was practical, immediately useful, and
given in a tone that was not patronizing to these largely inexperienced writers.
Reading Elbow’s work, the students felt that they could see the person behind
the words, the author behind the curtain, the complex human being rather
than the icon. At the same time they were reading Writing With Power, the students were reading from John Warnock’s anthology of creative nonﬁction,
Representing Reality. Around midterm, John came to the class. He discussed his
reasons for writing Representing Reality. He talked about his own writing
processes and the difﬁculty inherent in putting words on paper. None of my
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students had ever met the author of one of their textbooks, and the experience
affected them profoundly. They wanted to talk to Elbow.
As associate editor of Rhetoric Review, I had corresponded with Elbow on
numerous occasions. When I asked if he would mind responding to some
questions from my students about Writing With Power, he readily agreed. My
students read through their journals and thumbed through their books, deciding what to ask. They worked in groups to craft their questions. Several students combined the groups’ questions, and the short list came to me. I
e-mailed it to Elbow.
“In your book you mention how ‘constant revision’ of papers is a good
thing. When is it good to stop revising? Is it possible to over-revise a paper?”
my students asked. Elbow’s response was direct and thorough:
Yes, it’s possible to overrevise. It was extreme and unrealistic of me to imply that we
should always and interminably revise. Deﬁnitely we sometimes produce sections of
writing that are not far from how we want it eventually. And it also depends on the
piece. I won’t revise these answers I’m writing; the writing is informal and I don’t
mind letting my non-careful writing show. It’s a matter of tact. Perhaps the biggest
thing is to let time go by; that helps you decide if something is “cooked” or done.

This answer represented a revolutionary thought: A writer could be wrong,
could go too far. The advice Elbow had given about constant revision—which
scared the students with its open-endedness and uncertainty—was now open
to question. Published words had had an unbeatable ethos built into them
simply by virtue of being published, and Elbow’s answer to their question
deﬂated this false sense of authority they accorded printed material.
Embedded in Elbow’s answer was a second idea that pushed my students to
reconceive of academic writing: the writer is the one who decides when a text
is done, when it has cooked enough. Other readers give feedback, but the
writer makes the decisions. If writers decide when to stop revising, as Elbow
said they should, my students wondered where teachers ﬁt into the process.
Their reasoning was very pragmatic: Revision produces better writing, and
better writing gets a higher grade; if the teacher decides the grade, then the
teacher’s feedback must be considered while revising. This conundrum led to
long discussions about teachers, grade point averages, and the academic writing environment.
The section of Writing With Power that intrigued my students most and
prompted several questions was “Writing for Teachers.” The scene Elbow
describes of a “teacher engaged in being an audience” especially caught their
attention (218). They had never really considered the logistics of reading,
responding to, and grading student papers. Yet Elbow’s advice confused them.
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Would teachers really be willing to negotiate assignments in the ways he suggests? Might this advice be more appropriate for a high school student than for
one in college? “I meant [this advice] for both high school and college students,” Elbow wrote. “I wasn’t trying to make some complex analysis—or think
of the differences. Maybe it sounds like high school because I’m treating the
teacher as so ‘human,’ fallible, prone to preconceptions (and college teachers
are so often portrayed as lofty and rational).” The students grasped this argument immediately, chagrined to see that the very stereotypes Elbow
describes—high school teachers as somehow being soft and college teachers as
being rigid and controlling—were at work in the questions they had asked.
The ﬁnal lines of Elbow’s answer summarize the unintended lesson the students learned that semester: “I’m trying to make the point that all teachers are
extremely human. It helps to know that.”
It would be a lie for me to say that Elbow’s statement affected only the students. Peter Elbow had been one of my teachers for years—from my introduction to his ideas in various composition pedagogy and theory courses to my
use of Writing to Write to my use of Writing With Power—yet he had always
been “Peter Elbow.” For my students he was, until his e-mail, a distant author,
represented only by the textbook they had been required to read. For me he
was the representation of an area within my ﬁeld, a name on conference programs and in journals, and an argument against which to balance my own
ideas about writing and assessment.
White, concluding: In recent years, Peter’s path and mine seem to be intersecting with increasing frequency. In 1993, we debated portfolios at a conference in
Ohio, an experience that led to what I think remains the most interesting book
on the subject: New Directions in Portfolio Assessment (Laurel Black et al.). At
the 1994 WPA conference on Composition in the Twenty-First Century (now a
book—Bloom, Daiker, and White), we debated issues in writing assessment.
Tom Thompson’s 1995 article in Assessing Writing compared our personalities,
as proﬁled by the Myers-Briggs inventory. And in 1999, as I have said, we
joined to give the keynote speech for an NCTE conference in Florida. These
have been friendly but spirited exchanges.
The essay by Thompson focused on an issue I have been skirting here: the
personality factor in assessment and, by extension, in teaching. Thompson gave
the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) to both of us and secured our permission to make those tender ﬁndings public. His purpose was to uncover the way
personality traits underlay scholarly perspectives. Unlike some devotees of
Myers-Briggs, he is both sensitive and cautious in his use of the ﬁndings:
“Although many factors other than personality preferences certainly inﬂuence
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behavior, an understanding of those preferences can help explain certain behavioral tendencies” (193). His summary of our ratings on the Type Indicator scale,
however, gives a strong clue to why Peter and I differ as much as we do:
These different interests—in internal versus external assessment, and in trying to create new assessment measures versus trying to improve the design and use of existing
ones—are consistent with different personality preferences. So, too, are the differences in philosophy implied by Elbow’s and White’s other works. Elbow’s score on
the MBTI indicates preferences for introversion, intuition, feeling, and perceiving;
White’s score indicates preferences for extroversion, intuition, feeling, and judging.

Where Peter registers introversion, I show extroversion; where Peter favors
perceiving, I prefer judging. Too simple, I suppose, and too general perhaps.
But perhaps not. Wear a mask long enough, George Orwell says in “Shooting
an Elephant,” and your face grows to ﬁt it. After all these years, we may indeed
have grown into our icons.
Borrowman, concluding: Throughout my formal education in rhetoric and
composition, I have learned to think in terms of reductive icons: “Elbow” represents a set of theories concerning the process of discovery in writing.
“White” represents theories about the formal programmatic and institutional
assessment of writing. The two are opposed to each other, not because their
ideas actually exist in opposition—even though their personalities might—but
because it is easier to remember them that way. The icons are terribly oversimpliﬁed but are useful as both mnemonic devices and as places to begin discussion, and they probably cannot be discarded for those reasons.
While this chapter represents a description of the practice of icon-building,
it also represents a snapshot of the strangeness of that practice. I have coauthored a chapter with an icon, in which we consider another icon as an icon. I
juxtapose the work of “Elder” with Elbow’s within my analysis. “Evergreen”
serves as the sole representative of an entire system of education. I am represented within the text by only my last name, “Borrowman,” and I even quote
myself—a gesture toward personal icon-building?
As this article describes the practice of icon-building, it also reveals the
strangeness of that practice. Ed and I have been friends for years, so my memories of “White” are indistinct. Dana has been a friend and mentor for nearly a
decade, so now “Elder” exists only on paper. And then there’s “Elbow.” I have
read much of his work. I am familiar with—and am now a contributor to—the
secondary scholarship that trails along behind him. I have heard him speak at
conferences, and we have exchanged e-mails. Twelve years after my introduction to “Elbow,” I ﬁnd myself writing about Peter.

C LU S T E R I I
Exploring Contraries

INTERSECTION
Charles Moran

Deep in Peter Elbow’s thought and work is the belief that we—writers, thinkers,
teachers—need to be able to hold in our minds, simultaneously and without
conﬂict, two ideas that are in radical opposition to one another. This is such an
extraordinary belief that it is often—perhaps almost always—misunderstood.
We have been so conditioned to believe that we should be seeking the
Aristotelian golden mean between the extremes that we in a sense marginalize
the extreme positions, seeing them not for what they are, but as a necessary
frame for the middle ground, a precondition to compromise, settlement, reconciliation. As a result, we are practically incapable of seeing as Peter does and,
more particularly, of understanding his work in the light of this belief.
It is tempting to try to connect this element of Elbow’s work with another:
his disposition to ﬁght for what he perceives to be the underdog, the view that is
likely to be silenced by a dominant, more politically-powerful, received truth.
Elbow has said and written again and again that he is not wanting his students
to do nothing but personal, autobiographical writing, but that he wants us to
make room for some of this writing in our courses. He wants his half of the bed.
Here he aligns himself with James Britton, Nancy Martin, and the Schools
Council project: as Britton, Martin and their team found, in the upper grades of
British schools, students were practically never asked to write expressively, to
write from what Britton termed the stance of the “spectator”. Arthur Applebee’s
1981 study found the same to be true in American secondary schools. Elbow
has argued as he has because of what he sees as a curricular imbalance: we
spend too much of our time preparing student writers for the academic workplace; we spend too little of our time encouraging student writers to make sense
of their lives through their writing. In the good writing curriculum, we would
do both, and some of each in its most extreme form: absolute freewriting, and
absolutely perfect documentation in a researched essay.
Yet this role that Elbow so often takes, the advocate of the silenced, the marginalized, is at odds with his larger aim: to help us move away from advocacy,
away from the oppositional, and toward the active and generous belief in the
position of the other. His is not the peaceable kingdom, where the lion lies
down with the lamb, but a world closer to that envisioned by William Blake,
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one in which contraries are necessary if there is to be movement of any kind.
The dissonance is to be cherished, to be internalized, to be sustained, reﬂected
on, understood. Winning and losing is not what it is about at all. And neither is
tolerance, or reconciliation. War is not an option—think of Elbow’s work with
conscientious objectors here—because war is a process that eliminates, silences
one side. How, then, can Elbow participate in a conventional academic debate,
as in the Bartholomae-Elbow exchanges? He could win this debate only by
silencing the other side. It is ﬁtting that the Bartholomae-Elbow debate is kept
alive in composition theory readers as a debate, as an argument that will not be
won or lost, as a dialogue that calls us to reﬂection.
What I have learned from working with Peter is how easily I acknowledge
the contraries and then move toward the center, toward the compromise.
Instead of including, for instance, both ungraded and graded writing in my
writing class, I will “sort of ” grade everything. So my intended use of both lowstakes and high-stakes writing becomes all middle-stakes; and I and my students lose the virtues of the extremes: we are never entirely free from
evaluation, and we are never really, seriously evaluating. Easier for me, but still
slippery, is my simultaneous hold on the radically opposed teacher-roles of
“coach” and “evaluator.” I need Peter to remind me that when I shift roles I am
not betraying myself, or my students. And I note in passing how rhetorical,
how dramatistic this approach to teaching is: multiple and conﬂicting roles to
be played by the teacher and, therefore, by students as well. When I feel that I
am, in my essence, my essential self, a coach and that in grading students I violate that self, Peter’s advice to me denies the essence or redeﬁnes it: I am many
things, some in absolute conﬂict with others, and I should cherish, nourish,
exploit, continually examine these oppositions that are, in all senses of the
word, essential. Given that I often feel that I am a natural coach, Peter would
ask me to look hard at what I do and see that I am also, naturally, the opposite
of coach: the grader, evaluator, the stickler for standards. It is true—there is
something in me that really hates bad writing! And this multiplicity is not just
OK; it is just what it should be. I am, naturally, both coach and evaluator. The
trick is to keep both roles as clean as I can: be the pure coach when that seems
appropriate, be the pure evaluator when that seems right, and not slide toward
the middle ground.
My struggle to enact Peter’s theory in the classroom is mirrored by the
authors in this section, as they struggle to come to terms with the complexity of
his thought. Cy Knoblauch and Lil Brannon take on what seems to be Elbow’s
attack on those who call themselves followers of Paulo Freire but do not follow
his teachings. Elbow’s 1973 essay, “The Pedagogy of the Bamboozled,”
reprinted in Embracing Contraries (1986), is a complex, many-voiced argu-
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ment against what Elbow sees as the duplicity of those who declare themselves
critical teachers but do not come clean about the power relations that exist in
their classrooms and in the institutions in which they teach. Knoblauch and
Brannon argue that in this piece Elbow does not embrace contraries, does not
balance doubt and belief, but unfairly tips the scales against critical pedagogy,
making it seem too fraught with contradictions—not as applied by Freire, but
as applied by teachers of middle-class students in America’s suburban schools.
Knoblauch and Brannon admit to ﬁnding themselves to a degree bafﬂed by the
complexity of Elbow’s argument—is his tongue in his cheek? And if so, when?
Is this an attack—or a game? Yet if critical pedagogy is to have its half of the
bed, Elbow must be taken seriously and his arguments answered. They offer,
therefore, a detailed response to his arguments and a passionate defense of
critical pedagogy, which they see as a “Pedagogy for the Bamboozled,” a force
for change in a society, an economy, and a culture that is entirely too sure of its
own success.
Thomas O’Donnell takes Elbow’s work with doubt and belief and pushes it
further, “marking a distinction between doubting as an activity and doubt as a
reaction to a claim.” He ﬁnds a connection between Elbow’s way of reading
students’ writing and the work of the ordinary language philosophers, in particular J. L. Austin. For these philosophers, the meaning of a word lies in its use
by ordinary speakers in real-life situations. For instance, to discover the different meanings of accident and mistake, we need to imagine ourselves into situations where we would use ﬁrst the one and then the other of these two terms.
O’Donnell sees Elbow’s reading of student writing as an attempt to live
inside—to imagine—the world created by the student’s language—an acting
out of the believing game, a taking on of the other. When, as Elbow reads, he
encounters difﬁculty in this attempt to imagine, he is made to doubt, and this
doubt becomes the center of a comment to the writing—not a comment that
seeks to disprove, but one that explores a moment of dissonance and asks the
writer to go back and re-think, revise.
M. Elizabeth Sargent looks at Elbow’s essay “The Doubting Game and the
Believing Game,” published as an “appendix essay” to Writing Without
Teachers (1973), as one of our field’s foundational documents and therefore
long past due a careful rereading. She ﬁnds that throughout his career Elbow
has misread or misrepresented Polanyi, to whose work he has often acknowledged an intellectual debt. Sargent argues that Polanyi would not present
believing as a “game,” nor would he see the tacit dimension as a kind of
“magic,” as Elbow on occasion calls it, a faculty opposed to the rational. For
Polanyi, Sargent tells us, “believing can never be as detached or as reversible as
Elbow’s formulation of it as a ‘game’ or ‘method’ suggests.” Elbow’s practice as
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a teacher, she believes, lies closer to the heart of Polanyi than does his theory,
particularly that articulated in “The Doubting Game and the Believing
Game.” For Elbow, as for Polanyi, she argues, belief is primary, a necessary
first move: a belief that you will have something to say (freewriting) and a
belief that a student writer has something to say (attentiveness). Elbow’s critics, Sargent concludes, sense Elbow’s implicit advocacy of the need to believe,
and they simply can’t accept this fundamental premise because it threatens
their present practice and the structures that support it.
George Kalamaras leaves western civilization to understand Elbow, ﬁnding an
analogue for Elbow’s theory in traditions of meditation in Eastern thought.
Kalamaras has come to understand Elbow through his own deep experience of
Eastern meditative tradition, where “embracing contraries yields a consciousness
nonattached to either pole of an apparent contradiction, but, rather, a deepening
attentiveness to their reciprocal interaction.” No western dualism this, but a
deepening attentiveness: contradiction is complement, not conﬂict. So, from this
perspective, as Bartholomae and Berlin doubt aspects of Elbow’s work, they
enact his belief that two heads are better than one. What is generally understood
as debate thus becomes “cooking,” a process that draws on multiple ingredients
to produce a dish superior in taste to that of any of its components. Kalamaras
traces his own journey from his ﬁrst readings of Elbow as a dualistic thinker to
his subsequent re-reading of Elbow in the light of his own experience of the
meditative traditions of the East. In an instantiation of yin-yang, the reciprocal
interaction of contraries, Kalamaras ﬁnds that his re-reading of Elbow’s work
has, in its turn, “deepened my understanding of the dynamic interplay within
Eastern meditative practices.”
The ﬂaw in Elbow’s theory, as Sargent sees it, is that he has not completely
reconciled in his own mind his deep, instinctive faith in the primacy of belief,
what he and Polanyi call the “ﬁduciary transaction,” and his position that
believing and doubting are contraries that must be equally embraced. Her construction of Elbow gets at the opponent that Knoblauch and Brannon feel
behind the mask, the rhetor whose arguments must be struck down if critical
pedagogy is to ﬂourish. Sargent’s construction of Elbow resonates, too, with
O’Donnell’s need to limit and sharpen our understanding of Elbow’s own
practice of the doubting game. Beside these versions of Elbow stands George
Kalamaras’s Elbow, who, like the Elbow of Lucile Burt’s poem (opening this
volume), is thinking beyond the envelope, seeing doubt and belief, like yin and
yang, as inseparable elements in an organic whole.

5 P E DAG O G Y F O R T H E B A M B O O Z L E D
C. H. Knoblauch
Lil Brannon
Bamboozle: to deceive by trickery, hoax, cozen, impose upon; to mystify,
perplex, confound.
O.E.D.

“Put up or shut up” seems a fair, if abrupt, rendering of Peter Elbow’s point in
“The Pedagogy of the Bamboozled,” which ﬁrst appeared as an article in
Soundings nearly 30 years ago and was subsequently included in Embracing
Contraries in 1986. Elbow’s blunt challenge to teachers enamored of Paulo Freire’s
arguments for critical pedagogy was essentially this: either they should “really”
practice what Freire recommends in Pedagogy of the Oppressed, or they should
stop talking as though they practiced it and stop “bamboozling” both themselves
and their students. Real practice, Elbow insists, entails faithful adherence to four
principles abstracted from Freire’s text: (1) the teacher must work as a “collaborating ally” of students, not as their “supervisor”; (2) the subject of study must be
students’ own lives, their perceptions of their experience, rendered as problems
for critical reﬂection; (3) the goal of instruction must be to change, not just the
individual student, but the world itself, “objective, external reality”; and (4) the
teaching and learning processes must be primarily “rational and cognitive” rather
than “affective” (“Bamboozled” 87–88). However plausible a Freirean pedagogy
might be among Brazilian peasants, or even among Jonathan Kozol’s adult learners in the church basements of inner-city Boston, Elbow argues that critical
teaching is unrealistic for ordinary American schools, which are not “cruel or
oppressive” and which already encourage “thinking, problem-posing, doubting,
rationality, critical thinking, and genuine discussion” (92). Speciﬁcally, critical
teaching is unrealistic for teachers like himself, “hired by an educational institution to teach mostly non-adult, middle-class students” (87). Perhaps anticipating
a ﬂood of tiresome leftist prose when Freire’s arguments hit the academic scene in
the early 1970s or perhaps simply concerned about the potential for fakery in
classrooms, which have enough fakery already, Elbow essentially dares teachers to
enact Freire for real, while forcefully expressing a view that they can’t or won’t—
and maybe shouldn’t. Given the rhetorical complexities of such a position, it is
not clear whether or when his tongue is in his cheek.
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A new millennium has since dawned, under the same sun, of course, that
illuminated the old one, and some predictable turns of history have followed
the migration of Freire’s arguments from Third World literacy projects to the
alien setting of U.S. education. One such turn has been a robust academic publication industry grown up around the concept of critical pedagogy, an industry never more than contingently related to the actual classroom fortunes of
Freirean or other “radical” teaching practices. How cynically one views the
proliferation of scholarship in the absence of pragmatic follow-through
depends on how one understands the relationship between theorizing and the
supposedly grittier business of doing the world’s work. A second predictable
turn is, let’s face it, the substantial failure to actualize Freire’s “principles,” certainly as Elbow articulates them, in the uncongenial culture of American
schools. The institutional realities that, for Elbow, make critical pedagogy
impractical remain solidly in place. Teachers work mostly as “supervisors,”
authorities, grade-givers, not as “collaborating allies,” no matter how circled
the desks or how animated the class discussion. The object of study remains a
state-sponsored curriculum, getting more prescriptive every year, and not the
concrete experience of students. Teachers continue, like most folks, to measure
out their lives in coffee spoons, unmotivated by revolutionary pretensions or at
least sensible enough not to confront institutional power if that’s what “changing the world” would require. Classroom practices are as rational, cognitive,
and unaffective as anyone could possibly devise, but they remain dedicated to
the problem-solving ideal of an advanced technological society well satisﬁed
with its collective ethos and material prosperity (however unequally distributed), not to the problem-posing ideal of a society conscious of its status as a
perpetual work in progress. Elbow’s pragmatic doubts about the adaptability
of Freirean practice turn out to have been prescient, even if unremarkably so.
Arguably too, his in-your-face challenge to teachers has laid bare anew the
academy’s capacity for self-bamboozlement, since scholars interested in pedagogy continue to speak energetically about something that is not actually happening. If Elbow’s intent, thirty years ago, was to expose phony textual
radicalism and ersatz political engagement, then the passage of time appears to
have validated his skepticism.
Still, it has always seemed to us that skewering radical chic was something of a
side issue in “Pedagogy of the Bamboozled,” certainly in the context of
Embracing Contraries, where Elbow’s larger purpose is to query the sufﬁciency of
any teaching practice and “embrace” the competing values that different practices represent. His pursuit of this end makes it reasonable to situate critical pedagogy within a constellation of such values, but we are struck by the pointed
critique of Freirean pretensions in an argument ostensibly seeking to balance

Pe dagog y for the B amboozled

67

opposites. Elbow wishes, after all, to hold “critical teachers” to a remarkably stern
standard if they are to avoid bamboozlement—higher, for example, than any
standard he invokes for prospective followers of Socrates, who is named as the
“locus classicus” of an alternative to Freirean pedagogy and whose method he
labels the “emulation or participation model of teaching”or, still more congenially, the “falling-in-love model” (96). However appealing the recollected image
of Socrates’s riverside dalliance with Phaedrus, we can’t quite forget the philosophic-gadﬂy intensity, the hemlock-drinking incorruptibility of Socrates’s practice, or ignore the likelihood that (pseudo-)Socratic teaching might have its own
potential to bamboozle—let’s say by claiming that it seeks the truth relentlessly
wherever truth may lie when it is “really” just posing a series of canned, selfanswering questions, predetermined to support a teacher’s biases. Since Elbow
(fortunately!) does not commit would-be Socratics to an all-or-nothing discipleship, his insistence on such a commitment from would-be Freireans, which then
makes the prediction of failure a self-fulﬁlling prophecy, seems unsporting at the
least. “It is not feasible,” Elbow insists, “for most institutional teachers to follow
the model laid down by Freire”; therefore, we should “examine scrupulously the
nature of our teaching” and “if it doesn’t ﬁt all four principles we can stop pretending, through words or implications, that we are engaged in an education to
help people be free” (94). But surely no model or theory, not Socrates’s, not even
Elbow’s, could survive such a test. That is, even “embracing contraries” is a philosophical ideal different in kind from the casual eclecticism of classroom life. It
entails an artful negotiation of alternative possibilities—“doubting” and “believing,” for example—in an integrated educational practice (see “Embracing
Contraries in the Teaching Process,” Embracing Contraries 142–59). Teachers will
fail in the application because theories are simpler than life, propositions that
neither fully comprehend the world nor adequately plot a course through it.
Ironically, given Elbow’s intent, the tactical ﬂaw in representing Freirean theory
as mere bamboozlement unless applied with requisite faithfulness is that such a
move also eliminates the theory as a meaningful “contrary” to embrace. The
logic of the argument from strict practicality is that Freire must be abandoned if
teachers are to avoid deception, not that his practice is always modiﬁed in the
context of other values.
As teachers who have appreciated Peter Elbow’s hard-nosed assaults on
bamboozlement in education, we want to accept his challenge, still echoing
across the rising sea of scholarship, to articulate the possibility of an American
critical pedagogy. We’re hardly the ﬁrst to attempt an adaptation of Freire’s
now familiar assumptions, but other theoretical justiﬁcations have steered
clear of Elbow’s inconveniently explicit terms. It’s important to begin, however, just where Elbow chooses not to begin, by recalling that critical pedagogy
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is an idea, not just a method—or better, a “practice,” not an algorithm. For
Freire, “practice” entails a dialectical relationship between action and reﬂection, each informing, each modifying, the other—an idea in action. Elbow is
content to measure Freire’s idea by doubting its practicality; we prefer to establish the value of the idea as stimulus for addressing the difﬁculty of implementation. Critical pedagogy is an idea that strives to reconceive the aims and
responsibilities, no less than the “methods,” of education. Broadly speaking,
the “idea” is to incorporate traditional areas of knowledge, including language
arts, within a framework of cultural critique in order to promote, through
“dialogue,” a community of “knowing subjects,” as Freire calls them, who apply
what they know to the practical challenges of social change. The teacher
regards the analysis and transformation of existing social relations as the central activity of democratic culture and views critical reﬂectiveness, therefore, as
the most important competence of an educated citizenry. Over thirty years, of
course, the idea of critical pedagogy has grown beyond Freire’s formulations,
incorporating materialist, feminist, postmodern, and other conceptual perspectives. Discordant voices have joined in lively conﬂict, from Dewey to the
Frankfurt Marxists, from liberation theology to the Birmingham school of cultural criticism. The work of Ira Shor contrasts with that of bell hooks, Henry
Giroux’s with that of Michael Apple, Jennifer Gore’s with that of Donald
Morton. But although the voices are (dis)arrayed across what Gore has called
“fragmented discourses” (6), we agree with her that they share, amidst differences, a certain “commonality of claims” (7–9). The importance of critical
pedagogy as an idea, and arguably the point of convergence among competing
theoretical vantage points, lies neither in explicit designs for cultural change (a
utopian perspective often critiqued in the literature) nor in speciﬁc methodological recommendations, but in its posing of problems that are not formulated in traditional American educational philosophies: its critique of social
life, its imagining of social change, its distinctive situating of education within
culture, and—if we may turn Elbow’s argument around—its sustained investigation of the various forces, forms, and techniques of bamboozlement, in education and elsewhere. Far from causing or encouraging bamboozlement, as
Elbow fears it does, the art of posing critical problems, we would argue,
enables the very dialogical encounters that can identify deception, misrepresentation, trickery, or mystiﬁcation and open them to inspection. Critical pedagogy is, in short, the antidote to bamboozlement.
The theoretical effort to pose problems is not a retreat into empty intellectualism, an escape from practicality; it is the starting point for practice—reﬂection
and action—since cultural critique is what reveals both the need and the opportunity for transformation. This critique may focus on forms of injustice—racial,
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class, or gender bias, corporate greed amidst worker layoffs, unfair housing practices. It may focus on relations between educational and other social realities—
literacy levels in the inner city, unequal subsidies for urban and suburban
schools, the relationship between income and academic success. Or it may interrogate realities within schools—the exploitation of teachers, the power arrangements in classrooms, the workings of the hidden curriculum. Always, the
critique presumes that the issues explored have relevance for pedagogy and
belong with the disciplined knowledges that teachers and learners should wish to
acquire. Some theorists, Ira Shor notably (Empowering Education, Critical
Teaching and Everyday Life), have accepted the added challenge of a practitioner’s viewpoint, even suggesting the work of Monday morning; but when they
do, they remember Freire’s advice to Donaldo Macedo in Literacy: Reading the
Word and the World: “I refuse to give so-called how-to recipes. . . . Educators
must investigate . . . conditions in their own contexts. . . . In essence, educators
must work hard so that learners assume the role of knowing subjects and can live
this experience as subjects. Educators and learners do not have to do the exact
same things I did in order to experience being a subject. That is because the cultural, historical, social, economic, and political differences [will] play a role in the
deﬁnition of the tense relationship between the educator and the learner” (134).
In general, when critical teachers move their theorizing to the classroom, turn
reﬂection into action, they import the motivating concern for a just society, concretize it for students through investigations of cultural conditions, reconceive
their disciplinary materials in critical terms, and “work hard,” as Freire puts it, to
create opportunities for students to “experience being a subject.” But the nature
of those opportunities, the nature of the “experience” itself, grows out of the realities and possibilities of a distinct educational setting.
For Freire, human beings as “knowing subjects” accept responsibility to
learn, not merely be taught, and to act, not merely be acted upon. Through
education, they improve their power to “perceive critically the way they exist in
the world . . . ; they come to see the world not as a static reality, but as a reality
in process, in transformation” (Pedagogy 56). Education in and for critical consciousness does not transform the world (except insofar as it may change the
school); rather, it works to develop the habits of mind that make transformation possible. It assists the emergence of the knowing subject, for whom awareness of the imperative of transformation derives from prior understanding of
conditions that jeopardize the continuing possibility of democratic culture.
Accordingly, the principal focus of educational work is reﬂection, a politically,
no less than intellectually, disciplined will to inquire rather than to take the
world on its own, apparently self-evident terms. Freire describes the habitual
stance of the “knowing subject” in The Politics of Education: “whether it be a
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raindrop (a raindrop that was about to fall but froze, giving birth to a beautiful
icicle), be it a bird that sings, a bus that runs, a violent person on the street, be
it a sentence in the newspaper, a political speech, a lover’s rejection, be it anything, we must adopt a critical view, that of the person who questions, who
doubts, who investigates, and who wants to illuminate the very life we live”
(198). Freire’s concern is, in a manner of speaking, very like Elbow’s, but more
encompassing: his concern is a world in which a lack of reﬂectiveness, an
uncritical assent to cultural “common sense,” and a docile immersion in history work for the most part inconspicuously, and therefore effectively, to
maintain existing social arrangements. His concern, more pointedly, is a world
awash in bamboozlement, where unequal privilege and opportunity are rationalized or mystiﬁed by the manipulations of political parties, corporations,
mass media, and even state-sponsored education, while the critical faculties of
the citizenry grow ﬂaccid from underuse.
Elbow is probably correct that the “doubting game” for Freire receives more
attention than the “believing game” (see “Methodological Doubting and
Believing” in Embracing Contraries 254–300), just as, arguably, there is more
room for the affective in education than Freire sometimes appears to provide
(we can think of more responses to a raindrop, a lover’s rejection, than critique).
But Elbow has introduced the issue of bamboozlement, even if limited to the
self-deceptions of certain teachers; and Elbow certainly recognizes, no less than
Freire does, that belief and bamboozlement make good partners—that misrepresentation and deceit are not easily perceived from the stance of the believer,
even, perhaps, the “methodologically” sophisticated one (282–84), let alone that
habitually uncritical human being who is (one of Freire’s darkest words) “naive.”
The naive person is one who submits to the power of cultural common sense—
“my country, right or wrong,” “you can be whatever you want to be,” “one
nation, under God, with liberty and justice for all”—thereby becoming easy
prey for bamboozlers. What makes “common sense” so mischievous is that it
evades one of those “stringent” tests for intelligent belief that Elbow cites from
Wayne Booth: “you have good reason to believe that all men [sic] who understand the problem share your belief ” (281). It’s the nature of “common sense” to
be uncritically believed—because it has lost its visibility as an argumentative
proposition—and scrupulous examination alone, Elbow’s “doubt,” can reveal its
non-necessity. American life is replete with representations that should cry out
for public inspection but that, instead, have successfully wrapped themselves in
the mantle of common sense. People speak glibly of trickle-down economics
amidst manifest, and accelerating, inequities in the distribution of wealth. Equal
opportunity has become reverse discrimination; new schemes for segregated
education are nostalgically presented as returns to neighborhood schooling;

Pe dagog y for the B amboozled

71

civil regard for the sensitivities of historically disenfranchised groups is mere
political correctness; laying off workers to increase proﬁts is framed as corporate
responsibility to stockholders; welfare is a free lunch for shirkers; the bombing
of civilians in war is collateral damage; incinerating wrongdoers in electriﬁed
chairs is getting tough on crime. Are these representations necessarily bamboozlements? Let’s just say they are splendid candidates for critical inspection and
reasonable examples of the type of unexamined assertion that might have preoccupied Freire had his work been here and now. Cultural common sense is not
always bamboozlement because it is not always deceptive; but it encourages the
possibility of bamboozlement because its formulations present themselves as
self-evident and therefore beyond debate.
Critical pedagogy investigates common sense, seeks in effect to “doubt” it, in
order to root out the bamboozlements that jeopardize free and fair communal
life. The effort does not presume some transcendent vantage point from which
deceit or mystiﬁcation is clearly visible (after all, if bamboozlements were selfevident, they would not be effective). It presumes instead the efﬁcacy of public
dialogue in which engaged participants evaluate, judge, and challenge public
representations, analyzing their claims, testing their integrity, weighing their
sufﬁciency. The trouble with common sense is not that it is false but that it is, by
deﬁnition, unreﬂective. The trouble with bamboozlement, meanwhile, is that it
is corrupt, a form of representation in which the complexity of experience is
wrongly simpliﬁed, whether through naivete, conceptual laziness, or malice, in
order to control or close off deliberation. If the representations above—
“trickle-down” economics, “collateral” damage, “neighborhood” schools, and
the rest—were to deserve the label of bamboozlement, the reason would not be
the argumentative stands they signify on complex issues (relying on investment
to prime the economic pump, tolerating casualties in order to win a war, using
the social network of a neighborhood to support a school). The truth of such
issues is not so readily discerned nor does it attach to liberal positions more reliably than to conservative ones. Rather, the reason would be that they willfully
simplify, distort, or mystify in a bid to manipulate the public mind. It might be
found, for instance, that the warm and fuzzy concept of “neighborhood” has
been allowed to obscure the reality of white, suburban enclaves competing
unfairly for resources with inner-city ghettos and barrios. It might be found
that the evocation of “toughness” on crime has been calculated to imply that
alternative views of the electric chair signify weakness, masking the likelihood
that the innocent are sometimes executed, while eliminating the possibility that
a desire to do justice without descending into savagery could be something
nobler than “bleeding-heart liberalism.” The issue here is not truth, correct conclusions versus false ones; the issue is honesty, a rhetoric of inquiry versus a
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rhetoric of manipulation, a practice of sustaining debate versus a tactic
designed to preempt it. Bamboozlements are not overcome by posing counterarguments, because they are not in themselves argumentative. They can only be
exposed for what they are, displayed for their naivete or intellectual laziness or
cynical distortion. The business of critical pedagogy is to scrutinize representations, rendering them problematic in and through public dialogue, not because
we know them to be bamboozlements but precisely because we do not yet
know, precisely because a free citizenry must remain alert to the possibility of
deception and manipulation.
Elbow worries about Freirean wannabes bamboozling themselves and their
students, though he also admits that teachers are, even at their worst, amateur
bamboozlers: “most teachers are not good at conscious deception. . . . They simply allow things to be fuzzy in their own minds” (“Bamboozled” 93). And the
worry is reasonable even if the (self-)deception derives from good intentions.
Were a teacher and her students to work together (in a writing course, say, or a
civics course) to examine the politics of representation through scrutiny of signiﬁcant public mystiﬁcations, the teacher would certainly be mired in bamboozlement if she believed, and led students to believe, that their isolated work
is changing the world. Innocence is not helpful even when harmless, and it is
not always harmless (particularly if the students are gullible or if school
administrators don’t appreciate the teacher’s enthusiasm). But if, for Elbow,
this “radical” teacher’s activity deserves critique, a move that her own pedagogical philosophy should encourage, how much more deserving of scrutiny are
the bamboozlements that she and her students are investigating, public ﬂimﬂams that do not, themselves, encourage public reﬂectiveness? And if the students’ efforts to identify bamboozlement are of limited effect, how much
greater might the effect be if a society of critical inquirers were engaged in the
same principled activity? To be sure, one bamboozlement does not justify
another: the teacher’s obligation is to consider more carefully the meaning of
her practice. But if it is possible to imagine such careful self-scrutiny, then perhaps it is reasonable to conclude that the ideal of a society of inquirers is an
appropriate aspiration for an educator.
We have certainly been bamboozled as teachers and have probably done our
share of bamboozling, including unreﬂective ventures in critical practice. But
it is not critical teaching that risks bamboozlement; it is teaching. We have been
at least as self-deceived in our conscious and unconscious involvement in traditional forms of educational practice that show themselves, on examination,
to be authoritarian, functionalist, and culturally biased, as well as unreﬂectively committed to such values as technological superiority, competition, and
the pursuit of merely individual prosperity. We have also been self-deceived by
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those more liberal practices, sometimes generalized as “process pedagogy,” that
seek to resist authoritarianism and functionalism, but that sometimes also
romanticize “expressivity,” “authenticity,” and the power of “self ”-actualization, thereby mystifying students and teachers alike about social and political
realities, such as school testing or the conventions of public discourse, that do
not readily accommodate “process” ideology. Bamboozlement is, of course, no
more necessarily linked to expressivist pedagogy than it is to critical pedagogy:
teachers can mystify themselves or others through any unreﬂective practice.
Indeed, that is the point: what opens the door to bamboozlement is unreﬂectiveness, not an “incorrect” or “unrealistic” educational philosophy. We would
add, however, that what makes critical pedagogy conceptually different from
other perspectives is not just its introduction of an altered philosophical
framework for teaching but the attendant concern to scrutinize representations, thereby rendering problematic the common sense knowledge forming
the silent backdrop of all our pedagogical activity, traditional, liberal, and radical alike.
Of course, if such a pedagogy is to actualize its potential, teachers must
understand its demands on them and ﬁnd explicit, culturally sensitive ways to
implement it. Elbow’s adroit playing of the doubting game effectively challenges American advocates to confront practical issues without hiding indeﬁnitely behind the disingenuous observation that critical pedagogy is, after all,
“just a theory.” So, let us face that discomﬁting challenge and explore the possibility of implementation by looking more carefully at how American teachers,
working in conventional school settings, might understand the four “principles” of Freirean practice that Elbow extracts interpretively from Pedagogy of
the Oppressed. As we do so, however, we propose to take unapologetic advantage of Freire’s invitation to imagine his practices in other social circumstances
than those in which they were ﬁrst formed, recognizing that American teachers
far more frequently confront the culture of privilege—middle-class students,
well-to-do, already literate, bound for success—than the culture of poverty
and oppression. In mainstream U.S. education today, critical pedagogy is not
for the poor and disenfranchised. It is for the bamboozled, only some of whom
are poor and disenfranchised. The principles are, once again, (1) the teacher is
an ally of students; (2) the subject matter is students’ own experience; (3) the
end is changing the world; and (4) the teaching and learning processes are primarily rational and cognitive. And let us start with the immodest notion of
“changing the world,” even though it comes third in Elbow’s original order,
since, of the four principles, no other is more immediately damaging to the
realistic possibility of a “critical” American classroom if it cannot be sympathetically recomposed. Why struggle over the nature of the teacher’s role or the
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substance of a syllabus if the end of the enterprise is either inconceivable or
unacceptable?
Surely, it is difﬁcult to conceive a less plausible ambition than the one Freire
refers to as “intervention in reality” (Pedagogy 81), the more so for American
teachers when Freire’s sources of theoretical inspiration range from Karl Marx
to Che Guevara. Elbow observes wryly that few teachers propose in their
classes “a particular set of partisan activities designed actually to change some
social, personal, or political situation” (“Bamboozled” 90), implying not only
that the end of a critical pedagogy is, on the face of it, impractical but also—
assuming that the word partisan means blind, prejudicial adherence to some
cause or faction—that it is wrong-headed. But what does it mean to change the
world? Freire, to be sure, speaks frankly of liberation, the “incessant struggle”
of oppressed people to “regain their humanity.” His pedagogy “makes oppression and its causes objects of reﬂection by the oppressed, and from that reﬂection will come their necessary engagement in the struggle for their liberation”
(Pedagogy 25). He speaks admiringly of “revolutions” in Cuba, Mexico, Bolivia,
which “broke open the closed structures of rural areas” (Politics 95). Freire’s
language, with its references to “oppression” and “struggle,” appears to equate,
and sometimes does equate, “changing the world” with political revolution.
Because his argument emerges from conditions of life among the poor in Latin
America and Africa, it fails to ring true, as Elbow seems to imply, for “ordinary” Americans (even those who may be economically disenfranchised) in
the mostly comfortable environments of U.S. life and education. But critical
theorists understand that “oppression” is a relative construction, as is the
“struggle” that responds to it. Concrete circumstances give speciﬁc meaning to
the notions of freedom and domination and also shape the imperatives, as well
as the strategies, of action. Notwithstanding the uncomfortable overtones of
revolution, Freire’s argument does not identify the transforming of reality with
catastrophic social disequilibrium or the dramatic overthrow of existing institutions. True revolution consists in the emergence of a new subjectivity among
dominated human beings (81–84), an educational and political project the
radicalness of which depends on the tolerance of an existing social order for
the dialogue of renegotiating reality. Repression of dialogue in apartheid-ist
South Africa proved over decades to have tumultuous consequences. By contrast, tolerance of dialogue in American political history, though that tolerance
has been sorely tested, has largely retained its social value even amidst the agitations of labor unions and civil rights activism.
To equate change with revolution is ﬁnally to misunderstand the nature of
change, to see it mechanistically, as though the “ordinary” condition of life is
stasis, a monolithic, imperturbable order that is rarely, and then only violently,
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destabilized as pressures build up within and overwhelm it, leading to a new
monolith. For Freire, however, it is change, not stasis, that is the natural condition of society because society is comprised of “uncompleted beings conscious
of their incompleteness” (Pedagogy 20), “restless beings incessantly pursuing a
fuller humanity” (24), beings forever “in the process of becoming” (57).
Critical thinking “discerns an indivisible solidarity” between the world and
human beings, perceiving reality “as process and transformation, rather than
as a static entity.” The mechanistic view of history, which Freire calls “naive,”
sees historical time as a “weight” that has yielded a “normal present” to which,
as a matter of “common sense,” human beings must accommodate themselves.
But for the critic, history is the “continuing transformation of reality, for the
sake of . . . continuing humanization” (65). The challenge of critical pedagogy
is to intervene creatively in processes of change that are always and necessarily
under way, not to deploy kamikaze politics in the vain hope of dismantling
massively impervious social institutions. The realistic possibility of directed
social change derives from this insight while the pragmatics of change derive
from analysis of existing social conditions.
Changing the world, then, is neither more nor less than “intervening in
reality.” Human beings ceaselessly change what we ourselves have made in the
ﬁrst place, although we are only able to participate in its re-making when we
ﬁrst perceive human beings to have been its makers, when we understand ourselves as subjects, not as objects of the will of others or of an ontological historical process. One function of pedagogy is to assist that understanding. But
just as a mechanistic view of change—stasis followed by revolution and a new
stasis—is unhelpful to understanding the possibility of critical intervention, so
too is a teleological view, which supposes that the aim or conclusion of intervention is social utopia—a preconceived political order. Utopian thinking presumes a “modernist” view of history, in which great individuals and great
events occasionally take society upward another notch in the long march
toward a perfected condition. A utopian understanding of change justiﬁes
Elbow’s concern about “partisan” activity on behalf of some explicit political
agenda, raising the specter of a “visionary” individual or group willfully
imposing on others. The modernist image of steady progress toward the end of
history is a damaging illusion that can lead to elitist and paternalistic formulations of intervention, denying equal participation in the project of transforming reality to those who lack the requisite genius, the latest technologies, the
“professional” expertise, the appropriate class afﬁliation, or the correct political vantage point. A desire to “save the masses,” to do something “for” the less
enlightened or the dispossessed, turns would-be progressives into the new
reactionaries, the latest oppressors. Freire retains a notion of “utopia,” just as
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he retains a concept of “revolution,” but he insists that “a true revolutionary
project, to which the utopian dimension is natural, is a process in which the
people assume the role of subject in the precarious adventure of transforming
and recreating the world” (Politics 82).
Human beings can and do work to change what they perceive to be limiting
to their potential to be more fully human. But the change is not controlled by a
privileged group, not “progressive,” not “developmental,” and not linear; rather,
it is a continuing process of critical reimagining in the pursuit of social justice,
typically a dispersion of slow, unpredictable communal “dialogues,” including
oppositional discourses, perhaps never fully aware of their tendencies, their
“bearings,” as they proceed. Change is what we see when we look backwards,
when we understand ourselves historically; it does not begin from a blueprint.
Dialogue can occur in any community setting—a church basement, a union
hall, a town meeting, a public school; it does not continue “on behalf of ” the
voiceless but rather, recognizing the entitlement of every citizen to speak,
insures a voice for everyone. The intent of critical pedagogy is to renew that dialogue wherever it has been silenced or perverted, to insure that all citizens have
opportunity—and requisite ability—to participate, and to assist the development of practices of inquiry that can unveil bamboozlement. The commitment
to full participation and the explicit challenge to bamboozlement are precisely
what separate Freirean dialogue from the current workings of practical
American democracy, where the debate may be animated—“democrats” and
“republicans” hammering away at rising costs of welfare—but where no one
scrutinizes either the common sense framing the terms of debate—“people
who won’t work should not expect handouts”—or the exploitation and oppression that such “common sense” enables. For Freire, common sense itself, with
its attendant bamboozlements, becomes the object of attention. And those who
are least enfranchised speak about the nature of their disenfranchisement.
There lies the “revolution.”
An issue that is crucially corollary to these problems regarding the nature
and possibility of social change is the relationship between “changing the
world” and “changing the school.” Elbow speaks at times as though schools
enjoy a reprieve from life, suggesting, for example, that Dewey is less radical
than Freire because he advocated a “laboratory” or “practice” kind of action
whereas Freire intends “to make a difference in the real world” (“Bamboozled”
90). Indeed, Elbow’s challenge of the practicality of a critical pedagogy begins
signiﬁcantly from the assumption that schools simply are what they are; we
should not pretend we are doing things that the realities of the school world
render impossible. To be candid with students, for instance, teachers should
explain up front the power arrangements that circumscribe school life, that
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render teachers and learners alike helpless before imposing institutional realities: this is my course and I have developed it without consulting you; credit
decisions are unilaterally mine; we are not studying your lives here but rather
my course materials; we are not trying to change the world; this is not education designed to make you free (94). His point in commending these frank
admissions is, however, less to draw critical attention to the power realities of
schooling—something that a critical teacher would seek to do in somewhat
similar terms—than to underscore, through overstatement, the seeming
impracticality of bringing that kind of attention to bear in the ﬁrst place. After
all, the prospect that Elbow envisions, large numbers of students simply leaving public schools in favor of alternative education, must rest on the dubious
assumption that students already wish for, and are determined to seek, the
freedom their teacher is telling them they cannot have in this classroom. Even
if such an assumption were plausible, the politics of such a move would seem
more reckless than productive since the teacher offers to say nothing more to
these freedom lovers than “Seek your freedom somewhere else,” when he
might have said, feeding off of their energy, “let us work where we are to analyze and change the conditions of schooling.” But the assumption is not really
plausible, and we doubt that Elbow wishes to be reckless. More likely, he wishes
to be truthful in emphasizing the limitations of critical pedagogy—but overstates the limits.
We agree, as Freire does, that there is no reason to assume that schools are
ideal locations in which to enact a critical pedagogy or, still less, to suppose that
schools are the point of origin for more comprehensive social transformation.
But we would add that there is no reason to assume that other locations are
better or easier or that the school is somehow less a part of the world than
other venues might be. We agree that the school does not readily permit a
redistribution of authority, but we would add that this reticence does not distinguish it from other institutions or other potential sites of critical engagement. The school is part of the world, and the contradictions inherent in
establishing critical dialogue there exist equally in establishing it elsewhere. The
larger point, which critical theory has explored in some detail, is that, while
schools do indeed function to reproduce existing social arrangements, they are
also, no less than other social institutions, sites of contestation, where competing social values, diverse constituencies, various pressures for conformity and
change vie with each other for authority. Hence, the school is as good a place
for dialogue as any, and as limited as any, and when school practices change, as
they surely do, something is different, not just in a laboratory that simulates the
world, but in the world. When teachers work to change the schools, therefore,
they work to change the world. This does not mean that what happens in
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schools constitutes the starting point for more pervasive social change. As
Freire notes, schooling is too deeply “rooted in the global conditions of society”
to serve as the “lever” of transformation (Shor and Freire 129). Changing the
school is part of changing the world, but it is not the agency by which the world
is changed. It is only the part of the world that teachers and students—along
with school administrators, parents, school board members, and other committed citizens, working collaboratively—can change.
Elbow’s other representations of Freirean practice are best reviewed against
the backdrop of this understanding of the school world—because they accurately presume a conﬂict between the sort of school that critical practice envisions and the kind of school that presently exists in American institutional
reality. There are two ways of responding to the remaining principles, therefore: one is to rewrite Elbow’s expression of them, accommodating the differences between American schools and Latin American “culture circles,” but the
other is to examine how existing school practice would need to be, and can be,
reconceived in order to meet their expectations. We propose to respond in
both ways. Consider the principle that the teacher must be a collaborating ally
rather than a supervisor of students. Elbow believes that the role of ally is
largely unavailable to classroom teachers, given the power arrangements of
schools, and would be inappropriate even if available to the extent that teachers are legitimately expected to be “credit-givers” (“Bamboozled” 88), not
intellectual comrades. In this formulation, Elbow presents teachers with stark
choices (rather than contraries to embrace): either be an ally or be a creditgiver; if they must be the second, then they cannot be the ﬁrst. To be sure, this
issue is less complex in the circumstances of Freire’s culture circles, noninstitutional, indeed countercultural, settings that do not implicate the teacher in the
accrediting actions of a state educational apparatus. But Freire’s reasoning
about the critical teacher is applicable beyond the culture circles if one appreciates his careful deﬁnition of the relationship between the teacher and the
learner. He establishes some contraries of his own for us to embrace, neither
usurping the critical authority of the student nor shirking the teacher’s role in
sustaining the practice of critical inquiry. “The role of an educator who is pedagogically and critically radical,” he writes, “is to avoid being indifferent, a
characteristic of laissez-faire educators. The radical has to be an active presence
in educational practice. But the educator should never allow his or her active
and curious presence to transform learners’ presences into shadows of the educator’s presence” (Literacy 140). What is ﬁnally at issue, Freire suggests, is not
the (naive) claim that teachers can give away their authority, can “empower”
students in the face of the overdetermined institutional reality of the school,
but instead the more plausible claim that the teacher can foster an atmosphere
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of critical engagement that includes learners as active subjects, while conceding, indeed drawing scrupulous attention to, the concrete circumstances of the
school world. It is in such a context that Elbow’s recommendation of cautionary statements a teacher might make at the beginning of a course could be
meaningful. His statements in that circumstance, instead of drawing ironic
attention to the unlikelihood of critical activity, would focus student attention
on the reality of school life, inaugurating a cultural investigation suited to the
oppositional aspirations of the course.
As Freire tells Ira Shor, the objective “is not for the teacher to have less and
less authority,” but rather that “the democratic teacher . . . never transforms
authority into authoritarianism” (Shor and Freire 91). Being an “ally,” then, does
not mean denying or evading responsibility as a teacher, including the responsibility to judge; it means trusting the reasoning abilities of the learner (Pedagogy
41), trusting the possibility that the learner can teach and the teacher learn (53),
understanding that it is not the mission of the teacher to domesticate the
learner by “giving” a knowledge that the learner can only depend helplessly on
the teacher, as expert, to provide (124). Nonetheless, rewriting Elbow’s version
of Freire’s “principle” does not explain away the teacher’s inescapable position
within the power arrangements of the school. Aronowitz and Giroux have
noted the importance of facing up to the “contradictory roles” that transformative intellectuals occupy in schools, earning a living within institutions that help
to produce dominant culture while offering “forms of alternative discourse and
critical social practices” at odds with the “overall hegemonic role of the school”
(40). The teacher does not, cannot, give away authority in the process of
becoming an ally. The teacher can only make authority a problem for critical
analysis and join with other teachers in the same practice, together creating
classrooms in which students are invited to examine “hegemonic” practices,
including the arrangements of schooling, and thereby assume roles as knowing
subjects. Through such a practice, teachers acknowledge the difﬁculties of critical engagement while also adapting strategies of engagement to the circumstances of the school world, confronting with learners that powerful silence
about themselves that schools, like other social institutions, depend on for their
reproduction of dominant culture. Does this effort count as changing the
world? In the larger sense, no, because of the practical limits of formal schooling for social transformation. As Freire laughingly tells Ira Shor, “I am not
thinking that when I say goodbye to the students I have twenty-ﬁve more revolutionaries. No, no! But what we may have after ﬁnishing the seminar is an
increase in the curiosity of the people.” Having asked new questions, having discovered a new critical awareness, perhaps some of those students “will become
much more strongly engaged in the process of transformation” elsewhere (Shor
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and Freire 130). Perhaps, too, the world of the school will have seen a transformation in how some teachers envision the practice of education.
Another of Freire’s four principles, according to Elbow, is that the object of
study “is the actual lives of the students and their perceptions of their lives,” rendered as problems for critical reﬂection. And once again, we must try both to
rewrite the principle in the context of American education and also to imagine
how ordinary school practice would need to be reconceived to accommodate
Freire’s intent. To be sure, the preparation of the culture circle entails the sort of
“anthropological” analysis that Elbow describes (“Bamboozled” 88), a prior
ethnographic study of the local reality of the peasants leading to a derivation of
generative words and themes from their life-world that will later form the substance of the literacy workshop (see Education for Critical Consciousness). These
words and themes then serve to relate the practical business of learning to read
and write to the cultural work of investigating the conditions of life evoked
through the generative language. Freire’s approach presumes learners who have
never experienced active control of the written word and who rarely if ever have
had motive or leisure to inquire systematically into the circumstances of their
lives. In short, his methods reﬂect his experience of a speciﬁc educational setting and do not transport to other settings, least of all the American school in
which broadly literate, media savvy students engage familiarly in superﬁcial
academic rituals of thinking, doubting, investigating, and discussing. But the
larger questions here go beyond pedagogical tactics and have to do with how
“knowledge” and “learning” are to be understood and how teachers and learners are to relate to each other in the pursuit of critical understanding. For all the
evident differences between the culture circle and the school room, one similarity stands out: in each case, the critical educator works with learners as they
become serious, active producers of knowledge, “knowing subjects,” rather than
passive recipients of information.
Focusing on the “actual lives” of students does not mean a “voyeuristic” preoccupation with their “private” experience of the world, nor does it mean that
education is “about” student biographies or “about” ﬁnding meaningful issues
with which students can identify—“drugs, sex, suburbs” (“Bamboozled” 89).
It’s worth underlining the fact that peasants in the culture circles are learning to
read and write: these activities constitute the proximate object of study. But
Freire does not conceive of reading and writing as mere technologies to be given
to people who lack them. Instead, these competences represent ways of understanding the world, ways of composing and recomposing reality. There is a reciprocity, therefore, a dialectic, between understanding the world and living in
the world—reﬂection and action—naming the world and changing the world.
“Actual life” and the perception of actual life are focuses of instruction, but they
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are dialectically related to the proximate object of study: each informs the other.
Hence, when Jonathan Kozol invites his learners to read or write such words as
‘tenement,’ ‘landlord,’ and ‘rat,’ instead of Dick, Jane, and Spot, his object of
study is equally the substance of literacy—sounds, letters, words, combinations
of words—and the reality that his learners experience, a reality concretized
through these words. When a college writing teacher invites her learners to read
Toni Bambara’s “The Lesson” and write about it in the context of sociological
arguments relating wealth and social class, she is teaching reading and writing—but she is also encouraging a critical perception of American consumerism, an investigation of students’ own images of The Good Life. In either
of these instances, writing and reading ultimately become ways for learners to
act upon their experience as “knowing subjects.” The formal curriculum of the
school represents, in Freire’s terms, diverse ways of understanding the world,
“knowing” it verbally, mathematically, historically, or physically. Learning disciplinary knowledges opens new possibilities not only for understanding the
world and students’ own positions in it, but also for transforming the world—
where change is conceived not as “improvement” through technological or
other advance but as continued negotiation, through dialogue, of free and fair
communal life. The object of study is precisely “the lives of students”—as some
disciplinary knowledge contributes to the composing and enables the recomposing of those lives, as a speciﬁc knowledge provides the lens for posing problems about the conditions of life.
But this adaptation of Freire’s principle to the school context sharply
deﬁnes the difference between what critical pedagogy envisions and what
American schools actually do. The school curriculum, far from representing
disciplinary knowledges as ways of understanding and acting in the world,
represents them as static, commodiﬁed bodies of information, designed to
“explain” the necessity or desirability of the world-as-it-is, while preparing students for docile service in it. Changing this perception of school studies
requires directing explicit critical attention toward the differences between the
two ways of conceiving knowledge, along with classroom enactments of
authentic disciplinary inquiry, consciously designed to oppose the inert transferring of information that Freire calls “banking” education (Pedagogy 45–59).
While these practices take time and energy to concretize as the work of
Monday morning, many teachers, indeed many students, are already allies in
the effort, even if they are not advocates of critical pedagogy. They recognize
already the dissatisfactions of lecture formats, the lack of engagement, the
deadening of curiosity. Consistent with the nature of social change generally,
the task is to intervene creatively in the midst of these dissatisfactions, seeking
to imagine alternatives. No doubt, the aspiring critical educator will encounter
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the problems that worry Elbow, including negative reactions from students to
an unfamiliar focus on dimensions of social experience ordinarily left outside
of school studies. The issues the teacher introduces may not seem “relevant to
the real lives of the students” (89) because students are not accustomed to
thinking of their lives, certainly their school lives, in critical terms. There could
even be some bamboozlement because the work is difﬁcult for teachers as well
as learners and the potential for missteps is signiﬁcant. But never mind: the
real bamboozlement perpetuated across the curriculum does not derive from
the clumsy aspirations of critical teachers; it derives from the well orchestrated
“banking” of reiﬁed, ossiﬁed information that schools settle for as a pale facsimile of learning. “Knowledge,” Freire says, “emerges only through invention
and reinvention, through the restless, impatient, continuing, hopeful inquiry
men [sic] pursue in the world, with the world, and with each other” (Pedagogy
46). The pursuit of this idea can tolerate some minor-league bamboozlement
along the way.
The fourth and ﬁnal principle that Elbow identiﬁes in Freirean method is an
insistence on rationality, critical thinking, the posing of problems. The opposition that most interests Elbow is that between “education as cognitive dissonance,” a model of skepticism, doubt, resistance, which he ascribes to Freire,
and “education as emulation or participation,” identiﬁed variously as the
Platonic, Socratic, Freudian, and Piagetian model. The second depends on
belief, trust, admiration, and a willingness to participate in, rather than resist,
“what is different from the self ” (“Bamboozled” 96–97). Elbow does not repudiate the ﬁrst in favor of the second: he intends here a real embracing of contraries. But he argues that a resistance model may be somewhat more
appropriate for adult Brazilian peasants, bamboozled for centuries by the
assumption that their misery is part of a divine plan, and proportionately less
appropriate for middle-class American adolescents already steeped in skepticism, isolated in their individualism, and fearful of dependency or commitment. We suggest, however, that Elbow has picked the wrong target when he
invokes Freirean liberatory rationality in what would otherwise be a plausible
critique of American adolescent alienation. The real target is the authoritarian
rationalism that currently dominates American schools and that may very well
encourage just the alienation that Elbow describes. Freire speaks of the “culture
of silence” that results when people are not free to speak their word. In such a
culture, people are “mute,” prohibited from “creatively taking part in the transformations of their society and therefore prohibited from being” (Politics 50).
Freire has in mind, to be sure, the oppressive conditions experienced by the
peasants in his culture circles. Yet how apt a metaphor is the “culture of silence,”
suitably modiﬁed in the context of American education, for characterizing
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sullen, apathetic students whose school days are comprised of lectures, artiﬁcial
discussion, and cold attention to ideas they are not invited to own, explore, or
even react to as something meaningful in and for their lives. Alienation is a
response to bamboozlement, ineffective but understandable. Freire has much
to say, by contrast, about the comradeship, the mutual trust, the selﬂessness
that come to exist among teacher-learners and learner-teachers involved
together in projects of cultural transformation. He can imagine an “unquiet
pedagogy,” a critical stance, that does not entail alienation—that promotes just
its opposite, communal engagement, faith in a productive future, commitment
to an articulate public pursuit of social justice.
We acknowledge, with Elbow, the dehumanizing impact of authoritarian
rationalism in American education, and we support, as he does, the need for
belief, afﬁrmation, and commitment outside the self. We also think that liberatory rationality responds to that need by imagining a culture of creative dialogue to supplant the culture of silence. And we suspect that there is little in
that imagining with which Peter Elbow, long-time foe of bamboozlement and
long-time advocate of “unquiet pedagogy,” would disagree.

6 NEW USES FOR DOUBTING
Thomas G. O’Donnell
The doubting game represents such a thirst for certainty that it tends to
confuse certainty with truth. This confusion is so widespread that many
people equate the two. Yet they are fully distinct. Whether a proposition
is certain or whether it is true are very different matters. Your behavior
and the results of your inquiries are likely to be very different according
to how greatly you insist on certainty.
Peter Elbow
The clarity Austin seeks in philosophy is to be achieved through mapping
the ﬁelds of consciousness lit by the occasions of a word.
Stanley Cavell

I think it likely that many writing teachers have encountered my ﬁrst epigraph,
taken from the appendix essay of Peter Elbow’s expressivist classic Writing
Without Teachers. That essay, entitled “The Doubting and Believing Games: An
Analysis of the Intellectual Enterprise,” can be read as a critique of ingrained
habits of doubting coupled with speculations about the consequences of those
habits. Elbow does not deny that doubting has an important place in intellectual work, but he argues that its success has rendered us myopic, unable to see
the value of believing in coming to understand ideas, claims, and persons. “The
monopoly of the doubting game,” Elbow writes, “makes people think the
doubting muscle—the sensitivity to dissonance—is the only muscle in their
heads, and that belief is nothing but the absence of doubt” (Writing Without
Teachers 162). The monopoly that concerns Elbow is most pronounced in the
scientiﬁc community, and although he contends that falsiﬁcation procedures
do not dominate scientiﬁc methods to the extent often assumed (150, note #7),
the ﬁgure of the skeptical empiricist, poised to disprove, looms large in our
psychoepistemological landscape. And, because the material provisions of the
sciences are so tangible—vaccines, contact lenses, cell phones—these successes
inadvertently champion disproving and doubting as approaches to knowing.
The provisions of believing are not so clear, at least in material terms, and it is
one of the aims of Elbow’s essay to draw out those provisions.
It is unfortunate that the doubting and believing games have not been taken
more seriously as seeds of an expressivist epistemology, or even—if such a
thing can be imagined—an expressivist angle on ideology construction. In
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promoting believing as a source of knowledge, Elbow is engaging skepticism
while simultaneously showing how consequential the need for certainty can
be: “Your behavior and the results of your inquiries are likely to be very different according to how greatly you insist on certainty” (179). An “ideology,” in
Kenneth Burke’s words, “is like a spirit taking up its abode in a body: it makes
that body hop around in certain ways” (Language 6). Elbow’s call for more
attention to believing cannot help but be a call for a certain ideology: people
hop around in certain ways depending on their predisposition to believe or
doubt; the need for certainty inﬂuences how we behave in the world we think
we know, among the persons we think we know. I haven’t enough space here to
pursue these rather large ideas, but my discussion hints at them, perhaps
assumes them. My more modest aim is to reﬁne Elbow’s doubting and believing games by marking a distinction between doubting as an activity and doubt
as a reaction to a claim. Then, while tracing congruities between Elbow’s
dialectic and the procedures of ordinary language philosophy, I will demonstrate how reactions of doubt can guide investigations of meaning.
Ordinary language philosophy follows out the implication of Wittgenstein’s
dictum that the meaning of a word is its use in the language. In the early 1940s,
Wittgenstein shared the reigning assumption of his day that ordinary language
was too coarse and imprecise for philosophical discourse. His later work, especially Philosophical Investigations, takes this assumption to task and shows the
extent to which philosophical problems are created by special demands being
made of ordinary words. Many philosophers came to share Wittgenstein’s
assumptions and imitate his methods, including Norman Malcolm, J. L.
Austin, Rush Rhees, John Wisdom, and G. E. M. Ansombe. These philosophers
treat different problems, but they all share the conviction that philosophical
clarity results from returning words to their ordinary uses, their everyday contexts. What’s most distinctive about them, then, is not a set of beliefs but a
shared conﬁdence in a method, a particular way of doing philosophy. What is
their relevance to the teaching of writing? J. L. Austin, the philosopher I discuss
in this essay, refers to ordinary language philosophy as “linguistic phenomenology,” and although that’s quite a mouthful, the phrasing strikes me as an apt
description of what goes on in writing communities well trained in believing;
in such communities, words and expressions are phenomenologically assessed
by inserting the self into the experiences of the person using the word or
expression. Elbow and philosophers who proceed from ordinary language
locate meaning in communal norms of use,1 and both authorize individuals to
speak as representatives of the their native language. These assumptions help
explain why reactions of doubt—resistance to a use of language—can be so
useful as indicators of where a sustained investigation of meaning is needed.
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Because I speak as a representative of what English speakers do, uses that trouble me stand a decent chance of troubling others, not because we share opinions but because we share linguistic practices that depend on conformity
(Writing Without Teachers 54–55).
To establish a sense of how doubting and believing work in practice, I begin
with a portion of Richard Straub and Ron Lunsford’s Twelve Readers Reading:
Responding to College Student Writing, in which Elbow is one of the featured
respondents to an essay entitled “Street Gangs,” by a student writer referred to
as “Rusty.” Included in the narrative is a vague but provocative description of
what it felt like to be a member of a gang:
Being a member had its ups and downs. The worst part was being paranoid about
something happening to you. It wasn’t a frightening feeling, but more like a burden.
You knew something, somehow, would eventually happen, either to you or the gang.
Many times I paid the price for being a part of the Cripps with black eyes or broken
noses. I even had my windshield busted once. (102)

In the margin next to this paragraph, Glynda Hull, another respondent to
“Street Gangs,” writes; “This is a great way to describe the paranoid feeling.” I
suspect that most teachers would share Hull’s interest in the description—a
feeling related to fear, it seems, “but more like a burden”—but praising it may
be premature since it also raises a number of questions. In distancing the feeling
from just plain fear, is Rusty securing his meaning (intention) against implications of acuteness, perhaps conceiving of typical fear states as sudden, such as
when one reacts to the approach of a speeding car or a snarling dog? Is the word
“burden” intended to associate qualities of endurance with the fear, removing it
still further from an acute experience? Ultimately, Hull may be right—the feeling is simply a species of paranoia—but there is work involved in ﬁnding out.
In his response to the same portion of “Street Gangs,” Elbow is also provoked by the description of burdensome fear, but he has more questions than
he does praise. More to my point, it seems as though he lights on the passage
for different reasons than Hull—he is not quite able to believe the description
Rusty offers so he requests more to go on, more to experience. There is a sense
that Elbow has gone the extra mile to try on the feeling for himself, but in the
end, he needs more to work with:
What I noticed ﬁrst are the places where you talk about your feelings while being in
the gang: the oddly, interestingly, low-key “burden” as you put it. I would feel ﬂat out
fear. Also the feeling of comfort and support and family-quality. Seems important. I
would enjoy getting a bit more exploration here: but not just ﬁnding more words for
it but more examples: what does all that look like in events or scenes? (104)

Ne w Us es for Doubt ing

87

Glynda Hull approaches Rusty’s words from a stylistic angle, while Elbow is
engaging the language on an experiential level, calling for more scenes, sensing
that more showing stands the best chance of bridging the gap between the feeling Elbow is able to conjure and the feeling Rusty wants to convey. What needs
special attention is that Elbow is enacting a method as he works out his
response and that what he responds to is prompted by the dissonance he hears
in Rusty’s description. Instead of allowing himself to pass over it, however, he
engages the believing game, the dialectic of experience—“the more you get ideas
and perceptions into the most fully experienced form, the better it works”
(171). In his response to Rusty, Elbow is after a richer, more textured background of sights and sounds and events; he is after ideas in their “most fully
experienced form.” Writing teachers are in the habit of asking students to “show
not tell,” but usually for stylistic reasons, our attention ﬁxed on a ﬁnal product.
Elbow’s work reminds us of the underplayed phenomenological reasons for
scenes: readers sometimes need to be shown sights and sounds in order to get a
foothold for belief, in order to insert themselves into the situation and assess the
writer’s words inside out. It is this process of self-insertion that ﬁnds a parallel
in J. L. Austin’s philosophical procedures.
As a description of Austin’s philosophical procedures, “linguistic phenomenology” captures the way his methods rely on imagining oneself in a detailed situation and saying certain things in or about that situation. In most cases, Austin
pursues distinctions in the language that can prove consequential, but that usually pass us by until we ﬁnd ourselves in rhetorical straits that inspire close
inspection of what we say and mean. It’s only when we weigh our words that they
weigh in on us and force an awareness of their meanings. Austin wants to ﬁnd out
what certain words mean, but he wants to ﬁnd out what they mean when we use
them. He cannot, in other words, accomplish his philosophical aims by citing dictionaries because the data he seeks must be gathered by eliciting and comparing
what “we” (speakers of English) say when we ﬁnd ourselves in certain situations.
One might say Austin is interested in the pragmatics of language, whereas dictionaries illuminate only semantic questions. Aligning meaning with use, Austin
ﬁnds the investigation of “what we say when” to be more philosophically fecund
than constructing “ideal” languages (e.g., logical notations) precisely because in
so many instances the conceptual problems that vex the philosopher are rooted in
confusions about what is meant by some ordinary word or expression. The phenomenological aspect of his procedures is evident in his use of detailed scenes he
sometimes refers to as “stories.” My favorite is from “A Plea for Excuses”:
You have a donkey, so have I, and they graze in the same ﬁeld. The day comes when I
conceive a dislike for mine. I go to shoot it, draw a bead on it, ﬁre: the brute falls in
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its tracks. I inspect the victim, and ﬁnd to my horror that it is your donkey. I appear
on your doorstep with the remains and say—what? ‘I say, old sport, I’m awfully
sorry, &c., I’ve shot your donkey by accident’? Or ‘by mistake’? Then again, I go to
shoot my donkey as before, draw a bead on it, ﬁre—but as I do so, the beast moves,
and to my horror yours falls. Again, the scene on the doorstep—what do I say? ‘By
mistake’? Or ‘by accident’? (Writing Without Teachers 185)

When I cited this example at a conference, one participant suggested that
Austin’s case is unﬁt for marking the subtle distinctions he intends to display:
“In that situation,” the objection went, “who would be parsing their words so
deliberately? You just killed someone’s donkey!” This point is not a challenge
to Austin’s methods but a clariﬁcation of them: if there is signiﬁcant hesitation
about use after placing oneself in the imagined situation—if there are serious
doubts as to what one would say in or about that situation—the case simply
fails to elicit the kind of data Austin is after. The words and expressions must
come forth on their own; they must be evoked, not imposed. In both of
Austin’s stories, there is a donkey corpse not far away, and we are at the injured
party’s doorstep preparing to offer an excuse. What should be said? What matters in these stories, of course, is not the fact of the dead donkeys but the
machinery of action characteristic of the shootings. The resources of the
English language, Austin wants to show, dissects this complex machinery with
remarkable precision.
When your donkey moves and I shoot it, I’ll explain it as an accident, but
when the animals are mismarked, I shoot your donkey by mistake. What is the
lesson here? We sometimes mistake one thing for another, but we also experience problems at the level of execution, and these latter cases tend to be called
“accidents.” I’m not aiming for your donkey when I shoot it by accident: my
preparation is sound, it’s just that your donkey moves into the line of ﬁre.
When I shoot it by mistake, the execution goes off without a hitch, but a problem occurs at the planning stage; I shoot the donkey I wanted to shoot while
shooting, but I had mistaken yours for mine when I marked them. These are
not the kinds of distinctions revealed by dictionaries. My American Heritage
tells me a mistake is an “error or blunder,” but this is vague synonymy when
contrasted with the results of Austin’s stories. We don’t learn meanings from
dictionaries but from interested exchanges with other interested speakers;
Austin’s cases recreate and amplify salient aspects of those exchanges. In both
stories, I shot your donkey—the bald fact is the same—but they are partitioned
when preliminary action sequences are considered: marking the wrong donkey
in the one case, your donkey unexpectedly moving in the other.
For Austin, discoveries about what we say and mean require us to “imagine
the situation in detail, with a background of story” (183). Again, there are clear
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afﬁnities with Elbow’s believing game and what it requires of participants.
Elbow writes, “it helps to . . . try to get inside the head of someone who saw
things this way. Perhaps even constructing such a person for yourself. Try to
have the experience of someone who made this assertion” (149). In insisting
that assertions be treated as utterances—words people say and mean in conceivable circumstances—both the philosopher and the writing teacher are
assuming that language is most likely to deceive when it is disengaged from the
intentions and interests that accompany its uses. When ordinary language
philosophers solicit phenomenological data by asking what we say and when
we say it, the issue “is one of placing the words and experiences with which
philosophers have always begun in alignment with human beings in particular
circumstances who can be imagined to be having those experiences and saying
and meaning those words” (Cavell, “Avoidance” 270). Elbow’s attention to
Rusty’s low-key, not-quite-fear “burden” is provoked by a sense of dissonance.
There is a temporary misalignment between the phrasing and Elbow’s imagined experience. His response to “Street Gangs” initiates a dialectic of experience in which Rusty is invited to take the next step.
II.

“Tolerance of paradox,” writes Christopher Burnham, “is a hallmark of
expressive rhetoric” (156). This seems true of Elbow: we have to believe, we
have to doubt, and we have to learn how to do both of them well if the dialectic is to be productive. There are serious questions that Elbow does not address
in his essay about how these potentially contradictory activities are to be balanced, especially in the largely provisional and often unpredictable setting of
classroom discussion. When should one believe and when should one doubt?
Is there an optimal sequence? If the doubting game is played ﬁrst, are the
results that come from believing thereby contaminated? I can’t answer all of
these questions, but this much seems true: if we defuse the dogmatic rejection
that can accompany reactions of doubt when we read certain claims and questionable uses of language, it is possible to pinpoint where the doubting and
believing games are likely to be productive. Consider an essay by a ﬁrst year
writer on the subject of procrastination; it was offered in a classroom workshop by a student I’ll call Steve. I want to show the extent to which my reactions to certain assertions—my initial predilection to believe or doubt
them—dictate my responses to the essay.
The Last Minute
It seems that everyone has some weird or awkward habits but mine is just annoying and very bad for me. My bad habit is that I never ﬁnish an assignment when I
ﬁrst get it, rather I wait till the very last minute to do it. That’s right I’m one of those
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guys you usually only read about (even in this case). I’m a PROCRASTINATOR. I
have no idea why I do it. There have been many times where I have set aside time to
do something but still don’t do it.
I originally started this assignment talking about a different little quirk of mine. I
then noticed that it was twelve thirty and realized that I had done it again. I wish I
had thought of doing this paper on procrastination earlier. I might have actually ﬁnished but then again, I doubt it.
The fact that I do wait until the last minute started when I was in grade school.
Twelve o’clock at night, the day before it was due and I would decide to ﬁnally start
that two month science project. It drove my mother crazy. She would rant and rave for
days after. She would tell me what God awful thing she would do to me if it were ever
to happen again. Then sure enough, when the big project was due, it happened again.
I have come up with a lot of different theories for why I do this and all of them
are stupid. My ﬁrst theory is that I guess subconsciously I think that if I wait long
enough, I won’t have to do it anymore. It’s like I told myself, I’ll have it done in a certain amount of time and when that time is up the project will be done. I realize this
is stupid but when the last thing you want to do is a report or a paper, you’ll fall into
any traps.
Another reason I procrastinate so much is that I am very easily distracted.
Especially if I am doing something I would rather not do. For example I just stopped
writing for about ﬁve minutes to fool around with a lighter next to me then walked
out in the hall to see if anyone was out there. Another major distraction of mine is
that I sometimes stop in the middle of a thought to turn on the TV or the radio
which is nothing but distractions.
The last and major reason for procrastinating is that I simply don’t want to do it.
“Why do today what you can put off until tomorrow.” I keep thinking I’ll have more
time to get it done. This really hurts when it comes to library books or movie rentals
because I usually run up ﬁnes. It’s also horrible when I get a bill that I have a week or
more to pay and set aside. Then when it comes time for it to be paid I either forget
about it or I’ve lost it.
What it all boils down to is stupidity. Why would I spend time sitting around on
a normal day when I feel bored out of my mind. When I could do whatever it is that
has to be done. Instead I may spend an entire day doing nothing but watching TV
and then complain when I can’t go out that night because I still have a paper to do.
It drives me crazy and I still do it.

Many teachers, I’m sure, have received essays similar to “The Last Minute.” In
some ways it reminds me of the quasi-Zen performance documenting why the
writer cannot write, a ruse I get every ﬁve semesters or so (e.g., “I didn’t know
what to write about, so I roamed the hall of my dorm to get some ideas, but
then I noticed that the window of the laundry room was wide open and . . . ”).
But there’s more here than a pointless narrative written solely to ﬁll space and
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get an assignment done. What struck me while reading “The Last Minute” was
how contradictory my responses were and how my level of interest changed so
dramatically as I weighed different claims and ideas. After a second reading, I
found myself unable to resolve two lingering doubts. The ﬁrst is trivial—I’m
not sure whether procrastination can be considered a “habit”. The second is far
more consequential—I doubt Steve would really be willing to count “not wanting to do something” as a legitimate “reason” for putting something off, at least
in straits where he really cares about the problem.
Notice that I’m voicing reactions to claims and ideas, not trying to disprove
them. I am not, in other words, engaging in the doubting game. I am documenting and explaining reactions of doubt in order to get at their source. My
doubts are interested doubts. I want to ﬁnd out why they arise and where they
lead, not declare and maintain them, the danger Elbow notes: “The doubting
game . . . reinforces hanging on. Defending something against all attacks
rewards the universal tendency to hang on at all costs to what you have” (185).
In responding to Steve’s essay, I want to transmute dissonance into questions
and cases that will unpack my doubts. Instead of “hanging on to what I have,” I
am compelled to ask questions about the uses and meanings I do have and why
I might or might not want to defend them. One assertion that provokes these
kinds of questions begins the sixth paragraph: “The last and major reason for
procrastinating is that I simply don’t want to do it.” It’s not that I doubt this as
a major reason; I doubt that it will count as a reason at all in most cases of
putting things off. It is crucial to remark, though, that the doubt I have about
this claim emerges against the background of things Steve has already led me
to believe. Take another look at the far more promising approach he takes to
the problem earlier in his essay:
My ﬁrst theory is that I guess subconsciously I think that if I wait long enough, I
won’t have to do it anymore. It’s like I told myself, I’ll have it done in a certain
amount of time and when that time is up the project will be done. I realize this is
stupid but when the last thing you want to do is a report or a paper, you’ll fall into
any traps.

This is not a full-blown theory, but it’s the start of one. Steve identiﬁes
deceptive self-talk as part of the problem, and I think he’s right. He acknowledges that when the self-talk is made explicit, it sounds ridiculous, but he goes
on to note that when the task that needs doing is “the last thing you want to
do,” you may be vulnerable to methods of coercion that would ordinarily fail.
The other aspect of procrastination mentioned—distraction—also strikes me
as relevant. These two ideas immediately have me believing them. If believing
is conceived in Elbovian terms as a “dialectic of experience,” I can say that these
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ideas resonate with my experience: I also “tell myself ” that things I’m putting
off will just somehow get done; when facing an unpleasant chore, I also ﬁnd
myself susceptible to distractions that would never seduce me on other occasions (if I’m sitting through an infomercial I’ve seen before, there’s a good
chance I’m avoiding something). These aspects of procrastination are also evident in things I have heard other people say. A former professor confessed that
whenever he had to prepare a paper for a conference, he found himself scrubbing his toilets. Chore-like distractions, if I may extend Steve’s idea, mitigate
the stress of procrastination more effectively than distractions that are impossible to construe as a chore because they can evoke a sense of accomplishment
and congratulatory self-talk that obvious distractions like watching television
cannot.
The insights in “The Last Minute” that have me believing are precisely those
that have me thinking. The theory of self-talk goads me to assemble my own
experiences and investigate them; the lines of thinking inspire me to ask questions of others about their own struggles with procrastinating. Against this
background of productive thinking, “The last and major reason for procrastinating is that I simply don’t want to do it” comes across as conspicuously
unhelpful. To put it another way, I doubt it. The “reason” evokes dissonance in
me, but this dissonance is more indicative of what I do as an English speaker
than of who I am as a person or what I believe about procrastination.2 In order
to get at the source of my doubts about Steve’s ﬁnal “reason,” Austin would
insist on creating a few stories in order to get some concrete data as to when
and why reasons are accepted or rejected. There is, for example, a familiar
species of cases in which an interlocutor takes advantage of the multivocality
of “reason” and is self-servingly selective in the kind of reason he offers: if I ask
my nephew why he sprayed his sister with the water hose, “to get her wet” is
not the kind of reason I want. He’s telling me what he wanted to accomplish—
something I already know—but the question goes to motive, not goals.
Offering reasons, this simple cases shows, can be a complicated language game.
How about a case that speaks more directly to procrastination: if I were to
ask someone why they are putting off some unpleasant but mandatory task
like ﬁling their tax return or getting their wisdom teeth pulled, would “I don’t
want to do it” sufﬁce as a reason? Probably not. It’s a poor candidate precisely
because procrastination typically involves postponing the unpleasant. Upon
hearing such a reason, I’d be thinking, “I know you don’t want to have your
teeth pulled—who would—I’m assuming you’ve got to have the procedure
done and putting it off only makes things harder.” At best, then, Steve’s reason
can serve as a reminder that procrastination usually entails putting off the
unpleasant, but it certainly lacks the explanatory force of his hunch about
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deluded self-talk. If you’re putting off having your teeth pulled because you’ve
been telling yourself the condition will disappear on its own, we’re at least on
our way to addressing the problem.
These cases help me understand dissonance I merely sensed upon reading
“The Last Minute.” I come away convinced that “not wanting to do it” is a poor
“reason” for why someone is procrastinating, but also with a heightened sense
of the intricacy involved in offering reasons and accepting them. Still, it’s
worth considering that my stories are loaded; because “not wanting to do it”
did not satisfy me as a reason, my scenarios worked to amplify this dissatisfaction. Elbow and Austin would urge me to ﬁnd out what it would take to believe
the assertion. Can a story be told in which “not wanting to do X” sounds like a
“reason” for not doing X instead of a reminder that X is unpleasant? My best
effort is a situation where a person’s wants are difﬁcult to comprehend, hence a
prominent component of the problem. Someone may put off cashing a winning lottery ticket. In such a case, “I don’t want to do it” may, in fact, preface an
illuminating explanation of the procrastination because the looming mystery
is why an action most people would run to do is being postponed. In such a
situation, the admission that the anticipated desire is absent is an important
one. In the contexts Steve mentions, however, it is the unpleasant, not the
exciting or immediately rewarding, that is being put off. The function of “not
wanting to do it” then, is to redeﬁne, not to explain or account for or analyze—
activities writing teachers tend to look for and encourage.
In “After Theory: From Textuality to Attunement with the World,” Kurt
Spellmeyer laments that “What gets lost in the semiotic universe is the crucial
distinction between ‘codes’ and ‘signs,’ which simply ‘signify,’ and the living
words that foster a ‘felt’ resonance between ourselves and the world” (906).
Elbow’s believing game, well played, has the capacity to bring about a felt resonance with living words even when it is difﬁcult. By inserting ourselves into the
experiences of others, we can hear their words differently and allow initially
troublesome claims and expressions to mean something different from what
we were able to hear the ﬁrst time. I have been championing the pedagogical
value of “felt dissonance.” When a use of language seems curious or wrong,
when a meaning is being sought but not conveyed, a sense of doubt need not
unleash efforts to disprove. Instead, doubt can play a phenomenological role;
dissonant reactions can help pinpoint words and uses that require ﬁnding out
“what we say when” by considering cases and stories we are able to believe.
Sometimes, dissonance is in the head of the reader, not the words of the writer,
and all that’s needed is another reading. Sometimes instances of dissonance
turn out to be pedestrian troubles with diction—a use evokes doubt simply
because it is incorrect. Sometimes, however, words and expressions that we
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doubt need a patient investigation in order to sort out legitimate disagreements from confusions about meaning. “A disagreement as to what we should
say is not to be shied off,” writes Austin, “but to be pounced upon: for the
explanation of it can hardly fail to be illuminating” (184). For teachers inspired
by Elbow, pouncing on disagreements about meanings requires, ﬁrst and foremost, believing those meanings. If this seems a difﬁcult task, that’s because it
often is. If it seems a paradoxical task, that’s because it is representative of the
kind of epistemological temperament that marks the expressivist tradition.

NOTES

1. Expressivists, I realize, have been attributed with “the conviction that reality is a
personal and private construct” (Berlin, Rhetoric 145), but Elbow is quite clear
about the role of community in determining meaning; in fact, learning the language is largely a matter of repeatedly “giving in” to communal norms of meaning and use:
When an individual speaker means things by a set of words which the community of listeners does not “hear,” he tends to give in to the community and
stop meaning things by those words. . . . Similarly, when an individual listener
hears things in a set of words which the community of speakers do not mean,
he also tends to give in to the community and stop hearing those meanings or
stop being aware of having those meanings. (Writing Without Teachers 155)

2. Reasons have, as Wittgenstein would say, a grammar. If someone asks me why I
am carrying an umbrella on such a sunny day, the reply that “I thought the bus
would be late” would probably not stand as a reason, not because of some linguistic preferences on the part of the questioner but because of how “offering
reasons” tends to proceed among English speakers. To emphasize this point in a
different way, the criteria for whether a reason will count as a reason have nothing to do with intentions. As Hanna Pitkin explains, speakers may use “by mistake” and “by accident” interchangeably, suggesting they may think the phrases
are identical in meaning, but the distinctions in the language are retained. They
are simply being ignored:
Even if a great many people ordinarily use “by accident” interchangeably
with “by mistake,” the patterns in our linguistic system—in those same people’s linguistic system—continue to distinguish the two terms. To obliterate
the distinction one would have also to talk of “trafﬁc mistakes” as readily as
“trafﬁc accidents,” to talk of “making an accident” as readily as “having an
accident.” The distinction in meaning is there, in the language, whether or not
we are educated and attentive enough to make use of it. (15)

7 BELIEVING IS NOT A GAME
Elbow’s Uneasy Debt to Michael Polanyi
M. Elizabeth Sargent

With every year that passes, I become more and more aware of the profound
impact Peter Elbow’s work has had on my theory and practice of teaching writing. But I also ﬁnd myself wondering nearly as often why Elbow’s work doesn’t
always get the serious attention it deserves—to mention one particularly
incomprehensible instance of this, his complete absence from a lengthy bibliography of the ﬁeld which Andrea Lunsford produced for MLA in 1992. I’ve
ﬁnally concluded that Elbow’s powerful misreading of Michael Polanyi’s inﬂuential work may be partly to blame. Elbow quite simply gives too much away—
by his own standards—when he writes about believing as a game and about the
“tacit dimension” (Polanyi’s phrase) as magic, opposing it to reason (Writing
With Power xxii, xxvi). It was precisely here, in altering and widening our deﬁnition of the rational to include—as central and necessary, not peripheral—the
tacit and belief, that Polanyi’s major contribution was located.
I take Elbow seriously as a theorist: his work deserves the most careful theoretical discriminations we’re capable of making, with a close attention to
chronology and change in his thought. In examining one of the founding documents in our ﬁeld, a text that exists in two closely related but distinct forms—
“The Doubting Game and the Believing Game: An Analysis of the Intellectual
Enterprise” and the later “Methodological Doubting and Believing”—and the
extent to which both were inﬂuenced by Polanyi’s work, I am concerned not
just with setting the record straight, but with the continuing fruitful development of our discipline. In all ﬁelds, scholars go over and over foundational documents to tease out every nuance, paying particular attention to moments
where the thought seems to take a wrong turn or grow tangled. Similarly, we
need to give Elbow’s doubting and believing essays the meticulous reading and
Recurring references to works by Polanyi and Elbow will be abbreviated in the text as
follows: “The Doubting Game and the Believing Game”—“DGBG.”; Embracing
Contraries—EC; Everyone Can Write—ECW; Knowing and Being—KB; Meaning—
M; “Methodological Doubting and Believing”—“MDB”; “Polanyian Perspectives”—
“PP”; Personal Knowledge—PK; Science, Faith and Society—SFS; The Tacit
Dimension—TD; Writing With Power—WWP; Writing Without Teachers—WWT
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critical rereading they deserve. This essay attempts one such rereading, attending to difﬁcult intersections with Polanyi’s theory, because chasing the thought
back to the source of the difﬁculty might give us a chance to start over and carry
the thought forward in a more productive direction. If we are able to do this, we
can do so only because of the particular way in which Elbow misread Polanyi,
only because of his sensitivity to a particular line in Polanyi’s thought and the
generosity with which Elbow has expressed his indebtedness to Polanyi’s work.
Consider, for example, one of the passages Elbow cites, in which Polanyi
argues that our use of language is itself sufﬁcient to reveal that belief is the crucial and primary power of the human mind:
A child could never learn to speak if it assumed that the words which are used in its
hearing are meaningless. Or even if it assumed that ﬁve out of ten words so used are
meaningless. And similarly no one could become a scientist unless he presumes that
the scientiﬁc doctrine and methods are fundamentally sound, and that their ultimate premises can be unquestioningly accepted. We have here an instance of the
process described epigrammatically by the Christian church fathers in the words
ﬁdes quaerens intellectum, faith in search of understanding. (SFS 45)

The Hungarian-born medical-doctor-turned-research-scientist Michael
Polanyi published these words in 1946 in his ﬁrst book, two years before he
ofﬁcially shifted his focus to philosophy of science and epistemology by
exchanging his chair in Physical Chemistry at the University of Manchester for
a chair in Social Studies. Peter Elbow read Polanyi’s Personal Knowledge (1958)
in the late 1960s; and certainly anyone familiar with Polanyi’s work would be
struck by the extraordinary echoes of Polanyi everywhere present in Elbow’s
Writing Without Teachers (1973), but most obviously in Elbow’s appendix
essay to that volume (“DGBG”).
In the recent reissue of Writing Without Teachers (WWT), Elbow—in a new
introduction—acknowledges his intellectual debts, the formative reading that
fed into that early book. To use a phrase from David Bartholomae, Elbow’s
early published pages were “crowded with others” (“Writing” 63): Elbow lists
seventeen by name, from Ken Macrorie to Peter Medawar, from Carl Rogers to
Jerome Bruner. But the second name on this long list is Polanyi’s:
His rich and monumental book Personal Knowledge made a huge impression on me
when I read it. . . . I learned more from him than it would be easy to say, but certainly I owe a large debt for my thinking about the believing game; he talks about
the “ﬁduciary character of doubt.” He stresses the need to make use of what is tacit,
unarticulated, and known by the body. He provides a larger picture of rationality
and knowing. (xxviii)
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In a little-known essay on Polanyi published in 1991, Elbow goes a bit further:
I read Polanyi a long time ago. . . . I’m indeed embarrassed at how deeply I had internalized and perhaps not credited his thinking. (“PP” 5)

Then, commenting on the passage above from SFS, Elbow continues,
The Polanyian phrase is “ﬁduciary transaction,” which suggests the act of belief
that’s necessary, that underlies any act of knowing. I cite Polanyi in my doubting and
believing essay (EC 258), but I see now that merely citing him doesn’t do justice to
the degree to which I had simply internalized his point and was essentially borrowing it. And the “ﬁduciary transaction” is central to my teaching. When I write and
when I try to help my students write, the necessary thing is the act of trusting it, the
act of believing it. Freewriting is an act of believing that meaning will come. (8)

Elbow explicitly mentions Polanyi in WWT only twice (173, 189), yet
Polanyi’s inﬂuence is clear on almost every page. What I want to do here is suggest, ﬁrst, how accurate Elbow is when he says he had deeply “internalized” and
“not credited” Polanyi’s thinking (even at those moments when he quarrels
with it), and second, how, nevertheless, his formulation of the believing and
doubting games is signiﬁcantly at odds with Polanyi’s insights. For Polanyi,
believing can never be as detached or as reversible as Elbow’s formulation of it
as a “game” or a “method” suggests. Elbow’s take on Polanyi may have been
strategically necessary and effective at the time, but I’ll argue that some of the
continuing resistance to Elbow’s work grows out of two reactions: an uneasiness with Elbow’s wavering theory of knowledge, and, an underlying sense that
deep un-game-like beliefs are being asserted or threatened.
In doing so, I won’t be able to claim that I’m taking up the full challenge
Elbow issues in his new introduction to WWT: yes, I hope to engage “at the
theoretical level” with the substance of his argument about “the epistemological strengths of the doubting and believing games,” but I can’t promise to do so
by “using the doubting game or critical thinking . . . on [his] argument to see
what we can learn” (xxv–xxvii), at least not in the way that Elbow means those
terms. My thinking has been irreversibly shaped by both Polanyi’s and by
Elbow’s; this does not mean that I am unable to answer back to them or to
raise questions about parts of their intellectual frameworks, but I can do so (as
Polanyi says in relation to the language in which we think and speak and write)
only by relying acritically on the rest of those frameworks as I analyze or criticize one part of them at a time. In fact, some of the critiques of his own work,
which Elbow describes but dismisses as having misunderstood or misrepresented what he was saying (xxvi–xxvii in “Introduction to the Second Edition”
of WWT), fail precisely because they have not believed or indwelt Elbow’s
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work enough. Elbow, characteristically, might hope to have it both ways—to
have a thoroughgoing doubting of his argument that nevertheless fully understood it—but I’m not sure that he can.

In an attempt to make explicit Elbow’s debts to Polanyi—and to highlight
what I see as the uneasiness of those debts—I lay out below eight theses on
how Writing Without Teachers builds from Personal Knowledge.1
1. Without Belief, There Would Be No Knowledge
The insistence on belief in Polanyi’s Personal Knowledge clearly inﬂuenced
the appendix essay in WWT, on the third page of which Elbow echoes Polanyi’s
often-repeated use of Augustine’s formulation credo ut intelligam—“I believe in
order to understand” (PK 266)—although Elbow mistakenly attributes it to
Tertullian, who actually said, “I believe it because it’s impossible.”2 Of course,
Tertullian would leap to mind in relation to the Through the Looking Glass epigraph with which Elbow opens both versions of the doubting and believing
essay—“sometimes I’ve believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast.” An emphasis on the role of belief in all knowing is central to both Elbow
and Polanyi but is also the site of their primary disagreement (and in ways that
correspond closely to Elbow’s revealing confusion between Augustine and
Tertullian here); I will return to the role of belief at the end of this essay.
2. Doubt Has Been Overvalued as The Only Way to Arrive at Trustworthy
Knowledge
“The Critique of Doubt” is the title of the ninth chapter of PK. Clearly,
when Elbow announces on the third page of his WWT appendix that “this
essay is an extended attack on the doubting game” (149), he is linking his project with Polanyi’s. He emphasizes that “somehow the doubting game has
gained a monopoly on legitimacy in our culture”; since Descartes, we have
come to believe that “the way to proceed to the truth was to doubt everything”
(150). The result is that an intellectual who doubts in the twentieth century is
seen to be “rigorous, disciplined, rational and tough-minded” (151).
The echoes from Polanyi’s “Critique of Doubt” are remarkable:
It has been taken for granted throughout the critical period of philosophy that the
acceptance of unproven beliefs was the broad road to darkness, while truth was
approached by the straight and narrow path of doubt. We were warned that a host
of unproven beliefs were instilled in us from earliest childhood. . . . We were urged to
resist the pressure of this traditional indoctrination by pitting against it the principle of philosophic doubt. Descartes had declared that universal doubt should purge
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his mind of all opinions held merely on trust and open it to knowledge ﬁrmly
grounded in reason. . . . The method of doubt . . . trusts that the uprooting of all voluntary components of belief will leave behind unassailed a residue of knowledge
that is completely determined by the objective evidence. Critical thought trusted
this method unconditionally for avoiding error and establishing truth. (PK 269)

However, Elbow—in both “DGBG” and in “MDB”—differs from Polanyi in
presenting doubt and belief as equal opposing binaries, both effective methods
for establishing the truth. Polanyi’s project is to reveal how inadequate “the
method of doubt” is for the production of knowledge; he continues the above
passage in this way:
I do not say that during the period of critical thought this method has been always,
or indeed ever, rigorously practiced—which I believe to be impossible—but merely
that its practice has been avowed and emphatic, while its relaxation was marginal
and acknowledged only in passing. (269–70)

By the time of Embracing Contraries thirteen years later, Elbow declares a
fuller disagreement with Polanyi on the issue of doubt and belief (contrast
“MDB” 267–68 with PK 272–73, 276), but it’s clear even from this early point
(“DGBG”) that Elbow is willing to grant more powers to systematic doubt
than Polanyi ever is.
3. When We Say That a Theory or a Finding Will Be Fruitful, We Are Saying We
Believe It to Be True
Elbow’s second direct mention of Polanyi in “DGBG” comes near its close:
People like Thomas Kuhn and Michael Polanyi give an account of the history of science to the effect that . . . important cruxes are settled by something very like the
believing game. . . . At a period of scientiﬁc revolution—when competing paradigms
or models are up for grabs—it is as it is with readings of a poem: the wrong paradigm is not proven wrong; rather [scientists] perceive another one as more fruitful
and indeed truer. They perceive this truth from within it, not from without.
(189–90)

Elbow rightly adds “and indeed truer,” recognizing Polanyi’s impatience
with those who would use circumlocutions to avoid acknowledging their
reliance on a theory or a ﬁnding to do their intellectual work—referring, for
instance, to the beauty or elegance or explanatory power or fruitfulness of a
theory instead of to its truth (PK 147). But Elbow signiﬁcantly does not qualify
his use of the word “fruitful” as Polanyi would: Polanyi insists that it is the
“intimation of a theory’s fruitfulness” to science, not the fruitfulness itself, that
is a primary criterion for scientiﬁc truth (148). That is, we must be willing to
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admit we are trusting an intimation of the fruitfulness of a hypothesis, based
on our informed judgment, since we cannot know ahead of time whether a
particular theory will be fruitful or not: “At the stage when we have to make up
our minds about the merits of a discovery its future repercussions are still
unknown” (147–48). Polanyi argues that the trained instincts and intimations
of the scientist—indeed, of an explorer in any ﬁeld—play a key role in the
selection of productive problems to work on and lines of inquiry to follow.
Elbow, however, insists from the start that we must not select: “Believe all the
assertions. If you merely look through the pile and pick out what seems truest,
that would be the guessing game or the intuition game, not the believing
game” (148). We will return to this important disagreement between Polanyi
and Elbow below, noting here simply that for Polanyi random guessing and
trained intuition would be distinct behaviors.
4. Explicit Knowledge Always Relies on Tacit Knowledge and on Distinctions
Between What Is “Focal” and What Is “Subsidiary”: Thus, Indwelling Is “The
Very Mechanism for Knowing” (“DGBG” 173)
Elbow nowhere uses Polanyi’s term “indwelling” in “DGBG,” but when he
contrasts the doubting game—dedicated to the attempt to “extricate the self ”
from the propositions being tested—to the believing game—“built on the idea
that the self cannot be removed: complete objectivity is impossible” (172)3—
he makes his other explicit reference to Polanyi:
It takes practice over time . . . to learn to “project” more in the good sense—to see
more of what’s really there by getting more of the self into every bit of it. . . . The
believing game is built on the idea that you can’t get away from projection since it is
the very mechanism for knowing and seeing—and that the culprit is not projection
but inﬂexible and limited projection. . . . The believing game emphasizes a model of
knowing as an act of constructing, an act of investment, an act of involvement: what
Michael Polanyi calls “the ﬁduciary transaction.” (171, 173)

For Elbow, the impossibility of objectivity is closely related to the nature of
perception, to the fact that both thinking and perceiving are “active and constructional” (171).4 Yes, the active shaping nature of perception and the necessity of indwelling make mistakes inevitable, but they also make knowledge
possible. However, by the time Elbow publishes Writing With Power eight years
later, indwelling has become an emotional, even magical, practice, as Elbow’s
description of “a more magical view . . . this act of putting-yourself-in” (368)
makes clear. Polanyi, however, emphasizes that the way we use tools—focusing
not on how the hammer hits our palm with varying pressure, but on where the
hammer hits the nail—is structurally identical to how we use all intellectual
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tools, everything from microscopes to telescopes to X-rays to language. All of
our knowing has this from-to structure: that is, we are relying on something
subsidiarily, often tacitly, pouring ourselves out into it, while we focus on whatever it is we want to know or discover. If we suddenly shift focus—concentrate,
say, on how the wooden handle of the hammer touches our palm—we momentarily lose our ability to hit the nail. Elbow’s emphasis on freewriting owes a
great deal to this distinction between the focal and the subsidiary in Polanyi’s
work, as Elbow himself acknowledged ﬁfteen years after WWT, reﬂecting on a
key passage in PK:
“We pour ourselves out into [our tools] and assimilate them as parts of our own existence. We accept them existentially by dwelling in them. . . . Our subsidiary awareness
of tools and probes can be regarded now as the act of making them form a part of our
own body” (PK 59). Then [Polanyi] makes one more turn into the next paragraph:
“Hammers and probes can be replaced by intellectual tools.” That is, we use words and
language as tools in the same way. I take the hammer, I take the cane, and in a sense I
pour my body out into the end of the thing so I don’t feel like I’m touching the hammer or the cane but rather the nail or the street. I do the same self-pouring into language. This seems a potent, pregnant theme in Polanyi; I’m struck in retrospect with
how much I got from it and how it informs what I do. . . . Freewriting: pouring yourself into the act of writing, indwelling in the tool. (“PP” 6–7)

Polanyi’s distinctions between focal and subsidiary awareness helped Elbow
articulate one of his crucial insights, the necessity of separating the composing
process from the editing process. However, Elbow wavers between wanting to
reproduce the old binaries Polanyi set out to discredit and redeﬁne—between
objective and subjective knowledge, between rational and emotional/magical
ways of knowing—and wanting to acknowledge, as Polanyi insists we must,
indwelling as a deeply rational, structural principle on which all knowing
depends.
5. The Languages We Are Born Into Inevitably Immerse Us in Theories about
the Nature of Reality, Simultaneously Limiting Us and Equipping Us to
Think Further, Even to Challenge Those Theories.
According to Polanyi, it is the interplay between these two kinds of awareness, focal and subsidiary—the shifting of our focus from our meaning to our
symbols and back again—that extends our powers of thought. Carefully deﬁning articulation (language) to include all symbolic representations, from maps
to mathematical formulas to words, Polanyi argues that temporarily focusing
on our tools, on an element that was previously subsidiary—to complicate or
challenge or reﬁne or explain it—can lead to important discoveries (PK 115).
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Alternating between using our symbols as tools and attending to them “represents in miniature the whole range of operations by which articulation disciplines and expands the reasoning powers of man” (131). Thus, while Polanyi’s
primary aim—like Elbow’s—is to allow us to trust language, to dwell in it, to
pour ourselves into our tools to get work done, his epistemology (again, like
Elbow’s) also requires that we challenge language, that we examine our tools,
improve them, or toss them out and get new ones. But he insists we can never
challenge all of them at once: a full-scale doubting of our entire socially created symbolic framework would render us imbeciles (295).
Elbow, too, argues that the rules for meaning building are tacit: they “are
not explicitly set down and agreed to. . . . Our rules for building meaning into
words are unspoken and are learned by doing” (“DGBG” 154). While there is a
constant tension between what an individual wants words to mean and what
various overlapping speech communities are willing to let them mean at that
moment, language also has to follow certain other guidelines—economy, ﬂexibility, redundancy, ambiguity (see 167, 1575 ). The debts to Polanyi’s ﬁfth chapter, “Articulation”—(PK 77–117), which draws on the work of linguists to
engage “in an epistemological reﬂection on the relation of language to its inarticulate roots” (77 n.1), are stated explicitly in Elbow’s 1988 talk at MLA
(“PP”), but they are also clear in WWT. Polanyi, like Elbow, insists on the necessary imprecision of language—since language must be ﬂexible enough to be
applied to new experience—and on our inability ever to get outside it. As contemporary critics have pointed out from other vantage points, language writes
us. Polanyi puts it this way: every word we learn and use is a theory about the
nature of reality (see PK 80–81, 104–5, 95).
6. All Knowing Is Inherently Social
Elbow argues that both the believing and the doubting games are inherently
social (176). Throughout WWT runs the assumption that writing and language are social activities, that words have meaning only within speech communities, and that these meanings are constantly shifting slightly as we talk
and write to each other. The teacherless writing class is dedicated to the principle that “when an individual speaker means things by a set of words which the
community of listeners does not ‘hear,’ he tends to give in to the community
and stop meaning those things by those words” (154)—with the important
exception, of course, of the powerfully original writer who makes us hear “in
an utterance what [we] never used to hear in it” (155).
As a scientist, Polanyi naturally pays particular attention (in Chapter 7,
“Conviviality”) to the complex workings of the scientiﬁc community in policing and preserving the integrity of science: the convivial nature of knowledge

Belie v ing is Not a Game

103

involves overlapping networks of mutual control that exist within and between
disciplines. In fact, Frank Kermode and Wayne Booth both, like Elbow before
them, draw on this aspect of Polanyi’s thought in relation to the idea of consensus in interpretative communities (see Art, 157–61, 168–84; Dogma 120).
Polanyi emphasizes the social, communal nature of all knowledge and the
necessity for challenging and revising each other’s ﬁndings; while individuals
do challenge the scientiﬁc community (indeed, the growth of science depends
on their doing so), they can’t challenge all of it at once—and they can only
mount an effective challenge after serious apprenticeship and submission to
science and identiﬁcation with most of its skills, standards, and concerns (PK
206–8; cf. EC 96–97).
7. All Knowing Is Rooted in the Body
To ask how I would think if I were brought up outside any particular society
is as meaningless as to ask how I would think if I were born in no particular
body, relying on no particular sensory and nervous organs (PK 322–23).
In his new introduction to WWP, Elbow stresses the importance of Sondra
Perl and Eugene Gendlin’s contributions to our thinking about “felt sense,”
about our ability to sense where we connect with meaning in the body (xvi);
but ten years earlier, he had already made the connections he saw between
Polanyi’s work and theirs explicit, citing PK (71):
The famous word in Polanyi’s work, of course, is “tacit”. . . . Polanyi is getting at the fact
that what we can say rests on a foundation of what we can’t say. He talks at length in
Chapters 4 and 5 of Personal Knowledge about the paradox that what humans achieve
through language actually rests on a root ability that we share with animals and
infants—the root ability to simply match a sign or symbol with an experience. . . .
Polanyi wants us to honor and develop and dignify the inarticulate. Gendlin and Perl
have developed a teaching practice that trains people when they put out words to stop
for a minute and say, “Wait, is that what I wanted to say?” Eugene Gendlin’s work,
focusing on the bodily dimensions of that question (which of course ﬁts Polanyi too),
suggests for writers a reﬂective routine. . . . A related teaching practice is freewriting,
writing out of inarticulateness, writing when you don’t yet know what you want to say
and trusting it—plunging into the unknown. The practice of freewriting follows from
this Polanyian insight about the priority and fecundity of the inarticulate. . . . In short,
we know more than we can say. (“PP” 5–6)

Elbow clearly found Polanyi’s emphasis on the “bodily roots of all thought”
(TD 15; cf. KB 147–48, 183–85), on the physical roots of language, congenial. The
inseparability of mind and body is central to Polanyi’s work: “To a disembodied
intellect, entirely incapable of lust, pain or comfort, most of our vocabulary
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would be incomprehensible” (PK 99). But for all his emphasis on the personal,
bodily, social, and limited nature of all knowing, Polanyi’s stress—like Elbow’s—
is on how we can arrive at trustworthy knowledge. Polanyi sees all knowing existing on a continuum between the knower and the known, the person discovering/
creating/upholding knowledge on one end and the claim/discovery/creation
itself at the other. He never abandons what he refers to as the “universal pole” of
personal knowledge: skillful knowing claims to reveal something about reality,
and “any presumed contact with reality inevitably claims universality” (313). A
believer in socially constructed knowledge—Polanyi would say there is no other
kind—he simultaneously insists that this constructed knowledge is not whimsical or arbitrary: in any search for truth, the freedom of the discoverer/producer
of knowledge “to do as he pleases is overruled by the freedom of the responsible
person to act as he must” (309). Knowledge is always simultaneously both created
and discovered in Polanyi’s epistemology; Elbow speaks in similar terms in
“MDB” when he suggests that the interpretation of texts, hermeneutics, is a useful model for all knowledge, a paradigm revealing the world as always, simultaneously, both “given” and “made up” by perceivers (298).
8. The Hunger for Certainty Should Not Be Confused with the Search for Truth
“What kind of truth do you need?” Elbow asks in the appendix essay:
There is a dirtier and a cleaner truth, and the believing game settles, much of the
time, for the dirtier kind: truth mixed with error. . . . There is a contrast here
between the thirst for certainty and an acceptance of uncertainty and ambiguity.
The doubting game . . . tends to confuse certainty with truth. This confusion is so
widespread that many people equate the two. (“DGBG” 177, 179)

Indeed, Polanyi argues in PK that “truth mixed with error” is all we have: there
is no “cleaner” kind. Since we would have no truth, no knowledge, not even any
facts, without people who were committed to and upholding that truth or that
knowledge or those facts and since we could always conceivably be mistaken, in
whole or in part, no truth is certain. Polanyi talks about three factors that jointly
determine scientiﬁc value, that is, how precious a particular hypothesis or ﬁnding
is to science: (1) certainty (precision or accuracy); (2) systematic relevance; and
(3) intrinsic interest. He argues that science can be very precise indeed about
many things that are not in and of themselves very interesting to science, let alone
to anyone else, and that within scientiﬁc ﬁelds these “three criteria apply jointly, so
that deﬁciency in one is largely compensated for by excellence in the others” (136):
The scientiﬁc value of biology is maintained at the same level as that of physics by
the greater intrinsic interest of the living things studied, though the treatment is
much less exact and coherent. (139)
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Polanyi then extends these values to all disciplines, arguing that each discipline has a kind of precision natural and appropriate to it and is thus equally
valuable to human knowledge. Absolute certainty or precision is worth little
indeed in the absence of the other two values. Elbow appreciated Polanyi’s
insistence on appropriate forms of precision in different ﬁelds of inquiry:
Though the believing game produces less precision, what I wish to stress here is that
it does represent a huge advance in precision over undisciplined thinking. And that
using the doubting game in the realm where it doesn’t work is nothing but undisciplined thinking. (“DGBG” 173–74)

Elbow connects this hunger for certainty with the “itch for closure,” our
impatience for answers, our unwillingness to dwell in uncertainties, complexities, contradictions: the parallel with Keats’s “negative capability” is close. All of
WWT is an extensive, carefully articulated, and effective heuristic device
designed to help writers resist the urge for too-early closure and for spurious
forms of certainty. Thus, as with any heuristic device, its only true readers are
those who, in the words of Elbow’s dedication, “actually use it—not just read
it,” who fully test its usefulness in practice, who, in Polanyian terms, indwell it
long enough to make it a fully operative extension of their bodies or use it as a
lens to look through (M 36–37; Elbow, incidentally, also uses the metaphor of
the lens, “MDB” 283, 299).
However, of course, once a reader has done this, the existential change, the
change in his or her being, is irreversible. It is on this issue in particular—the
irreversible nature of indwelling, tacit knowing, and belief—that Polanyi and
Elbow part company.

Insofar as the late 1960s began the last three decades of intense scholarly
activity in the ﬁeld of rhetoric and composition, Elbow is one of the founders
of that ﬁeld. He worked out some crucial concepts for the discipline in reaction to Polanyi’s thought; like all founders, he got many things right and some
wrong. Polanyi functions here as a similar authority in another ﬁeld, an epistemologist who got certain things wrong and many right—for example, his
later work with Harry Prosch on literature and metaphor (in M) is frustratingly unsatisfactory: he could have learned a lot from Elbow. My own experience using Elbow’s theories and practices in the classroom over the past
fifteen years has convinced me that they work—and not because of Elbow’s
account of how they work, but because of Polanyi’s. I’m also convinced that
it’s a matter of some importance that we figure out not only that Elbow’s
methods work, but why.
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In the eight theses above, I’ve argued that Elbow drew on Polanyi for his
formulation of the doubting and believing games, in WWT in particular. In
Embracing Contraries, a collection of essays written between 1965 and 1986,
Polanyi’s inﬂuence is still clear: he is cited only ﬁve times throughout EC, but
as in WWT, his thinking leaves its mark throughout. And the ﬁnal essay in that
book, “Methodological Doubting and Believing: Contraries in Inquiry,” in its
very title reveals the continuing debt to, argument with, and backing away
from Michael Polanyi’s thought. The project of “attacking” doubt has been
softened in the second version (contrast “MDB” 258 with “DGBG” 149); the
emphasis on hermeneutics, the interpretation of texts, as paradigmatic for all
knowledge has been heightened. Elbow has a more assured sense of his epistemological project in the second version (300), claiming that in the absence of
certainty, our task is to ﬁnd “valid” or “trustworthy knowledge” (296—the
echoes of Booth are strong here). However, what seems from the essay’s title to
have been meant as a great stride forward—believing and doubting systematically, methodologically—was in fact present in the earlier essay (“Believe all the
assertions,” 148; cf. p. 10 above)—and underscores the major differences
between Elbow’s views and Polanyi’s.
Polanyi worked to accredit a scientist’s trained intuitive ability to select, to
ask good questions, and to identify worthwhile problems: any systematic
attempt to believe everything would be irresponsible, a waste of scientiﬁc
resources (PK 124). Polanyi argues that we have to accredit our ability within
our individual disciplines to recognize what counts as a serious hypothesis
within our ﬁeld and to make decisions—decisions which, of course, could
always be mistaken—about which hypotheses deserve further investigation.
Elbow’s emphasis on believing as a systematic game disregards the limitations
on our believing time and energy.
Unlike Elbow, Polanyi warns us from the start that “Personal knowledge is
an intellectual commitment, and as such inherently hazardous” (viii). Precisely
because of the bodily roots of all thought, the way we place our bodies in space
and time makes irreversible changes in us—we arrive at discoveries already
committed to them:
The change is irrevocable. . . . Having made a discovery, I shall never see the world
again as before. My eyes have become different; I have made myself into a person
seeing and thinking differently. I have crossed a gap, the heuristic gap which lies
between problem and discovery. (143)

Further, once we do see differently, nothing can relieve us of the responsibility of acknowledging the assumptions on which we rely to guide our thinking
from that point on. In his section on “The Critique of Doubt,” Polanyi argues
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that modern science is a system of beliefs just as circular and unassailable by
doubt as the superstitions of the Azande tribe (288 ff.); nevertheless, he afﬁrms
that he and his fellow scientists believe that the framework of contemporary
science offers them a closer relation to reality than the beliefs of the Azande do.
He does not argue that he and his fellow scientists are wrong to do this—only
that they must responsibly acknowledge that they cannot themselves (and
could not, ever) prove irrefutably all of the scientiﬁc assumptions upon which
they rely. Further, within the framework of modern science, controversies
develop that cannot be solved by carefully presenting one’s irrefutable data:
Formal operations relying on one framework of interpretation cannot demonstrate
a proposition to persons who rely on another framework. Its advocates may not even
succeed in getting a hearing from these, since they must ﬁrst teach them a new language, and no one can learn a new language unless he ﬁrst trusts that it means
something. (151; cf. SFS 45)

Thus, Polanyi argues, it can be extraordinarily difﬁcult to “persuade others
to accept a new idea in science”:
[T]o the extent to which it represents a new way of reasoning, we cannot convince
others of it by formal argument, for so long as we argue within their framework, we
can never induce them to abandon it. (PK 151)

No list of good reasons (cf. Booth)—no matter how full, how long, or how
good—is ever sufﬁcient to force someone across a logical gap into a new intellectual framework. Elbow may be right that only a stance something like what
he calls the believing game—some imaginative willingness to indwell a new way
of seeing, to take the time to learn a new language—may allow such changes to
take place. Indeed, Polanyi suggests something similar, an “intellectual sympathy” enabling others to “listen sympathetically. . . to a doctrine they have not yet
grasped” (151); Martin Buber describes it as physical action, a “bold swinging—
demanding the most intensive stirring of one’s being—into the life of the
other” (“Elements” 81).6 But systematic, methodological attempts to believe
everything that is difﬁcult or impossible to believe are unrealistic: Elbow gives
too much away when he uses the word “believing” in this way.7 Intellectual
beliefs are life-changing; Polanyi speaks of them as “conversion[s]” and “selfmodifying act[s]” (PK 151). Elbow’s critics are correct when they refuse to
accept his proposal that the believing game is safe or reversible—it is neither.
And it cannot be a game. Crucial issues are at stake about how we are going to
invest our limited life energy and time.
At many points, Elbow seems close to admitting this (see “MDB” 270); at
one point, he seems almost to be answering an objection from Polanyi: “Am I
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seeming to say that there is nothing about commitment in the believing game?
Not quite” (284). But he always ends up claiming that the beliefs can be temporary (270, 284).
Polanyi disagrees: “We must now recognize belief once more as the source
of all knowledge” (PK 266). Our beliefs can be mistaken or inadequate, and
they can certainly change; our next beliefs may replace or build on or complicate or challenge our current beliefs—but our current beliefs are not simply
reversible: they inﬂuence our behavior and our subsequent beliefs; they have
consequences over time.
I have tried to demonstrate that into every act of knowing there enters a tacit and passionate
contribution of the person knowing what is being known, and that this co-efﬁcient is no mere
imperfection,but a necessary component of all knowledge.(312)

Polanyi insists that belief is prior, is the root of all knowing, is the essential
power of the mind:
The learner, like the discoverer, must believe before he can know. . . . Such granting
of one’s personal allegiance is—like an act of heuristic conjecture—a passionate
pouring of oneself into untried forms of existence. (208, as quoted in “MDB” 264)

Elbow relies on Polanyi’s discussion of indwelling and the structure of tacit
knowing in the ﬁnal chapter of WWP, citing for the ﬁrst time there Polanyi’s
example of pouring oneself into a tool, a probe, indwelling it, and making it an
extension of one’s body in order to use it successfully (368–73). But while
Polanyi develops this example to analyze the structure of tacit knowing and
thus to give us a larger deﬁnition of rationality (see TD, esp. 17–18), Elbow
associates it with magic (368), further heightening his association of “the nonrational, the unexplicit or tacit and the magical” (xxvi).
I’m torn, however, because Elbow’s pulling back here from the full implications of Polanyi’s thought may indeed have been both strategic and effective. By
not requiring us to go all the way with Polanyi’s argument for the priority of
belief, by pulling back to a binary we’re comfortable with—the familiar opposition between rationality and magical thinking—Elbow has, I think, succeeded
in getting a much wider range of scholars to try out freewriting in their classrooms, assuming they could always pull back and critique it or dismiss it later.
They were free to consider it a mere strategy, a technique that couldn’t possibly
commit them to a particular epistemology or theory about the nature of reality
(although, of course, James Berlin argued otherwise—“Contemporary” 776). In
my own experience, however, the results have been so reliable that it would be
irresponsible to attribute the change in my students’ writing to “magic.” Nor
could it be attributed to my requiring students to systematically believe and
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then doubt all assertions because I have never made any such requirement or
even suggestion.
Studying the change in my students’ writing brought about by varieties of
free and exploratory writing (see Sargent, “Errors,” “Mapping,” and “Peer”) has
led me to hypothesize that something else is going on here—and to decide that
I want to spend 90 percent of my energies on this something else because it is
more productive and more intellectual, richer in ideas, concepts, thinking,
than any other theory or practice I have tried in the classroom. Elbow’s theories of systematic believing and doubting don’t account for what I see happening in my students’ writing with such regularity. Polanyi’s theory, on the other
hand, does.
Elbow chooses William Blake’s “Without contraries is no progression” as
one of three epigraphs to open EC; and throughout both versions of the
doubting and believing essays, Elbow insists that these contrary games, doubt
and belief, are equally weighted and equally important: his deepest argument
is for the fruitfulness of the dialectic between them, for Embracing Contraries.
This dialectic remains central—even though Elbow’s most eloquent and forceful passages are critiques of doubt, convincing illustrations of how academic
doubt can paradoxically reinforce credulity, the unexamined belief of ideas we
already hold (“MDB” 263). This dialectic remains central—even though
Elbow also writes powerfully about the believing game as a way to the truth
and about our culture’s fear of belief (“DGBG” 176, 183). In the end, Elbow
always returns to the balance of opposites: he presents doubt and belief as
equally important, both necessary and balancing each other. In Polanyi’s epistemology, on the other hand, while doubt has an essential role to play, it is
always a subsidiary, dependent, secondary role. It can test what believing has
made or discovered, but it can never make or discover anything on its own.
Many of us have turned to Elbow’s doubting and believing essays for help in
our teaching, particularly when students trained in glib forms of critical thinking refuse to enter into any work of literature or theory with energy; we’ve
pointed out to these students how skilled they are at holding new ideas at arm’s
length, at distancing techniques that are ultimately self-protective and selfindulgent. We owe Elbow an enormous debt of gratitude for expressing this
dynamic so forcefully and convincingly. But the insistence on the “tacit” as a
form of magic shows Elbow’s continuing uneasiness with belief and with
Polanyi’s thought. The structure of tacit knowing as Polanyi describes it—of
focusing, say, on where the hammer head hits the nail instead of on where the
hammer handle touches our palm—is not magic. It’s simply how the mind
works. Elbow’s turn—in the last chapter of WWP as well as in his 1998 introduction to it—back to the old binary of emotion versus reason, of mystery and
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chaos and magic and the tacit versus analysis and control and care and the
explicit (xxvi), allows too many to dismiss or disregard his groundbreaking
work as irrational or unintellectual or “deeply ﬂawed” (ECW xvi; see Covino
on Winterowd and Young’s dismissal of Elbow’s “magic”8). The tension
between equal opposites can often be productive for our thinking, but—as
Elbow himself acknowledges in “The Uses of Binary Thinking”—we shouldn’t
necessarily “balance every dichotomy we encounter” (52). I would argue that
the dichotomy between doubt and belief is one Elbow needs to revisit. Even
while he admits that he’s been partisan—that he’s been preoccupied with generating, with freewriting, with private writing, that he’s “campaigned [his]
whole career for the believing game” (68)—he nevertheless insists that he’s
only ﬁghting to get his view heard equally, not to conquer or win over the
opposite emphasis on criticism, control, audience, and doubt. He wants an
epistemology of dialogue, dialectic, not just rhetoric (69–73), and he can’t
understand why people misread him as someone who doesn’t value critical
thinking and doubting. Why do they “see me as one-sided . . . when I preach
over and over this theme of embracing contraries”? (69).
My criticism, however, is that Elbow hasn’t been one-sided enough, that he
hasn’t campaigned hard enough or far enough for believing. Perhaps those
who resist his position are sensible because, in the end, these matters don’t ﬁt
into equal binaries—those who critique and doubt will always feel themselves
embattled and at risk at some level because they are secondary, subsidiary.
Elbow can’t argue that generating words and then critiquing or revising or
editing those words are completely equal oppositions; as he states them, one is
absolutely prior: if there is no generating, there are no words to critique or
revise or cut. Similarly, Polanyi makes clear, belief is the prior and essential
condition for doubt—the very operations of the mind that allow us to doubt
are absolutely dependent on belief, on our prior ability to pour ourselves into
and learn various symbolic languages in order to do our thinking and our
doubting. However, simply because a practice or perspective—like doubting—
is secondary and dependent upon some prior activity—like believing—does
not mean that it is therefore expendable or wrong: its continuing strong presence may be necessary and productive and, in the case of doubting, crucial for
the growth of human knowledge.
Polanyi’s life work was a refusal to abandon the words “knowledge,” “objective,” and “reason” to those who would equate them only with empirical,
explicit, impersonal skepticism. He fought for the word “knowledge” to
include intellectual passions, belief, commitment, and the tacit—and not as
secondary, occasional, barely tolerated, marginal, or exceptional extras, nor as
equal balancing opposites, but as central, necessary, prior. Elbow’s appreciation
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of binary thinking has blinded him to the fact that linking the tacit and emotion with magic lets his critics off the hook too easily. They are not forced to
confront the full complexity of his thought and practice as serious knowledge
claims. Appeals to magic, emotion, and the personal can be laughed out of
court (cf. Winterowd in n. 8 below or Hashimoto, quoted in ECW 147) in a
way that serious, thoughtfully argued and supported knowledge claims usually
cannot be. And Elbow’s critics have rightly sensed that if his methods work,
their own methods are called into question. In his theory, Elbow wants the
ﬁeld to be large and generous, able to hold opposing but equal contradictory
views (ECW xiii-xxiii)—I do too. I just think this particular binary cannot be
one of them.
Note the hesitations in Elbow’s introduction to Part I of Everyone Can Write
as he talks about his “philosophical foundations”:
It might be that the believing game underlies everything else. . . . Yet since I also love
doubting, criticism, and logic, binary thinking may lie deeper than the believing
game. (ECW 3)

However, he also acknowledges that “someone’s conscious or unconscious
theory of knowledge is less real and important than how they act, and especially how they behave toward their students and colleagues and staff ” (3). I
would argue exactly this: that Elbow’s practice, as opposed to his theory,
reveals his profound commitment to Polanyi’s more disturbing, thoroughgoing, and radical conception of rationality. Elbow creates in the body of WWT
a powerful heuristic, a practice, based on a Polanyian theory of knowledge,
but then wavers in the theoretical appendix: the belief enacted in the way he
teaches writing suddenly, in his theory, becomes not the ground of all knowing and discovering but a game, make-believe. However, he trusts the power
of writing—it is the deepest truth in his life. And in his teaching and his writing he is steadily operating not in the framework described in his wavering
theory, but in a Polanyian framework—which is, I would suggest, why the
practices he suggests (freewriting in particular) work.9
Elbow’s critics are right to feel threatened by his work; just as our students
learn more from what we do than from what we say, Elbow’s critics sense
behind his words the fully operational reality of a new conceptual framework,
a framework in which their old forms and distinctions and ways of working
are all at sea. They can’t be argued out of their paradigm into a new one; and
even Elbow himself hasn’t completely accepted—in his theoretical writing—
his new location. But he writes and he teaches writing from a larger, more
inclusive conception of rationality, a theory of knowledge that he hasn’t yet
consciously, consistently, and fully described. It is not a theory of knowledge
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that requires him, as his Lewis Carroll epigraph might suggest, to believe
impossible things (before or after breakfast)—unless the necessity of belief
itself as the ground of all knowing is that impossible thing.

NOTES

1. It’s not clear if Elbow read more of Polanyi’s work between 1973 (WWT) and
1986, when Embracing Contraries came out, but he did read Booth’s Modern
Dogma during that interval and expresses his debt to that work (280–81) in EC’s
alternative version of the doubting and believing essay—which is thus inﬂuenced by Polanyi’s thought as mediated through Booth. Elbow returned directly
to Polanyi’s work again, however, in the late 1980s, chairing an MLA session on
Polanyi at my request in 1987 and then giving a paper on Polanyi at MLA 1988 in
a session I chaired and organized (see Wallace).
2. Tertullian’s thinking on these issues was far from Augustine’s (cf. PK 266, TD 61).
I’m indebted to Professors Dale Cannon (Western Oregon University) and
Richard Lord (Willamette University) here.
3. Elbow’s development of the believing game seems to owe as much to Carl Rogers
as to Polanyi (see his new Preface, WWT xxix). However, in contrasting Rogers to
Polanyi, he inadvertently suggests that Polanyi’s thinking was less disciplined,
perhaps even “sweet, soft and fuzzy,” an implication I’m sure he did not intend.
Rogers and Polanyi were, by the way, interested in each other’s work and participated in a televised dialogue together (cf. Coulson and Rogers).
4. Though Elbow speaks of a “mechanism for knowing,” neither he nor Polanyi
think of knowing as a mechanical process: both Elbow and Polanyi root their
epistemological projects in the ﬁndings of Gestalt (see, for example, “DGBG”
167–68 and PK vii).
5. These correspond closely to Polanyi’s discussion of the operational principles of
language—the Laws of Poverty, Grammar, Iteration, Consistency, Manageability
(PK 77–82).
6. See Sargent and Watson on Buber’s “History of the Dialogical Principle,” esp.
415–18.
7. Is my objection simply a semantic one?—that is, would I object less if Elbow had
referred instead to “make believe” (he does use the word “pretend” a few times,
“MDB” 277) or to “the holding-at-arm’s length game” vs. “the empathy game” (a
la Carl Rogers)? Probably—though the insistence on systematic methodological
game playing would still strike me as a nonproductive reach toward rigor.
Certainly, since Elbow framed the debate in Polanyian terms, the words doubting
and believing were loaded from the start. Further, Elbow insists that believing is
what he has in mind, especially when he accuses Coleridge of “ben[ding] over
backwards to avoid the word ‘belief ’ itself ” in his “rubber-gloved double negative”—the “willing suspension of disbelief.” Elbow insists that “opening and
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restructuring of the mind . . . don’t usually occur unless the attempt to see is
fueled by some kind of assent. . . .” (“MDB” 279).

Believing, as a term, covers two related but at times separable realms
here—the realm of belief systems (believing in, focusing on, ideas that can
be articulated) and the realm of existential belief, of skill, behavior, or action
(believing as skillful tacit knowing, as indwelling, as pouring oneself into a
tool—like a hammer or language—in order to focus on something else, in
order to accomplish a focal task). Polanyi at times used the word belief to
cover both meanings, but increasingly extended the notion of indwelling
and tacit knowing in his later work, especially in The Tacit Dimension, to
reduce his reliance on terms like commitment and belief when talking about
tacit knowing. Elbow doesn’t turn to the deep rationality of tacit knowing to
anchor his discussions of the believing game, thus opening his position to
the following critique from Polanyi scholar Dale Cannon:
Sometimes one can ﬁnd persons who become so enamored with this kind
of experimental believing that they never come down anywhere—nothing
ever is wholeheartedly believed by them, nothing ever becomes the object of
full commitment. The resulting position is a variety of postmodern romantic
irony: believing becomes a game only, intellectual passion is enervated, and
any deeper respect for the integrity and profundity of genuine belief gets lost.
Even though Elbow may not be such an ironist himself, his position affords little if any leverage to critique that intellectual posture. (unpublished e-mail, 10
Oct. 2000)

Signiﬁcantly, this critique is leveled by a philosopher; it’s highly unlikely
that anyone in the ﬁeld of composition and rhetoric, knowing Elbow’s work
and reputation, would notice this weakness in Elbow’s position or ever think
of him in terms of ironical detachment.
8. Covino quotes Winterowd’s critique of Elbow’s belief in magic in WWP, that
writing involves “access to a mysterious power that may or may not materialize
the ‘right’ words” (153, n.2).
9. A parallel essay could be written about Elbow’s use of Eugene Gendlin’s concept
of “felt sense” (cf. Sargent, “Thinking”); Gendlin’s work in epistemology corroborates Polanyi’s ﬁndings and gives us a convincing and nonmagical explanation
for the effectiveness of methods like freewriting and Sondra Perl’s composing
guidelines (recommended in Elbow and Belanoff, 32–35).

8 EAST MEETS WEST
Peter Elbow’s “Embracing” of “Contraries” Across Cultures
George Kalamaras

B E YO N D C O N T R A R I E S

Eastern philosophy—vast and diverse as it is—is replete with references to
the paradoxical nature of reality. Peter Elbow’s play with paradox as a way to
shatter oppositional thinking and truly “embrace contraries,” speciﬁcally, his
work with “contraries” as a vital dialectic (such as “doubt” and “belief ”),
resembles Taoist concepts of yin and yang and Hindu concepts of pan and
apan (meditation on the “contraries” of inhalation and exhalation of breath).
For Elbow, as with Eastern meditative traditions, embracing contraries yields a
consciousness nonattached to either pole of an apparent contradiction but,
rather, a deepening attentiveness to their reciprocal interaction.
One’s initial impression of Elbow’s contraries might be that they are an
extension of the dichotomous thinking found in Descartes and other positivists. Let me be speciﬁc: this, indeed, was the case with me in ﬁrst reading
him. Thus, Elbow has presented me with an essential challenge in light of what
can appear to be his dualistic framework, one incompatible with Eastern practices that continually challenge dichotomies in order to embrace a consciousness that is reciprocal rather than oppositional.
To be sure, Elbow’s prose is packed with contraries. A mere glance at the table
of contents in Embracing Contraries yields such seeming binaries as “two roots of
real learning,” “the interaction of conﬂicting elements [in ‘cooking’],” “two kinds
of thinking by teaching writing,” “contraries in responding,” and “the value of
dialectic,” to name a few. These contraries at surface appear to extend Elbow’s
seeming dichotomy of “doubt and belief” presented in Writing Without Teachers
and perhaps to reinforce the kind of dualistic thinking our most generous feminist and postmodern thinkers have rightly argued against. In piece after piece,
Elbow seems to struggle between two poles of thought, ﬁnding value, strangely,
in each, yet also, more importantly, within their seemingly contrary interaction.
At the same time, it is important not to read Elbow too narrowly. Interpreting
his “contraries” through primarily Western rhetoric alone may very well yield a
vision of a writer embattled by and caught within a dichotomous vision. But
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what happens if we shift the focus to the East? What vision of Elbow’s contraries
emerges? It wasn’t until I was bold enough to subject Elbow’s contraries to the
same rigor as my own meditative practices (rooted in Eastern philosophy, particularly the Hindu-yogic tradition), that a more generous understanding of his
paradoxes emerged. Furthermore—and a bit unexpectedly—examining Elbow
in the light of Eastern philosophy has enabled me to make a critical turn in my
own thinking about Eastern traditions themselves and their relevance to Western
discourse theory.
Here, I want to be sure not to sound dichotomous myself, pitting, say, East
against West. Rather, I’d like to argue that reading Elbow within the perspective of
Eastern philosophy is illuminating, given the paradoxes at play within his theories,
and that not doing so does him a grave injustice by excluding a more generous
view of “opposites” that his writings suggest. Furthermore, given the interactive
element of Elbow’s opposites, what could be more apropos than utilizing a further
apparent contrary (East and West) to ﬂesh out an interpretation of the value of his
work? Finally, it is important to emphasize that the terms Eastern and Western are
indeed not monolithic, nor are they separate, or, for that matter, contrary.
However, some Eastern meditative theory presents a more complex understanding of contradiction that often gets displaced within the conﬁnes of Western logic;
as to the issue of a monolithic rendering of both East and West, in examining the
East I will limit my discussion to three key wisdom traditions. I will focus on their
commonality regarding paradox and reciprocity—the complementary rather
than conﬂictive nature of “contradiction”—rather than nuances of their differences, which might be more appropriate in a study of comparative religion.
Before proceeding further with reading Elbow through this nondualist
framework, though, let me ﬁrst claim as my philosophical ground the Advaita
Vedanta tradition—radical (or absolute) nondualism—the dominant school of
Hinduism, and within it, the philosophy and practices of yogic meditation.
Yoga, comprised of a variety of speciﬁc psychospiritual practices, has as its goal
the joining or “yoking” of the individual “self ” (atman) with the larger, more
expansive “Self ” (brahman). (The etymology of the word, yoga, itself means “to
join, to yoke.”) Therefore, focusing on certain nondual yogic aspects of the
Advaita Vedanta tradition can deepen our understanding of the reciprocal
nature of Elbow’s contraries.
Self-realization, the Hindu scriptures repeatedly describe, is experiential,
and the actual practice of yoga (asanas, or postures, and meditation) is the
central method of attaining the nondual state of enlightenment described
philosophically. In other words, the study and practice of yoga is a site of metaphysical “praxis,” a true praxis in which theories and practices inform one
another in reciprocal, nonhierarchical ways.
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PA R A D OX A N D T H E P R A C T I C E O F AT T E N T I O N

Eastern wisdom traditions focus on paradox as a generative rather than debilitating condition (indeed, mystics often describe the meditative experience itself
in paradoxical terms as a “full emptiness”); understanding this aspect is key to
understanding the reciprocal nature of Elbow’s contraries. For the meditator,
attention to apparent contradiction enables the critical transformation of consciousness from oppositional to reciprocal perception—an attentiveness that
ultimately allows one to break free of binary constructs altogether. Meditative
practices that focus on paradoxical elements often encourage this transformation, particularly by cultivating attentiveness to paradox. This is an attentiveness
that Elbow shares—secularly and not necessarily metaphysically—as a means of
transforming his contraries into something more reciprocal.
One practice in Hindu-yogic and Zen sitting, for instance, of “watching the
breath,” ultimately moves beyond the apparent contradictions of inhalation
and exhalation, yielding an awareness in which the perceiving subject is “inside
the breath”—so to speak—and is a psychic participant in a reciprocal process
rather than an outside observer of dualistic principles. Hindu-yogic emphasis
on “mind-body” further attests to the ﬂuidity of apparent contradiction and
the fostering of paradox as generative; what the yogi discovers is that mind and
body are not separate (but that each inﬂuences the other), and he practices
attentiveness to this intimate connection, utilizing the interaction of mind and
body as a vehicle for liberation from dualistic thinking. Taoism’s yin and yang
(feminine and masculine principles), furthermore, are also complementary
rather than contradictory, and Taoism encourages a similar attention to the
interplay of opposites as reciprocal, nonhierarchical, and nondualistic (with
the yin and yang visually depicted as a swirl of black and white, respectively,
each containing a dot of the other’s color to illustrate their interdependence).
Even the practice of Zen koans (nonsensical questions such as “What is the
sound of one hand clapping?”) are similarly designed to utilize paradox to
shatter one’s concept of both question and answer, reorienting the practitioner
to the discursive situation in a more intimate, less binary way.
For Elbow, a similar practice of attentiveness to paradox occurs as a means of
attaining—what we might call—“discursive liberation,” in which focus on contraries becomes complementary rather than dichotomous, an attentiveness to
apparent contradictions (such as doubt and belief or even the “two elements” of
cooking), that renders each as ﬂuid, instable, and negotiable. A Peter Elbow
“contrary” automatically calls forth its “opposite,” not so much in the
Aristotelian tradition of antagonistic dialectics but, rather, in ways more closely
aligned in intent with Eastern meditative paradigms where apparent contradictions are complementary and reciprocal, that is, more truly “dialogical.”
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Attentiveness to the dialogical interplay of opposites is often the catalyst for “liberation,” what for Elbow might be “insight” or textual luminosity or—for that
matter—even just the ability to generate more writing and further thinking.
Consider, for example, Elbow’s ground-breaking work with doubt and
belief. His description of each is well-enough known not to warrant detail
here; however, for my purposes, it is important to emphasize that Elbow argues
that both doubt and belief are present and necessary to some degree in everyone. Furthermore, he makes explicit the crucial apparatus of his investigation,
which ultimately becomes metadiscursive—namely, to use one of the poles
(doubt) to argue against itself, ﬁrst, to “grant legitimacy” to the other pole
(belief) and, second, to dramatize in a metadiscursive way the importance of
remaining attentive to the interaction of what might on the surface be considered contradictory. This is similar to the use of Zen Buddhist koans (such as
“What is your face before your parents were born?” [emphasis added]), whose
paradoxical structure serves to sever the question from the answer (and, paradoxically, even from the questioner), reorienting one to a fresh experience of
reality. That is, Elbow ultimately uses doubt to doubt the doubting game,
demonstrating—paradoxically—both its necessity and hindrance:
In a sense this essay is an extended attack on the doubting game. But I make this
attack as someone who himself values the doubting game and is committed to it. . . .
My goal is to make the doubting game move over and grant legitimacy to the believing game. (Writing Without Teachers 149–50)

Elbow forcefully depicts the importance of each while arguing (at least on
the surface) for one and against the other, as a Buddhist might come to doubt
the efﬁcacy of the actual question (as opposed to the discursive structure) of
her koan for achieving the experience of the unspeakable. By using doubt
against itself, so to speak, Elbow grants it a legitimacy along with belief (even
as he states the latter as his goal), posing problems with doubt yet simultaneously placing it into reciprocal alignment with belief.
As I already discussed, Elbow argues that both doubt and belief are present
and necessary in everyone. This is not to suggest a benign relativism in Elbow.
We clearly see that he has strong commitments to playing the believing game,
for instance, and, through implication, to the doubting game. A further paradox that enhances Elbow’s work with contraries, therefore, is not an abandonment of goals but, rather, a reorientation of one’s relationship to those goals in
ways that do not privilege them over the process of remaining attentive to the
interplay of apparent contradiction, that is, to a deeper understanding of the
reciprocal nature of contraries. A similar reorientation occurs in Eastern wisdom traditions. For the contemplative, there is no “transcendent” reality to
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speak of, only the liberation of realizing that transcendence and immanence
are, ﬁrst, the same, and second, only constructs to name a nonconceptual reality that one learns to immerse oneself in by not striving after it but by remaining attentive to the paradox. In other words, the mystic has no goal per se, save
for the “goal” of achieving heightened awareness (a goal that can remain elusive, ironically, if focused on directly as a goal, placing one outside the experience of heightened attention). The mystic may desire peace, joy, and greater
well-being (by-products of remaining attentive to paradox) but can, paradoxically, experience these in their fullest capacity only by relinquishing desire for
them. The Bhagavad Gita of Hinduism, for instance, is clear about the importance of performing action in the world—even meditating—without desire for
the “fruits” of that action.
Elbow has goals for college writing instruction, to be sure (perhaps his professional version of peace and well-being), as can be seen throughout his work
and in particular in his relationship to academic discourse (see, as some of
several examples, Writing with Power, A Community of Writers, and “Being a
Writer”). Even his Writing Without Teachers (perhaps the guidebook to
“freewriting” and other seemingly process-dominant approaches) begins with
an injunction to “improve your writing” through the practice of freewriting
(3). Even when Elbow tries to stave off focus on an “immediate product,” he
nonetheless still designs his approaches for “their gradual effect on future
writing” (11).
In the midst of these goals, however, the overriding principle Elbow reiterates, the one that acts as a constant ground of being for him, is to “cook,” to
“keep writing,” to “[l]earn to stand out of the way and provide the energy or
force the words need to ﬁnd their growth process” (Writing Without Teachers
48, 24–25). These processes may certainly lead to results that Elbow acknowledges and even aims for. At the same time, it is clear from Elbow’s contraries
that he is a writer ﬁrst and foremost (see Writing Without Teachers and “Being
a Writer”). Even when he learns the most about writing from his teaching—a
pedagogical approach in which the teacher increasingly becomes less dominant as authority and more present as facilitator—it is the process of writing
and the practice of remaining attentive to its ﬂow, shifts, and paradoxical play
(as with the mystic’s focus on the endless play of the universe) that is both the
ultimate guide and, if you will, reward.
Thus, rather than wrongly dichotomize the goals issue, we’d do better to
read Elbow through the lens of Eastern wisdom traditions and interpret
“goals” in the context of the paradoxical processes Elbow advocates. We might
therefore fold goals into this paradoxical play as a desirable, even—as is obvious in Elbow’s case—sought-after, by-product of attentiveness to contraries.
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This is, then, to assign greater value to the process of negotiation of opposites
than to any product these contraries in themselves may yield, suggesting a
dialogical strain in Elbow. Here I am thinking, for example, of Bakhtin’s discussion of the dynamic and interdependent aspect of discourses, what he
refers to as their “interanimate” and “interilluminating” characteristics (47).
This is perhaps most apparent in Elbow’s depiction of what he calls “cooking,” the “interaction of conflicting elements” (Embracing Contraries 40).
“Cooking,” he tells us,
consists of the process of one piece of material (or one process) being transformed
by interacting with another: one piece of material being seen through the lens of
another, being dragged through the guts of another, being reoriented or reorganized
in terms of the other, being mapped onto the other. (Embracing Contraries 40–41)

Hence, the dichotomy between one pole and its “other” diminishes.
Otherness ultimately becomes less other if “reoriented or reorganized” in
relation to, “dragged through,” its counterpoint. Dialogically, contraries
“interanimate” and “interilluminate” one another. It is true that Elbow’s social
orientation remains less obvious at times than Bakhtin’s (Berlin, “Rhetoric
and Reality” with regard to Elbow and Freire, 486), and there are many
instances where Elbow’s expressionism predominates (see Berlin’s powerful
critique of Elbow, for example); thus, I am not arguing that Elbow is a disciple
of Bakhtin. At the same time, when interpreted through the lens of the
Eastern wisdom traditions, Elbow’s contraries emerge as dialogical, his dialogic manifesting primarily in his trust in the endless play of discourses as
language events that shape and are shaped by other language events, not as a
kind of relativistic process to which Elbow remains uncommitted to outcomes. The writerly “self ” encounters the textual “other,” while textual features interanimate or “cook” until both text and self are reoriented in terms of
its other.
This is similar to the understandings of yogis and other Eastern mystics
who have been wrongly critiqued as seeking transcendence. For the yogi, the
primary paradox of the individual self and the more expansive Self increasingly wanes through practices of attention that serve to bring the meditator
into a state of nonconceptual awareness in which contraries reciprocally
reside. As I have argued elsewhere, when understood from inside the nonconceptual meditative sensibility (rather than from conceptual awareness alone),
it becomes clear that the contemplative is not trying to “get out” of anything,
since there is nothing, ultimately, to get out of—only the eternal play of reciprocal conditions to which the yogi strives to remain attentive and, thus,
merge with in ways that cast self as other and other as self (Kalamaras
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186–87). To put this less paradoxically, there is no transcendence without
immanence, and the “transcendence” to which Eastern texts sometimes refer
is actually a misnomer for a paradoxical condition language has difficulty
expressing, in which the perceiving subject becomes so intimate with the
object of attention that all division between seer and seen dissolves. As Zen
mystic D. T. Suzuki notes, “The doctrine of sunyata [the Void of meditative
consciousness] is neither an immanentism nor a transcendentalism. . . .
‘Knowing and seeing’ sunyata is sunyata knowing and seeing itself; there is no
outside knower or spectator; it is its own knower and seer” (261–62).
Liberation is therefore “liberating” because the yogi’s paradoxical practices
enable him not to seek transcendental experiences but to go deeply into the
dynamic interplay of the practices themselves, dissolving (in the process) a separate sense of self and other. When Whitman, echoing Wordsworth, says, “There
was a child went forth every day, / And the ﬁrst object he looked upon . . . that
object he became” (138), he echoes this yogic understanding of a consciousness
becoming completely identiﬁed with itself and, thus, with that which it had previously perceived as “opposite.”
Elbow is certainly no mystic, nor does he claim mystical predilections. In
this regard, however, his “opposites” approach the paradoxes of the mystic, and
we can better understand the process of his “contraries” through such a reciprocal framework. Elbow demonstrates by virtue of attentiveness that certain
contraries are really complements—similar, say, to Taoist concepts of yin and
yang, which continuously change, shape, and reorient one another not only by
moving in relation to but through the other, or to Hindu-yogic practices of
observing the pan and apan (inhalation and exhalation of breath) “pouring
through one another,” as the Bhagavad Gita describes. In these traditions neither virtue is superior. Each pole simply “exists” and, indeed, changes through
its interplay with its complementary other.
Elbow’s contraries “interanimate” each other, similarly to the manner in
which the pan pours through the apan. How many subatomic particles of one’s
exhalation return with the inhalation? How much of ourselves are we, really,
without those with whom we interact? If one longs for deeper peace, psychic
integration, and well-being, one would do well, Taoism and Hinduism both
argue, to mirror this eternal interplay of apparent contradiction and remain
attentive to its ever changing complementary nature. If one longs for a deeper
experience of the mutability of the writing enterprise and the integration that
emerges with involving oneself intimately with the composing process, one
would do well, Elbow might similarly argue, to echo in theory and practice the
endless paradoxicality within language and focus on the reciprocal process of
praxis as complementary rather than contradictory.
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BORDER CROSSINGS

Earlier I noted that the nondual aspects of yoga, which emphasize the experiential aspect of “Self-realization,” illustrate a metaphysical praxis. I also
argued, by implication, that (although not metaphysical) Elbow’s contraries
enact a similar praxis, in which theory and practice inform one another in reciprocal, nonhierarchical ways. Now, I want to brieﬂy revisit this notion.
Paradoxically, the critical yet generous quality of Elbow’s theories strangely
allows—even invites—one to examine and interact with his theories in ways
that ultimately transform them into an increasingly reciprocal vision. The generative nature of his paradoxes invites interaction, in large part because the
paradoxes are themselves interactive. His paradoxes are therefore themselves
not only dialogical; their framework encourages one to engage it. In this sense,
Elbow’s theories embody a sense of Hindu and Buddhist nonattachment, as
his contraries invite the reader to work within and against them, demonstrating Elbow’s nonattachment to either pole of his supposed binary framework.
That is, what happens when we doubt Elbow? In some strange sense we, therefore, enact his principles.
I’m thinking, as one example, of Berlin’s critique of Elbow’s “expressionism,” that for Elbow, “political change can only be considered by individuals
and in individual terms” (“Rhetoric and Reality” 486), and of the ways a reader
might interact with this critique in coming to her own position. In the context
of interpreting Elbow’s contraries through the lens of Eastern wisdom traditions, a reader might rightfully ask whether an “individual” within the framework of a nonoppositional “other” is really an individual at all, as we have
come to deﬁne that perspective in the West, and therefore whether Elbow’s
individual response to political and social impositions is indeed, as Berlin
argues, only a “resistance that is always construed in individual terms” and,
thus, easily co-opted by the very capitalist forces it opposes” (487). Berlin’s
argument is rich and complex, and arguing for or against it (in terms of
Elbow) is beyond the scope of this essay. However, my point is twofold: (1)
Berlin’s construction of Elbow’s “individual” may not be the same as the individual that emerges from a reciprocal, nonoppositional framework; and, perhaps more importantly, (2) that in doubting Elbow, we enact his principle of
contraries that its nonoppositional structure invites, with the result that each
apparently separate pole (in this case, perhaps, “individual” and “social”)
inhabits the other more fully, becoming more soundly dialogical.
Similarly, we could consider Bartholomae’s arguments regarding Elbow’s
position on academic discourse (see “Writing With Teachers”). Without
rehashing them here, our focus should be on the dialogic Elbow’s contraries
engender. What ultimately occurs in such an exchange as that between
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Bartholomae and Elbow is that the exchange itself yields something greater
and more complex than either position in isolation. Elbow’s theory of “cooking” lays the ground for this realization, illuminating the process:
Two heads are better than one because two heads can make conﬂicting material
interact better than one head usually can. It’s why brainstorming works. I say something. You give a response and it constitutes some restructuring or reorienting of
what I said. Then I see something new on the basis of your restructuring and so I, in
turn, can restructure what I ﬁrst said. The process provides a continual leverage or
mechanical advantage: we each successively climb upon the shoulders of the other’s
restructuring, so that at each climbing up, we can see a little further. (Embracing
Contraries 41)

In this way, Elbow is truly dialogical, presenting a theory whose very constructs allow for its own critical reﬂection and transformation. As C. H.
Knoblauch discusses in “Rhetorical Constructions: Dialogue and Commitment,”
a dialogical sensibility—if it is to be truly dialogical—must indeed present
opportunities for critical examination of its own position (138). One no doubt
can cite numerous dialogical reﬂections that appear less open to including this
mechanism (privileging, perhaps a bit ironically, their own dialogical position
over other arguments). How dialogical are these thinkers really? Interestingly—
expressionist or not—Elbow’s contraries prod us to consider such issues, facilitating, I would argue, the practice of dialogics in ways that keep them more
dialogical and truer to their radical intent. First, within Elbow’s position, his contraries present a critical framework in which each pole must confront (and
shape, change, and enhance) its “other” in a noncombative, reciprocal relationship. Second, the reciprocal nature of his contraries presents a position in itself
that generously interacts with arguments from outside that critical framework
(as with Elbow’s dialogue with Bartholomae). That is, he points the way for
Western dialogics to become more reciprocal than binary.
As nearly all Eastern philosophical texts agree, reading about meditation is
not the same as taking it up as a practice. One limitation that yogis and other
meditators have faced for centuries, for instance, is how to depict within an
inherently binary discourse the experiences of undifferentiated consciousness
encountered in nonconceptual (meditative) awareness. This has led to misinterpretations of meditative philosophy and practice as hierarchical, inherently
dualistic, transcendental, and mystifying. However, as Western anthropologist,
Indo-specialist, and Hindu Swami, Agehananda Bharati, has described in The
Light at the Center: Context and Pretext of Modern Mysticism, the one aspect
that remains after an individual has an experience of nonconceptualization or
unitary consciousness and reemerges into the realm of conceptualization “is
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the code of speech” (48). That is, as Bharati argues, mystics, in describing their
experience, never use language outside their own social, cultural, and linguistic
context (48–49). It should not be surprising, then, that Eastern meditative
treatises sometimes sound inherently dualistic to the nonpractitioner. These
texts may also represent their nondualism in ways which, at the other extreme,
are so paradoxical as to appear completely relativistic or, perhaps more
deplorable, intentionally mystifying.
However, in the spirit of true reciprocity, Elbow’s “Western” theories can
contribute to our understanding of Eastern texts—when read, that is, through
the lens of his complementary contraries. Critical reﬂection upon the reciprocal character of Elbow’s contraries may reorient Western readers’ interpretations of Eastern practices, clarifying (in light of, one might say, a more
complex “code of speech”) meditative understandings in ways that more fully
account for their generous and complex rendering of reality. That is, given a
fresh understanding of the complementary nature of contraries in Elbow, one
can bring that insight to bear upon the apparent contradictions within Eastern
philosophy. Furthermore, beyond generating understanding of Elbow and the
Eastern wisdom traditions, one might even rely upon each to critically examine the other, dialogically that is, in a manner similar to that which Elbow
describes as “cooking.”
This, indeed, has been the case with my own grasp of Elbow and Eastern
meditative traditions. The complementary nature of Elbow’s contraries has
deepened my understanding of the dynamic interplay within Eastern meditative practices. I recall a story that James Moffett once related as respondent to a
1992 CCCC session on “Spiritual Sites of Composing,” in which he echoed a
similar reorientation of both Eastern and Western perspectives in light of one
another, regarding the relationship between meditation and writing. In warning against an emphasis on only one side of a “contrary”—seeing meditation
as a means of making better writing—he described one of his earliest meetings
with his spiritual teacher, the yogic master Swami Sivalingam. When his
teacher asked him what he spent most of his time doing, Moffett replied,
“writing.” “That’s good,” Swami Sivalingam responded, adding something to
the effect of, “It will help deepen your concentration for meditation.”
In this way, Moffett “turned the sock inside out,” so to speak, demonstrating
a radical reorientation of each perspective of writing and meditation in terms
of its cultural other. Interestingly, both Elbow and the Eastern wisdom traditions also encourage this kind of dialogue and reorientation in terms of its
“other.” Years ago in ﬁrst reading Elbow—in doubting and believing him—I
grappled with his contraries, which dynamically sent me more deeply into my
practice of yogic meditation in ways that have helped me understand an even
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richer rendering of the nonoppositional nature of that practice. Similarly to
Elbow’s depiction of “cooking,” in which “one piece of material . . . [is] seen
through the lens of another, . . . dragged through the guts of another, . . . [and]
reoriented or reorganized in terms of the other” (Embracing Contraries 40–41),
this understanding took me, in turn, back to Elbow, enhancing my understanding of reciprocity within his contraries, and then back again to test this
perspective within the context of the Eastern wisdom traditions, and so on in a
kind of Bakhtinian “mutual cause-and-effect and interillumination” (12).
As a result, I have considered each apparent contradiction in terms of its
“other,” crossing important philosophical, theoretical, and cultural borders to
practice the theory that each encourages. This dialogical praxis has helped me
reimagine both Elbow and my own meditative practice through the radical
reorientation for which each ultimately calls, shaping each perspective in terms
of its “other.” Contrary or complement? Or contrary and complement? The dialogical interplay between Elbow’s contraries and those of the Eastern wisdom
traditions might very well suggest that neither term, in the ﬁnal analysis, is sufﬁcient to capture the complexity of this highly ﬂuid, reciprocal “embrace.” It is
an embrace that can hold onto everything, while at the same time—in light of
the generative paradox of meditation’s “full emptiness” and the cultivation of
an experience of “nonattachment”—hold onto nothing at all.

C LU S T E R I I I
In The Classroom

INTERSECTION
Sheryl I. Fontaine
Reading the essays in this section of our collection, I was inevitably drawn back
to my own experiences in the classroom with Peter. The classroom I shared with
him, when we were colleagues at SUNY Stony Brook, took the form of staff
meeting rooms, high school classrooms, passenger sections on airplanes, hallways and cafeterias, the department mail room, and Peter’s own department
ofﬁce. I learned much during those three years about the same topics that our
authors raise: putting teaching theory into practice; the grey, compelling corners of assessment; what can be gained and lost by disciplinary labels; just how
full and attentive reader response can be; and the intricacies and conﬂicts
among academic writing, personal writing, and freewriting. But Irene Papoulis,
one of the writers included in this section, reminded me of what I learned most
from Peter when she confesses “how startled [she] was at Peter’s ability to listen
so well and to respect the opinions of anyone who gave them” (228). During the
years that I worked with Peter, I, too, learned a great deal about being listened to
and listening to others. When I arrived on the East coast from graduate school
in southern California, I didn’t expect that this man, who at that point in my life
was nothing less for me than an academic idol turned into a tall, gentle man
wearing a green turtleneck sweater and plaid jacket, would open his ears and his
mind to what I had to say. In fact, at ﬁrst I didn’t have much to say. But Peter
would have none of that. He never allows his students or his colleagues to be
silent for too long before he lightly probes for their thoughts. Even when I didn’t think I was having any thoughts, he would somehow tease them out of me.
Aside from learning about listening by being listened to, I learned about it by
watching Peter listen to other faculty, to secretaries who arranged his appointments, to the students he taught and advised, as well as to every writer whose
words he read and shared with us. I came to have enormous respect for others’
words, for the value of letting their words be in the air where they could be
respected and heard. As an exliterature student, I knew a lot about jumping on
others’ words and pushing them through my analysis ringer; I knew much less
about letting words be and letting them be heard.
Although my charge in this interchapter is to introduce its ﬁve essays, I am
fearful that the genre of “introduction” will lead me to interpret the essays before
you have had a chance to hear their words, to let them speak for themselves. And
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so I have devised a way to let the authors, Irene Papoulis, Kathleen Blake Yancey,
Keith Hjortshoj, Kathleen Cassity, and Jeff Sommers, utter their own words
without my interpretative translation. As I read each essay, I used a habit of pen
that Peter himself started in me, underlining the sentences and words that somehow caught my attention. I didn’t stop to think about why they caught my attention or to write notes in the margin or to draw arrows and stars from one essay
to the next. Using only what was underlined, I challenged myself to use another
teaching strategy that I learned from Peter, to create a conversation among the
lines that I had identiﬁed, letting the writers speak for themselves and to one
another. My voice appears only when the conversation shifts to set the scene for
the next exchange. In reading my draft, Marcia referred to what I have created as
a “found conversation.” My hope is that it will provide you with a very particular
introduction to the essays, one that prepares you for the way these writers resonate with one another and, together, shape a view of Elbow in the classroom.
A N AU T H O R S ’ C O N V E R S AT I O N

In this ﬁrst part of the conversation, we hear the author’s examining what
they have learned about teaching from Elbow’s essays and books and, equally
important, from Elbow’s own classroom instruction. For it is in his own classroom that we see Elbow enacting the voice-centered pedagogy about which he
writes, and we feel the dramatic effect that such a pedagogy can have on his
students. And yet, as these writers also point out, what Elbow writes about and
practices is much more than a way to be personal with students. Rather it’s a
way to let students experience the relationship between the academic and the
personal, between freedom and structure, between reﬂection and assessment.
Once these relationships are better understood, then students can also appreciate the choices that are theirs to make as writers.
Kathleen Yancey: In some ways, it may be that Peter is always telling the teaching story.
Irene Papoulis: Watching Peter work, I realized that attention to pedagogy was crucial for
anyone wanting to ﬁnd ways to effect political change within established classrooms.
Kathleen Cassity: A voice-centered pedagogy tells the students that they matter, that
their own experiences and perceptions are worthwhile: worth writing about, worth
being read about and heard by others.
Jeff Sommers: [W]hen students learn what their readers are thinking, they are reminded
that “their words have effects,” and . . . more frequent use of reader response genres
could provide . . . an “antidote” to the impersonal nature of end comments by personalizing the comments.
Irene Papoulis: While I do not remember the speciﬁc issue, I do remember how startled
I was at Peter’s ability to listen so well and to respect the opinions of anyone who
gave them. In addition to the important lesson about teaching it gave me, Peter’s
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attitude gave me permission, ultimately, to express my own hesitant views in the
study group too; without his generous listening, I may well have remained silent.
Kathleen Cassity: Voice is one of the most important elements in Elbow’s pedagogy.
However, the concept of voice Elbow promotes is neither autonomous nor isolated.
Keith Hjortshoj: The writer seems little more than an occasion for writing to happen—or
the locus of concepts that keep writing from happening of its own accord. Far from
representing any ﬁxed notion of the self, “Writing is, in fact, a transaction with words
whereby you free yourself from what you presently think, feel, and perceive.”. . . Even a
term such as “growing” does not refer to “personal growth” but to words, sentences,
and ideas themselves. Like “cooking,” this concept is relational. It refers to the evolving relations between writers and words, words and other words, ideas and other
ideas, writers and other writers. “Believing” and “doubting,” introduced at the end of
the book, are not personal feelings or matters of opinion; they are intellectual choices
and cognitive conditions.
Kathleen Cassity: Interestingly, though Elbow initially achieved recognition for a book
entitled Writing Without Teachers and though he is often associated in the literature
with “de-centered authority” and “student-centered” teaching approaches, Elbow
exerts considerable authority and inﬂuence in this classroom, but he chooses to exert
it over how students behave . . . instead of using his authority to “rank” student writing by assigning reductive grades or restricting students to a singular writing style.
Kathleen Yancey: There is an Elbovian legacy to writing assessment: a deﬁnition of
assessment located ﬁrmly within a rhetorical situation of personal interaction, trust,
and willingness to learn.

Because Elbow is, perhaps most of all, a teacher, even his interest in assessment grows from his interest in teaching and learning. As the writers in this
section indicate, within the process of assessment are inherent contradictions
and conﬂicts that the teacher and student must face. Rather than ignore such
contradictions, our challenge as teachers is to create a classroom and design
assignments that still promote learning. For ultimately, unless assessment promotes learning, it has no value for Elbow.
Kathleen Yancey: [E]ven when motivated by the same general good intentions, testing
and teaching rely on fundamentally different understandings of human behavior.
Writing assessment, which both redeﬁnes testing and locates it in the speciﬁc ﬁeld of
writing, is . . . intend[ed] to bring teaching and testing together, to make them congruent with each other, to open each to the possibility of accommodation between
their agents—the testers, the teachers.
Keith Hjortshoj: Writing, in this sense, may be compared to dancing with a new partner.
Initially, you do not know your partner’s style or experience. There is a fear of stepping on the other person’s feet or of trying a daring move. As a result, the dance is
stiff and constrained. It is awkward and unnatural.
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Kathleen Cassity: Freewriting does not represent an “open” classroom in any static or
permanent sense, but instead enables student writers to clear a temporary space for
generating ideas, a momentary withdrawal from internal and external censors in
order to begin the process of getting words onto paper.
Irene Papoulis: To me, such techniques, Peter’s techniques, are more powerful in themselves than theories, because they effect change on a practical, even visceral level.
Kathleen Yancey: Peter’s sense of assessment evokes a different rhetorical situation: one
that is ﬂuid, emerging, and personal. It’s a situation embodied in a felt relationship, a
situation whose primary purpose is to help students learn. If students aren’t being
helped, then assessment is superﬂuous.
Irene Papoulis: My methods, I realized, were preventing me from getting [my student] to
experience the pleasure of expressing in writing the ideas he was passionate about. . . .
My task now is to ﬁnd ways, through better and more demanding informal writing
assignments and better-structured insistence on extensive revision, to push past my
students’ complacency and to encourage them to explore themselves more deeply and
at the same time to be increasingly responsible for listening well to others’ views.
Kathleen Yancey: Peter reminds us: “. . . That’s my parable of assessment. It’s not part of
teaching—even though we are lulled into assuming it is. It doesn’t really help make
people learn.” . . . This is what Peter seems to understand, but not because he’s so
interested in assessment. Because he’s interested in teaching.

We all know that just invoking the name “Peter Elbow” can incite a great
deal of disagreement and even conﬂict. In this section of the conversation, the
authors attempt to understand and explain the strong, negative reaction that
Elbow’s work evokes from others. Yet, as they also point out, even Elbow’s supporters ﬁnd his refusal to be categorized or take sides, his desire to “embrace
contraries,” both compelling and frustrating.
Irene Papoulis: I came to be fascinated . . . by the deeply negative emotional reaction that
some people had against what they imagined as Peter’s perspective.
Keith Hjortshoj: Through this pattern of response, Elbow has routinely argued that people misrepresent him by half, and in his tendency to “embrace” whatever critics say
he is or is not (along with its opposite), he has embraced expressivism more explicitly than he did at the beginning of his career.
Kathleen Cassity: In a way, that makes [Peter] more free, when he disagrees with something, to say so—to enter into dialogue, converse about the issues at stake, in the
hope of bringing hidden assumptions and prejudices to the surface.
Irene Papoulis: I ﬁnd myself wanting him to be more radical, more brazen in his theories, since for me these theories contain a kind of brazenness that I ﬁnd exhilarating,
even as it scares me.
Keith Hjortshoj: But in his effort to deﬁne the personal or expressive side of this false
dichotomy, the academic side becomes blurred.
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Irene Papoulis: This other side makes me begin to understand those in our ﬁeld who
resist Peter’s views and who, consciously or not, see him as a threat to the established
order. He is a threat to the established order, and that is probably what draws me to
him most strongly even as it scares me a bit.
Kathleen Yancey: What’s interesting to me here is the utter and complete faith in a system. What’s as interesting to me is the lack of faith in either democracy or education
that drives one toward a system. What’s ﬁnally as interesting to me is what happens
to students when one’s faith is transferred from people to systems.
Keith Hjortshoj: This illusory notion of academic writing creates some of the most common difﬁculties student writers encounter; it represents the main obstacle Peter
Elbow was trying to move beyond in his early work; and it continues to undermine
the potential value of this work for academic writers.
Irene Papoulis: Peter seemed to stir up some sort of deep fear in . . . people, fear that
often seemed to be based on a cursory reading of some of his work and an irrational
judging of it as somehow less than academic.
Kathleen Yancey: Likewise, and more telling, these academics have not joined Peter in
thinking about, talking about, and enacting social change in the one arena where all
change ﬁnally is estimated: that is, in assessment circles. This reluctance I cannot
understand: that is to say, we can incorporate new pedagogies like collaborative learning, and we can introduce new technologies like computers, and we can speciﬁcally
enact reform curricula like service learning, but if we do not provide for these changes to
be valued. . . , they cannot effect the promised reform. . . . What Peter has done, then, . . .
is to start providing for changes in learning and teaching to be valued—and he’s taken
this up not as an expert but as a teacher.
Keith Hjortshoj: While this effort to avoid ﬁxed positions annoys Elbow’s critics, I
should acknowledge that it has often broadened and enriched the ﬁeld of debate in
composition theory and pedagogy.
Irene Papoulis: Why has he become such a ﬁgure of contention? Why have so many people felt so passionate in their resistance to his ideas?
Keith Hjortshoj: To a great extent the answers to these questions lie behind closed doors,
in realms of academic discourse that undergraduates rarely enter. As a consequence—even for graduate students, even for faculty in some disciplines—these
appear to be personal questions about private dimensions of individual lives.

Finally, we hear the authors create an identity pastiche of Peter Elbow. Just
as Elbow himself encourages us to embrace contraries, we can easily see the
contraries in our perception of who he is: public and private, academic and
personal, authority and novice. In Yancey’s ﬁnal word, we ﬁnd one quality
seems constant across the emergent images of Peter Elbow: “trust.”
Irene Papoulis: Implied in “my” Peter’s work is a strong authority, one that can say “you
must freewrite, NOW!”

132

W r i t i n g Wi t h E l b ow

Kathleen Cassity: [A]s Elbow expressed to me, “My ‘style of teaching’ or ‘my presence in
the classroom’ is anything but self-effacing. To put it bluntly, to run a workshop, you
tend to have to be very pushy . . . and be a very strong presence in order to clear space.”
Irene Papoulis:. “[M]y” Peter is an expressivist, an advocate of a kind of essential self as the
source of ideas and feelings. However, the “real” Peter is different. In spite of the fact
that he is often categorized as one, the real Peter, I would say, is not an expressivist at all.
Keith Hjortshoj: If expressivism did not exist, social constructionists, among others,
would have to construct it.
Irene Papoulis: The real Peter would be the ﬁrst, I’m sure, to celebrate this desire of mine
to take his theories wherever I want, even when he does not necessarily agree with me.
Kathleen Yancey: Trust.

9 RE-IMAGINING “FRONTIER”
P E DAG O G Y
Inside Peter Elbow’s Composition Classroom
Kathleen J. Cassity
To truly educate in America, then, to reach the full sweep of our
citizenry, we need to question received perception, shift continually from
the standard lens.
Mike Rose

The scene opens in a frontier classroom. In bursts our lone, logocentric superhero on his galloping steed. Dismounting, he proceeds to preach a rousing,
anti-intellectual sermon on the virtues of voice and personal writing. “Throw
away your textbooks!” he shouts. “Celebrate bad writing! If you’ve ever stopped
freewriting in order to correct your grammar, come forward, repent, and be
saved! And most important of all: Freewrite! Freewrite! Freewrite!”
The students, all solipsistic and conservative, smile and nod approvingly. This
teacher will demand little of them. He will not push them toward excellence. All
they will have to do this semester is freewrite and make little collages. They smile,
content in their neo-Platonic isolation, happy to be free from the burden of
intellectual inquiry. Things haven’t been this good since kindergarten.
A cluster of social-epistemic composition theorists spy through a window,
nodding knowingly. “Ahah! There he is—Peter Elbow! Undermining our
attempts to promote academic discourse, to critique traditional humanism.
Promoting truth as a private vision of an autonomous self. Lowering standards. A threat to the academy and to the nation!”

Cut to a ﬁrst ﬂoor classroom in the University of Hawaii’s Webster Hall,
February 1996. The class is divided into noisy groups of four, as all students take
turns reading their drafts aloud. Peter has asked his students to note which bits
have “life,” are “real,” powerful, strong? Where are the moments of energy?
Today I’m observing Michael, Martin, Megan, and Angela. They’re working on
their “descriptive scenes,” helping their readers to see something in vivid detail.
Though my friends in the education department might say they are “occasionally off
task,” they do seem to be ﬁnding plenty of “moments of energy.” Megan is reading.
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She’s a conﬁdent writer, and her essay grows out of a personal experience, her semester abroad in Italy. She reads about a ﬁeld in Tuscany. “I expected to see waves. How
do Italians ﬁgure out where they are when they are surrounded by all this land?
Everywhere you look, land, as far as you can see. . . .”
“That is so weird,” says Angela, “to look as far as you can see and not to see any
water. I’ve never seen that!”
“Yeah, I bet they’d think it was weird if they came here and couldn’t see very
much land. . . .”
Pretty soon they’re off task, Megan’s essay having led to a lively discussion about
how people in Hawaii are perceived by people elsewhere. “People are so stupid, they
actually think we live in grass shacks.” “Yeah, one time somebody from the mainland
asked me, ‘What kind of money do you use?’” “This tourist comes up to me and
goes, ‘Do you speak English?’” “Yeah, and you go somewhere, and when people hear
you’re from Hawaii, they think all you do is surf. You tell them you go to the
University of Hawaii, and they’re, like, surprised that people in Hawaii even study.”
Terms from my seminar in colonialism circulate through my mind—core/
periphery, marginalization, Orientalism, exoticizing. Just because these freshmen
aren’t using those terms doesn’t mean they don’t understand the dynamics; they
live them every day of their lives. These issues have certainly led to a moment of
energy for this group. Though student discussion has moved off their papers, I
change my notes—these students are not off task at all.

The discursively constructed “Peter Elbow” of my opening scene is a caricature, created characterizations made by several of Elbow’s most vocal critics.
I. Hashimoto has characterized Elbow as an “evangelist,” calling him “zealous,”
“overemotional,” and “anti-intellectual” (73–83). David Bartholomae has
dubbed Elbow’s classroom a “frontier classroom” and has called his teaching
“logocentric,” “conservative,” and “retrograde” (70–71). James Berlin has typed
Elbow as a Thoreau-like solitary ﬁgure, “isolated” and “cut off from community,” a teacher whose pedagogy is “Neo-Platonic” and “solipsistic” (146). And
Lester Faigley calls Elbow “Romantic,” with a capital R (530). The image of
Peter Elbow that emerges in contemporary composition literature is a mixture
of iconic ﬁgures ranging from John Wayne and Newt Gingrich to Thoreau,
Plato, Sigmund Freud, Jimmy Swaggart, and Billy Graham. Those who have
directly experienced Elbow’s teaching, however, feel a dissonance between the
discursive Peter Elbow that emerges in composition literature and the actual
Peter Elbow who is their teacher. After taking graduate classes from Elbow
when he was visiting Citizens Chair at the University of Hawaii from 1995 to
1996, I myself experienced such a sense of dissonance. This led me to observe
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the freshman English composition course Elbow taught at UH in spring 1996,
in order to discern what his classroom practice actually entailed.
Two things emerge when observing Elbow’s teaching. First, his classroom
practice is rhetorically complex, emphasizing at various points all elements of
the rhetorical situation—writer, reader, language, and subject matter—
through an ongoing, dynamic process that actively shifts among the various
interacting elements. Second, Elbow’s teaching is voice-centered rather than
textually centered. That is not to say that Elbow construes voice as singular,
“authentic,” or as issuing from an “autonomous” and “genuine” “self.” Though
some assume that voice-centered approaches to composition pedagogy must
be philosophically naive and politically retrograde, the implications of a
voice-centered pedagogy—that is, a teaching approach that places people
rather than words at the center—hold the potential to be more potentially
radical and transformative than discourse-focused pedagogy, which places
language at the center.

It’s a sunny Tuesday in January, a little before noon. Peter arranges the chairs
into a circle as students ﬁlter in. Most appear to be local Hawaii students of mixed
Asian and/or Polynesian ethnicity, and there are a couple of Caucasians, slightly
more males than females. It’s still early in the semester, and there’s not a lot of
chatter before class begins.
Class begins with students calling one another’s names. “I’m Linda, and that’s
Peter.” “Sue, Linda, and Peter.” “Kimo, Sue, Linda . . .”
After six years in college, I’ve been through class introductions more times than
I can count. What makes today different is that it’s not the ﬁrst day of the class; it’s
the fourth. And from my experience as Peter’s student, I already know what these
students will soon learn: almost every class begins with students calling one
another by name, from now until the end of the term. Peter explains his philosophy: “This is something we’re going to do at the beginning of every class. . . . It
seems to me, you’re not really present until you’ve been named. And we want you
to be present. Good news, anybody?”
Another Elbow ritual. Whether you’re an eighteen-year-old freshman or a
forty-something Ph.D. candidate, Peter wants to know who you are. And he doesn’t just want us to talk—the listening is even more important. In Hawaii, it’s
called “talking story.” Kimo tells us he went surﬁng over the weekend. Martin has
landed a role in a university play. Peter heard from his children in college.
Jenny walks in—she’s late. “Give us some good news,” Peter says. “That’s your
penalty.”
“I got my assignment done on time!” Laughter.
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Peter gives today’s assignment, a freewrite on names. He passes out copies of
the Cree naming poems, “Rain Straight Down” and “Quiet Before the Thaw,” and
reads them out loud before students freewrite about their own names for ten minutes. Students share in pairs, then Peter gives his minilecture of the day. Today’s
subject: Private versus public writing. He elucidates the debate in the composition
ﬁeld, without using professional jargon. “Some people think that everything we
write, even when it’s supposed to be private, is really in a sense public. And they
make a good point, since language is a social phenomenon, and our languages
come to us from our cultures . . . but for now, let’s just assume there are times
where we’re really writing just for ourselves, even if we decide to share it later. Is
there some way to turn that private writing into public writing?”
Peter relates this issue to the way the course is structured. Students keep journals, and he checks periodically to see that they are ﬁlling the pages. But he won’t
read them. Some teachers, he explains, require journals and call them “private”—
then proceed to read them, sometimes even grade them. In this class, he tells students, your journals will be private—but you might sometimes want to look at
them, think about the issues you raise to yourself—and think about ways to turn
those concerns into public writing. Public writing is more formal, more geared
toward the needs of an audience—but that doesn’t mean it can’t still have its roots
in the personal.

The one believable element in my imagined “frontier classroom” scene is
the command to “Freewrite! Freewrite! Freewrite!” Elbow admits to being
“something of a cheerleader” on this score, and anyone who has studied with
him at any level knows she will write, write, and write some more, sometimes
freely, but at other times not so freely. Elbow constantly pushes his students,
not simply toward more writing—though he does do that—but toward
increasingly better writing. Moreover, Elbow’s reader-responses to students
demonstrate that he takes their texts seriously, reading them as carefully as a
literary scholar would read a published text. Freewriting does not represent an
“open” classroom in any static or permanent sense, but instead enables student
writers to clear a temporary space for generating ideas, a momentary withdrawal from internal and external censors in order to begin the process of getting words onto paper. This clearly is the point where Elbow chooses to start,
though it is not where he stops.
Elbow uses personal topics in the same manner—as a point of entry rather
than as a point of rest. For, to a considerable degree, Elbow’s pedagogy also
emphasizes audience. One important audience for students, of course, was
Elbow himself, who provided reader-response feedback by taking students’
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texts seriously. Meanings between writers and audiences were also negotiated
through the use of groups and class publications, and students were encouraged both to make use of peer responses when undertaking revisions and to
enter into the minds of others by listening actively and attentively to the writing of their fellow students.
Interestingly, though Elbow initially achieved recognition for a book entitled Writing Without Teachers and though he is often associated in the literature with “de-centered authority” and “student-centered” teaching
approaches, Elbow exerts considerable authority and influence in this classroom, but he chooses to exert it over how students behave (for example, by
enforcing punctuality and putting full effort into revisions) instead of using
his authority to “rank” student writing by assigning reductive grades or
restricting students to a singular writing style. Elbow graded this course by
entering into a contract with students, which guaranteed certain letter grades
for specific tasks, rather than by making subjective assessments of quality.
But, as Elbow expressed to me, “My ‘style of teaching’ or ‘my presence in the
classroom’ is anything but self-effacing. To put it bluntly, to run a workshop,
you tend to have to be very pushy . . . and be a very strong presence in order to
clear space.” (Personal correspondence—Elbow) Paradoxically, for a teacher
to distribute power in the classroom in the way Elbow does suggests that the
teacher is actually exercising more authority, not less—a paradox further convoluted when the teacher in question is most well known for a book called
Writing Without Teachers.

I’m thinking about Elbow’s own comments on “authority” while reading
through some of his detailed written comments to students. To Sue: “My deﬁnition
of a good essay is one that ﬁgures stuff out and gets somewhere. (Lively voice is not
the main thing—despite my interest in it.) I like especially the way your essay ends
up somewhere different from where it started; you see there was something wrong
with your initial feelings. That gives a kind of drama to it—something actually
going on before our eyes.”
To Dave: “It’s great to see how much you did in revising. Lots of thinking here.
. . . You are continuing to THINK, WONDER, turn the gears. Try to remember the
feeling and how you got yourself to do that. That will be the key to writing you
have to do at the university (and after): just trying to have more thoughts, ﬁgure
out more things, explore more.”
To Dave and Brad: “When you talk about the rise in wages for women compared to men, you forget to mention one little fact: that women still get paid
MUCH LESS than men for the same work!”
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To Karen and Gary: “My main reaction in reading. There’s something quite
weird about your paper. EVERY EXAMPLE of racism that you talk about is an
example of thinking or behavior by members of a targeted group, blacks or
Hawaiians. NOWHERE IN YOUR PAPER do you ever give an example or seem to
acknowledge the more pervasive racism of groups with more power. In short, you
are making the point Y, and it seems a valid point—except that by failing to make
the more obvious point X, you end up sounding very racist yourself. It’s as though
you think that only blacks and Hawaiians are racist. Did you mean to do that?”
To Adam and Mark: “You make a bunch of statements that are kind of illogical—
that no one you know is gay. (You better not be so sure.) That everyone you know
who is gay is messed up. (I thought you didn’t know anyone.) That once someone is
gay you can’t see them the same. (Well how can you trust your perception when you
know you go into this gear?)”
Students often write things that are uncomfortable to read—and maybe there’s
more risk of that when they know they won’t be graded on what they say.
On the other hand, if students harbor these thoughts and feelings, perhaps it’s
better to get them out on the table where they can be addressed directly. Peter asks
them to think through things more deeply. Would this be happening if instead,
they had told him what they thought he wanted to hear, because they knew their
grades depended on his opinion of what they were saying? Can students hear the
teacher’s opinions more clearly when they don’t come with a grade attached?
At least students won’t be able to complain that Peter graded them down
because he didn’t like what they were saying. In a way, that makes him more free,
when he disagrees with something, to say so—to enter into dialogue, converse
about the issues at stake, in the hope of bringing hidden assumptions and prejudices to the surface.
Grades, on the other hand, have more of a silencing effect: “This is a C paper;
I’m the teacher, and you’re the student. End of discussion.”

Though Elbow exercises his own authority as teacher to encourage writing
habits and classroom behaviors that he ﬁnds most effective, “authority” in the
sense of authorship clearly remains in the hands of students. And, Elbow
clearly retains allegiance to the idea of authorship, which has opened him to
criticism by compositionists of the social-epistemic school such as David
Bartholomae, who asks, “Should we promote the notion of authorship in their
classrooms at a time when the whole concept of authorship is under attack in
every other realm of the university?” (70). It is important to note, however,
that while Elbow believes in authorship, he does not deﬁne “author” as singular, static, isolated, autonomous, and uniquely gifted. Elbow makes clear to his
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students that he believes no one functions autonomously, and no one writes in
a vacuum. What emerges in Elbow’s classroom is a revised notion of authorship as plural and dynamic, allowing for more people, from all walks of life, to
develop their authorial potential. Elbow works toward authorizing more voices
and in more linguistic registers (such as Hawaii Creole English), a move that
challenges elitist notions of authorship. The space Elbow makes for students’
home languages, multiple linguistic registers, and discursive alternatives can be
conceived in Bakhtinian terms as encouraging both the centripetal, unifying
forces of standard English and the centrifugal, disruptive forces of heteroglossia. It is the dynamic tension between the two that keeps language alive, enriching ongoing conversations through the participation of as many voices as
possible and facilitating the possibility of social change. For writing students,
encouraging the discovery of their voice(s) helps them develop the power to
enter into society’s conversations, moving among the full range of multiple
voices and linguistic registers available to them, “taking the word and making
it [their] own.”

On a Thursday in February, Peter asks students to discuss their reactions to the
ﬁrst class publication, a collection of the students’ “self-as-writer” collages. At ﬁrst
there’s the usual quiet, feet shufﬂing, papers rustling. Mark breaks the silence.
“The thing I noticed is how lots of people complain they can’t write, but their
papers are pretty good.”
Karen adds, “There was so much funny stuff. Like the pidgin—it sounded like
the person, you could just hear the person saying it.”
Now they’re jumping in eagerly, talking faster, overlapping. “Yeah, it’s like gossip,
I like to hear what’s in other people’s minds.” “I like the way Kerry thanks her mother
for helping to teach her there’s times and places for different kinds of language.”
“Well, it’s not just the pidgin, it’s other kinds of street talk. Like Robert, it’s not
pidgin, but when he’s in the factory with those Polish workers, it’s not like standard
English, it’s street talk, it sounds really real.” “And Karen’s is funny and sarcastic.”
“I liked where Megan said she’d have made an excellent beatnik.” I feel as though
I’m in a theatre lobby at intermission, immersed in an electric buzz. Peter has to
raise his voice, like a judge calling for “order in the court,” so he can give the assignment for next Tuesday.
In Kerry’s “self-as-writer” collage, she moves back and forth between standard
English and pidgin, which she describes as her “natural” language. “It is not that
different from standard English,” she says, “but some people have a hard time
understanding that dialect. Being here at Manoa, I have become a better English
speaker. When I return to my home on the Island of Kauai, the pidgin-English
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language ﬂows naturally out of my mouth. It’s actually so weird, I write standard
English better than I speak it.” She writes about her mother in the language she
most associates with mother, family, home. “Mom, you teach me dat dea times
when propa foa speak pidgin and times foa speak propa English.” To her favorite
high school teacher, she writes in standard English: “I didn’t enjoy writing before I
had you. I want to thank you for opening up my eyes. Your compassion has
brought many students to believe they can write.” To her mother she writes again,
“Oh, ma, I wish I was back home foa speak my natural language.”
Jenny writes in a process letter about having an “on-off ” switch. “Pidgin for
your friends and family, English for your teachers.” Peter writes in his feedback, “I
agree, it doesn’t have to be this either/or thing.”

Voice is one of the most important elements in Elbow’s pedagogy. However,
the concept of voice Elbow promotes is neither autonomous nor isolated. With
his emphasis on group work, reading aloud, and responding to the work of
others, Elbow’s concept of voice comports easily with Bakhtin’s concept of
dialogism:
The idea lives not in one person’s isolated individual consciousness—if it remains
there only, it degenerates and dies. The idea begins to live, that is, to take shape, to
develop, to ﬁnd and renew its verbal expression, to give birth to new ideas, only
when it enters into genuine dialogic relationships with other ideas, with the ideas of
others. (In Morris 98)

While Bakhtin does not view utterances as emanating from individuals, he
grants that utterances are issued through individuals. Thus, a Bakhtinian view of
voice acknowledges both the human dimension of language and the social
processes by which knowledge and meaning are created. Judging by my observations of Elbow’s English 100 course, “dialogic interaction” is an excellent characterization of the classroom dynamics that result from his teaching. Listening to
others was as important as writing and reading one’s own work. In group work,
for instance, students spent seventy-ﬁve percent of their time listening to others
and only twenty-ﬁve percent reading their own work. The small groups never
proceeded to assess any writer’s “authenticity” or “sincerity”; instead, the techniques of showing, summarizing, pointing, and relating “movies of the mind”
allowed for reader response and negotiation of meaning between readers and
writers. The collaborative writing assignment provided for meanings to be negotiated between writers (often with contradictory viewpoints) as well. Once again,
Elbow’s extensive oral and written feedback allowed writers to consider readers’
reactions in more detail than would have been provided with mere letter grades.
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Elbow further encouraged dialogic interaction through his emphasis on
using voice to engage in public discourse. Those wishing to earn an “A” in the
class had to submit class publications and write one explicitly public piece of
writing, and most assignments asked students to consider how their private
writing might be reshaped into public writing geared for an audience—once
again demonstrating that the personal and autobiographical was a starting
point, not an ending point. Personal narratives allowed students to position
their own subjectivities, while feedback groups enabled them to consider the
subjectivities of others. One assignment called for students to engage with
group identities explicitly, and all assignments fostered increased student
awareness of their own social positions. As a result, the students’ writing
teemed with issues regarding how differences play out in the cultural and ethnic landscape of Hawaii, a place where the legacy of colonial conquest and
domination is still very much alive. Extensive abstract theorizing was hardly
necessary, given the depth of the students’ own perceptions and experiences of
their complex multicultural location.

A Thursday afternoon in March. We’re inside Peter’s ofﬁce on the sixth ﬂoor of
Kuykendall Hall, waiting for the ﬁrst student to arrive for her biweekly ﬁfteenminute conference. By the end of the semester, each student will have had about
eight conferences.
The main purpose, Peter tells me, is for the students to read their drafts out
loud; it helps if a piece of writing is heard, not just read. As students read their
own work, they can often hear mistakes for themselves. And when teachers listen
without reading along, they can temporarily put aside copyediting concerns and
hear the total “shape” of a piece.
Today, students will be reading about identities. This assignment started with
an in-class freewrite about “any aspect of any of your group identities,” then carried over into a collaborative research essay written with a partner. But before students get together with their partners or start poring through the library, Peter
thinks it’s important for them to explore their own thinking and experience.
Sue, a somewhat shy eighteen-year-old, is ﬁrst. As I listen, I think of the cliché
that “still waters run deep”; her writing has a lively voice, considerable energy,
undertones of anger. She writes about attending private school, about being a
girl—how public school kids assume she’s a rich snob, how her parents give more
privileges to her brother. She writes of being second-generation ChineseAmerican, of traveling in China for the ﬁrst time, of ﬁnding that the Chinese people she met didn’t consider her Chinese at all: “They were insulted when I said I
was Chinese. I’d never felt more American.” She discusses the slurs used against
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those of Chinese descent in Hawaii and recites one of the derogatory rhymes she
heard other kids chanting when she was little, feeding into the stereotype that the
Chinese are “cheap.” Breaking away from her text, she tells Peter, “I don’t really
believe it, you know.”
“Right,” says Peter. “But it’s sort of like some of the rhymes black kids have had
to hear, some of the slurs—nowadays it’s outlawed, but you’ve still heard it. It’s
still in there.”
“Yeah,” Sue agrees, returning to her essay. She reads about being Catholic. It’s
part of her identity, part of her family heritage, and though she’s not sure how
much of the church doctrine she believes, she intends to keep practicing. “The Lord
knows I’m not a great Catholic,” she reads—a breezy statement that could be read
either as slangy and humorous or as a serious religious admission. Peter points out
the nice potential double meaning: “Did you do that on purpose?”
Sue laughs. “I don’t know . . . maybe I did!”

In Pedagogy and the Politics of Hope, Henry Giroux draws upon Bakhtinian
theory to formulate his own concept of pedagogy that questions the status quo
and works toward what he terms “radical democracy.” The element that Giroux
identiﬁes as missing from most pedagogies, whether ostensibly conservative or
liberal, is voice: “Both radical and conservative ideologies generally fail to engage
the politics of voice and representation—the forms of narrative and dialogue—
around which students make sense of their lives and schools.” He further points
out: “While this is an understandable position for conservatives or for those
whose logic of instrumentalism and social control is at odds with an emancipatory notion of human agency, it represents a serious theoretical and political failing on the part of radical educators” (120). Voice, then, is a concept that need not
be limited to a conservative pedagogical agenda; it is a tool that can and should be
used in the service of a radical, liberatory pedagogy as well. A voice-centered
approach allows for differences, such as gender, ethnicity, and sexual orientation,
to come to the forefront; accordingly, Giroux calls for the “discourse of lived experience” to be brought into the classroom as a way of challenging the orthodoxy
represented by academic discourse. This is exactly what Elbow accomplishes.
A voice-centered pedagogy tells the students that they matter, that their own
experiences and perceptions are worthwhile: worth writing about, worth being
read about and heard by others. In Giroux’s terms, Elbow’s students encounter
a pedagogy that engages “the forms of narrative and dialogue around which
students make sense of their lives and schools” (120). “In this class, you are not a
number but a student,” says one of Elbow’s students in her end-of-semester
review. Elbow provided each student with considerable individualized attention
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in the form of conferences and written feedback. Small group interaction and
collaborative writing projects also contributed to a classroom in which students
got to know each other, as well as their teacher. Even Elbow’s policy of beginning every class by having students call on one another by name contributed to
this sense of student engagement, presence, and investment; Elbow insists on
student presence, and his students sense his own presence and investment in
their narratives and respond accordingly. End-of-semester evaluations included
comments such as “He cares a lot about his students,” and “He is a sympathetic
man who shows great concern for us.”
Giroux calls for a “border pedagogy” that empowers students to “cross over
into borders of meaning, maps of knowledge, social relations, and values that
are increasingly being negotiated and rewritten” (147). His ambitious goal,
education in service of “radical democracy,” empowers people across various
boundaries, such as race and gender, without obliterating differences. While
Giroux identiﬁes himself as a culturally left critic, he also notes a current tendency toward defeatism in culturally left criticism: “Radical education theory
has abandoned the language of possibility for the language of critique” (120).
Giroux proposes that those with an interest in transformative pedagogy rediscover what he calls “the language of possibility”; it is crucial, he says, to “create
conditions within particular institutions that allow students to locate themselves and others in histories that mobilize rather than destroy their hopes for
the future” (161). After a full semester of observing Elbow’s classroom methods and individual conferences, reviewing student papers, and reading Elbow’s
written feedback, I concluded that Elbow’s pedagogy is exactly what Giroux is
calling for: an education that empowers students to make connections
between their lives and the world around them, to expand their own critical
powers, to “locate themselves and others” in narratives that are still unfolding,
and not least of all, to give students a sense of hope, possibility, and individual
agency through the process of becoming more powerful writers with more
control over both their writing process and their written products.
“Frontier” may be associated with tropes of gunslinging cowboys in the Wild
West, but it is also a synonym for “border.” If we reconceptualize what kind of
frontier we are talking about, Peter Elbow’s classroom is indeed a “frontier classroom”—not the caricature classroom of our gunslinging cowboy evangelist,
but a site for “border pedagogy” in Giroux’s sense. The freshman English course
I observed in spring 1996 helped students to learn and implement “the language of possibility,” to write “with power” and “without teachers,” in the
process “mobiliz[ing] rather than destroy[ing] their hopes for the future.” This
was a “frontier pedagogy” that the academy needs more of if we are ever to work
toward the “radical democracy” of which Giroux speaks.

10 D I S S O LV I N G C O N T R A R I E S
Keith Hjortshoj

No one can be blamed for associating Peter Elbow’s work ﬁrst with antiestablishment movements in higher education and then with expressionist pedagogy in composition. These were real historical implications of Elbow’s writing
and teaching, supported by strands, at least, of intention. Appearing in the
midst of challenges to institutional authority of all kinds, even the title of
Writing Without Teachers suggested that teachers and their institutional roles
were the central problems writers faced. If teachers represent the constraints of
academic discourse, writing without them must be nonacademic. Freewriting,
without these rhetorical constraints, suggests that other kinds of writing are
not free. And if we are not writing to tell others what we have to say, we must
be writing to tell ourselves what we have to say. It is only a short step, then, to
conclude that the value of freewriting must reside in this discovery and to call
it self-discovery, self-realization, and self-expression.
Through a patchwork of quotations and inferences along these lines, James
Berlin thus distinguished Peter Elbow as the central proponent of “expressionistic epistemology,” which, according to Berlin, “locates all truth within a personal construct arising from one’s unique selfhood that prevents these
expressionists from becoming genuinely epistemic in their approach, despite
their use of activities—such as the editorial group—that on the surface are
social in nature” (53). In Berlin’s reading of Writing Without Teachers, even
“cooking”—interaction and exchange—serves the purpose “of discovering the
nonverbal reality of the self.” (Rhetoric 154).
Nearly thirty years after the publication of Writing Without Teachers, most of
Elbow’s critics and many of his followers continue to view his work through this
“expressionistic” lens. On his side of a “Conversation” with Elbow, in the
February 1995 issue of CCC, for example, David Bartholomae characterized “free
writing” as a nonacademic genre: “a ﬁrst-person, narrative or expressive genre
whose goal is to reproduce the ideology of sentimental realism” (“Writing” 69).
Because they fail to acknowledge that this is a genre, Bartholomae argued, Elbow
and others in his camp create illusions of freedom, through a naive “desire for an
institutional space free from institutional pressures, a cultural process free from
the inﬂuence of culture, an historical moment outside of history, an academic
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setting free from academic writing” (64). By identifying writing with individual
psychology, leaders of expressionist and cognitive trends in the 1970s derailed
composition studies, in Bartholomae’s view, from more productive attention to
the social, rhetorical contexts in which academic writing occurs.
If Peter Elbow’s reputation alone were at stake in this unresolved argument, I
would let him speak entirely for himself, as he has done on many occasions, with
considerable annoyance. In his 1991 review of Jeannette Harris’ book Expressive
Discourse, for example, Elbow revealed both his desire to disentangle himself
from the category of expressivism and the difﬁculty he faces in doing so:
When I ﬁrst discovered, thumbing through the book, that she wanted to get rid of
expressive discourse as a category in our discipline, I was intrigued—even attracted.
Not just because I don’t ﬁnd the word “expressive” particularly central to my own
lexicon, not just because I too wonder what the word means, but most of all, quite
frankly, because I ﬁnd these days that the term is mostly used as a stick to beat me
over the head with. My hopes were dashed, however, when I found that she is only
trying to get rid of the term “expressive discourse” but that she wants to keep the
terms “expressive pedagogy” and “expressive theory” and “rhetorical expressionism”
for people like me—for the general school of thought that Berlin gave that label to.
Unfortunately, she seems to want to hang onto the term “expressive” so that she too
can continue to beat “expressivists” about the head and shoulders. (84)

There is something odd, as Elbow implies in the passage above, about the
persistence with which his critics preserve the category of “expressive writing”
while denying its relevance to writing and teaching in the university. There is
also something odd about the narrow, extreme rendition of expressivism that
Bartholomae attaches to Elbow’s work, even though he knows that Elbow
avoids such ﬁxed, one-dimensional positions. As the anthropologist Mary
Douglas observed in Purity and Danger, categories of order, power, and inclusion depend upon categories of disorder, weakness, and exclusion. This observation suggests that, as an excluded, denigrated category, “personal expression”
is essential for maintaining certain institutionalized conceptions of “academic
discourse.” If expressivism did not exist, social constructionists, among others,
would have to construct it. Elbow therefore has good reasons to suspect that
theorists who wish to maintain narrow conceptions of academic writing need
“expressivists” like him to kick around—ones willing to represent the positions
they need to exclude.
To the extent that Elbow and Bartholomae agree to maintain the distinction between personal expression and academic discourse, we can think of
them as allies, even when, as in the CCC debate, they intend to disagree.
Abandoning this distinction, as I’ll propose, would genuinely challenge ideas

146

W r i t i n g Wi t h E l b ow

about academic writing that represent an institutionalized illusion. This illusory notion of academic writing creates some of the most common difficulties student writers encounter; it represents the main obstacle Peter Elbow
was trying to move beyond in his early work; and it continues to undermine
the potential value of this work for academic writers.
The institutionalized illusion I have in mind is a conception of the university
as a place of accomplished performance. In this view of the university, high status results from being knowledgeable, original, and eloquent on demand. After
all, scholars are known and rewarded not for work in progress but for their performances: their publications, teaching skills, public lectures, awards, and
grants. Students succeed through strong performances on writing assignments,
exams, and presentations, exchanged for the currency of grades. In this kind of
institution, we can think of “academic discourse” as a large category of textual
performances—accomplished writing and speech—that includes the books
and articles scholars publish, the readings they assign in their courses, prepared
lectures, and the assigned papers students submit for evaluation.
These products of academic work are indeed forms of academic discourse,
and there is nothing illusory about the values, rewards, and imperatives
attached to them. Writing, teaching, and learning are ultimately performing
arts. The goal of an academic writer or teacher, like that of an actor or musician, is to deliver a convincing, polished performance that demonstrates mastery of the medium. And this performance should create for the audience an
illusion of ease that conceals the messy, experimental process of rehearsal, the
long ordeal of becoming accomplished. When such an artist is on stage, behind
the lectern or in print, we don’t want to observe the hesitation, confusion, and
labor from which ﬁne performances gradually emerge.
But the university is an educational institution, not just a theater of accomplishment, and in some respects we conceal the process of becoming accomplished entirely too well—especially from our students. “My history professor
talks just like a book!” a freshman told me with admiration, and he seemed
disillusioned when I raised the possibility that this professor was talking from
his book, or delivering lectures he had rehearsed and performed many times.
Real teachers of the performing arts know that in order to create the illusion of
ease in ﬁne performance their students need to be disillusioned in precisely this
way. Students need to spend most of their time learning the arduous process
through which actors, dancers, or musicians bring work to the stage. They
must be aware that professional actors, for example, are people who have
learned not just how to perform but how to rehearse: ways of developing characters, coordinating their roles with others, and making productive use of performance anxiety. This is what they teach their students.
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For the sake of comparison, therefore, imagine a school of theater arts in
which students are supposed to become accomplished actors by watching brilliant performances. Imagine that they are then asked to produce similar performances on stage, before critical audiences, without rehearsals, without
formal training in voice and movement, without direction in the development
of their characters. Imagine that assessment of their ability is based entirely on
the strengths or weaknesses of those makeshift performances and that the
whole process of preparing to be on stage is considered an individual, personal
enterprise, not the focus of instruction in theater arts. Imagine that students in
this school are allowed to believe that truly accomplished, professional actors
can perform brilliantly without preparation and rehearsal.
This is the kind of place David Bartholomae best described in his essay
“Inventing the University”: a place where student writers are routinely put on
stage and asked to perform roles for which they are unrehearsed and, as often as
not, miscast. In these performances, they are supposed to imitate the daunting
ﬁgure of accomplishment: the “professor of English” (as Bartholomae casts himself), who already knows everything the student writer is struggling to learn.
If my students are going to write for me by knowing who I am—and if this means
more than knowing my prejudices, psyching me out—it means knowing what I
know; it means having the knowledge of a professor of English. They have, then, to
know what I know, and how I know what I know (the interpretive schemes that
deﬁne the way I would work out the problems I set for them); they have to learn to
write what I would write or to offer up some approximation of that discourse. (140)

As Bartholomae says elsewhere in the essay, they have “to assume privilege
without having any”—to write as though they were people they have not yet
become, with kinds of authority they do not possess. And from Bartholomae’s
perspective, this struggle occurs on stage, in the papers they have written
which, along with the professional literature they read, constitute “academic
discourse.” Through the window of the completed text, the teacher can see precisely what the writer was doing, because “A written text, too, can be a compelling model of the ‘composing process’ once we conceive of a writer at work
in a text and simultaneously, then, within a society, a history, a culture.” (162)
Bartholomae’s account of the university closely mirrors the ways in which
my students describe the challenges of academic writing. And while
Bartholomae attributes these problems to “basic writers,” I’ve found that the
difﬁculty of assuming privilege you do not have increases, in some ways, as
tasks become more complex and as standards rise. When I ask students in an
advanced writing class to explain what makes writing difﬁcult, the majority
include papers they write for unfamiliar, authoritative teachers as examples,
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and they tend to describe this ordeal as a kind of performance for which they
are unprepared. One student observed that writing the ﬁrst paper for a teacher
was like trying to make intelligent conversation on a blind date. Another concluded, “It is impressing others which cramps my thought processor.” This
junior imagined herself on the dance ﬂoor with a stranger:
Writing is most difﬁcult for me when I am unsure to whom I am writing. I torture
myself as I attempt to strike a balance between delivering to the audience what I
think it wants to hear, and what I want to say. . . .Writing, in this sense, may be compared to dancing with a new partner. Initially, you do not know your partner’s style
or experience. There is a fear of stepping on the other person’s feet or of trying a daring move. As a result, the dance is stiff and constrained. It is awkward and unnatural.

And this sophomore’s description of writing for teachers corresponds very
closely with the rhetorical conundrum Bartholomae poses, of trying “to
assume privilege without having any.” She also describes her effort to meet this
academic challenge as a personal, emotional struggle, in terms of insecurity
and self-consciousness:
Since the majority of my writing is for professors, whom I regard in the beginning as
impersonal entities—strangers—I am very insecure about my writing ability. I am
constantly conscious of my need to hide my insecurity by writing to meet their
approval. Thus, I feel my writing should be coherent, intelligently composed, and
interesting in order to reﬂect some of my nonexistent characteristics.

Like Bartholomae, all of these students are referring to their “writing”
entirely as the product of their effort, not the process. One exception is this
junior, who describes his struggle to move beyond what Bartholomae calls the
“imitation or parody” of the teacher’s accomplishment:
I have the most trouble using language . . . when I am trying to write about something that a professor has discussed in one of my classes. I feel controlled by his
words, somehow imprisoned by his thought, unable to reshape his ideas into my
own. I have so much trouble taking the leap from my professor’s framework to my
own interpretation of the ideas that the process of writing is like vomiting all night
long, over and over again. I have to hammer out every sentence at least three times
before I will accept it, and by the time I ﬁnish a paragraph, I already hate the ﬁrst
sentence all over again. But then I will think of something (usually in the middle of
the night), a new slant—my own direction—and the paper will be redeemed. This is
the most difﬁcult writing, but probably the writing from which I learn the most.

Yet even this writer, one of the best in the class, was trying to produce the ﬁnished paper at every utterance, in a single draft. Like the other students, therefore,
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he could not clearly distinguish the product from the process, the performance
from the rehearsal. And like all of the students who wrote about their difﬁculties,
he assumed full responsibility for ﬁguring out how to get this writing done. In
more than a hundred papers on this subject, I can’t recall a single writer who
viewed the process of completing papers as an object of instruction—something
one should expect to learn from teachers outside a process-based writing class
such as mine. In other classes they were on their own, taking personal responsibility for their awkward efforts to reﬂect their nonexistent characteristics or to
dance with strangers. If they were more accomplished like their professors, they
assumed, they wouldn’t face these difﬁculties.
For teachers and for administrators, this is a very convenient view of academic performance and academic discourse. Placing the means to the ends of
accomplishment in excluded categories of personal experience and personal
responsibility relieves teachers from the most complex, time-consuming types
of instruction and allows the institution to run more efﬁciently. It also allows
scholars to maintain the appearance of being wholly accomplished, in departments where admissions of confusion or ignorance can be hazardous. In the
chapter she wrote for Howard Becker’s book Writing for Social Scientists, sociologist Pamela Richards described the risks of showing early drafts to colleagues:
If you give someone a working draft to read, what you’re asking them to do is pass
judgment on your ability to think sociologically. You’re asking them to decide
whether you are smart or not and whether you are a real sociologist. If there are no
ﬂashes of insight, no riveting ideas, what will they conclude? That you’re stupid. If
she tells that to anyone else, it’s the kiss of death. (114–15)

If faculty are not showing this work to their colleagues, they are unlikely to
use it for purposes of instruction. Very few of my students, even at advanced
levels of undergraduate study, have ever seen rough drafts of their professors’
publications, research notes, rejected manuscripts, peer reviews, or other artifacts of work in progress. Because they are barely aware that such documents
exist, students tend to assume that professional academic writing, like their
own, is the accomplished thing itself, not the way that thing came about.
How do people and texts become accomplished? How do successful scholars acquire knowledge, prepare lectures, produce books and articles, and pass
tenure reviews? How do undergraduates and graduate students become scholars and other kinds of professionals? How do “Student Writers,” in the title of
Nancy Sommers’s 1980 study of revision, become “Experienced Adult
Writers”? How do the unprivileged acquire privilege? How can writing come
to reﬂect characteristics the writer did not possess at the beginning of the
process?
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To a great extent the answers to these questions lie behind closed doors, in
realms of academic discourse that undergraduates rarely enter. As a consequence—even for graduate students, even for faculty in some disciplines—these
appear to be personal questions about private dimensions of individual lives.
Yet these are really questions about academic work and academic writing,
and they are the kinds of questions from which Writing Without Teachers
emerged. In this initial form, Elbow’s work was simply an effort to demystify
the process of getting things written, and I focus on this ﬁrst book because it
precedes the entangled theoretical arguments through which Elbow half
became, as I’ll illustrate later, the expressivist his critics needed him to be.
As Elbow explained in an interview in Writing on the Edge in 1992, he knew
very little about the ﬁeld of composition when he published Writing Without
Teachers, and he did not develop freewriting to celebrate personal expression
or to renounce academics. His version of freewriting began, instead, as the lastditch survival strategy of a young scholar, prone to writing blocks, who wanted
very much to become an academic and has remained one ever since. As he
explained in that interview, “The main attraction” of Williams and Oxford,
where he was an undergraduate, “was the sophistication, learning to ‘pass’”
even though these places made him feel unsophisticated, awkward, and inarticulate (“An Interview” 15). The challenge for him, as for the sophomore I
quoted above, was to ﬁgure out how to produce writing that “reﬂected [his]
nonexistent characteristics.” As a graduate student at Harvard and Brandeis, he
said, “I was very self-conscious about writing, scared I couldn’t do it” (10).
Writing Without Teachers emerged from the spontaneous notes he wrote to
himself about his struggles, when writing seemed otherwise impossible. These
were the tormented explorations he had in mind, no doubt, when he made this
remarkable statement about authority in the preface:
The authority I call upon in writing a book about writing is my own long-standing
difﬁculty in writing. It has always seemed to me as though people who wrote without
turmoil and torture were in a completely different universe. And yet advice about
writing always seemed to come from them and therefore to bear no relation to us
who struggled and usually failed to write. But in the last few years I have struggled
more successfully to get things written and make them work for at least some readers,
and in watching myself do this I have developed the conviction I can give advice that
speaks more directly to the experience of having a hard time writing. I have also
reached the conviction that if you have special difﬁculty in writing, you are not necessarily further from writing well than someone who writes more easily (viii).

This “completely different universe” where people seem to write “without
turmoil and torture” was the kind of university Bartholomae describes, where
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performance is all that really seems to count and where performance anxiety is
therefore a way of life. And we can think of Writing Without Teachers as an
attempt to develop a strategy for survival in this place. Through his own effort
to recover from the performance anxieties this environment tends to induce,
Elbow developed a phenomenology of writing as a productive activity. Writing
“without” teachers simply means that to examine what we are actually doing in
this process, we have to put the still illusory ﬁgure of accomplishment in
parentheses, along with the illusion that brilliant products tumble effortlessly
from the minds of brilliant writers. The “teacherless classroom” is the kind of
place in which this investigation can occur, with or without teachers, much as
lessons and rehearsals occur before a performance of music or theater. Writing
Without Teachers examines what happens in the practice of writing, before the
product of this effort reaches an intended audience.
Presented in the “tell it like it is” style of the period, the language of this
analysis is conversational, often self-referential, but seldom expressivist. Elbow
rarely describes writing as a means to “self-discovery” or “self-expression” in
the terms Berlin attributed to the book. Instead, he continually uses the language of perception, cognition, physical movement, and physics, often to construct metaphors or models for understanding how writing itself comes about,
takes direction, and transforms, or to explain how ways of thinking interfere
with this process. In reference to “summing-up” what one has already written,
for example, he uses terms of movement and energy to explain a common
misconception:
The essence of this approach is to change your notion of what it means to try or
attempt or work on a piece of writing. To most people it means pushing as hard as
they can against a weight that is heavier than they can budge—hoping eventually to
move it. Whereas of course you merely get tireder. You must create mechanical
advantage so that “trying” means pushing against a weight that you can move even if
that only moves the main weight a small distance (20).

Even a term such as “growing” does not refer to “personal growth” but to
words, sentences, and ideas themselves. Like “cooking,” this concept is relational.
It refers to the evolving relations between writers and words, words and other
words, ideas and other ideas, writers and other writers. “Believing” and “doubting,” introduced at the end of the book, are not personal feelings or matters of
opinion; they are intellectual choices and cognitive conditions. In Writing
Without Teachers there is very little sense of the writer as a unique individual, and
conceptions of the “self,” to the extent that they appear in the book at all, seem
insubstantial—certainly not romanticized or reiﬁed. The writer seems little
more than an occasion for writing to happen—or the locus of concepts that keep

152

W r i t i n g Wi t h E l b ow

writing from happening of its own accord. Far from representing any ﬁxed
notion of the self, “Writing is, in fact, a transaction with words whereby you free
yourself from what you presently think, feel, and perceive.” (15)
More than any other book I know about, Writing Without Teachers examines
what happens in the writer’s reference frame. Within this reference frame,
freewriting is not a variety of personal expression. Instead, this exercise demonstrates the point of departure for all writing—in a kind of coordinated movement both physical and intellectual, which Elbow has often described as the use
of a writing “muscle.” This account of writing as an embodied activity—a matter of knowing where you are in the process and what you are doing—directly
addresses the sense of disembodiment, dislocation, and stage fright my students
describe. Elbow’s work has also been enormously helpful in my work with graduate students afﬂicted by writing blocks, which the university encourages them
to perceive, as Mike Rose observed, “as a mysterious, amorphous emotional difﬁculty.” Writing Without Teachers illuminates the nature of these obstacles as
patterned features of the writing process that all writers encounter and can
move beyond.
Elbow formalized, expanded, and in some ways clariﬁed these ideas in
Writing With Power, which also precedes Berlin’s taxonomy of rhetoric and the
debates that followed. In the index to Writing With Power, terms such as
“expression,” “discovery,” and “personal” do not appear at all. The word “self ”
occurs only in a few references to “self-evaluation.”
If in his first two books Elbow was not the expressivist Berlin imagined
him to be, how and to what extent did he become such a figure in composition theory?
In the Writing on the Edge interview, Elbow acknowledged that his view of
writing, especially his own struggle with writing, is in some ways psychological, “in the sense of ﬁguring out how my life works.” He added that “When
Writing Without Teachers came out, a lot of people said, ‘Well, this is too therapeutic. This is too much about feelings.’ So in a way I was always trying to
prove it was all academic, not too psychological” (25).
To this extent, perhaps, Elbow does maintain expressivist interpretations of
his own experiences as a writer, and the fact that he views his early difﬁculties
as emerging from personal problems explains in part why he has never entirely
refuted charges that freewriting and other kinds of exploratory writing are
forms of personal expression.
But there is another reason, rooted in the intellectual foundations of Elbow’s
contributions to composition theory. Elsewhere in the Writing on the Edge
interview, Elbow described the best candidate for a central theme that runs
throughout his work: not expressivism, but “embracing contraries.” “I want to
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deﬁne it as one of my life’s works,” he said, “to work out an intellectual justiﬁcation for going in two directions at once, for maintaining things that look irreconcilable to be—if not reconcilable, at least both true, both deserving one
hundred percent afﬁrmation” (16). Even in this strong statement of purpose he
said “one of my life’s works,” leaving room for other goals, other positions—
what we might call Elbow-room. When he notices that one perspective has
become dominant, he usually promotes the opposite, not instead but as well.
As a consequence, it is almost impossible either to pin Elbow to any single
position or to exclude him entirely from any position. Because he hates exclusion and hates being “pigeonholed,” as he often says, there is an underlying
pattern to the way he responds to criticism or to characterizations of his work,
even when we can’t predict exactly what he will say. Told that he is or is not A,
he will reply vigorously that he is A, but also B, its opposite. Told that this kind
of thinking makes a virtue of ambivalence, he would probably reply, Yes, but I
don’t want to be just ambivalent. I also want to be very deﬁnite!
Through this pattern of response, Elbow has routinely argued that people
misrepresent him by half, and in his tendency to “embrace” whatever critics say
he is or is not (along with its opposite), he has embraced expressivism more
explicitly than he did at the beginning of his career. To understand why Elbow
has been engaged in this unresolved argument for so many years, we have to
acknowledge the extent to which he has agreed to represent “personal expression” against the rigors of “academic discourse,” the ﬁgure of “the writer”
against that of “the academic,” and the “private” domain of writing against the
“public” domain of texts that have reached an intended audience. In his arguments against his critics, Elbow partly adopts the roles he has been assigned
and stubbornly refuses, as often as not, to say what I want him to say.
On his side of the “Conversation” with Bartholomae in CCC, for example, I
wanted Elbow to say “No, David, you’ve missed the point altogether. There is
nothing essentially personal or nonacademic about freewriting, and a dimension of the writing process is not in itself a genre.”
But Elbow did not challenge Bartholomae’s notion that exploratory writing
represents a genre of ﬁrst-person narration or argue that most academic writing is initially exploratory. Instead, he set up an opposition, “Being a Writer vs.
Being an Academic,” and defended the open, exploratory role of the writer
against a narrow, ambiguous conception of the academic. Students must learn
to be writers ﬁrst, he argued, before they become academics, and meanwhile,
especially in the freshman year, teachers should maintain the illusion of context-free discovery that Bartholomae criticized: “Indeed,” Elbow said, “much of
my behavior is an invitation for them to pretend that no authorities have ever
written about their subject before” (“Being a Writer” 79).
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In his essay “Reﬂections on Academic Discourse,” Elbow maintained similar
distinctions between the writer and the academic, nonacademic and academic
varieties of discourse within academic contexts. He argued, for example, “for
one kind of nonacademic discourse . . . that tries to render experience rather
than explain it. To render experience is to convey what I see when I look out
the window, what it feels like to walk down the street or fall down—to tell what
it’s like to be me or to live my life” (136). In this passage he referred to types of
writing, more or less literary: “autobiographical stories, moments, sketches—
perhaps even a piece of ﬁction or poetry now and then” (137). In the next
paragraph he argued that “we need nonacademic discourse even for the sake of
helping students produce good academic discourse”—now referring to the
kinds of exploratory writing that lead to ﬁnished essays or reports.
What is “nonacademic” about writing used to develop understandings or
positions for course assignments? For that matter, if teachers assign autobiographical narratives, ﬁction, or poetry, isn’t that writing, in that context, academic? We could understand these distinctions more clearly, perhaps, if we knew
what Elbow meant, exactly, by “academic discourse.” But in his effort to deﬁne
the personal or expressive side of this false dichotomy, the academic side
becomes blurred. In different parts of the “Reﬂections” essay, Elbow deﬁnes academic discourse as writing based on “reasons and evidence rather than just opinions, feelings, experiences” (140) or as “the discourse academics use when they
publish for other academics” (135). Although he refers to many general features
of academic writing (such as “detachment,” “explicitness,” and also “inexplicitness”), he argues in turn that “we can’t teach academic discourse because there’s
no such thing to teach” (138). If genres of academic discourse are too diverse to
distinguish as a category of writing, as he then argues, how can we distinguish
“nonacademic” writing from them? And what is the point of doing so?
In the same fashion, Elbow has become an advocate for the types of writing
readers associated with his work. Writing Without Teachers did not promote
personal writing as an expressive genre, in opposition to academic discourse.
Nor did Writing With Power. Yet in 1990 he edited an issue of Pre/Text devoted
to “expressive writing,” represented in this issue as a loose assortment of narratives, letters, dialogues, and essays with little in common beyond a casual, selfreferential style and a tendency to refer to others by their ﬁrst names. In his
foreword to the issue, however, Elbow did not just present this work on its merits. He used the occasion to argue that this kind of “personal expressive writing
can do the work of academic discourse.” (“Foreword: About Personal” 13).
Considering that Pre/Text is an academic “Journal of Rhetorical Theory,” we
might assume that the pieces contained in the issue are already doing the work
of academic discourse. It is difﬁcult to imagine, when reading them, what
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other kinds of academic work they might be doing in other contexts, or what,
exactly, this kind of writing has been excluded from. In the following passage
from his preface, Elbow’s sense of opposition and exclusion appears to serve
the main purpose of supplying contraries for him to embrace, an excluded
position he can defend in the interest of restoring balance between opposites:
Thus, I constantly read passages that simply assume without any argument that
since Elbow is interested in the personal, private, and individual dimension, he must
be working against what is social, against the idea of the social construction of
meaning and reality. With this comes, of course, the assumption that if the social is
good, then personal and private must be bad: that people who stick up for what is
personal and private must be advocating the cause of solipsism. (13)

With one hand, therefore, Elbow proudly points to the label he tries with
the other hand to remove.
While this effort to avoid ﬁxed positions annoys Elbow’s critics, I should
acknowledge that it has often broadened and enriched the ﬁeld of debate in
composition theory and pedagogy. The brilliant distinction between the
“doubting game” and the “believing game” has helped to resolve crippling
dilemmas for teachers who feel they must choose between opposite values and
roles in the classroom. By alerting us to the uneven “war” between reading and
writing, Elbow has encouraged us to balance these distinct yet related dimensions of learning. As a rule, I greatly appreciate the kind of binary thinking that
has led Elbow to these insights.
Some contraries, however, are more useful than others, and the effort to
embrace a false dichotomy creates more confusion than it resolves. To the
extent that Elbow has agreed to defend personal expression against academic
discourse, he has helped to keep essential dimensions of academic writing in
the closet of expressive discourse and individual psychology.
“What’s at stake here?” Elbow often asks, and in conclusion I should explain
why I consider it so important to dissolve, not embrace, this dichotomy
between the personal and the academic.
One reason is primarily conceptual: an inclination, very different from
Elbow’s, to make single kinds of sense out of ideas I ﬁnd useful. Peter Elbow
and David Bartholomae are among very few composition theorists who have
closely examined what student writers are actually doing, along with the ways
in which teachers and institutions are implicated in the problems these writers
encounter. Yet it is very difﬁcult for readers in our teacher training programs,
for example, to see that Elbow and Bartholomae are describing different
dimensions of the same phenomena, the same kinds of writing problems in
academic work. The impression that Elbow defends personal writing, while
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Bartholomae describes academic writing obscures the complementary values
of their insights into the ways in which writing comes about and into the
broader rhetorical contexts in which writing occurs. Because both theorists
create these impressions to some extent, I ﬁnd that I need to make their work
mutually useful through selective interpretation.
Other reasons are pedagogical. As I noted above, I often use principles and
passages from Elbow’s work to give blocked writers alternatives to the hopeless
conclusion that their problems result from personality disorders, irrational
fears, and other personal or emotional factors best understood through psychotherapy. The emphasis on embodied movement and direction in Writing
Without Teachers and Writing With Power directly addresses blocked writers’
sense that they are paralyzed, as they often say, or mired, derailed, disengaged, or
lost. These conditions arise in the contexts of their academic work, not just in
their minds. Most of the obstacles they encounter result from misconceptions
of the writing process (including the idea that it is “psychological”), ineffective
methods, or rhetorical and social factors that make writing virtually impossible, such as graduate committee members who have conﬂicting expectations. I
do not want composition theorists to tell these writers that their problems or
the solutions are “personal” after all.
Freewriting exercises also hold very limited value in a writing class if my
students think of this kind of writing as personal expression, as opposed to
academic writing. These contraries correspond entirely too well with categorical distinctions my students bring with them to college, ﬁnd reinforced when
they arrive, and apply to the types of writing their teachers assign. Because
they have been led to believe that the formal, impersonal essays they submit to
teachers fully represent academic writing, they assume that informal writing
they do not submit to teachers is personal and “expressive.” If they are not
writing for teachers, they assume they are writing about themselves, even when
they are not. Like Bartholomae, and like Elbow himself on some occasions, my
students also tend to identify all spontaneous, exploratory writing with genres
of autobiographical writing and literary description. Without help, they cannot ﬁnd a bridge across this divide, between the material they generate in
freewriting and the papers they turn in to teachers. Many of my colleagues run
into similar obstacles when they assign “reﬂective journals,” which their students imagine to be a distinct variety of personal expression akin to a diary,
even when their entries about course material include wonderful observations
they could expand in assigned papers.
When we encourage students to place exploratory writing in a nonacademic category of personal expression, they also become blind to the real foundations of academic writing and research, and this is my main concern. For
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scholars in English, who have the most direct inﬂuence on students’ conceptions of writing, academic texts are about other texts and are therefore implicitly about reading. Writing based on direct experience and observation,
memory, perception, or dialogue represents the genres of ﬁction and nonﬁction scholars in literary studies write about and therefore seems nonacademic.
This distinction appears to draw a clear line between academic writing and
writing based on personal experience, and it is possibly one reason for which
Elbow distinguishes “the writer” from “the academic.”
But the line is not so clear in other ﬁelds, which include most of the ones my
students choose as majors. In my collaborative work with teachers throughout
the disciplines, I continually encounter varieties of academic writing based on
direct experience, observation, description, and memory. Some of these forms
represent essential stages of investigation or phases of the writing process. Some
are narrative or descriptive or contain dialogue. Yet the terms “personal writing” or “expressive discourse” would misrepresent them completely. Laboratory
notebooks, for example, include extensive narration and description based on
direct observation in the process of doing research, yet for professional scientists these are also public, legal documents. A botanist’s ﬁeld journals consist
largely of descriptive writing, often supplemented with drawings. In many
other ﬁelds, too, direct experience can be another word for “data.” Both in
research notes and in publications, psychological or sociological case studies
include extensive writing based on ﬁrst-hand experience, often with interview
material presented in dialogue. “Writing from experience” does not necessarily
mean literary nonﬁction. Nor does it necessarily “reproduce,” in Bartholomae’s
terms, “the ideology of sentimental realism.”
Many ethnographers, for example, depend on a version of freewriting in
their research. To record as much as possible of what people are doing or saying
or to recall this information before memory fades, they write continuously
without pausing to think about what they are writing. For similar purposes, in a
course on social research I often assigned what I called “descriptive freewriting.”
I asked students to situate themselves in any kind of social context and describe
what was going on, by writing continuously for at least ﬁve pages. Is this kind of
writing personal or academic, private or public, subjective or objective? Analysis
of this descriptive writing helped to illustrate that such dichotomies obscure
more complex, useful questions about the relations between the observer and
observed and about the choices observers make in writing—questions essential
to research and writing in the social sciences.
When they become involved with our writing programs, teachers in the disciplines develop a wide range of assignments of this sort: assignments that
engage undergraduates in varieties of academic discourse that occur prior to
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the completion of published literature in their ﬁelds. This work is often informal, exploratory, or collaborative. In some cases teachers read and evaluate this
work; in other cases they do not. Sometimes students work on these projects in
groups, exchanging drafted material and suggestions for the next move before
teachers see what they have done. In an ecology class, for example, students
spend an afternoon writing down dozens of questions during ﬁeld observation
near a pond. During the next class, they work in groups to sort through these
questions and identify the most interesting ones they might be able to answer
through research. When they have selected questions for further study, they
begin to design research methods, conduct literature searches, and exchange
drafts of research proposals. Teachers remain on the edges of these activities,
which closely resemble those Elbow described in the “teacherless classroom.”
Teachers involved with interdisciplinary writing programs develop these
assignments because they represent versions of disciplinary practices, acknowledged forms of academic discourse. When disciplinary practices become
instructional practices, as they should be, students begin to understand the otherwise hidden, mysterious ways in which knowledge, accomplishment, and ﬁnished writing evolve from confusion, exploration, collaboration, false trails,
repeated experiments, and hard work. They can experience the process through
which observation of social phenomena, for example, becomes the literature
and knowledge of sociology. Engaged with their teachers in these kinds of academic discourse, students no longer feel that as writers they must assume privilege and authority they do not possess.
In this respect, Peter Elbow’s early work on the evolution of texts holds the
greatest potential value among writing-intensive courses in the disciplines
where teachers are often predisposed to think of exploratory, observational, and
collaborative writing as essential forms of academic discourse. His work will
not reach these teachers and students outside English, however, if composition
theorists, writing program administrators, and Elbow himself continue to associate this work with literary genres and processes of “personal expression.”

11 P L E A S U R E , P O L I T I C S , F E A R , A N D
THE FIELD OF COMPOSITION
Elbow’s Inﬂuence on My Theorizing and Teaching
Irene Papoulis

Peter Elbow the person was my ﬁrst introduction to the ﬁeld of composition. It
was in the early 1980s; I was a few years into my graduate degree in literature at
SUNY Stony Brook; and Peter took over our writing program. I had barely, if
at all, been aware of a ﬁeld called Composition, but I taught ﬁrst-year composition regularly, usually by lecturing on how to write arguments. Fascinated by
literary theory, especially feminist theory, I was feeling somewhat resistant to
the ﬁeld of literature, because of my growing awareness of the discrepancy
between what I thought of as my political consciousness and what seemed to
me to be the pseudopolitics I was learning in literary studies.
I got to know Peter through his books, which I began to read after attending
his ﬁrst meeting with graduate students (where, in a sequence of prompts that
has since become second nature to me, he introduced us skeptical graduate
students to freewriting, focused freewriting, and process writing), through the
study group on composition theory he convened, and, not least, through the
calm but relentlessly insistent way he imposed his views on the graduate students and his colleagues at Stony Brook. Many years later I still learn from
Peter, and I want here to describe how my own thinking about teaching composition has evolved as a result of my exposure to his ideas and also to speculate about the strong reactions he tends to evoke in people in our ﬁeld.
Peter’s approach—kind, willing to listen, often appearing to be a bit undecided, yet in fact totally unshakable in terms of the things he really believes
in—deeply interested and delighted me from the start. For example, I remember how he dealt with one ﬁrst- or second-year graduate student, very earnest
but uninformed, who had found her way into our composition theory study
group, which was made up mostly of faculty and more experienced graduate
students. Her understanding of the subject at hand—it was collaborative
learning, I remember; we were reading Ken Bruffee—seemed to me limited
and useless to our group discussion. I did not know much about the issue
either, but therefore I felt obligated to keep my mouth shut. I seethed inside,
listening to my fellow student speak in a hesitant and querulous way. I barely
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refrained from rolling my eyes, willing her to ﬁnish what she was saying so the
group could go on with what I was sure was a much more sophisticated discussion than she could appreciate. However, Peter listened to her very carefully
and kindly and said something in response that revealed a very interesting and
provocative question in what she was saying. From within her struggle at articulation he pinpointed the deepest insight and made the group see that she was
actually raising an issue that was very engaging for all of us.
While I do not remember the speciﬁc issue, I do remember how startled I
was at Peter’s ability to listen so well and to respect the opinions of anyone who
gave them. In addition to the important lesson about teaching it gave me,
Peter’s attitude gave me permission, ultimately, to express my own hesitant
views in the study group too; without his generous listening, I may well have
remained silent. I have seen Peter attend gracefully and productively to many
seeming-at-ﬁrst-to-be-insigniﬁcant perspectives since then; such attention is
an intrinsic part of the way he approaches the world and by giving it he
expands his own perspective and others’, immeasurably. To me, it is a political
act, in the sense that Peter uses his position of authority to bring out the views
of people whom others might not otherwise listen to. He never does it in a
patronizing way—his action grows out of a deep and genuine curiosity and
out of the knowledge that people inevitably, no matter who they are, do in fact
have something useful to tell him and others.
As a result of having the wonderful luck of being in a position to think with
Peter about teaching writing, I ended up all but abandoning my ﬁeld of literary
studies and redeﬁning myself as a composition person. Watching Peter work, I
realized that attention to pedagogy was crucial for anyone wanting to ﬁnd ways
to effect political change within established classrooms. While I rarely heard
Peter talk overtly about politics, his ideas answered a yearning in me to have a
practical grounding for the theoretical framework I was developing, a framework that grew out of feminist and postmodern theories, resistance to hierarchies, concern with fairness, championing of the marginalized, and attention to
women’s experience. The kind of classrooms Peter urged us graduate students
to create, I realized, was the kind in which such ideas were enacted in practice.
For example, our classrooms resisted the view that writing classes should
mold students into exactly the kinds of writers that faculty in other departments wanted them to be. While I did instruct students to an extent in meeting
the requirements of speciﬁc discourse communities, my overall interest was in
getting them to articulate their unique responses to their subjects. Teaching
writing came to seem to me to be political work in that if I refused to impose a
way of thinking or writing on students, I felt I was allowing them to resist
established hierarchies and power structures and gain access to their own
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unique ideas. Those ideas, I thought, should be brought from the margins of
the classroom to the center, and they would ultimately enable students to
assert their own power in the world at large. It was a feminist act, I reasoned, to
require that my classes open up time and space to listen well to each view, particularly those of quiet women students, whose voices ordinarily were silenced.
I now understand the naiveté in my thinking; systems, of course, are more
entrenched than any individual. Nevertheless, I still believe that encouraging
individuals to speak from their own convictions enables them to get along better within systems and to be in a position to effect profound change. In his
abiding interest in ﬁnding ways to allow students, and everyone, to speak for
themselves, I think, is the heart of Peter’s political power and is also the threat
he represents to the established order, even the academic established order.
It was only after getting my ﬁrst full-time teaching job, as a lecturer in the
composition program at the University of California, Santa Barbara, that I
came to discover that Peter did not deﬁne the ﬁeld of composition as I had
hoped he had. Though ubiquitous in his inﬂuence, I realized, he served, as
many of the essays in this book attest, as an object for many very mixed and
complicated emotions in the ﬁeld at large. I found that colleagues referred, and
some continue to refer, to people like me as “Peter-Elbow-people,” which
meant to them that I was out of touch with the hard realities of the real academic world, naive about the nature of institutional power, and “touchy-feely” in
the sense of wishing to serve as a therapist of sorts to students. Many people, I
found, could not get past this stereotypical view and could not take me, or my
perspective on writing, seriously. To me and to many others, the ﬁeld of composition in the late 1980s was a place where one had to take sides in what we
now tend to see as false dichotomies—personal vs. social, expressivist vs. social
constructionist, etc. I had many debates about teaching writing in those days,
but they tended not to be fruitful on either side because, as I came to see later, I
too falsely stereotyped the “other side” as being overly and blindly obsessed
with a rejection of the “personal” in the name of the “social” and as being too
cowed by the idea of “academic discourse” to be able to effect real change.
I came to be fascinated, though, by the deeply negative emotional reaction
that some people had against what they imagined as Peter’s perspective. At
UCSB, and in the ﬁeld at large, I encountered many people whose emotion
toward Peter was enthusiastic appreciation and gratitude, of course, but there
seemed also to be a critical mass of people whose reaction went the other way,
toward passionate negativity. Peter seemed to stir up some sort of deep fear in
the latter people, fear that often seemed to be based on a cursory reading of
some of his work and an irrational judging of it as somehow less than academic.
At the time I did not understand that reaction, as I knew Peter was nothing if
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not rigorous and philosophical, but at the same time I myself came to feel surprisingly ambivalent about those who spoke so strongly against Peter.
While my peers always saw me as representing the “Peter Elbow” side, my
teaching was in fact deeply affected by the strong arguments of my “opponents.”
Though in theory I believed that “empowering” students, in the sense of “helping them gain access to their unique opinions,” was to their greater beneﬁt in
the long run than “teaching them how to write academic discourse” in a more
didactic way, in practice, in spite of myself, I began to change. This happened
out of the sense of guilt I felt when I listened to people I respected, who disdained what they saw as Peter’s views. They convinced me that perhaps I was in
fact doing my students a disservice when I simply invited them to explore their
own ideas. Perhaps my methods were naive and not rigorous enough, I worried;
perhaps I would do better to initiate students into the harsh realities of academic discourse, by requiring that they write the way that I, in my role as a representative of the university, considered most academically effective. After all, my
training in literary studies had given me an abiding appreciation for academic
discourse in the strictest sense, the sense of being based, always, on texts and on
clearly structured arguments questioning and probing those texts. I began to
worry that perhaps freewriting and other unbound explorations of students’
own ideas were simply too pleasurable, and the part of me that was worried
about rigor was deeply suspicious of pleasure. Didn’t I want students, I asked
myself, to take their place as members of an academic discourse community?
How could I do them such a disservice as to engage them in “fun” writing that
blinded them to the harsh realities of the academic world?
In answer, I turned away from assignments that invited students’ unique
responses, began to use The World of Ideas and then Ways of Reading as texts,
and began to require academic argument in my composition classes. I even
stopped, for a few quarters of teaching English 1, inviting students to do any
freewriting. I returned to the sort of teaching I had done before I met Peter,
focusing on argumentation, except that I retained what I had learned about
peer groups and let students read and respond to each others’ essays. My students would read a selection of relatively difﬁcult academic essays, and I, like
countless other ﬁrst-year composition teachers everywhere, would assign writing based on the assignments given in the book.
This teaching practice put me in line with what many of my colleagues were
doing and assuaged the part of me that, in spite of my theories to the contrary,
bought into the “Peter Elbow is a naive idealist” argument. Yet I was not at all
content. Another part of me, the “if Peter Elbow is a naive idealist then I am too,
and besides, the only way to effect real change is to push for the perspective I
believe in” part felt extremely uncomfortable. I was undecided and conﬂicted; I
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told myself that teaching students—and at the time I was teaching in a voluntary program of composition classes for students considered “at risk,” in addition to my work with “mainstream” students—to write academic discourse was
perhaps in fact more powerful politically than doing otherwise. Yet my doubts
and hesitations grew. I found that I did not relish going to class as much as I had
when I had required writing that was more centered in the students’ own experiences, and I was alarmed to ﬁnd that I was bored reading much of my students’ writing. At the same time, inevitably, the students seemed bored too. It
was clear that they were dutifully, with varying degrees of effectiveness, obeying
rules and doing what they were supposed to do, but their hearts did not seem
engaged. Instead of the joyful desire to share their work with others that I had
noticed in students assigned writing about issues growing out of their own
thoughts and feelings, I noticed a weary seriousness that did not seem fruitful. I
remember one student in particular, a very friendly, thoughtful, outgoing, opinionated ﬁrst-year student, struggling in my ofﬁce to shape his ideas into a clear
essay. Writing, for him, was agonizing, completely unrelated to his natural gregariousness. He had so much to say in class, but when he wrote, his sentences
were inevitably pinched and awkward. I sat with him in conference many times,
suggesting ways that he could restructure and revise in order to formulate a
clearer argument, but as I did so the conviction grew in me: he needs freewriting, he needs to choose his own topics. Those things alone would cause him to
blossom as a writer, because they would connect the ﬂuency he had in speaking
with his writing. Instead, he saw writing as unrelated to talking; he struggled to
construct and reconstruct each sentence, and he was stiﬂed. My methods, I realized, were preventing me from getting him to experience the pleasure of
expressing in writing the ideas he was passionate about. I knew I could help him
experience that pleasure if I taught more in the “Peter Elbow” way that I had put
aside. Yet I was constrained by my syllabus and by my stated goal that the course
involved writing essays on the academic texts I had chosen and on the issues I
had provided. I felt trapped, too. Could this possibly be the best way to
empower the student? I wondered, and my answer was “no.” I imagined him
having the same clenched experiences writing for other classes, even as he tried
so hard to do well. His fate, it seemed to me, would be to ﬁnish college—if he
did ﬁnish—with a mediocre record at best, in spite of his considerable intellectual energy and enthusiasm. Instead, though, if he learned to connect his own
lively thinking and opinions with his writing, his fate could be very different.
Painstakingly showing him how academic essays should work, I felt, was not the
way to help him make that connection.
As I thought further about this, acknowledging my sense of what that student
and many others really needed from a composition class, I gradually realized, for
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the second time, that teaching analytic arguing in a way that did not engage students’ personal interests simply did not work for me. My expressivist inclination,
my belief that the best thing I could teach ﬁrst-year writers was to develop the
conﬁdence and skill to articulate their own deepest insights, took over again. At
ﬁrst I tried to combine Elbow-type approaches with more argumentative ones. I
began requiring that students buy Writing With Power in addition to their text of
readings, I had students focus-freewrite before essay-writing, and I put more
time and energy into making peer-responding more serious and effective. In
spite of my worry about not being rigorous enough, I began to think about how
methods aimed at getting to students’ personal reactions were necessary to the
most powerful academic work.
Peter’s philosophy had led me to think about the fact that effective professional academics do tend, while constructing their arguments, to write out of
genuine personal interest in the material. Before my students can really argue
in their chosen ﬁelds then, I decided, I needed to help them get a sense of pleasure and conﬁdence in their own ideas. The pleasure needed to come ﬁrst; it
would propel them to write in a more engaged way. This meant that if I wanted
them to analyze academic texts, I would assign not ﬁxed questions from the
book, but, say, a series of informal responses designed to help them to come up
with their own particular angles on the material.
From there, they could construct theoretical essays that were much more
personal in the sense that they were heartfelt. As the semesters went by, I came
to assign fewer texts to read and more writing that grew out of students’ interests. I came to work in class with raw drafts of students’ writing, focusing on
helping them ﬁnd ways to create clear and formal structures from within their
informal writings, instead of making use of already established structures.
Meanwhile, I had a chance to experience Peter’s style of work from the perspective of a participant in a group led by a student-centered teacher, when I
got involved with the National Writing Project in Santa Barbara. I experienced
the great pleasure and growth that occurs when students (who in this case
were all teachers as well) get to write together, work in groups, and use writing
as an intrinsic part of group discussions. Realizing ﬁrsthand what a pleasure it
could be to work with peers in such a community energized my teaching, as it
made me see that I was creating ways for my students to experience the same
thing. The pleasure was also a large part of my reason for becoming an
Associate of the Institute for Writing and Thinking at Bard College, in 1991
when I moved back to the east coast.
Peter started the latter institute in 1980 as a three-week summer program,
taught primarily by faculty from other colleges, for students about to enter
Bard College. Invited to do so by Bard’s president, Peter developed a program
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in which faculty and students wrote together frequently and where faculty—
each in charge of a class of about twelve students that met for about ﬁve hours
daily for the three weeks—lived together in a dormitory, away from their families, and collaborated intensively on theoretical frameworks as well as on class
planning. The way he started this institute—gathering friends and associates
from all over the country, who he felt would be effective and interesting collaborators and asking them to recommend others in a grassroots way—is vintage
Peter, as is the way he led the institute, always open to anyone’s feedback, but
insistent on certain parameters, like his rule that everyone write together in the
dining hall before breakfast.
By the time I got to the institute in 1991 (Peter actually worked there for
only two years, and the institute has evolved since, but it remains true to many
of his founding principles) it had become a well established place for faculty
development for teachers from all over the country, as well as continuing to
house the three-week program for entering ﬁrst-year students. As a faculty
member there for the student summer program as well as the teacher workshops, I worked intensively in teaching groups that grew out of Peter’s philosophy of teaching. When associates of the institute get together, at meetings that
last anywhere from an hour to an intensive weekend, with groups ranging
from a handful of people working on a particular issue to the larger group of
about ﬁfty associates, we inevitably write together and hear our writing around
the table, as a way of beginning or continuing our discussion.
Writing together, I found, through these experiences with peers, is a profoundly fruitful experience for practically any group of people. Having experienced it so intensely and repeatedly, I now try to get people to write, with
varying degrees of success, whenever I am at any meeting with colleagues.
When I do so, I remember Peter’s gentle but ﬁrm insistence on writing; often
colleagues, like students, grumble when they have to write on demand, but
they usually are pleased after they have done so. It is amazing how quickly people can get to know each other when they write together and how present people feel in a group once they have read their writing aloud around the table
without feedback until everyone is heard. This practice—requiring, say, that all
participants write their thinking on a particular question and listen to all the
others before talking—can seem unnecessary and ponderous for those who
have not experienced it. Someone will usually say “can’t we just all talk?” But
once people write and are forced to listen to everyone before talking, they
begin to realize that the process not only allows views to come forth that otherwise could easily be swept aside, but also saves time because it forces everyone
to articulate a position brieﬂy. It decreases the instances of tiresome ﬁlibusters
by people wanting to get their opinions heard. Further, it helps people ﬁgure
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out what their positions are more productively than talking can. Seeing the
transformative effect of writing in practice on a regular basis with my peers
conﬁrmed for me that requiring my students to write and share informal writing together was crucial to my own teaching. Peter’s work on freewriting has
immeasurably helped me and countless others deﬁne our classes around writing more than texts. I came to see that the more deeply personal people could
be in writing, the more alive their writing in any genre became, because they
had access to the scariest and thus usually most interesting parts of their ideas.
If one purpose of this book is to encourage people to delineate “their” Peter,
in the way reader response critics might talk about “their” Pride and Prejudice
or “their” Beloved, “my” Peter is a strong believer in the self, while the “real”
Peter is perhaps more hesitant about the primacy of the personal, as seen by
his discomfort about the way he has been pigeonholed as an expressivist (see
Elizabeth Flynn’s article in this book). At times, I wish that Peter would enact
more of “my” sense of him, which, I realize, contradicts in some ways what I
am calling the “real” him. Knowing this, I ﬁnd that I want to push harder for
some of the things that Peter is thought of as advocating, even, sometimes,
when he himself does not necessarily wish to advocate them.
The real Peter would be the ﬁrst, I’m sure, to celebrate this desire of mine to
take his theories wherever I want, even if he does not necessarily agree with me.
In fact, the real Peter has always given me, as well as so many others, the permission, and the tools, to articulate my own most unique ideas. When it is working
best, freewriting gets us in touch with our scariest and most interesting
thoughts, and even very experienced freewriters need to be reminded regularly
of this. How many times in the last almost two decades have I sat with my writing and said “I have nothing left to say; I don’t know what I have to say” and
then, remembering Peter’s techniques, stopped that useless train of thought and
said, “no, go with it, keep writing, close your eyes, don’t worry about audience,
just articulate what’s there.” How many times have any of us done so and taught
our students to do so and heard students say “wow, this really works”?
So, having freewritten about it, I will describe some of my current thinking
about teaching ﬁrst-year composition as it takes up, moves beyond, and comes
back to Peter’s ideas. Though I deﬁne myself without reservation as an expressivist, I am beginning to take another turn, one that questions student-centered
learning even as it continues to embrace it. I ﬁnd that sometimes—especially
working, as I am now, with mostly economically privileged students—students
do not necessarily seem as enlivened as I would want them to be by the opportunity to explore their own ideas in writing and to share them with others. After
I had introduced freewriting to a class on the ﬁrst day one recent semester at
Trinity, for example, a student came to me and said, “I had freewriting in high
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school, so I really don’t think I need this course,” as though such writing is yet
another task to do for the teacher, instead of an ongoing practice for self-knowledge and communication! Many of my students see school as a place for doing
what the teacher wants and meeting speciﬁc conditions; they understand the
teacher’s requirement that they “think for themselves” as simply another thing
they should do for the teacher. “Okay, I’ll think of more feelings to add to the
essay; where should I put them in?” was a response a student made recently to a
comment I made on his essay that I wanted to know more about his views.
So what happens to student-centered learning when the students do not,
cannot, or simply do not wish to serve as the center? What happens to my desire
to effect some sort of political change through my classroom practices? Faced
with the kind of students I have now, I still sometimes wonder if the techniques
associated with social constructionist composition pedagogy might be the best
ones to push students out of their complacent attitudes. Yet I resist teaching
theoretical critique in my composition class, as that seems best suited for sociology or political science classes. What I have to offer as a composition teacher in
particular, still, is an experience of using writing both to better experience self
and, a necessary corollary, to become, in parallel, better able to listen well to
others. My task now is to ﬁnd ways, through better and more demanding informal writing assignments and better-structured insistence on extensive revision,
to push past my students’ complacency and to encourage them to explore
themselves more deeply and at the same time to be increasingly responsible for
listening well to others’ views. I have also been thinking again about argumentation, about how to encourage students to argue well by pushing against the traditional parameters of argument—for example, by using emotions in their
arguments instead of putting them aside in the name of rationality.
In short, there is a paradox here, and, of course, the man who embraces
contraries invites such things. I want students to think for themselves, but, if
they don’t want to, I want to use writing to force them to think for themselves
and to move beyond their initial thoughts and discover more. Implied in “my”
Peter’s work is a strong authority, one that can say “you must freewrite,
NOW!” and I want to be very explicit about that authority. Yet faced with students like the ones at Trinity, my temptation nevertheless is still strong, I ﬁnd,
to capitulate and tell them what to do. They are excellent obeyers of rules, and
most are at least fairly competent, so if I just require that they read academic
essays and give them some good instruction on established forms, they will
leave my classes satisﬁed and, if all goes according to plan, well equipped to
write essays in their other courses. So why don’t I just do that? Why do I bother
with trying to free the students from something they may well have no wish to
be freed from?
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My answer is that my political beliefs force me to resist the status quo and to
teach in a genuinely student-centered way. And I cannot simply create the structure and let the students do the rest, as I may be able to do in other contexts—for
example, when working with engaged teachers. With my undergraduates, I have
to be much more forceful about what “student centered” means. Paradoxically, I
want to compel students to let their own unique ideas out, to listen well to others’ ideas, and to let their essays take forms that grow out of their thinking.
“Student-centered” can thus not really mean what it initially meant—i.e., growing out of the interests and desires that the students bring to class with them. As
I said, the desire many students bring is to be told what to do. So my current
sense of “student-centered” means that I must ﬁrst cajole students into allowing
themselves to gain access to their intellectual desires and deep interests and then
ﬁnd ways to help them cultivate those. If they are not interested in those desires,
they have not looked deeply enough into themselves, and I need to ﬁnd ways to
help them do so. This, to me, is political work, in that it actively resists complacency and pushes for change, growth, and awareness.
I need, then, to take a much more authoritative stance than I used to, in my
gentle and perhaps overly nice encouragement that students explore their own
ideas. I now put forth a more judgmental or critical stance, one that can seem
different from Peter’s, as it attempts to chasten students, for example, with
messages like “you’re not writing what you really think: shame on you!” The
imposition of such a stance in the classroom, for me, lies in the systematic and
insistent use of certain well known techniques. To me, such techniques, Peter’s
techniques, are more powerful in themselves than theories, because they effect
change on a practical, even visceral level. The most important of these is
focused-freewriting, which I am coming to insist on ever more stringently. In
the midst of class discussion, say, I ask students to stop and write regularly,
interrupting our talking, and afterwards I force everyone to read out loud at
least something from their writing, to get a range of views out and then to ask
the class to consider all the conﬂicting views. The more students write together
and share, paradoxically, the more they realize that informal writing is not
merely an exercise for the teacher, it is a practice for life, a way to sort out and
deepen their tangled ideas and communicate them. The key to making informal writing work effectively is in the prompts, which must cause students to
probe and question. One of my favorite kinds of informal writing assignments
in class, though, is very simple—the question “what did you hear” after students have heard a diverse collection of their classmates’ views. It obliges them
to listen carefully and to consider and pinpoint other views. From there comes
the prompt “how has your thinking changed, even if only a little, as a result of
our discussion?” When it is time to write an essay, students always have plenty
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of notes and informal writings to draw on, and from there they can construct a
more nuanced essay—one that actually grows out of their own changing
thinking—than they would have otherwise. I used to simply say “look at your
notes and write a draft,” but now, again, I have a much more engaged
approach, which involves having the class look together at a few students’
informal writing and talking extensively about what potential structures
emerge, followed by peer group work that has strict rules to encourage students to help each other ﬁnd the essay structures that work best with each
writer’s ideas. While I used to demonstrate responding to writing and then let
peer groups ﬁnd their own way, I now give them response sheets and require
them to be much more accountable for their work. This move toward explicit
demands, I have found, enables more growth on the part of the students than
does greater freedom
These ideas are familiar to many composition teachers; they are quite simple. To me, they seem more powerful lately because of my newfound
approaches to them. I no longer smile understandingly when students want to
talk from their writing instead of reading it aloud or when they refuse to write;
I am more insistent. That insistence enables me to require that students
explore their ideas and discover their own structures.
Intrinsic to the expressivist view, I would say, is a welcoming of essay structures that grow out of writers’ ideas, and a resistance to the belief in instructing
students in explicit structures. Even though theoretically I know this, I ﬁnd at
the same time that part of me, still, is scared of my own methods. In spite of
Peter and of all I believe, I still have the impulse within me toward a more traditional way of teaching composition. It’s odd—I still struggle a bit, on some
level, in spite of my strong belief to the contrary, with the idea that I am supposed to be requiring extensive readings in ﬁrst-year composition, leading
class discussion about them, and assigning speciﬁc essay questions that grow
out of issues in them. After all, that is still what most of my colleagues continue
to do. In spite of this lingering worry, of course, the part of me that actually
writes my syllabi is moving farther and farther away from such assignments. I
want more and more to force the students to write out of their own interests,
not mine, and to allow those interests to shift and change as a result of others’
views. That, to me, is real academic work. As a result of the fact that my students’ reading skills, even at a relatively elite college, are often quite poor, I feel
that I can’t take a great deal of time in a writing class to work extensively with
them on how they read. I differ with my colleagues who say that learning to
write and learning to read are inseparable, and I think the composition classroom, while I make use of readings at times, is a place to focus on writing. So I
ﬁnd myself making use of assignments that call upon the student to chose
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something with signiﬁcance to them—“I-search papers,” interviews with a faculty member, analyses of some issue they are thinking about—in short, the
kind of essays that Peter has assigned all along in his composition classes. I
converge with Peter here, in my view that while students will write academic
essays in many courses, what a composition course is especially equipped to
give them is a sense of pleasure in their own ideas, as well as many ways of
accessing and articulating those ideas.
Of course, the dichotomy I have set up throughout this essay, between traditional teaching and “Peter Elbow teaching” is a false one. Those who explicitly
teach academic discourse may well use informal writing and peer groups in their
classrooms; and, of course, expressivists, myself very much included, ultimately
do help students write academic essays. I would not teach the way I do if I did
not believe that my aim of encouraging students to take pleasure in their own
ideas and in writing those ideas enables them to write better in any context.
Yet, like Peter, I like to think of both sides of a dichotomy as distinct, sometimes, because it helps me clarify my ideas. As I look back on the nearly two
decades that I have been teaching ﬁrst-year composition, I see that the conversation within me about methods has been formulated as one between the side
of me that feels completely connected to Peter’s theories and the side of me
that is skeptical and cynical in the face of them. This other side makes me
begin to understand those in our ﬁeld who resist Peter’s views and who, consciously or not, see him as a threat to the established order. He is a threat to the
established order, and that is probably what draws me to him most strongly
even as it scares me a bit. Implied in Peter’s work is the old feminist dictum
that “the personal is political,” and, to me, his methods too are feminist in
nature, in that they honor some of the traits and values traditionally associated
with women, like listening, nurturing, and attending to feelings. Those traits
can be very dangerous in the academic world.
I have noticed a resistance in composition theory to our association with
women’s work. To make our ﬁeld more “legitimate,” it seems to me, and less
“womanly,” some of us, including, paradoxically, some who have a feminist
theoretical perspective, attempt to make composition more rigorous and theoretical in the traditional sense of the word. Thus we feel moved to work in
abstractions and to do so in a way that resists the practical, womanly reality of
looking at each student, seeing who they are and where and how they are sitting, and insisting that they speak their truths. I, too, feel this pull toward
abstraction, even as my practice counteracts it.
By insisting on what I am calling the womanly realities, Peter serves as an
object of fear to many people in our ﬁeld. I have been trying, lately, to understand why it is that some people react so deeply against Peter’s ideas. With my
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psychological orientation, I cannot help but think that his attempts really to
come to terms with, as well as question, academic discourse and other matters
simply are too threatening to some people. While I have a conscious delight in
Peter’s ideas and a less conscious resistance, for others the conscious reaction is
aversion, due, perhaps, to unexamined fears that are not all that different from
mine because they are a function of a fear of not being rigorous enough or not
playing by the rules. I am especially struck by the fact that many of the people
who are so averse to Peter’s ideas believe in the theoretical perspective underpinning them. They might say, for example, that classrooms are politically
charged, and they work to ﬁnd ways to instruct students in the nature of power
and in attempts to overcome that power. Meanwhile, Peter’s ideas help countless people deal with their own powerlessness, yet he gets criticized on theoretical grounds for being less than political. Is the threat he poses to the academy
simply too great? Do his ideas necessarily undermine the status quo? Is the
action-oriented nature of his politics too scary?
The “real” Peter, I would say, has great respect for academic discourse and
has written about that respect. He seems to me not to want to push hard and
ask why, for example, we need to hold on at all to any deﬁnitions of such discourse. I ﬁnd myself wanting him to be more radical, more brazen in his theories, since for me his theories contain a kind of brazenness that I ﬁnd
exhilarating, even as it scares me. I suppose the best way for me to apply what I
have learned from him, then, is to try to be a bit more brazen myself.

12 S P O K E N R E S P O N S E
Space, Time, And Movies of The Mind
Jeff Sommers

T E A C H E R C O M M E N TA R Y A N D R E A D E R R E S P O N S E

As I write this opening paragraph, I have just completed another academic
term. I have spent approximately 150 hours in class, meeting with four composition sections. Using my grade book and a calculator, I realize that I have also
spent 143 hours outside of class responding to my students’ drafts and portfolios. This semester has been typical; the numbers merely quantify what all
composition instructors are always acutely aware of: responding to student
writing is one of the most important—if not the most important—activities in
which we engage when we teach writing. Has it always been this way?
Robert J. Connors and Andrea A. Lunsford have traced the history of
teacher commentary on student writing, pointing to the 1950s as the earliest
moment when teachers began to respond as “rhetorical audiences” (201) for
their ﬁrst-year students. Prior to the 1950s, teachers’ comments were predominantly focused on rating the students’ writing. In fact, Connors and Lunsford
note that teachers seemed “conditioned not to engage with student writing in
personal or polemical ways” (214).
With the rise of the process movement, the nature of responding to student
writing clearly assumed a greater importance because writing teachers began
to view themselves in roles other than just as judges of written products.
Responding as a reader rather than as a judge became an alternative approach
for teachers. Robert E. Probst suggests that “teachers might proﬁtably reﬂect
on the roles they adopt in reading papers and might consciously try to conceive of their role as that of the common reader” (74). Summer Smith’s
research into the genre of the end comment reveals how small a role, however,
reading as a “common reader” apparently plays for most instructors. Of sixteen
genres of end comments, Smith’s two reader-response genres ranked tenth and
ﬁfteenth in terms of frequency (253). Despite the infrequency of these genres,
Smith praises them, pointing out that when students learn what their readers
are thinking, they are reminded that “their words have effects,” and she counsels teachers that more frequent use of reader-response genres could provide
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what she terms an “antidote” to the impersonal nature of end comments by
personalizing the comments (258).
But Peter Elbow told us about the worth of reader response comments in
the early 1970s in Writing Without Teachers. Elbow addresses would-be writers
directly, bypassing the traditional classroom, envisioning a teacherless writing
situation where peers would work together in reading-writing groups. He tells
his readers that “to improve your writing you don’t need advice about what
changes to make: you don’t need theories of what is good and bad writing. You
need movies of people’s minds while they read your words” (77). He elaborates
a bit later on what he means by “movies of the mind”: “As a reader giving your
reactions, keep in mind that you are not answering a timeless, theoretical question about the objective qualities of those words on that page. You are answering a time-bound subjective but factual question: what happened in you when
you read the words this time” (85).
Elbow has expatiated on reader response more recently, noting that such
response ﬁts into a “solid tradition of trying to describe texts rather than judge
their quality.” (“Taking Time Out,” 16). He argues that the “most bluntly simple, obvious, and frequently asked question about a text” is “as a reader, what
are my thoughts on the topic?” and asserts that answering that question is a
way to remove the commentary from the realm of judgment. That removal, he
concludes, can assist both students and teachers in seeing the complexity of a
text in all its “multivalent implications” because the conversation moves away
from the “limiting, one-dimensional lens of good versus bad.” (18). And he
notes how often students respond by saying that they have never had a teacher
take the time to engage seriously with their ideas rather than with the quality
of their writing (17).
As a participant in a research project focused on responding to student writing, Elbow demonstrated the kind of reader response commentary he had been
advocating for over two decades. Richard Straub analyzed the responses of several compositionists to student essays (“Concept of Control”); his analysis of
Elbow’s response is revealing. He notes that Elbow primarily acts as a “sounding
board for the writing,” and Straub describes the comments as “what [Elbow]
himself might call ‘movies-of-the-reader’s-mind’” (243). Elbow’s comments are
roughly 300 words in length; by my count, 175 of those words constitute movies
of the mind. Straub continues by referring to the movies-of-the-mind portion
as “a kind of summary transcript,” the “least controlling” mode of response
because it does little more than “dramatize how the words are being understood
by an individual reader, not by someone in charge of judging, criticizing, or
improving the writing” (243), and he concludes that “to a large extent, . . .
[Elbow’s] comments are geared to the student behind the text” (245).
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In a review of the research done by Straub and his partner Ronald
Lunsford, Bennett A. Rafoth focuses on the length of the comments made by
the participating instructors. He notes a range of 44 to 786 words, with Elbow’s
300+ in the upper half of that range. He cites these numbers because he wishes
to advance a critique of the research: “Taking time may be the single most
important variable in this study, but it is never measured and rarely mentioned” (206). He asks his readers to consider the amount of time it must have
taken for the teachers to write their responses. Rafoth concludes that the socalled “Hawthorne effect” most likely inﬂuenced their response; that is,
because the teachers knew their responses would be read by the researchers
and other members of the profession, they may very well have departed from
their usual practice in order to produce exemplary response, often, he argues,
much more detailed, and thus more time-consuming, than any teacher could
expect to replicate during the course of a normal teaching day (206).
Rafoth thus explicitly introduces the concept of time into teacher response
(which I consciously did in my opening paragraph to this essay). “How much
time?” is the question he wants to raise. Connors and Lunsford’s statistics
demonstrate how brief most comments are; even though longer responses are
probably more valuable, they report only 5 percent of the comments they
examined were longer than 100 words (207). To provide as extensive a movies
of-the-mind response as Elbow does obviously requires more time than most
instructors can spare.
Tucked away in Rafoth’s review is another important statistical note, however. He points out that the most “proliﬁc responder” in the Straub-Lunsford
study was Chris Anson, who, he observes, used a tape recorder. The link
between response and time is changed in signiﬁcant ways when teachers use
tape recorders to provide their response. At this point, I want to make two
arguments about the use of tape-recorded response, both in terms of time, not
space, one practical and one theoretical:
1) tape-recorded comments are more time-efﬁcient than written comments, allowing teachers to expand their responses and thus more easily to
offer movies-of-the-mind.
2) tape-recorded comments themselves emphasize the temporality of reading and responding in ways that written comments do not, which is particularly useful in conveying reader-response commentary.
As a practical matter, movies-of-the-mind responses simply require many
words, as Elbow’s commentary in the Straub research indicates. Recording
those responses is one way to be time-efﬁcient. Gary A. Olsen asks, “Have you
ever written on a student’s composition everything you wished to say?” (122),
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arguing that tape-recorded response is more efﬁcient. While I will not argue
that any teacher should overload a student with everything on her mind,
Olsen’s question is a very good one, implying that most teachers recognize the
time constraints of response. In my own research, a case study of one student
working through ﬁve drafts of a single project and my tape-recorded responses
to the drafts, I have found that a teacher speaking at a conversational pace for
two minutes produces one page of double-spaced text if transcribed. In all, I
spoke to the student on the tapes ﬁve times for a total of twenty minutes; the
resulting transcripts of the tapes added up to ten pages of writing, each 250
words in length (“Effects,” 54). Thus, Elbow’s 175 words of movies of the mind
in Straub’s study would have required him less than two minutes to record. It is
hard to conceive that anyone could compose and type or write 175 words in
two minutes; that would be an excellent pace for a typist simply transcribing
an already composed text.
But why would movies-of-the-mind comments require more words?
Because they are more a temporal response than a spatial one, as Elbow
reminds us (Writing Without Teachers, 85). Russell Hunt was the ﬁrst to note
that written comments exist as “spatial display,” while taped comments exist as
“temporal display” (583). What Hunt has noticed is that written comments
can be observed in some position on the written text, whether in margins or at
the end of the text, but taped comments cannot be observed spatially at all. A
student listens to them and becomes cognizant of time passing. In fact, it
makes more sense to refer to the length of taped-comments in elapsed time
than in word counts (the twenty minutes I recorded for my case study is a
more meaningful number than the ten pages of transcript because ordinarily
there would be no transcript).1
Another thread of language used by writers about response could very well
point the way to tape-recorded response, the language of speech. Here is a
paragraph from an inﬂuential article by Knoblauch and Brannon (emphasis
added):
A single comment on a single essay is too local and contingent a phenomenon to
yield general conclusions about the quality of the conversation of which it is a part.
Any remark on a student essay, whatever its form, ﬁnally owes its meaning and
impact to the governing dialogue that inﬂuences some student’s reaction to it.
Remarks taken out of this context can appear more restrictive or open-ended, more
facilitative or judgmental, than they really are in light of a teacher’s overall communicative habits. (2)

Words like “conversation,” “remark,” “dialogue” appear frequently in discussions of written comments. In addition to evoking speech, they also suggest the
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temporal nature of the response process by implying a give-and-take between
student and teacher, one that obviously can only happen through the passage of
time. But not only does the language of response research hint at speech, it even
at times suggests tape-recorded response. Straub describes Elbow’s movies-ofthe-mind responses as a “sounding board” but also describes what Elbow is
doing as “playing back the text” (emphasis added) (244).
If we create a taxonomy of response that divides it into two modes—written and spoken—tape-recorded response is more akin to conferencing with a
student than it is to writing a response. One advantage of spoken response is
that it not only allows teachers to share more of their responses, but it also
emphasizes the temporal nature of reading in the ﬁrst place. Whereas “end”
comments and “marginal” comments are spatial designations useful in
describing written response, with spoken response the analogous phrases
would be “terminal” comments, those occurring at the conclusion of the reading, and “asides,” those taking place during the actual reading.
If teachers are persuaded that movies-of-the-mind reader responses have
value, tape-recorded response offers a more time-efﬁcient method for providing it, grants a glimpse to students of a reader involved in the act of reading as
time passes, and provides, unlike conferencing, the other form of spoken
response, a lasting record of that act of reading. Movies-of-the-mind responses
also emphasize the temporal nature of response because as the teacher
unspools those movies, the student becomes increasingly conscious of the
impact of her words on a reader reading. Marrying movies of the mind to
tape-recorded response begins to seem a logical blending. In the remaining
pages of my essay, I would like to illustrate how tape-recorded response can
provide movies of the mind to a student writer by examining my interaction
with one of my composition students.
A RECORD OF A MOVIES-OF-THE-MIND RESPONSE

The student, whom I will call Shelli, is a twenty-year-old, ﬁrst-semester college student. Shelli’s ﬁrst draft in English 111, College Composition, the ﬁrst of
two required composition courses, tells a story about an experience she had
had in high school English. The unit of the course had been focusing on educational issues and in particular analyzing what makes teachers effective; the
assignment required students to narrate a story about a signiﬁcant interaction
with a teacher.
Shelli wrote her draft and workshopped it with three of her classmates, took
it home and revised it, and then submitted her work to me along with a blank
tape cassette and a Writer’s Memo (see Sommers, “The Writer’s Memo”). Here
is part of Shelli’s memo:
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The ideal reader for my paper would be anyone. Of course, it would probably
mean more to those with some type of classroom experience, and it would probably
mean the most to a teacher. It gives a ﬁrst hand, student perspective of an “unfair”
teaching style. . . .
Do you think it’s necessary to develop my characters further? If so, which ones
and how? Jackson needs no development, but some insight into Mr. Reed’s teaching
style is needed.
Is my story clear? Does it ﬂow? Are there any speciﬁc parts you had trouble with?
Some of the dialogue between me and Mr. Reed was confusing. . . .
Is my paper clear? (I’m very concerned with clarity). What do you get out of this?
As a teacher, do you sympathize with me or Mr. Reed?

After reading Shelli’s memo, I began taping my response, even before reading her text, by saying, “Shelli, I’m looking at your ﬁrst paper of the term. I’ve
read your memo, which I found pretty helpful, especially in terms of the questions and comments that you make. . . .” I told her that I found her explanation
of her ideal reader thoughtful and that I noticed by the end of the memo, she
explicitly viewed me as her intended reader. In effect, she had not only begun
our dialogue, but authorized me to provide movies of my mind as I read. And
that’s just what I did in my comments. As I read each portion of her draft, I
would record my asides, sharing my ongoing response and stopping the tape
when it was time to continue reading. I explained to her that what I was going
to do was take her “on a walking tour of my reactions to the story as I go
through it.”
Here is Shelli’s ﬁrst draft:
I don’t recall the date exactly, it was sometime during the ﬁrst semester of my
senior year at Loudon High School; I was bombarded with homework, projects,
tests, and assignments. My goal to graduate a year early was proving to be a bit more
challenging than I had anticipated. Taking driver’s education after school for six
weeks simply to attain that vital one half credit seemed like quite the hassle, especially since I’d had my driver’s license for over a year. I was doing quite well with all
my classes and my 4.0 grade point average reﬂected this, but honors English was a
thorn in my side. Thankfully this was a weighted course, so my B’s were actually A’s,
but for my perfectionist attitude, this was just not good enough. Every essay, every
paper, I poured out ideas, beliefs, correlations, and interpretations. I expounded,
rewrote, revised and edited, to no avail. No matter what I did a B was as good as I
could get. I never thought Mr. Reed an unfair teacher, never even suspected so, but
the moment of truth was hidden around the corner.
It was a school day like any other. I endured ﬁrst period, Child Development, second period, Government, third period Spanish III, then fourth period Honors
English. Mr. Reed began the class in his usual manner, instructing the class to produce
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the vocabulary assignment that was due. Mr. Reed always seemed to me to be a man of
leisure. Although he did get some excitement from literature, he would never jump up
and down over it. He was the type of teacher that would work with you if you needed
any help, but had no patience for slackers. Mr. Reed began to walk around the room
grading the assignment on a ten-point scale. I waited for my turn to receive yet
another B, chatting with Jackson Croft about last night’s soccer game. Mr. Reed was
ﬁnally at my desk, judging how well I could deﬁne ten words. A simple enough task
this seems. Look in the dictionary and write down the deﬁnition. This method seemed
inadequate for Mr. Reed. He wanted a “good” deﬁnition. I could respect this, but a
seven out of ten was simply unacceptable.
Upon receipt of my seven, I turned to Jackson to exchange conversation regarding the grades we had received. Jackson revealed his grade to be a nine out of ten. I
requested to review Jackson’s paper, assuming these deﬁnitions would be so powerful, so in depth, that perhaps this could be a model for my next attempt. I was very
excited at the thought of ﬁnding a way to please this man. I studied Jackson’s paper
and to my dismay found ordinary, run of the mill deﬁnitions that are found in the
glossary of any English book. One of the words wasn’t even ﬁnished, just hanging
there, lonely, last on the page feeling incomplete and dissatisﬁed. I began to feel
somewhat enraged. My face felt hot, I could hear my heartbeat in my skull. I had
spent forty minutes looking these words up in the best unabridged dictionary I
could ﬁnd, then relating these words back to the story from which they came, then
creating the deﬁnitions I could, only to receive a seven. Jackson, on the other hand,
spent ten minutes looking words up in our textbook glossary, writing verbatim the
deﬁnition. His incomplete assignment received a nine.
Being the loud mouth that I am, I saw no reason in delaying the inevitable conversation. I raised my hand and waited for some acknowledgement. Mr. Reed granted me
permission to speak. I explained the differences between Jackson’s and my paper, and
questioned why the grades did not reﬂect this. I stayed pretty calm, despite my obvious
aggravation. Mr. Reed hopped around the question, stating he had his reasons and this
conversation should be continued after class. I sat silently for the remainder of the
class. After what felt like hours of gritting my teeth, hungry for an explanation, the
moment of truth was at hand. The bell rang, students ﬂocked to lunch, and I to Mr.
Reed’s desk. I stood there without saying a word, just staring expectantly.
Mr. Reed began our conversation with compliments, mentioning my intelligence, quality work and visible effort. I interrupted and requested that he get to the
point. I was about to get my answer.
“Shelli you have more potential than many of my other students, so truthfully I
grade you a bit differently.”
Once this sentence left Mr. Reed’s lips I jumped all over it. I questioned his ethics,
his judgment, and asked why he was trying to sabotage my grade point average. I stated
very clearly that Mr. Reed needed to stop this practice. That was all I said and I did not
care for a response. I walked away feeling a bit enraged, and proceeded to lunch.
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I refused to speak to Mr. Reed for two weeks, but after these two weeks, I received
my ﬁrst A in the class. Proof that Mr. Reed heeded my advise.
Upon reﬂection I see Mr. Reed’s actions more as a compliment and less as a sabotage to my grade point average. However, I was very excited to ﬁnally be graded
fairly and have an accurate perspective of my capabilities.

My taped comments took approximately six minutes, or roughly 750 words.
I will only excerpt those comments to illustrate the kinds of movies I was projecting for Shelli. I read the opening paragraph, turned on the tape player, and
began speaking:
In the opening paragraph, there were a couple of things that caught my attention.
One was the last sentence, the idea that you had not found him unfair and that
there’s a moment of truth coming. So I know you’re creating some suspense here. I
do want to read on to ﬁnd out what the moment of truth was. I get a pretty clear
sense of your character here particularly in terms of all the effort you’re putting into
this class [at this point, I read aloud three sentences from the ﬁrst paragraph]. Those
sentences gave me a real feeling of how much effort you had expended on this
course. At the same time, . . . I have to also confess that the opening paragraph was
somewhat slow moving for me. It seemed to be a lot of telling, not a lot of showing.
[I read aloud some of the sentences about drivers’ ed]. . . . I have to say that I was
interested in going on without being terribly engaged by what’s happening.

While my comments were certainly not devoid of judgment, I presented them
as my responses to the developing text, pointing to what attracted and lost my
interest, rather than directing Shelli to change or modify speciﬁc portions of the
text. In these opening comments, and throughout the tape, I was consistently situating agency for the paper with Shelli herself. I continued to read the draft, noting my progress (“. . . I’m having no trouble following. It’s clear enough to me. . . .
I can get a sense of your attitude [about the grade of seven].” I then stumbled
over her use of the phrase “man of leisure” to describe Mr. Reed and devoted 25
seconds to explaining how I interpreted that phrase to mean someone with an
excess of wealth and spare time to spend, suggesting Hugh Hefner as a model
who came to mind. I actually chuckled on the tape and expressed my doubts, as a
teacher myself, that Mr. Reed could really be a “man of leisure” in that sense.
By then, I had moved ahead to her third page. My comments continued,
Moving on . . . on page three what jumped off the page and struck me as really
memorable was your description of your growing rage. I particularly found vivid
the physiological descriptions [I read aloud her sentences about her face and her
heartbeat pounding in her skull]. . . . I know those feelings when I’ve been angry too.
I sense the sarcasm in the reference to the “lonely word.”
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I made the passage of time in my reading clear when I informed Shelli that I
was physically moving my eyes to the next unit of her text. My tone of voice
suggested that I enjoyed these parts of Shelli’s paper, but most important, I
think, is that she could judge for herself if my reactions were the ones she
would like her readers to have. I continued my comments by focusing on one
of her memo questions to me; she had asked me to focus on her characterization of the players in her drama.
In terms of characterization, this struck me as an interesting page because it’s a
silent page. Now what I mean is that you tell us that you’re a “loudmouth,” you tell
us that Mr. Reed “hopped around the question”. . . but we don’t get to hear any of
that. What I wondered is whether some dialogue might not allow you to show us
what you and Mr. Reed were like during this important interaction.

It is rather obvious at this point that I was offering her advice or perhaps even
directions about what to do, but I was doing so both in the context of following
her agenda for me as a reader by answering one of her questions and also in the
context of how I responded as a common reader, not so much as the teacher of
the course. I concluded my movies of the mind as I ﬁnished reading her text. My
next set of responses focused on her ﬁnal page, her interaction with Mr. Reed.
You do let him speak in his own words, and I was glad to see that as a reader
because I thought this is what the whole paper’s moving towards, an explanation of
his behavior. And here he gets to offer it himself. I again felt that it might be worth
hearing what he said and what you said rather than telling us about it.
You asked where my sympathies lie, and I think they’re divided. I can relate to
and identify with your position as a student because I was once an honors English
student myself and a very diligent kind of perfectionist high school student. On the
other hand, I’m a teacher myself and I can understand what Mr. Reed was trying to
do, but I think when you raise the question of ethics with him, I certainly wanted to
hear more about it because I do think there’s an ethical issue here.
And I found particularly interesting the last paragraph where you reﬂect back. It
turns out that all of this happened some time ago, and perhaps your outlook has
changed? I wonder. So that really did catch my attention. There are issues here about
grading and equity in grading: what’s the purpose of grades—to motivate? to evaluate? What does a teacher do that’s appropriate and ethical to try to motivate and
evaluate? It seemed to me that perhaps that’s part of what you’ve been reﬂecting on
since you’re now willing to see this more as a compliment than sabotage. So I was
quite interested by the end, and I certainly did get a clear sense of how the moment
of truth came to be. You delivered on the promise of the opening paragraph.

Having ﬁnished my reading and my “walking tour” of responses, I recorded
a “terminal comment.” It appeared at the end because my reading process was
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complete, not because I wanted to sum things up: “That’s it! That’s my walking
tour. I tried to describe for you what I was feeling and what I was thinking
about in hopes that you’ll want to revise the paper, and when you do, I’ll be
glad to look at it again.”
Because this paper was the ﬁrst assignment of the term, when I returned the
students’ tapes, I decided to play my comments in class; I wanted students to get
a sense of what to expect. With Shelli’s consent, I played the tape on the day I
returned the papers, so she heard the comments for the ﬁrst time along with her
classmates. I asked the class to listen carefully and identify when they heard me
offering praise, criticism, questions, and suggestions. We then discussed what
they had heard. While some students read my reservations about the “silent”
page and the “man of leisure” as critical, most agreed that if “criticism” were the
right word, it was constructive not negative in tone. (I acknowledged in class
that I had spent far too much time on the brief phrase “man of leisure.”) Many
construed words like “jumped off the page” and “interesting” as praise; some
interpreted the requests for dialogue as suggestions; they all heard my observations about ethics as questions. In a required follow-up letter to me, Shelli continued our dialogue by sharing her reactions to hearing the tape:
Dear Jeff,
Class has been going well for me lately. . . . I was pleased with how playing my tape
went in class. . . . I found it to be not only a painless experience, but a very helpful one.
I didn’t feel a bit discouraged by the experience, only encouraged. . . . The most
important thing I need to revise in my paper is the last paragraph. I took the tape
home and listened again, and I decided that expounding upon my feelings of this 3
years later is even more interesting than the actual story. This would also give my
paper a more important purpose that is a bit more applicable to many more individuals (types of readers). I thought your tape was very clear, of course I also got to
hear you expound a bit more in class, and I agreed with you when you said that you
went on too much about the “man of leisure” bit. But we can’t all be perfect. . . .
Shelli

Perhaps, however, the best way to assess the effects of these tape-recorded
movies of the mind is to examine Shelli’s revision, excerpts of which follow:
Perspectives
“Mr. Reed?” I whispered aloud to myself. I was sure it was him, but I could only see
the back of his head. I saw the same short, curly, brown hair I remembered. He
appeared to hold himself in the same manner, gentle, and calm. I asked myself if I
should interrupt this man, dining at the Olive Garden with at least twenty other guests.
After all, they were in the middle of a discussion and I had six tables to wait on.
. . . Upon receipt of my seven I turned to Jackson.
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“So, what’s the verdict?” I asked sarcastically.
“I got a nine,” Jackson answered nonchalantly.
“You got a what?” I half yelled, “Let me see it.” . . .
Admittedly, I am a bit of a loud mouth, so I saw no reason in delaying the
inevitable conversation. I raised my hand and waited for some acknowledgement.
Mr. Reed granted me permission to speak.
“Mr. Reed, what is with this? Jackson got a nine on his work, and you gave me a
seven. Jackson didn’t even ﬁnish all ten words!” I blurted this out and the whole
class quite quiet. I could feel a wave of tension crash over the class. Mr. Reed stood
there for a moment before speaking.
“Shelli, I have my reasons and this conversation will be continued after class.” . . .
Mr. Reed began our conversation with compliments.
“Shelli, you have such great intelligence, you display this with your quality work
and visible effort.”
“Come on, Mr. Reed, please get to the point.” I was about to get my answer.
“Shelli, you have more potential than many of my other students, so truthfully I
grade you a bit differently.”
Once this sentence left Mr. Reed’s lips, I jumped all over it.
“But what about your ethics? Do you really think it’s ethical to sabotage my
grade point average? What kind of a teacher are you? Stop, just stop.” This was all I
said, and I did not care for further response. I walked away feeling a bit enraged and
proceeded to lunch. . . .
Oh, what the hell, I thought to myself, I might never see this man again. I slowly
walked to the table, gave Mr. Reed a soft tap on the shoulder.
“I thought that was you! How have you been doing?” I knew as soon as I saw the
proﬁle, just when Mr. Reed was turning his head to look at the instigator of the tap.
Mr. Reed saw who I was, immediately recognized me, and rose to his feet.
“Well, Shelli,” he said calmly, “how have you been? I know you’re going to school,
right?”
Mr. Reed’s demeanor was exactly as I remember it. Some things never change.
Some things do. I carried on a wonderful conversation with this man, exchanging updates on our family, work, and school lives. At the time of Mr. Reed’s and my
explosive confrontation, I recall the anger I felt. I remember seeing myself as a victim of discrimination. Upon seeing this man I did not feel any of these things. I saw
Mr. Reed as a caring educator trying to motivate me to reach my highest potential. I
felt not only complimented, but also lucky to be in receipt of the compliment.

Shelli’s revision shows evidence of independent decision-making: she has
created a dramatic frame for the piece, presumably to give it a faster, more
attention-getting start, something I had indirectly asked for; however, she has
found a way to do so that also emphasizes the piece’s reﬂective nature, which
she had told me in her class letter now interested her more than the story itself.
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She adds dialogue in several places, in response to my comments about the
silence of the piece and the tendency to tell readers things she might have
shown them. Her new conclusion completes the frame and allows her to focus
on how her perspective on the story has changed. Her ﬁnal words praise Mr.
Reed. Has she done so to appease her current teacher, me, who told her he identiﬁed with Mr. Reed? I don’t think so. Shelli has already criticized me directly (in
her letter when she writes about the “man of leisure bit”) and ignored one of
my implied criticisms (she kept the drivers’ ed example in her revision). I think
she has simply continued to think about her current perspective, as she said she
would in her letter, using the movies of my mind to explore her own thinking in
more depth and with more sophistication than she had in her original draft.
C O N C LU S I O N S

For more than two decades, Peter Elbow has argued that what student writers, indeed what all writers, need most is honest response. Yet, providing that
response is a time-consuming activity, whether the instructor holds conferences
with students, as many writing “gurus” have counseled, or writes comments on
drafts, as most writing teachers have done. Using spoken response in the form of
tape-recorded commentary offers an excellent and practical way to use Elbow’s
advice because it can be a time-efﬁcient mode of responding to students.
However, this essay isn’t primarily about being practical. It is intended to
demonstrate the value of a mode of response that is probably still underutilized.
Comments I have collected from students through course surveys and research
projects over the past nineteen years have created for me a meaningful picture of
how students react to teacher commentary. While the surveys have asked for student opinion about taped comments, the students’ responses have also been
revealing in what they say about written response. They used verbs such as “decipher” to describe reading their teachers’ comments; they referred to “sloppy
handwriting” and “vague illegible scribbles in the margins.” One student
explained her preference for taped responses by noting “I liked it [taped
response]. . . . you were able to expound on what you meant by a comment without little editor marks or trying to ﬁt a ¶ into a margin.” This student articulated
a common theme in student opinion about taped response: it is more expansive;
it “covers more ground” than written comments. As one student phrased it, “I
have found that teachers have more comments when using a tape rather than
simply writing them down.”
Students have constructed written comment as handwritten responses,
making legibility an issue. When a student is “deciphering” her teacher’s
response, she is not actually engaged in the kind of meaningful reading act the
instructor envisions. The tape-recorded mode of response can stimulate a
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“reading” act that focuses more on substantial issues, rather than merely
decoding handwriting or editorial symbols. Aside from frequent praise for the
sheer volume of teacher response generated on tape, students also regularly
reported their heightened awareness of a reader reading their texts. Note how
the following comments from a recent anonymous course evaluation suggest
that the students are quite conscious of the reader speaking directly to them:
• “Also we can hear the expression in your voice to tell us if you really didn’t
like something or just didn’t understand it.”
• “I think the advantages are my papers are not marked all over with errors. I
was able to think for myself on what needed [to be] revised from the suggestions you gave me.”
• “Because you can take your paper and follow along with the tape on what things
you need to change or add, it is like having a workshop.”

This sampling of comments explains why students prefer the “personal”
nature of taped responses. They are aware that someone has read their writing
and are engaged in trying to read that reader’s response.
In one research project, a student listened to her teacher’s taped response and
spoke aloud her reactions as she listened. In this excerpt from the student’s
speak-aloud protocol, we glimpse how she “read” her teacher’s movies of the
mind: “When she describes her reactions back to me, I know that I got the point
across I wanted to get across. . . . I was [also] trying to bring in another little
aspect . . . since she read it back to me and explained how it isn’t working I can
understand. I can see it myself too.” This student’s careful reading of her teacher’s
responses allowed her to begin making decisions about which parts of her text to
revise and which to leave alone, based on her own sense of the text’s impact on
her reader, paralleling Shelli’s process in revising her teacher narrative.
This student echoes the comments about “feedback,” about hearing what
the instructor is “thinking . . . exactly,” about “having a workshop.” In all these
cases, the student/writer/listener takes an active role in interpreting the
teacher’s taped comments. Of course, the process is complex, and some students have articulated their concerns with taped response: “Students get very
discouraged when they hear the instructor’s negative comments.” And others
expressed disappointment that they were not afforded an opportunity to
“explain or defend” their writing, as they would be in a conference situation.
But even these criticisms suggest that the students are reading the taped
response actively: hearing a reader’s negative response evidently has a very
strong impact on some students. Can we conjecture that the familiar voice of
the classroom instructor makes that instructor somehow more present as a
reader than his/her handwriting might? Comparing a tape-recorded commentary unfavorably with a conference, a valid enough critique, still emphasizes
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that the student envisions the response as part of a dialogue, a disappointingly
truncated one. However, the disappointment arises because students are so
aware of their reader’s response that they wish to respond in kind.
My point is that tape-recorded response encourages students to become more
cognizant of an actual reader engaged in the act of reading their writing. Whether
the instructor offers movies-of-the-mind commentary, simple observations of
fact, or even directives, students are, it seems, more focused on the instructor as a
reader than when they are “deciphering” written comments. Students thus not
only engage in an act of “reading” their reader’s response but also engage in a dialogue with that reader, with their own texts, with themselves. They may still end
up with a draft that has scribbles all over it, but the scribbles are in their own
handwriting, the product of their own interpretation of what they have heard.
Obviously, tape-recorded response comes with its own set of problems, as
any response methodology does. One complication is student access to the
technology, because students must use a tape player in order to hear the
responses. My practice has been to require students to try the tape-recorded
approach with their ﬁrst submitted draft, but to allow them the option of asking for written comments instead on later drafts. The students report that they
use their own tape players, borrow tape players from friends and relatives, listen
in the campus media center, or play the tapes on their car stereos. In the past
twenty years, no more than a dozen students have requested that I switch to
written comments, either because of personal preference or access problems.
My experience has been that the students ﬁnd the tapes helpful and are willing
to overcome obstacles and inconveniences in locating a tape player to use.
Another complication is editing. If a teacher wishes to make a change in a
written comment, she uses an eraser or a quick cross-out, but the teacher who
wishes to change a taped comment must work a bit harder. Several times each
term, I have to rewind and re-record an entire commentary I sense is too
unclear or vague or harsh. More often, I rewind a tape and record over a small
portion where I have not expressed myself as I had intended. The students
seem willing to accept that my commentary will not be a seamlessly smooth,
polished performance; the starts and stops of a reader reading and reﬂecting
are apparently embodied in the somewhat messy text of the taped response
without undercutting the credibility or authority of the teacher.
What happens to that authority of the teacher when she uses tape-recorded
response? I can certainly imagine a taped commentary that would be a verbal
analogue of a red-pen-written response that issues terse directions and chastises
errors. Such a response would underscore the teacher’s power, but it would not
constitute movies of the mind as Elbow has described. The movies-of-the mind
approach foregrounds the teacher as reader. One student’s comment, however,
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points out that the teacher’s identity as teacher remains intact as well: “The
largest advantage was that I could see directly how to start revising my paper. The
comments were often very helpful in this regard. They told me what the professor as a reader was having trouble understanding.” It is the “professor as a reader”
that the students hear. As I have pointed out earlier, Richard Straub describes
movies of the mind as a “a kind of summary transcript,” the “least controlling”
mode of response because it does little more than “dramatize how the words are
being understood by an individual reader, not by someone in charge of judging,
criticizing, or improving the writing” (243). The voice of the instructor, however,
is still the familiar voice the students hear in class twice or more weekly, and I
suspect they never lose sight of the teacher’s role in “judging [and] criticizing.”
Inherent in a movies-of-the-mind approach, whether spoken or written, is
the complication caused by the teacher’s obligation to assign grades eventually.
But if the movies-of-the-mind approach has value as one method of response,
as Elbow persuasively argues, then the complications that come with the territory are ones with which we must deal. My argument has been that readerresponse reading and spoken response make a good ﬁt. The expansiveness and
personal nature of the taped response approach make movies-of-the-mind a
powerful model of response. Clearly, there is a place for both written and spoken response in working with student writing. A substantial literature expounding on the value of conferencing, the other form of spoken response, already
exists. I hope here to contribute to a growing literature advancing the value of
the “other” form of spoken response—tape-recorded commentary. When a
teacher determines that what she wants to provide to her students is a personal
response in some detail, a “walking tour” or movies-of-her mind, tape-recorded
response can prove quite beneﬁcial. By adding this mode of response to their
repertoire, teachers can put into practice Peter Elbow’s sage advice and answer
for students that most signiﬁcant question: “what happened in you when you
read the words this time?” (Writing Without Teachers 85).

NOTES

Contemporary software such as Word 2000 allows instructors to embed comments in the text in ﬂoating boxes that appear on demand as the student moves
the mouse over the text, thus exploding the notion of space in rather useful ways.
However, these comments still require time to compose and type, more time
than speaking the same remarks would take.

13 A N I N Q U I R Y I N T O W R I T I N G
ASSESSMENT
Deﬁning the Elbovian Legacy
Kathleen Blake Yancey

So the most important point, then,
is that I am not arguing against judgment or evaluation.
I’m just arguing against that crude, simple way of representing judgment—distorting it, really—into a single number,
which means ranking people along a single continuum.
Peter Elbow
But if we drop the SAT,
by what means should we allot membership in the nation’s elite?
John Cloud

What really, as opposed to rhetorically,
transﬁxed late-twentieth-century America was
the precise calibration of a systematic national reward system,
which was what the testing and education regime had
become over half a century.
Nicholas Lemann

For Christmas last year, I asked for a copy of Nicholas Lemann’s recent book
The Big Test. In that volume, Lemann, a staff writer for the New Yorker, details
the founding and growth of ETS, the Educational Testing Service. Perhaps
more than any single institution this century, ETS has shaped the very
American culture of testing. In fact, one might argue that it’s not only shaped
it, but also determined it—and therefore determined as well the education that
tends to follow the test. Interestingly, as Lemann demonstrates, both ETS’s
original purposes and its later developments were ideologically driven, often in
surprising and explicit terms. Basically, the founders of ETS designed a program that in retrospect seems almost benign. They hoped to replace a system
of advancement that in this country was based on inherited wealth and corporate and state connections with a simpler and—they believed—more equitable
one driven by intellectual talent. Their vehicle for making change?
Testing.

188

W r i t i n g Wi t h E l b ow


Assessment is a large and technical area,
and I’m not a professional. *

You have to wonder how it is that Peter Elbow got involved in an enterprise
like writing assessment anyway. His graduate work is in Chaucer, much of his
scholarly work explores topics like voice and freewriting, and as he says himself, he prefers to dissociate himself from claims made about his assessment
expertise. In spite of these facts (or as we’ll see, perhaps because of them), Peter
Elbow has become over the last ﬁfteen years a leading ﬁgure in collegiate and
university writing assessment—challenging the historic sorting function of
assessment, advocating portfolios, and developing and advocating new ways to
grade student work. In spite of reservations about writing assessment, he participated in the creation of the CCCC “Statement on Writing Assessment.” In
spite of reservations about outcomes assessment, he is working with leaders of
the WPA Outcomes Group, even if it is to help them consider reasons why we
might not want a national statement of outcomes. His vehicle for making
change?
Teaching.

Embracing [New?] Contraries

There are certain terms that don’t permit dialogue; it may be that testing
and teaching comprise such a pair. Or: even when motivated by the same general good intentions, testing and teaching rely on fundamentally different
understandings of human behavior. Writing assessment, which both redeﬁnes
testing and locates it in the speciﬁc ﬁeld of writing (Yancey, “Looking Back”), is
likewise benign, intending to bring teaching and testing together, to make
them congruent with each other, to open each to the possibility of accommodation between their agents: the testers, the teachers. As a teacher, as someone
who practices assessment, I hope and work for such accommodation. But as I
think about the different ways writing assessment is constructed by these parties, I wonder if such accommodation can be created, much less sustained. And
as you’ll see, I conclude this chapter still wondering.
Besides, even if we can create and sustain such accommodations, we will
encounter yet another problem. Even the assessments linked to teaching and
learning—like the ones offered by Peter Elbow—can produce consequences that
contradict their intents, can produce effects that are at odds with learning and
teaching both.
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Grading and evaluation are not bad in themselves,
but they are bad in their effects when they monopolize the scene of
teaching and learning.

Aware of this frequent disjunction between intent and effect, however, we
can compensate, ﬁrst, by identifying such distortions of intent and, second, by
undertaking to learn about and correct them.
Is there a claim in this text, after all? I think so, but it’s a caution as much as
a claim. Writing assessment has beneﬁted from Peter Elbow’s work, to be sure.
It is now understood through a new lens, located ﬁrmly within a new rhetorical situation, one deﬁned by personal interaction, by connections, by willingness to learn—a situation familiar to teachers, new to testers. If this legacy is to
survive, these attributes must locate both teaching and assessment. As Peter
Elbow argues, they are intimately connected.
To put my larger point in key terms: I suggested above that testing was one,
teaching another. But as I’ve written this chapter, taught classes and partnered
with faculty at a new university, and worked with K-12 teachers from Virginia
Beach to southern California, a third, deﬁnitive term has emerged, one that distinguishes teaching from testing, that brings perspective to this history and this
interpretation of our work as faculty and Peter’s contribution to that work.
Trusting.

I hear more voice in these passages;
something rich and useful and interesting
is going on there; can you get more of that?

In 1992, I decided that I would edit a collection on voice in writing, which
became the NCTE collection Voices on Voice. Although I didn’t know Peter, I’d
written him a letter inviting him to participate, he’d said yes, and he’d been
helping me think about the form the collection might take and the kinds of
offerings—like an annotated bibliography—that might make the volume valuable to readers. As part of developing the proposal for the book, I again wrote
Peter, this time to ask him to review my draft of the introductory essay,
although I use the term draft here—as they say—advisedly. What I sent him
was a set of scribbled notes that wandered in a stream of consciousness mode
around a topic I found intimidating. My central question was not, as one
might expect, what will the reader encounter in this text?—but rather, by what
authority am I doing this collection?
Foolishly, bravely, I sent the draft to Peter.
Quickly, helpfully, he replied, circling one idea, “I like this.”
It was an assessment moment.
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Validity was the SAT’s weaker point,
but nobody within the testing world questioned the test’s reliability.

An emphasis on testing, from an ETS perspective, was what assured fairness.
In fact, testing assured more than fairness; it effected social justice. What the ETS
founders—people like ETS President Henry Chauncey and Harvard President
James Bryant Conant—saw prior to 1945 was a country that claimed democracy
as a central value while practicing an elitism predicated on the advancement of
the mandarin classes: those who were born into wealth, who then gathered at the
Ivies (which functioned more as country clubs than as sites of intellectual
inquiry), and who then “naturally” progressed into positions of leadership and Last year [2000] 44% of the kids
inﬂuence. What Chauncey in particular who graduated from high school
saw—and Lemann’s argument in The took it [the SAT], up from 41% in
Big Test is that the story of ETS is the 1995. In all, more than 2 million
story of Henry Chauncey—was that students took the SAT in 2000. The
democracy would be better served by second-biggest admissions test, the
grooming leaders who had native talent ACT, has 1.8 million takers.
(Cloud [online])
and intelligence. How this process of
meritocratic selection was congruent
with democracy is an unanswered question for Chauncey, but what was clearly
answered was the means by which leadership for a democracy would be created:
through a system.
This is what Henry Chauncey wants to do in . . . postwar America: he wants to mount a
vast scientiﬁc project that will categorize, sort, and route the entire population. It will be
accomplished by administering a series of multiple-choice mental tests to everyone, and
then by suggesting, on the basis of the scores, what each person’s role in society should
be. . . . It will accomplish something not very different from what Chauncey’s Puritan
ancestors came to the New World wanting to do—engender systematic moral grace in
the place of wrong and disorder—but via twentieth century technical means. The vehicle through which he hopes to achieve all this is an aborning organization called the
Educational Testing Service, purveyor of a test called the SAT. (Lemann 5)

According to Lemann, Chauncey’s quest embodied the quintessential and
paradoxical American promise: parity for all, rewards for the quick and the
smart. Chauncey’s contribution to the realization of the American dream, of
course, was the system that would make that potential real, a system that
engendered complete faith. Ironically, what’s as interesting is the absence of
faith—in either democracy or education—that drives one toward a system.
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What’s interesting as well is what happens to students when one’s faith is transferred from people to systems.
In postwar America, what happened was simple but profound: education
changed. The role that the personal in educational access had historically
played shrank, becoming replaced by normed information that assured fairness
by its anonymity and its numbers: student as a GPA, a class rank, an SAT score,
itself normed. Collectively, as a people, we became sorted, categorized, and
ranked. To assure that such sorting was itself fair, we relied on science and on
the apparatus it supplied. We talked not about what students were learning, or
had learned, or might learn, but about four kinds of validity and about how to
check for those; about ways to calculate reliability; about ways to translate raw
scores into something meaningful—like percentile rankings that themselves
provided another means of sorting. These systems promised efﬁciency, to be
sure, but that was not their chief virtue: engineering society was that.
I see three distinct problems with ranking: it is inaccurate or unreliable;
it gives no substantive feedback;
and it is harmful to the atmosphere for teaching and learning.

In the process of engineering society, the ETS founders somehow lost a
virtue that assessment might offer: its function of valuing what is.

An emphasis on testing almost invariably
reflects a distrust of teachers.

In some ways, it may be that Peter is always telling the teaching story, and
that assessment for him is necessarily simply another version of that story. If
we think of a teaching story as narrative, then what Gregory Clark says about
Burkean narrative is precisely relevant here. Clark makes the point that for
Burke, narrative is
not story so much as it is contextuality. Contextuality embeds ideas and identity
alike in the particular and dynamic complexities that develop in relational life, and
it denies any possibility of their anonymity or autonomy. (129)

The key terms here, I think, include denial [of] anonymity and autonomy: for
Peter, assessment is always about context, about community, and about the personal. Social justice and fairness are linked, as they were for Conant and
Chauncey, but the vehicle for effecting them is not scientiﬁc, quantitative, and
systematic, but rhetorical.
Assessment, therefore, serves the ends of rhetoric.
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Let’s do as little ranking and grading as we can.
They are never fair and they undermine teaching and learning.

I said earlier that the terms testing and teaching seem to talk past each other;
and it is the latter that underlies an Elbovian view of assessment. Listen to some
of Peter’s most famous lines, particularly as they counterpoint the assessmentas-system engineered by ETS:
• Imagine the absurdity of trying to score a person with a single
number. (Black et al. 53)
• In fact, portfolios may now finally give us the leverage we have
needed to dislodge our overreliance on holistic scoring in general:
our habit of using single numbers to rank complex performances
along a single dimension. (“Will the Virtues” 46)
• In the end, then, I conclude that the least interesting questions we
can ask of any text—by students or published authors—are questions of quality or evaluation. The most intellectually interesting
work comes from asking and answering many of our most common analytic and academic questions—questions that invite us
(though they do not require us) to step outside the mentality of
evaluation. (“Taking Time Out” 17)
• Surely, most of us have learned that we don’t so much help people improve as persons by giving them constant diagnosis of
strengths and weaknesses. We help them by engaging with them
in serious and felt relationship. (“Will the Virtues” 54)

When Peter’s contribution to writing assessment is summarized, what
appears obvious is less the vehicle most closely associated with his name—
portfolio—and more the new rhetorical situation he seems to be defining
here. In the classic assessment situation, a student, a test-taker, is assumed to
be a given, to produce that which can be measured scientifically, and then, on
the basis of that product, to be sorted. It’s a fixed set, a static situation. In
contrast to this, Peter’s sense of assessment evokes a different rhetorical situation: one that is fluid, emerging, and personal. It’s a situation embodied in a
felt relationship, a situation whose primary purpose is to help students learn.
If students aren’t being helped, then assessment is superfluous, as Peter
reminds us:
This brings up a metaphor or parable that always returns to mind. In
my last year of college, I had an old beat up car; it worked but not well.
Then, a few years later; same kind of thing. Then my third car came a

An In q u i r y In t o Wr i t i n g As s e s s m e n t

193

number of years later when I first had a full time teaching job. It was a VW
bug in pretty good shape.
When I first got it and discovered it didn’t have a radiator, I was
amazed and then gradually got a feeling of having been cheated. All my
troubles with my two earlier cars had been with the radiator—and here,
suddenly, I was discovering that a radiator wasn’t necessary for a car. It
didn’t help make it go backwards or forwards. It was just something that
most designs built in as if essential. That’s my parable of assessment.
It’s not part of teaching—even though we are lulled into assuming it is. It
doesn’t really help make people learn. (Elbow and Yancey 105)

Several points here are worth noting. First, the priority belongs to teaching,
not to assessment. If assessment cannot aid in the teaching enterprise, then its
value is limited. Second, Peter draws his evidence not from sophisticated scientiﬁc theories or complicated theoretical applications, but from everyday experience, in this case from the experience of owning a VW. Third, the experience
is conveyed in the form of a parable, that is, in the form of a narrative that pretends to truth, a literary form familiar to English teachers.
Finally, Peter is quite clear about the fundamental purpose of assessment: to
help students learn.

In only twenty years or so, we have twice changed the world of
assessment, and we did it by resisting conventional practices of the testing community and setting an example of sound practices.

Peter is often described as the academic who is overly personal, who doesn’t
understand politics, who focuses overmuch on the individual. Perhaps unwittingly, these critiques have always sounded an ironic note to me. On the one
hand, of course, there’s the ring of truth about them: Peter’s gaze does seem to
cast on the individual rather consistently. On the other hand, the idea that such
focus isn’t itself another kind of political act is itself surprisingly naive.
The critique of Peter for his allegedly apolitical rhetorical stance fails to
consider both some of the tenets of reformers at the same time it fails to
understand the history of writing assessment in the last thirty years. The academics making the critique, for instance, are typically the ﬁrst to observe that
the personal is always political; is this not also so in this case? Likewise, and
more telling, these academics have not joined Peter in thinking about, talking
about, and enacting social change in the one arena where all change finally is
estimated: that is, in the rhetorical situation of assessment. And I have to
say—have to jump out of this text at this precise moment, much as a
Victorian narrator to say—how completely bafﬂed I am by this reluctance. In
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my view, we can incorporate new pedagogies like collaborative learning, and
we can introduce new technologies like computers, and we can specifically
enact reform curricula like service learning, but if we do not provide for these
changes to be valued in appropriate terms, they cannot effect the promised
reform. Instead, the new is held hostage to the old, and reform is defeated.
What Peter has done, then, in speaking a kind of truth to assessment power is
to begin changing the very terms by which learning and teaching are valued—
and he’s taken this up not as an expert, but as a teacher. Why?
[W]e nonprofessionals can and should work on it because professionals have not reached definitive conclusions about the problem of how
to assess writing (or anything else, I’d say). Also, decisions about
assessment are often made by people even less professional than
we, namely legislators.

From one view, most of the major crises in composition studies in the last
half of the twentieth century—from the continuing disputes about CUNY
admissions to the banishment of remediation in the California State System—
have hinged on assessment. Put differently, assessment has been used as the
(political) vehicle to exclude and even preclude certain students, and more
particularly, certain kinds of students. If we do not engage in these terms, we
are powerless to inﬂuence even the potential conditions that govern our students’ academic lives. Speaking from the rhetorical situation of his own experience and his own classroom, Peter assumes that he has power, even in
assessment matters, and he seeks to use it judiciously.
Not because he is especially interested in assessment, but rather, because
he’s interested in teaching.

Portfolios have kicked back at testing itself—
helping people rethink some central assumptions and practices.

Should the Elbovian legacy survive, particularly the legacy represented in
portfolios, two major problems must be addressed: ﬁrst, what I’ll call, borrowing from Catharine Lucas, distortion of effect, for both students and teachers;
second, a kind of naiveté about how what we teachers do will be used, will in
fact be systematized by a culture that worships ranking. Or: is it ever possible
to get outside the system? Alternatively, could we work both outside and inside
the system?
One difﬁculty with any kind of change that people are drawn to is that no
change is directly replicable. Rather, people learn about something new—in
the case of teachers, they learn about new ways of teaching like collaborative
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learning, or new ways of assessing like portfolios—and they interpret the new
within their own ways of being, and then apply the new just so, using the new to
suit their needs, their sense of their students’ needs.
It’s a messy, asystematic process, this kind of Students get the curricchange. At the same time, the new application can ula of their institutions
be fundamentally at odds with the design of the through the agency of
original. The controversies surrounding whole lan- particular teachers,
guage illustrate this principle fairly well. In general, some of whom are
whole language advocates, like Yetta Goodman, enthusiastic, some
don’t advise getting rid of phonemic or context muddled. . . . Students
clues altogether, although they do advocate inviting will understand portfostudents to read real and whole texts. But my son’s lio assessment in the
ﬁrst grade teacher—a woman devoted to whole way their teacher
language, she said—wouldn’t allow a phonics les- represents it to them.
son or a spelling rule, with the predictable result
(Nelson 248)
that my son spelled worse at the end of the year
than he did at the beginning. Was I in favor of abolishing whole language? No. Was I in favor of its being judiciously applied? Yes.
It’s the same story with portfolios, I’m afraid. The intent, as Peter says, is to
promote both better teaching and learning, not to create a new maze to puzzle
(or defeat) students—and not to create yet another exercise for them to complete as mindlessly as possible. And yet . . . there’s anecdotal evidence, at least,
that sometimes, perhaps more often than we’d like, portfolio-as-exercise is
what gets implemented. Elizabeth Metzger and Lizbeth Bryant report a student, for example, who claims to have beaten a portfolio system privileging
revision, more speciﬁcally to “have botched a paper so it looked like I revised.”
(7) Inviting students to underachieve (or worse, to misrepresent their talents)
was not the intent of the portfolio, but it can be the effect.
Question: given that our intents and our effects don’t always match, what
might we do to prevent such misapplications?
A second issue concerns the value students assign to portfolios even when
the implementation “works.” Liz Spalding and Gail Cummins’s study of ﬁrstyear students at the University of Kentucky points us toward some answers.
The students in the study had all completed Kentucky’s compulsory twelfthgrade portfolio; what Spalding and Cummins wanted to know was how students understood both the portfolio and the processes that contributed to its
composition—and regardless of how you parse them, the results discourage.
For instance, “some two-thirds of the students stated that compiling the portfolio was not a useful activity.” (191) As disturbing were the comments that
students articulated:
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I actually only had two pieces that could be used in my portfolio when time neared
to turn them in. So the week before, I wrote three pieces off the top of my head just
to turn something in. I don’t consider myself a good writer, but I did get a “proﬁcient” [score]. I feel everything was a waste of time. (182)

Another commented,
I think it was helpful to an extent, but there was just too much emphasis placed on it.
Many times we took time out of class to do and discuss portfolio pieces. This took
away from valuable class time and while we should’ve been learning something to
help further our education, we were discussing how to make a better portfolio (184).

The concern suggested in these comments is not that they emerge from a
mandated program. If that were the problem, then we could work toward
eliminating, or at least minimizing, the effects of a forced portfolio. I wish, in
fact, that the problem could be solved that easily, as un-easy as it may sound.
I think, instead, that the problem here is multiple.
One problem: the curriculum doesn’t always support the portfolio. If a colleague wants to introduce portfolios, do you require that a curriculum be in
place ﬁrst? Let’s reverse the question: doesn’t implementing portfolios and
then reviewing them provide a collective and textured way to learn about curriculum and to talk about it? At the same time, the student may have a point:
while we are in the process of learning—which itself is part of both teaching and
assessing—will students ﬁnd that the gap between intent and effect, between
curriculum and assessment produces nothing more than a waste of time? Is
there a way to avoid this problem?
Another problem: many students want the very education that portfolios are
attempting to replace. They don’t want discussions of portfolio pieces; they don’t
want their valuable class time wasted this way. For them, class time is valuable
only when the teacher talks, when the teacher directs them, when the teacher
identiﬁes knowledge, when lines are clear and ambiguity is erased. Given this
situation, what can we do to help students understand not only the contents of
portfolios, but also their design and their subtexts?
A ﬁnal problem, not unrelated: what’s true of students can also be true of
teachers. Just as students cannot be simply given portfolios as guaranteed vehicle-of-learning, neither can teachers be given them as guaranteed vehicle-ofteaching. Wendy Bishop makes this point in her discussion of using portfolios
with new TAs. One of them reﬂects on whether he’ll use them again—once he
can control what he does in his own classroom:
I don’t know. I don’t think that the Portfolio thing is a total disaster. It just didn’t do
anything for me this time around. If I wanted it to work for me, I guess I would have
to re-structure my entire class plan. (“Going” 225)
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Like the student above, this teacher ﬁnds that portfolios call for a re-structuring, a new way of understanding teaching and learning. Is there a way to
help the teacher begin the re-structuring? What would motivate such a
teacher? And for all teachers: isn’t re-structuring a dynamic fundamental to the
teaching enterprise? Or, is it rather re-structuring as dynamic fundamental to
the learning enterprise?

(“Ten,” mutter the guys when they see a pretty woman.)

Still, I want to argue, as I did in a recent
CCC article, that speaking in the language of
Assessment . . . defines our
the assessment experts can also be useful. In
work to outsiders and . . .
other words, if we know that language, we can
to ourselves and locates us
use numbers strategically. It’s not either/or:
within the faculty as well
we need to model best practices, yes: that’s
as within the larger culture.
one means of accomplishing change. But per(White 307)
haps we need as well, now and again, to link
our work to the numbers the culture loves. To
illustrate this, I want to cite some work that is currently taking place in
Virginia Beach. Chris Jennings, a faculty member at Tidewater Community
College and a former high school teacher in Virginia Beach City Schools, is
directing a FIPSE project that we might want to consider as a model of
both/and: fostering better teaching and learning, and using numbers as one
kind of conﬁrmational evidence. Here’s a basic outline of problem and new
practice and results.
The problem: students from Virginia Beach high schools enroll in very high
numbers at Tidewater Community College; the writing courses there fall into
three categories: 003; 001; and 101. English 101 is where we’d want all students
placed, since it’s the entry-level course; typically, 67% of the students enter
into 003 or 001. Seems to be a problem, the folks there said.
The new practice: Teachers in a speciﬁc Virginia Beach high school, Salem
High School, learn about and begin to use portfolios. The student population
excludes AP students: it’s a general track. The teachers aren’t writers, nor do
they practice a rich curriculum. But they volunteer to work with portfolios,
and like dominoes falling one to the next, the teachers develop a writing
process approach with their students; they begin to use reﬂection; they
respond to writing differently. Useful as a deﬁning concept, the portfolios
become an afterthought. At the end of a year, portfolios are collected and
scored according to a scoring guide created collaboratively by teachers at both
Salem and Tidewater.
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The preliminary results: The numbers ﬂip: 67% of the students are placed
into 101. These same students score better than their peers do on the Virginia
“Standards of Learning” (SOL) state twelfth grade test. These students enroll in
higher numbers in both 4-year and 2-year colleges. They stay in college longer
than Tidewater students ordinarily do.
Could this effort have failed? Yes. Might it still? Yes. It’s preliminary, but it’s
promising. The numbers above speak to the ﬁrst year. The second year, different
students, some new teachers, but the same results. This way of learning “works.”
Is the effort being held hostage to these numbers—the percentage who
place into non-basic ﬁrst-year comp, the number who scored well on the
Virginia state test, the number who go to college? No. (Not yet.) The SOLs, for
instance, weren’t intended to be part of the research. But the students have to
take the test, so we checked the scores—just to see. The scores were good, better than anyone would have predicted, suggesting that if the curriculum is rich,
the students’ work will be as well. That’s okay. In other words, the numbers do
tell a story, and we shouldn’t be afraid to see what that story is and how it compares with the story we think we are seeing. This is especially so when the
numbers don’t drive learning, but are used to back up what we’ve seen as we’ve
reviewed the portfolios: new curriculum, new students’ voices, new genres.
(Dare I say it? New selves.)
At the same time: do I like numbers? No, not much. You don’t work with
portfolios—as Peter’s work suggests—because you’re a fan of numbers. But
numbers we’re probably going to be living with for awhile yet. I’m not willing
to tailor the curriculum to the test and its numbers, no, but if I have to tolerate
the numbers anyway, I’m willing to use them to verify a curriculum that
encourages and rewards and helps students learn. And part of being able to do
this is knowing enough about numbers—being enough of a psychometrician
as well as a rhetorician—to be able to use them to foster good.
In the best case scenario, you see, we can use them to show that they aren’t
needed, after all.

It’s the mark of good writers to like their writing.

In thinking about the issues here, in reading Peter’s writings, in continuing
to work in both teaching and assessment, I’m struck by some contraries, some
oppositions, some assumptions. I’m reading the Greenville News, where a letter
to the editor comments on the SAT and how it cannot be other than undemocratic. The letter’s point is that (1) high achievement by all students is a laudable
goal and (2) the SAT as a measure is fundamentally unable to show this (much
less reward it), given its intent of showing quite the reverse. In other words,
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because the SAT yields norm-referenced scores, “high-achievement” means
above-average performance on the test. The letter, thus, rightly concludes that
by deﬁnition “all students in all states could never realize [high achievement].”
This, then, is what Peter, like this reader, has understood all along. In teaching,
we have a choice. We can teach students; if we do this, it’s possible that all students can achieve. We can sort students; if we do this, we apparently have two
options. We can agree, on the one hand, to sum the numbers as Garrison Keillor
does, so that all students are above average. We can understand, on the other
hand, that we’ll ﬁnd half of those students, regardless of context—background,
development, classroom conditions, you name it—recorded as below average.
More to the point, it’s highly unlikely that this recording will in any way alter
their chances to learn in the future—except perhaps negatively.

Not least, in reviewing Peter’s writings on assessment, one word appears
and re-appears.
Trust.
Something at odds with a system.
Because something that is personal, intuitive, human.
Something we bring to and take from our own teaching and learning.
Something we want to be for and to each other.

I’m observing an instructor this term as a part of a personnel procedure. It’s
pretty formulaic: like many places, we don’t pay much, so the instructor is
probably with us for the life of the contract. Still, I enjoy watching teachers,
and I enjoy watching students, and in each observation I learn something.
Today, late November, it’s sunny, the students ready to put the term to rest.
They are working on cases for a technical communication class; the instructor
has brought in several samples. She passes them around. She asks the students
to read them. She explains each one, carefully walking the students through
ﬁrst one case, then a second, ﬁnally a third. The cases: they aren’t difﬁcult. The
students like her personality: it’s engaging. But I observe as well: they aren’t
engaged. Concluded, the class concludes—15 minutes early.
I’m walking out the door, wondering (as I always do when the full time isn’t
used) what isn’t quite working here. I can’t seem to put my ﬁnger on it. The
students seem interested. The teacher’s very articulate. The cases illustrated
well. Suddenly: but the students, they weren’t trusted, were they? Why didn’t
they read the cases? Think about them? Try to ﬁgure out what in them was
illustrative?
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Couldn’t they have performed the readings?
Trust cuts in many directions.

Of course, all this—it’s not really about the SAT, you know? It’s about the
relationship between and among testing, teaching, learning, and democracy. It
is about the SAT as exemplar, and not quite as (single) villain. To see the SAT as
villain is to fail to see that it merely represents what can go wrong, even when
one’s intentions are worthy. It was a worthy thing to ﬁnd a substitute for
wealth as the ticket to success in America. The problem is that the alternative
means—the SAT—hasn’t altered that fundamental reality. Because it’s
designed to produce winners and losers, the SAT has simply produced substitutions, new winners and
For example, in Chicago, the Consortium on
losers, most of whom (by
Chicago School Research concluded that
the way) look remarkably
“Chicago’s regular year and summer school
like the originals. Likewise,
curricula were so closely geared to the Iowa
when constructed as tests,
test that it was impossible to distinguish real
good classroom practices
subject matter mastery for passing this particu- can go equally awry: portlar test.” These ﬁndings are backed up by a
folios become less vehicles
recent poll in Texas which showed that only
for learning, more a means
27% of teachers in Texas felt that increased
of sorting and ranking
test scores reﬂected increased learning and
of students and of surveilhigher quality teaching. 85% of teachers said
lance of teachers. Not least,
that they neglected subjects not covered by
testing itself—regardless of
the TAAS exam.
type—continues unabated
(Wellstone [online]) into every nook and cranny
of education, with results
that are predictably deleterious. The tests become the curriculum, especially as
teacher salaries and student promotion become contingent upon them. Or
perhaps it’s a variation on this theme of a nightmare connection between
assessment and the classroom, as, increasingly, the curriculum is devoted to
ways of taking these tests and passing them.
What we can do, Peter reminds us, is to do what we do well:
help students learn to communicate
work together to design assessments that capture what they do, not what
they don’t do
speak to our own experience, and, not least,
trust
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In short, portfolio assessment invites us to ask the real assessment questions:
“What do we really want in successful students?
What are we trying to produce?”

To say that a common teaching theme emerges in Peter’s assessment writing
is to understate badly: Peter’s interest in assessment both begins and ends in
the classroom. This point, I think, is not sufﬁciently understood. It’s not only
that teaching per se interests Peter, even after all these years; it’s also that he
understands teaching both to provide a common defense against testing and to
permit a way to change testing. It’s also that he plotted this change largely
against a culture invested in testing, simply by returning again and again—and
yet one more time—to what we know best: teaching. In other words, he identiﬁed a set of incongruences—between what we say we want, like achievement,
and our own practices, and he spoke about those as a teacher. This approach
provided one way of reforming writing assessment in America.
My focus is on pedagogy and practice.
My approach is not methodologically sophisticated;
I am simply trying to think through my own evaluative practices.

What’s also not so well understood is that in his teaching concerns, Peter
not only shares, but also anticipates the concerns of assessment specialists.
They talk in the language of consequential validity as they focus on the link
between assessment and curriculum; he talks about the importance of helping
students improve. They mean the same.
[T]he least interesting and useful question
to ask about any piece of writing is how good it is.

To observe this similarity, however, is not to suggest that they share much
beyond this singular concern for effect. Motivated by divergent values, they call
upon different apparati to enact their agendas. As
important, despite/because of his outsider status,
Location is everything
(Morgan) Peter’s agenda has changed assessment practice:
Foucault can mean multiply, it seems. Still, precisely because Peter’s changes inform our teaching,
it behooves all of us to do what Peter’s assessment work has reiterated: trust
ourselves, trust our students, and speak to that trust.

NOTE

* The quotes from Peter Elbow are indicated by a consistent font style and size,
and they appear without page references, for two reasons. First, many of the quotes

are layered into the text, and including citations will disrupt the tenor of the text,
so it’s in part a move to preserve the alternate feeling of the chapter. Second, and as
important, since I’m including quotes from across the Elbow canon, using them
without citation emphasizes the fullness of the canon and the gestalt of the work.

C LU S T E R I V
Voice and the Personal

INTERSECTION
Making it Personal
Marcia Dickson

I woke up more than one morning thinking about this piece of writing. It’s a
new genre to me, this commenting between sections of a collection of essays.
I’m not even sure what to call these words between: Intersections? Transitions?
Commentary? From an esthetic point of view, I like the idea of editorial presence throughout the collection, but the purpose of that presence eludes me a
bit. On the one hand, these interjections could add to the discussion. On the
other hand, perhaps they should simply introduce the essays that follow or tie
together their various themes, place them in a larger academic framework.
Hmmmm. Here goes.
It’s dangerously personal, this section. Personal but academic as well. These
writers are breaking the spirit if not the rules—unstated, of course—of today’s
academic discourse: be direct; be thorough; be objective. Being direct entails getting enough information and a thesis of sorts in the ﬁrst few paragraphs of the
essay and then not digressing from the main path that leads to a conclusion.
Being thorough involves being almost legalistic in arguments and viewing a topic
in as many ways as possible, once again, without digressing. Finally, being objective demands that authors retain an almost scientiﬁc distance from the subject of
their analysis. Sometimes, however, as Pat reminds me, subjects are better gotten
at by being indirect—or at least by appearing to be so. These authors are direct
without seeming to be so, thorough but in a manner that suggests the humanities
rather than the social sciences, and while not objective, they are not at all locked
into individual perspective. Each essayist tackles some aspect of “Elbowism” and
worries with it, applies it to their own theory and practice, takes it apart with a
curiosity born from a need to know and to understand, and makes it new.
It is the needing to know and understand that form the impetus for all scholarship. Generally, however, just toying with an idea isn’t considered to be enough.
Most academics insist that one needs a critical lens to view the subject through, a
philosophical underpinning, a theoretical position from which to pontiﬁcate.
I’m being unfair. Pontiﬁcate is the wrong word. In most cases.
However, in the academy, writers tend to privilege the difﬁcult and the
abstract. The scholarship becomes suspect when the critical lens one looks
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through is primarily personal experience, especially an experience that goes
from what my folklorist friend calls “the particular experience.” The suspicion is
no less when scholars refuse to force a theoretical frame on either the work, the
process, or the person being examined. In fact, when “who we are” becomes the
starting point for academic analysis, all sorts of people get nervous.
Some of the authors in this section push the borders of what is academic
and what isn’t almost to the point of breaking. As you read, you will see that
each essay moves a step away from the safe territory of academic discourse as
we have come to know it. Yet I would argue, all of the essays perform the work
of scholarship and perform it well.
Ronald and Roskelly’s “Embodied Voice: Peter Elbow’s Physical Rhetoric” is
the most conventional of the essays. They offer a straightforward examination
of metaphor—the stuff of English studies since literature became a legitimate
endeavor for professors of philosophy. Something happens in this essay, however, that is more within the purview of the creative writer than the scholar:
these two researchers discuss their early attempts to construct a physical representation of Peter Elbow. Like school girls (or graduate students desperate for
release from stress) they tried to imagine the author of a book. They assembled,
if not a living breathing creature, a sort of reﬂection of a man from his discourse. Was this revelation a necessary element in their arguments about Peter’s
use of what Audre Lourde calls “the erotic” to express the connection between
the body and the mind, between thought and feeling? In this essay, yes, because
the writing demonstrates the same sort of body/mind, thought/feeling that the
scholar is examining. It’s also a reﬂection of the type of scholarship to which
they are responding. Peter invites readers to construct him because he constructs himself as an accessible writer—a teacher who will consider and answer
questions, no matter how dumb they might be. Many composition theorists
remain only words on the page, theories that are unassailable by the uninitiated,
rather than people who invite you to observe their struggle with ideas and think
along with them as they work those ideas out.
“Gone Fishin’: Rendering and the Uses of Personal Experience in Writing,”
Anne Herrington’s essay, moves a bit further into the personal. Before she
begins her intellectual discussion of the possibilities of rendering personal
experience as a natural part of research, she lets us see the moment when she
began to question not only her practice but also the theories she was introduced to as a graduate student. Next, rather suddenly, she switches font, tone,
and genre, and inserts a short interior dialogue—there are too many voices to
call it an interior monologue—that expands upon the thinking that goes on
when a writer starts to take on a new task. Anne lets us in on her problems
with the essay, her hesitancy to write on a topic that has already received a great
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deal of attention in the literature of composition and rhetoric, and the fact that
her association with Peter and his works helped her move to legitimate her
position. Isn’t this contrary to the stance academics are supposed to take?
Shouldn’t our ideas come from a deep felt sense of the way things work rather
than from a need to defend ourselves? Shouldn’t we hide the fact that we are
unsure of ourselves, our ideas, and the need for both in the academy?
That last question was slightly sarcastic, but as long as I’m in the mode,
shouldn’t scholars avoid metaphors from childhood? Aren’t those images
reserved for creative writers? (On occasion it does seem that creative and academic are polar opposites.) Wendy Bishop obviously doesn’t think so. In “My
Favorite Balancing Act,” she compares Peter to the amazing plate spinners who
frequently appeared on the Ed Sullivan show. Like those remarkable performers, Peter sets one idea after another spinning and—while balancing all of
them on the intellectual equivalent of tall and spindly sticks—manages somehow to create one rather sturdy set of ideas for our consideration. The fascination with the real plate spinner rests upon the fact that no one ever thinks that
he or she will manage more than two plates, or at the most, three plates at a
time. Spectators are held in thrall because the really good spinners can manage
to keep anywhere from ﬁve to ten plates whirling at the same time. In a similar
manner, no one ever quite believes that Peter can bring together all the images,
ideas, and their inherent contraries at once, either. But as Wendy points out by
juxtaposing his words and writing prompts with her own musing, he manages
to do it. And while some Ed Sullivan watchers preferred Joan Sutherland, the
opera singer, and some preferred Red Skelton, and others screamed for Elvis or
the Beatles, no one could fail to be a little in awe of the dexterity of the man
who spun the plates.
Sondra Perl continues to work in the personal—indeed expands upon the
personal nature of the essays that precede hers—by sharing both her friendship and professional relationship with all of us in “Dear Peter: A Collage in
Several Voices.” But like the previous essayists, she does more than tell a tale of
“my friend Peter.” Through a collage of conversations, speculations, stories,
and even a Christmas letter, she explores the intersections between her teaching and Peter’s, as well as discusses his viewpoints on process, agency, and even
the sexual nature of teaching. The personal controls this collage, takes it to the
very edge of the academic, and leaves it dangling there, half in the academic
arena and half about to ﬂoat into a sort of new space where who Sondra is,
who Peter is, and ultimately who her readers are, come together. The movement between subject, voice, and audience isn’t always smooth. Elements of a
collage tend to overlap, exist side by side, or push against one another, but the
piece of writing Sondra has created has a cohesion that at ﬁrst glance would
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seem impossible. By the time I read the ﬁnal draft, I was amazed at the composition she had managed to create, and the courage—or bravado—that it took
to create outside the norm, to turn what is generally thought of only as a freshman writing exercise into a method for exploring professional issues.
Finally, “A Collage: A Coda,” the collage that completes not only this section
but also the book itself, mixes voices from a number of Peter’s former students,
demonstrating what we all should know: that learning comes from personal
interaction as well as from books. The creator of the collage, Pat Belanoff,
makes no claims at all that the collage meets the requirements for academic
discourse. One after another, she lets the writers couch the lessons they have
learned about composition in the experiences they have had with Peter as
mentor and as friend. As they reﬂect upon classes, students, their own experiences, they produce not only poetic language but also at least one poem. Do
they add to the knowledge base of our discipline? Perhaps, or perhaps not. It
all depends upon what we consider a contribution.
I’d call all of these pieces contributions to the discipline. The goal of studying, writing, and publishing is to instruct and delight—and from my particular
perspective I give delight equal emphasis with instruction. One of my former
graduate school professors—not Peter this time, but Rose Zimbardo—used to
bring huge linzer tortes to class, insisting that learning went down easier when
associated with pleasure. She didn’t mean that academic discourse should be
mixed with personal experience and expression—it wasn’t something they did
at Harvard in her day or in her career. She did, however, mean that love of
learning should be cultivated and enhanced by any means possible. For me, as
for others, the only thing that justiﬁes scholarship in the academic sphere is the
fact that it brings scholars and teachers closer to understanding the world about
them. To instruct themselves as well as others. Adding the personal increases the
delight. While not all essays can or should be personal in nature, it is a delight
for us to see the scholar at work, reﬂecting on personal experience in a manner
that scientiﬁc reasoning does not. It is not an easy task to write an academic
piece and still maintain your humanity. There’s danger that your work will be
dismissed as personal speculation. There’s danger that the metaphors you
choose will seem too slight to support the work of scholarship. There’s danger
that people who operate in other discourses and with other critical lenses won’t
think you—or your work—are worth bothering with. You may be perceived as
being not too smart. Or too popular. Or amateur. Or sentimental.
In a talk at my campus, Charles Cooper once allowed that personal writing
should never be the ﬁrst thing you teach a student. It’s too hard to write a good
personal essay that means something, that shows readers how the individual
experience might apply to the experiences of a far wider community. I don’t
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know that he’s right, but I suspect that when it comes to using the personal in
academic writing, he’s on target. It’s too easy to dismiss what seems simple, like
a personal story, in favor of what seems difﬁcult, like a reasoned argument with
lots of theoretical references. The two are not mutually exclusive; in fact, they
can be mutually beneﬁcial. The simple in art and in science is usually an illusion. The simple is always complex.

14 E M B O D I E D VO I C E
Peter Elbow’s Physical Rhetoric
Kate Ronald
Hephzibah Roskelly
There are many kinds of power, used and unused, acknowledged or
otherwise. The erotic is a resource within each of us that lies in a deeply
female and spiritual plane, ﬁrmly rooted in the power of our unexpressed
or unrecognized feeling. . . . We have been taught to suppress this
resource, viliﬁed, abused and devalued within western society.
Audre Lorde

Audre Lorde explores the resources the erotic can offer to women who wish to
rescue their own power, their capacity for using feeling to explain and explore
their lives. She describes a method women can recover in order to express fully
and honestly their own experience. The erotic refuses the dichotomy between
thought and feeling and between the body and the mind. It insists on the whole,
on making the erotic a part of the way women come to know and come to
speak. Lorde rescues the word “erotic” from associations with the pornographic
and expands its meaning beyond merely sexual connotations. She suggests that
the erotic is a “resource,” “spiritual” as well as physical, and that it is embedded
in “unexpressed or unrecognized feeling.” The erotic is powerful; it allows for
connection, for pleasure, for voice. Moreover, Lorde urges women to call upon
the power of the erotic to work toward excellence in their pursuits. Lorde is
speaking to and about women when she makes her claims about the necessity
of the erotic as a source of power and information. Perhaps it is even rarer for a
man to make such claims, given gender ideas about the place of the emotions
and the place of the sensual in professional life or professional discourse.
In this essay, we suggest how Peter Elbow claims the erotic—the place of feeling and the role of the body—in all his writing. He does so in an “erotic,” that is,
in a sensory, engaging, and powerful, way, not primarily in the arguments he
makes about voice or process or style, but in his own speech, in the metaphors
he chooses, and the in careful way he presents himself. In other words, we argue
that Elbow’s voice is embodied—physical and present—in ways that bring an
audience close both to Elbow’s persona and to his ideas about writing and in
ways that few academic writers attempt (and few academic readers expect when
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they read him for the ﬁrst time). His message is made more powerful, and perhaps more problematic among some of his critics, because of the bodily
imagery he uses and determined intimacy of his voice. This essay points out
and explores the physical, embodied nature of Elbow’s language and style. We
trace his use of bodily images and metaphors in order to illustrate and analyze
the cumulative effect of a rhetoric that calls up so many physical images and
provokes such personal reaction from his readers. We are less concerned with
an analysis of Elbow’s theory, pedagogy, or his thirty-year efforts to help teachers and students actually write—rather than merely talk about writing—than
we are in the cumulative effect of that message, how Elbow’s embodied voice
becomes the argument, a way of seeing the whole of his message about readers,
writers, and writing rather than its discrete parts.
Everyone seems to “know” Peter Elbow—and know him in a way that goes
beyond being familiar with his work or his pedagogical/scholarly positions.
Teachers and scholars in Composition, including graduate students and many
undergraduates, feel as if they “know” the man, the living person behind the
work. Elbow’s persona feels perhaps more intimately present to his wide-ranging audiences than any other writer in the ﬁeld of Composition. Yet although
his presence looms large in the minds of researchers and students, it appears as
much by reputation, more by a presumed knowledge about his work than
from actual study of the work itself. And his familiarity works both for and
against the message his work attempts to convey. “He’s an expressivist,” a graduate student will say dismissively. Or, “He’s a liberal.” “He’s not theoretical,
political, or radical.” “Have you read his work?” Kate will ask. “Well, everybody
knows. . . ,” they respond. Or, “Berlin says. . . .” This easy presumption of understanding, as well as the ease with which he seems to be contained by an unfashionable epithet—liberal, expressivist, romantic—indicates how much this
intimate persona precedes and governs what those in the ﬁeld know and
believe about Elbow’s work.
We were in graduate school, reading theorists and researchers in a composition theory seminar, when we ﬁrst encountered Peter Elbow. Hepsie remembers clearly how she tried to put a face to the name and a body to the voice that
appeared in the ﬁrst paragraph of the book: “Perhaps I shouldn’t try to talk to
so many different kinds of people. . . .” (Writing with Power 6) What kind of
author admits that kind of hesitation? What kind of person has that sort of
conﬁdence? A writer who was that open, that powerful, demanded a body. She
formed one. Reading on, she thought she could see him: Dave Garroway
glasses, shirttails working loose, a little overweight, genial.
When both of us taught Writing With Power in our ﬁrst-year classes, we
weren’t really surprised to ﬁnd that our students had much the same response.
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They commented as much on the demeanor of the person on the page as they
did the substance of the discussion. He says he couldn’t write his dissertation.
He couldn’t write. They were amazed that the author of their textbook admitted he had problems with ﬁlling a page. They liked that admission; they liked
him. Elbow’s book remains the only ﬁrst-year writing text we’ve ever used that
our students have actually lent to their friends in other writing classes or to
their roommates. One semester, Hepsie asked students to respond to the voice
they heard as they read the ﬁrst couple of chapters of Writing With Power. “He
sounds real,” remarked one student.
For most of his career, Elbow has in one way or the other wrestled with the
problem of what’s real and not real about voice. In Writing with Power, he tentatively (always tentatively) offers these deﬁnitions: “Writing with voice is writing into which someone has breathed” (WWP 299); “Real voice is whatever
yields resonance, whatever makes the words bore through” (WWP 313). Note
the physicality, not only of the writer, who must breathe her own life-force into
the words, but the words, which must bore through a reader’s body in order to
be heard. Our experience and our students’ conﬁrm that Elbow’s voice feels
real in this physical way; we make him into a person, a physical being, we
embody him because his words suggest his self.
Whether that “self ” is “natural,” “real,” “unique,” and “essential” are questions that have contributed to readers’ strong reactions to Elbow’s presence on
the page. At times, Elbow seems to insist on the individuality of voice: “We all
have a chest cavity unique in size and shape so that each of us naturally resonates to one pitch alone” (WWP 282). He stresses the connection between the
rest of the body and voice as well. Elbow says that “the metaphor of voice
inevitably suggests a link with the body and with ‘weight.’ . . . After all, the body
shows more of ourselves than the conscious mind does” (“About Voice” xxxvi).
This connection between the revelations of the body and the mind also makes
people nervous. After all, much of academic writing tends to mask, cover, or
disguise the writers’ doubts, fears, or insecurities. We are struck by how much
Elbow “shows” in his physical imagery. Both our mothers warned us as young
girls and women not to “show” ourselves, not to reveal our true natures
(assumed to be selﬁsh and vain) in public, as in “Well, you really showed yourself that time, didn’t you?” Elbow’s connection between the unique individual
body and the writers’ voice, however, seems to insist that a writer must show
herself, expose herself, give herself.
But Elbow’s long-standing discussions of voice are more complicated than
simply insisting that a writer tell the truth or stop feigning modesty. The
point, finally, is to get to something real, something excellent, something
worth saying to somebody. In all his work, Elbow tries valiantly to see from
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opposite directions, and so his explorations of voice always include a critique
of essentialist positions. In his introductory essay to Landmark Essays on
Voice and Writing, he explains that “The central question then for this kind of
power in writing is not ‘How sincere are you?’ but ‘How much of yourself did
you manage to get behind the words?’. . . That is, the physical voice is more
resonant when it can get more of the body resonating behind it or underneath it” (“About Voice” xxxvi). We had the sense that Elbow’s writing was
full of physical images; when we went looking for them, we were astonished
at how often—and how deliberately—Elbow uses the physical body as a
metaphor to add resonance and weight to a voice he has crafted to reach
more than one pitch.
In almost every one of his essays and books, Elbow tries to tease out the
physicality of his writer’s voice and, as well, the physical transaction between
writer and reader: “I want to read and study more about the human voice itself.
It took me a long time to realize that if I’m interested in voice then covertly or
implicitly I’m interested in importing the body into the realm of writing. The
body is where the voice comes from. . . . At a totally intuitive level, I’m sure our
writing will improve if we perform voice, if we move our bodies” (“An
Interview” 28). “Voice is produced by the body. To talk about voice in writing is
to import connotations of the body into the discussion—and by implication, to
be interested in the role of the body in writing”(“About Voice” xxi).
Writing worth reading comes through just this combination, he seems to say,
of sensibility and sense, body and mind, thought and feeling. “But if we learn to
talk onto paper and exploit the speech-like quality possible in writing, we can
have the experience of writing words with presence, and thereby learn what
such writing feels like—in the ﬁngers, in the mouth, and in the ear” (“Shifting
Relationships” 299). In that combination, a writer ﬁnds power. We can’t help
hearing echoes of Audre Lorde’s description of the erotic’s role in knowledge:
“Beyond the superﬁcial, the considered phrase, ‘it feels right to me,’ acknowledges the strength of the erotic into a true knowledge, for what that means is
the ﬁrst and most powerful guiding light toward any understanding. . . . The
erotic is the nurturer or nursemaid of all our deepest knowledge” (56). Lorde is
trying to reclaim the body and felt sense in epistemology, to put women’s power
back into systems of oppression; Elbow’s goals may be less political or radical,
but in his connection of body to the acts of writing and reading, we see him
exercising the uses of the erotic in ways that Lorde describes.
Elbow gets across his belief about connection convincingly, but not directly.
In fact, his ideas about real voice sound tentative and speculative rather than
deﬁnitive. “Real self. Real voice. I am on slippery ground here. There are layers
and layers” (WWP 293). “Real voice” may be hard for Elbow to deﬁne directly,
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but his readers get the point: the body—the self—is part of voice, and a necessary part if voice is to be real. Elbow helps us see the connection between the
physical self and the writers’ voice by enacting it. His style, particularly the
metaphors he chooses as he explores writers’ behavior, creates the argument
for a way to ﬁnd real voice by using the body. There may be no ﬁnal deﬁnition
for what’s “real” in voice, no discovery of an authentic self, no formula that
explains sincerity, but there is something felt within it, something, as Lorde
would say, erotic.
WRITING THE B ODY

Elbow’s metaphors of writing and of elements in the writing process are
embedded in all his texts, and they’re quite various. Especially in his earliest
books, Writing Without Teachers and Writing With Power, he uses some fairly
typical metaphors to describe what happens when a writer writes—writing as
playing a game or making a journey or sculpting a piece of art. For example,
“Consider the writing of a poem as the playing of a game, getting the ball
through a hoop” (WWP 102). Or, “the open-ended writing process as a voyage
in two stages: a sea voyage and a coming to new land” (WWP 50–51). But these
analogies for writing and the writers’ role, images so comfortably familiar that
they don’t even feel like metaphors to those of us used to reading about the
writing process, are found rarely in Elbow’s texts, especially in his writing after
Writing With Power. It’s as though he tries out the common comparisons and
then abandons them in favor of others—more physical, more direct, and startling—that work better to convey Elbow’s insights about the relationship of
writers to writing, writers to readers, teachers to students.
Other, more overtly physical metaphors are tried out in Writing With Power,
but unlike the journey or the craft-making or the game, they’re retained. They
appear over and over again in Embracing Contraries and in many of the essays
Elbow has written since 1985. As he ﬁnds the metaphor and repeats it, he often
plays with the implications of the comparison, spinning out the possibilities
that come from letting the metaphor run its course. These are the metaphors
of the body—of the erotic—that become his way to make meaning and his
way to connect. Obviously these body metaphors are generative words for him,
comparisons that provoke him to new thinking. Their use and repetition provoke readers too—to imagine him, the writer who chooses these images to
explain himself as well as his ideas about writing. Lorde might say that these
metaphors signal Elbow’s willingness to acknowledge that his work matters to
him, personally, and his hope that writing will matter to his students and readers. She says that “The lack of concern for the erotic root and satisfactions of
our work is felt in our dissatisfaction from so much of what we do” (55).
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Readers sense Elbow’s pleasure in his exploration of the body as part of the
writers’ presence. He concentrates especially, it seems, on the mouth, the skin,
and the eyes, all sites of emotional, erotic, and physical satisfaction and tension. Taste, touch, and sight metaphors seem the most provocative for him, the
most productive in terms of where the metaphorical image can take his discussion of writers and writing, and the most engaging for readers as they read
him.
E AT L I K E A N O W L

“The owl pops down the whole mouse, trusting her innards to absorb what
is nutritious and discard what is not” (Embracing 287). Of all Elbow’s sensory
body metaphors, the most familiar to his readers is the one of hunger and all
the related images of what a mouth can do—not only eat, but taste, touch,
suck, spit, gag. Elbow is fascinated with the mouth, of course, since the
descriptions of the mouth encoded in all the dozens of images he employs
reveal the workings of the voice itself, the connection of speech to hunger, of
breath to life, of voice to need.
His use of the mouth as a metaphor leads naturally to the emphasis on eating, on ﬁnding what’s nutritious for the body and using that sustenance to grow.
Hunger, and the need to be satisﬁed, are maybe the most important—certainly
the most recurrent—metaphors in all of Elbow’s writing. Writers and readers
alike eat because they’re hungry. As they eat, both reader and writer take nourishment or risk illness, as Elbow conﬁgures the metaphor: “Or does the writer
squeeze out so much of the juice of human communication, the oil of actual
spoken discourse . . . that the language is indigestible?” (WWP 95). Even words
that in other mouths would not even sound like metaphor, or would seem to be
simply the faded metaphor of cliché are clearly a viable and productive comparison in Elbow’s work because he makes so much of the sensual metaphorical
implications of eating: “If you want to digest and remember what you are reading, try writing about it instead of taking notes” (WWP 95). Or, “We must keep
on reading it and try to digest its ideas. For our jobs and for our own needs”
(WWP 344). In all his images of the rhetorical transaction between writer and
reader, the compulsion of hunger and then the satisfaction of digestion are
described as both pleasure and need, work and play, survival and luxury.
If the writing works, it’s tasty: “There is always a crunch in waiting”
(Embracing 52). But it also requires at least a community of two: someone to
feed and someone to eat. Elbow compares “nourishment that comes from having a real audience” (WWP 215) to what might happen when you’ve looked at
your own work too long without an audience to help you out: “never do major
revising when nauseated by your writing” (WWP 175). To describe a writer as
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“nourished” by an audience seems to us a feminine metaphor, especially when
read in the context of traditional deﬁnitions of rhetoric as agonistic, a duel, a
war of wills. In Elbow’s image, readers feed writers as well as the reverse. The
reader prevents nausea, in fact, as she gives the writer real nourishment. That
audiences both feed and are fed by writers calls up an erotic “resource,” one that
Lorde says has been “viliﬁed, abused, and devalued within western society” (53).
Eating is also physical work: “Perhaps all the writing throughout the openended writing process hovers over the same territory. You are gnawing on a
single tough bone” (WWP 55). Continual references to the physical act of consuming lead Elbow to acknowledge the primal nature of eating, the chemical
and physical changes that accompany nourishment: “There is violence in
learning. We cannot learn something without eating it, yet we cannot really
learn it either without being chewed up” (Embracing l48). And, as elsewhere,
Elbow dramatizes the oppositions inherent in metaphor: the doubled image of
eating and being eaten, of digesting and spitting out.
Metaphors of writing as eating/survival also point to Elbow’s insistence that
writers must have a compulsion, a need, to get it right—both to get it right in
terms of subject matter and also to make it palatable, even delectable, to its
readers: “Caring about quality implies a hunger to stamp out terrible writing.
A hunger to destroy defects . . . hungering for excellence” (WWP 301). As
usual, there is no one “right” way to put this meal on the table. Elbow speaks of
“a hunger for coherence; yet a hunger also to be true to the natural incoherence of experience” (Embracing x). He urges on his readers “the realization that
certainty is rarely if ever possible and that we increase the likelihood of getting
things wrong if we succumb to the hunger for it” (Embracing 257). A more
important hunger, even if it’s not more insistent, is the hunger for connection
with an audience. Writers must admit, yield, to their hunger for community
with readers. Echoing Lorde’s description of the way “unexpressed feeling” is a
resource suppressed by Western culture, Elbow says wistfully, “We are held
back from maturity and autonomy by a compulsive refusal to satisfy the less
acceptable hunger for participation and merging” (Embracing 98).
Elbow is no innocent; he does not drop these mouth/eating/hunger/
digestion metaphors into his descriptions of writers and readers without being
fully aware of their connotations. In fact, he explores in some detail those “less
acceptable” connotations of hunger, especially sexual hunger. He tells us that
“My wife makes fun of me sometimes, saying, “The style of that book invites
the reader in bed with you” (“An Interview” 18). No wonder, when in
Embracing Contraries, he says, “To change metaphors . . . as writers you must
say to your reader, ‘Why don’t you take off your clothes and let me play with
your body?’”! (314). This last is perhaps the most overtly sexual metaphor
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we’ve found in Elbow’s work, but throughout all his writing, he, more than any
other teacher/theorist we know, dares to say what the rest of us might be thinking about the metaphorical possibilities inherent in the images he creates.
Here’s Elbow complicating the standard student-centered paradigm, for
example: “It is clearly hostile to professors and professing: standing up there
and putting yourself at the center of the stage, asking students . . . to ingest you
or to fall in love with you” (Embracing 124). Here’s how he describes the pedagogical relationship: “Teaching is like a delicate human encounter, like love, like
sex” (Embracing l20). He describes the relationship between teacher and student
as “overtly sexual . . . . Teaching is sexual. What is uncertain is which practices
are natural and which unnatural, which fruitful and which barren, which legal
and illegal. . . .” (Embracing 70). And he tells students of the dangerous and
compelling power of teachers: “Or the falling in love model. . . . You want to
know what he knows, feel what he feels, have the opinions he has. You probably
adopt many of his mannerisms. Or hers. . . . Teacher as ‘role model’ though that
term seems to be a pale defensive abstraction trying to guard against the emotional truth we sometimes actually feel: he or she is someone you want to eat or
someone you want to eat you. To love and be loved” (Embracing 96).
It may be dangerous to desire this connection, to hunger, to feed, to digest.
But like the owl, we need to eat—and we should eat it whole. “Babies begin by
putting everything in their mouths. Thus when we doubt we sit out or fend off;
when we believe we swallow or incorporate. . . .” (Embracing 263–64). We open
our mouths, even when we fear it. “The idea of methodological belief . . . may
arouse our natural fear of being invaded, polluted, or forced to swallow”
(Embracing 265). Rescuing the faded metaphor of learning as simply “swallowing” what the teacher says, Elbow makes swallowing part of the necessary act of
eating and being nourished, one natural consequence of opening the mouth.
This image of the mouth and all its metaphorical possibilities—blowing,
sucking, eating, breathing—is especially generative for Elbow because it carries
within it oppositional images. Metaphors are oppositions in themselves, as
Elbow says. “Every metaphor is a force-ﬁt, a mistake, a putting together of
things that don’t normally or literally belong together” (WWP 79). With the
images of the mouth, eating or taking in, come the images of regurgitating or
spitting out. Both pleasure and danger, gluttony and survival are implicated in
writers’ relationships with audiences, and teachers’ with students.
WRESTLING AS EMBRACE

Elbow seeks profound satisfaction in writing for his students as both writers and readers. Part of that satisfaction involves merging, especially in terms
of feeling the skin or being inside the skin of another. “As though a single skin
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lined the inner ﬂesh of the performer and the music he sings” (“About Voice”
xxxvii ). Or, “make sure you spend plenty of time with your mouth shut . . .
Inside your reader’s skin” (WWP 269). “In the long run you get more out of
taking a ride inside your reader’s skin than you get out . . . of your writing”
(WWP 246). Complementing the focus on skin is the metaphor of the itch:
“the force that drives this kind of learning is not the itch of a problem or contradiction but the itch for the person who is the teacher” (Embracing 96). Or
“Unless there is a felt question—a tension, a palpable itch—the time remains
unbound” (“Shifting Relationships” 296). Elbow uses the skin quite often as a
metaphor for what separates and connects, as well as for what soothes and
itches. His most powerful description of skin comes when he shows skin in
contact, and the contact he chooses is wrestling.
Wrestling appears frequently in Elbow’s writing as a metaphor for what
happens among teacher and student and education, between writer and
reader, or between writer and the page. We were surprised by how often the
images of wrestling, and the muscles it takes to wrestle well, appear in Elbow’s
work. It’s a productive, and obvious, metaphor for the kinds of oppositions
Elbow likes to set up as he considers how the interplay between two elements
works. Again, as with metaphors of hunger and eating, both pleasure and work
ﬁgure into Elbow’s conception of writing as muscular; so do the oppositions of
power and surrender, exercise and relaxation.
Like hunger, too, muscles—stretching, contracting, vibration—are not neutral. They pull and push writers toward what they hunger for: “In the case of
our physical muscles, we can exert ourselves only to contract them, not to
loosen them. So in the case of our minds, our attaching muscle is usually
stronger than our detaching one” (Embracing 268). In other words, writers want
to believe in their developing texts, and Elbow invokes a muscular metaphor in
order to argue that working the opposing muscle—doubt—is crucial: “But you
don’t have to give into this dilemma of creativity versus critical thinking and
submit to the dominance of one muscle and lose the beneﬁts of the other. . . you
can exploit these opposing muscles one at a time” (WWP 4).
Balance, however, is not easily negotiated or won. In fact, images of struggle,
power, resistance, and force dominate Elbow’s own wrestling with the metaphor
of writing as wrestling: “To write is to overcome a certain resistance: you are trying to wrestle a steer to the ground, to wrestle a snake into a bottle, to overcome
a demon that sits in your head” (WWP 18); “you are straining to lift a heavy
load of bricks onto your shoulder or struggling to carry something unwieldy
across a stream” (WWP l94). And it can lead to unproductive thinking, what
Elbow calls “non-cooking”: “There is only deadlock and stalemate. Two strong
men arm wrestling: great energy expended, muscles bulging, sweat popping out
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on the foreheads, but no movement” (Embracing 46–47). For Elbow, then, as
usual, physical struggle can be both productive and nonproductive.
Writing isn’t merely the outcome of all this force. It’s also the training routine, the exercise that prepares the athlete for the race, the game, the contest:
“Reading your words out loud is push-ups for the speciﬁc muscle used in taking responsibility for your words” (WWP 23). Elbow’s exercise metaphors
might in some ways account for his critics’ beliefs that writers write only to
“express themselves,” when in fact what Elbow’s recommending is a regular
workout, in private, before a writer “shows herself ” in public: “twisting and
stretching what you are trying to write about by mapping it against a variety of
terrains” (WWP 80). It’s important, he says, to “manage this ﬂowering . . .gradually teach the stiff cells of our bodies to vibrate and be ﬂexible” (WWP 282).
Unlike advice that cautions writers to hide the traces of the private messy
process of composing in the public performance, Elbow shows himself in the
training room as well as in the arena. And he makes both spaces concrete and
physical, containing actual bodies with muscles, cells, and organs tuned to the
act of communication. This intimate, physical presence is both powerful and
problematic in a profession that at once understands and values the personal
location and mistrusts its use in scholarship.
Amid the force of the wrestling and workout imagery are also images of
surrender, the importance of letting the wrestling stop, the muscles relax. Akin
to the hunger metaphors, where writers and readers both prepare food and
accept nourishment, Elbow tells students that they must also “have the courage
to stop wrestling with the foe and give gifts to allies” (WWP l90). Muscles must
relax as well as contract, and Elbow often insists that extension is as useful as
contraction. In advising students to explore all ideas, even those that seem
opposite to a developing argument or point of view, he says, “Surely the danger
is not so much that false beliefs will deﬁle us if we try them on like garments—
as though the muscles in our minds will somehow be made permanently
labile” (Embracing 282). As always in Elbow’s thinking, the whole contains the
opposing parts; force includes surrender, exercise includes ease, and wrestling
also involves the embrace.
Teachers wrestle as well as writers and also must engage in this dance of
power and surrender. Elbow often advises teachers to become more passive in
the classroom, letting go in order to take stock: “The class ﬁnds a new and stabler center of gravity. And I discover a mental or emotional muscle I’ve always
been clenching to keep the ship from sinking . . . by feeling all of a sudden how
tired it is” (Embracing 72). At other times, teachers must wrestle with students,
and students must exert their own force. “Wrestling seems inevitable to me
because of the inherent paradox of authority in learning and teaching: students
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seldom learn well unless they give in . . . they resist or even reject their teachers”
(Embracing 65). In fact, good pedagogy demands a power struggle: “With that
good teacher . . . we feel we can go for broke, wrestle full out” (WWP 217). Or if
they don’t wrestle, they box: “Students only dare get in the ring with their teachers because they know the teachers will pull their punches” (WWP 224).
Wrestling, stretching, exercising are productive metaphors for Elbow
because of the doubting and believing, resisting and acceding, giving out and
taking in that such images call up for Elbow’s readers, reminding them of the
tension between opposing forces that results in interaction, dialogue, communion. For Elbow, the metaphor of wrestling is much more about the physical
straining, pushing, pulling, exerting, and surrendering than it is about declaring a winner, about defeat or victory, vanquished and conqueror. Lorde tells us
that the erotic functions not as contest but as sharing: it is the “power which
comes from sharing deeply any pursuit with another” (56). Although wrestling
is a metaphor that is gendered male, the way Elbow uses it to produce a new
relationship rather than a winner or a loser transforms the metaphor into
something more like a dance than a ﬁght.
SEEING IS BELIEVING

As we re-read Elbow, looking deliberately for bodily images, it seems to us
that his most productive metaphor for getting across his ideas about writers
and writing and for showing himself to his audience is sight. As with the image
of “digesting” or “swallowing” information in school, or the image of learning
as struggle and contest, Elbow reclaims an old metaphor and energizes it with
new contexts: “Vision is a paradigm for belief—‘seeing is believing.’ Just as we
mistakenly feel helpless about what we believe, so too with what we see”
(Embracing 272). For Elbow, vision is not passive, but active, again a kind of
wrestling, or even eating; in any case, seeing is not just believing, but also acting: “A belief is a lens and one of the best ways to test it is to look through it”
(Embracing 283).
Elbow also makes sight an active sense by, of course, describing vision as
doubled, focused in two directions at once: “You have used two kinds of consciousness: immersion, where you have had your head down and are scurrying
along a trail of words in the underbrush; and perspective, where you . . . get a
sense of shape and outline” (WWP 52). Moreover, sometimes it’s useful for
writers to surrender their clear vision, to lose sight of their goals: “If you want
to end up with new insights, you have to allow yourself to lose sight of your
topic during much of the voyage out” (WWP 75). Or, writers must use both
eyes in order to see the complicated whole of their texts as it’s developing:
“Nevertheless we feel it’s possible to have a bit of detachment with our left eye
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as it were—a certain part of one’s mind that ﬂies up to the seventh sphere with
Troilus and sees, ‘Ah yes, I’m really taking a strong position here—and I’ve got
a big personal stake in this’” (“Academic Discourse” 142).
Despite all the ways that Elbow’s writing is infused with images of the physical body, he does not often refer to his own body, except when he’s talking
about sight. With this metaphor, Elbow quite often uses his own eyes, his
impaired vision, to illustrate and explore writers’ dilemmas with topics and
readers: “I often ﬁnd myself involuntarily closing my eyes as I speak. I realize
now that this behavior is an instinctive attempt to blot our awareness of audience when I need all my concentration for just trying to ﬁgure out or express
what I want to say” (“Closing My Eyes” 50). (In fact, this habit of speaking with
his eyes closed was the physical trait that most struck us when we ﬁnally found
out what Peter Elbow looked like, at 4C’s in 1984.)
The idea that closing the eyes—becoming for the moment blind—allowing
for better “sight” has been a productive paradox for writers since Oedipus.
Elbow’s instructions for describing a person, for example, end with this suggestion: “Close your eyes and see______’s face as clearly and vividly as you
can” (Embracing 37). But his fear of blindness—of never being able to see—is
part of Elbow’s sight metaphor as well: “I can’t seem to make myself write well
anymore,” he reports from a journal entry describing his use of free writing. “If
I just write ﬂabby, mushy, soupy, I’ll go blind and insane if I indulge myself in
this easiness” (Embracing 51). Still, even in this moment of doubt, Elbow
understands the advantages of ﬁnding your way in the dark: “Is it really true? I
think I’m able to do more complicated things now—work at a higher level.”
(Embracing 52). This higher level—excellence in writing—may come, then,
from groping along as well as from scanning deliberately.
For one accused of writing merely the personal, there are few autobiographically personal details, like the journal entry, in Elbow’s work. Here’s
another exception: “My brain is accustomed to accepting conﬂicting data. . . . I
started out cross-eyed and childhood surgery left me with two good eyes
which happen to look outward in different directions” (Embracing 233). This
revelation is more than just a biographical detail. Elbow uses his own physicality to express an argument: the mind needs to be able to handle conﬂicting
data, to use data that doesn’t easily mesh. As in his other bodily metaphors,
sight carries oppositional tension; this metaphor holds the double perspective
of seeing and of being seen. Writers must understand that not only their vision
but their readers’ as well completes the rhetorical transaction. “When we
speak, listeners don’t just see our words, they see us—how we hold and move
ourselves” (“Shifting Relationships” 286). Being seen carries with it a connotation of exposure and also the sometimes painful possibility of judgment. “For
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none of us can function at our best unless we are seen as smart by ourselves
and others. One of the many reasons why smart students function well is that
they are seen as smart” (Embracing xiv). Elbow emphasizes the metaphorical
quality of the word by italicizing it, as though he’s reminding his readers that
he’s talking about actual eyes looking for signs that signal “smart.”
This metaphor of “seeing” each other, as well as oneself, exposing and being
exposed, with nuanced attention to how bodies move and how both writers and
audiences “hold” each other, infuses all of Elbow’s writing and, we would argue,
embodies Lorde’s conception of the “uses of the erotic.” Lorde insists that the
erotic is not merely feeling, but the use we make of feeling: “To share the power
of each other’s feelings is different from using another’s feelings as we would a
Kleenex. When we look the other way from our experience, erotic or otherwise,
we use rather than share the feelings of those others who participate in the experience with us” (59). Reading Peter Elbow, we get the deﬁnite feeling that he
writes not only out of his own experience—his own wrestling with his writing—
but that he writes always something that’s actually on his mind, something he
deeply cares about and struggles with. With Elbow, you don’t get a presentation
with a canned response programmed in, but a conversation, a search that deliberately includes not only Elbow’s experiences, but ours.
Lorde also asks us to remember that the erotic is connected not only to
depth of feeling, to satisfaction, but also to the striving for satisfaction, for
excellence: “The erotic . . . is an internal sense of satisfaction to which, once we
have experienced it, we know we can aspire. . . . For the erotic is not a question
only of what we do; it is a question of how acutely and fully we can feel in the
doing. . . . Within the celebration of the erotic, my work becomes a conscious
decision—a longed-for bed which I enter gratefully and from which I rise up
empowered” (54–55). Elbow’s bodily metaphors not only call up the erotic to
his readers in a physical sense, reminding us of the bodily act of writing and
connecting with other people; in all his work, Elbow has attempted to lead students to this sense of satisfaction with writing—the work of having wrestled,
fed—and to the joy of being seen in the process of that striving.
Peter Elbow is thin and tall, a little stooped. He wears tweed jackets and
turtlenecks. He has a wide, generous smile. He doesn’t wear glasses, but one of
his eyes focuses by indirection—looks at you sideways so as to see you straight
on. “Perhaps I shouldn’t have tried to write to so many different people,” he
says. But that was the point all along. He comes at it sideways, letting the
metaphor do its work, letting his audience of “many different people” ﬁnd a
way to embody his voice and their own.

15 G O N E F I S H I N ’
Rendering and the Uses of Personal Experience in Writing
Anne J. Herrington

The impetus and title for this essay come from a research essay written by a
former student of mine. Her essay, also titled “Gone Fishin’,” begins as follows:
A popular rap group called Arrested Development once had a song called “Fishin’ for
Religion.” I can honestly say I know what they meant. I have been “ﬁshing” for the past
two years. Through research and experience I think I’ve ﬁnally made a great catch.

In the next paragraph, the author draws on personal experience to describe
her disillusionment with Catholicism, concluding “I took the best lessons that
I learned there, to care for others and to love wholeheartedly, and went ‘ﬁshing’
for a religion I could trust my soul with.” The essay goes on to focus on how
and why her search led her to settle on Native American beliefs in a spirit
world. In the essay, she draws on a number of sources, documenting them
appropriately, to discuss primary spiritual beliefs shared by many Native
American tribes.
I used this essay once in a writing-across-the-curriculum workshop to show
how I structured the process of working through a research essay. In doing so, I
wasn’t thinking that this opening to her ﬁnal draft would be controversial. To
my surprise, a few faculty objected quite strongly, challenging me as to the
purpose of such an assignment: how could I justify having a student include a
personal narrative where claims about the Catholic religion were personally,
not historically, contextualized. At the time, I responded that my purpose was
for students to learn that they could use personal interests as a springboard for
research and could use their personal knowledge and experience along with
that from other sources in their writing. And I wanted them to realize the
importance of situating themselves for readers. A string of defensive responses.
This challenge stayed with me. Even though it was from one person with
support from only a few, it touched a chord, really an insecurity and doubt.
Maybe I was just perpetuating self-indulgence and uncritical thinking. Similar
challenges come from within Composition Studies as well: charges of “sentimental realism” (Bartholomae, “Writing” 67) and cultivating “the sentimental
persona of the personal essay” (Mahala and Swilky 373) are ringing in my ear. I
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don’t cite these charges to imply an easy distance from them. Indeed, the challenge to this essay genuinely caused me to wonder about my curriculum and
approaches in my ﬁrst-year writing classes. So, I went ﬁshing myself for some
answers, not just to the question of the place of personal experience in a college “research” essay, but also to how I ask students to represent their experience in any writing they do.
This essay represents a present attempt to develop part of an answer, a part
that relates to an important contribution that Peter Elbow’s work has made to
my thinking, particularly with the value he places on writing that “renders”
experience. In this essay, I aim to make a case for rendering of experience in
academic as well as nonacademic writing by analyzing some of the purposes it
serves. Because my primary focus is on my ﬁrst-year writing course, this essay
is only a start toward an answer to questions from faculty in other disciplines.
First things ﬁrst.

Anne the Doubter: Enough of this debate over the personal. You’ve nothing new to add,
Anne. Give it up.
Anne the Believer: I’m tempted to. Call Charlie and say I have to withdraw. I’ll just be
rehashing tired debates and writing a self-indulgent celebration of “I”-present writing.
Peter: Don’t give up yet. Try writing an instant draft.
Anne the Doubter: Writing under the inﬂuence. Am I just being a Peter Elbow groupie?
Peter: (Smiles, his eyes sparkling.)
Anne the Author: They differ frequently. She doesn’t believe any writing is “free.”
Peter: Well, freewriting is both free and nonfree.
Anne the Believer: Always both/and. Yes, but today I want to try to avoid setting up
dichotomies, particularly a dichotomy between academy and nonacademic writing.


Peter Elbow: I want to argue for one kind of nonacademic discourse that is particularly
important to teach. I mean discourse that renders experience. To render experience is . .
. to tell what it’s like to be me or to live my life. I’m particularly concerned that we help
students learn to write language that conveys their experience—or indeed, that mirrors
back to themselves a sense of their own experience from a little distance, once it’s out
there on paper. (“Reﬂections”136–37)

This claim about the value of writing to render experience is a fundamental
belief of Elbow’s about writing, learning, and personal development. What I
want to do is make my own case for this kind of writing, exploring some of the
multiple functions it can serve for writers and readers. In doing so, I’ll draw on
the writing of composition scholars and undergraduates in my writing classes,
ones whose writings have inﬂuenced my thinking as I’ve been on this ﬁshing
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expedition. And, yes, I’ll draw on my own experience. Those composition
scholars include Linda Brodkey and Min-Zhan Lu, two whose views differ
from Peter Elbow’s in many ways. My intent is not at all to conﬂate their views
or imply some line of inﬂuence; rather it is to show how reading across perspectives has broadened my own perspectives, as I hope it will readers’. The
writing from the students was done in classes where, following practices ﬁrst
instituted in our Writing Program by Charles Moran, ﬁnal drafts of their
essays were published in class anthologies, these anthologies then becoming
the primary texts of the course. I point this out because I believe that having an
audience for their writing motivates students and often provides important
validation of them as writers and thinkers.
To Peter Elbow’s mind, “discourse that renders is . . . one of the preeminent
gifts of human kind” (“Reﬂections” 137). He identiﬁes it with literary texts,
poetry, and autobiography. As he presents it, rendering is distinct from
explaining: rendering evokes an experience and the feel of it. Elbow’s conception of rendering seems related to James Britton’s conception of writing in the
spectator stance. Britton views this stance as serving a personal, psychological
function, conceiving of it as a stance through which we step back from the
world—as if a spectator—and remake it, work upon it, and craft our version of
it (99–115). Britton’s focus on “making” departs from Elbow’s view of rendering as “mirroring back” and is central to the concept of rendering that I am
making a case for. When we write of a past experience, we are shaping it with
the mind’s eye of our present self, doing so in a way that feels true to us in the
present. While it is a stance Britton associates with imaginative writing, I
believe it applies to any writing in which writers take up this stance, certainly
autobiographical writing. Britton says of writings in the spectator stance that it
“is their function to preserve our view of the world from fragmentation and
disharmony, to maintain it as something we can continue to live with as happily as may be” (117). I would add, it can also be their function to preserve
ourselves from fragmentation and disharmony.
These purposes for writing personal experience were already in my mind
before I began this ﬁshing expedition, but I am now more conscious of trying
to heighten students’ awareness that they are indeed shaping experience as they
recall and write of it. That shaping may serve for us as writers as a way to transplant ourselves to another time and, by creating and thereby re-experiencing a
moment, to ground ourselves, as happens in this passage:
It had never been so white around me; the walls, ceiling, window blinds, ﬂower
vases, and closet were all white. As a feeling of being in a holy place swept through
me, I gently moved my left hand closer to my thigh and pinched myself. The intense
pain I felt assured me that I was awake and not dreaming, alive and not dead. From
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every angle, the bright specks of white harassed my drowsy eyes and confused my
tired brain. My room had never been so spotlessly clean; my closet never lacked
clothes peeking out to steal a glance. This was not my room.

In this essay, entitled “White Omako,” Uche I. Nwankpa writes of waking
disoriented, later to ﬁnd that she is in a hospital, having been taken there while
unconscious and seriously ill. She wrote this essay while struggling through
her ﬁrst difﬁcult semester as a pre-med major. By invoking a tie to that period
in the hospital, she reinforces her commitment to her goal:
Now that I am a Pre-med student, each time I ﬁll out a form that requires me to
write in my major, each time I am faced with a difﬁcult academic problem, memories of “Omako” ﬂow back to me. I see myself wearing my imaginary white robe. I
hear Dad’s words: determination, hard work, and time. Then Mum’s sentence
echoes back to me, “She is equal to the task.”

The careful crafting is evident here as Nwankpa renders not only sights and
sounds, but feelings. Her essay was written for an assignment to describe a
place that stands out in memory. The exploratory writing prompts called for
students to write about that place—following excerpts from Sandra Cisneros,
Allan Gurganus, and Judith Ortiz Coffer that included ﬁrst- and third-person
perspectives. The aim was to heighten students’ awareness that their memory
of that place is constructed and, through the drafting and revising of their own
essays, for them to be conscious of how they were shaping their self presentation. It was from the Coffer excerpt from “Silent Dancing” that Nwanpka
picked up on the strategy of focusing on color.
Nwankpa’s essay also conveys a feeling of pleasure in the writing of it. As
does the following excerpt written for the same assignment. In it, Andrew
Hobgood writes humorously of huddling with others at a bus stop, waiting for
a bus while a rainstorm whirls around them:
Suddenly a gust of wind came up and blew hard against us. We all leaned into it as if
we could stop it by proving that we were stronger. I looked down once again at my
feet. This time, though, I discovered a leaf that had been blown free from a tree and
stuck to my shoe. I peeled it off and was about to throw it away, when something
occurred to me. I stood very still and got very quiet, so silent that all you could hear
was the rustle of the breeze against my umbrella. I strained to my ear to see if I could
hear the faintest hint of it. Nothing happened though. The Forrest Gump theme just
wasn’t going to start playing. I had hoped that maybe this leaf would be like that
feather in the opening of the movie and some kind of theme would start and I could
break out into this monologue of some sort, but instead nothing happened.

Here, Hobgood seems to take revenge on that rainy day by using it for a
humorous essay. He also plays with “self ” for the pleasure of it, calling attention
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to his narrative as a construction and himself as depicted at the bus stop that
cold, rainy day, hoping to be transported into another monologue, another role.
An indulgence? Perhaps. But more than that. Using humor and links with
movie scenes, Hobgood is experimenting—playing—throughout this essay
with representing everyday experiences, for himself and for readers. Reﬂecting
on this essay, Hobgood wrote, “It was just my mind wandering and pondering
on various events. . . . I made the audience look at the bus stop in a completely
different way and I enjoyed doing this.”
As I have implied, certainly by invoking the quote from Britton, writing to
render experience can, and often does, serve personal developmental ends as
well as ends for writing development. It can also serve purposes for learning in
other academic courses. For example, one of the students whom Marcia Curtis
and I write of in Persons in Process told us that the most personally valuable
writing he did while an undergraduate was a spiritual autobiography he wrote
(187–96). It was not for a writing course, but for a course by that name in
Comparative Literature, in which students both read some published spiritual
autobiographies and wrote their own. His autobiography served as a way to
render memories and shape some understanding of his spiritual life and identity over time. In the Comparative Literature course, this writing was also done
as a way to learn more of the functions and forms of this specialized kind of
autobiography, one that calls for a reﬂective stance and re-examination of
one’s past from a particular vantage point.
Texts with these attributes—a reﬂective stance and re-examination from a
particular vantage point—begin to look more like what is accepted by many,
but not all, as “academic writing,” both academic writing to serve aims for
undergraduate learning and academic writing for professional purposes. I’m
thinking here of what Mahala and Swilka term “academic storytelling” and
also of academic writing in our ﬁeld where personal experience is evoked for
the purpose of making a point about language and literacy as viewed in relation to class, race, family, and other institutions. Notable examples are MinZhan Lu’s “From Silence to Words: Writing as Struggle,” Linda Brodkey’s
“Writing on the Bias,” Victor Villanueva’s Bootstraps, and Keith Gilyard’s Voices
of the Self. A part of the power of these pieces is in the renderings, the evocation of childhood experiences as viewed from a later perspective.
To understand how this rendering is used, I looked more closely at Lu’s and
Brodkey’s essays. While both authors stress the public purposes for each essay,
for me as a reader, part of their power comes from the feel that the writing
served a personal purpose as well. In “From Silence to Words,” Lu uses the
recounting of her experiences to urge teachers to recognize that the discourses
of school and home may conﬂict for some students and, with that recognition,
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to adopt a pedagogy conducive to helping students understand and negotiate
these possibly conﬂicting discourses. She makes the point about conﬂicting discourses through her powerful description of the cultural conﬂicts she experienced during the Cultural Revolution in China between school Chinese
language, infused with the ideology of the Revolution, and her home English
language, infused with the ideology of Western literary classics. But in this essay,
the renderings of these experiences served a personal purpose as well, as Lu
acknowledges. In the opening, which begins with the strikingly rendered line,
“My mother withdrew into silence two months before she died,” Lu writes of the
power that reﬂecting on her experiences through words had in helping her create an understanding from her inchoate feelings of confusion and frustration:
My understanding of my education was so dominated by memories of confusion
and frustration that I was unable to reﬂect on what I could have gained from it.
This paper is my attempt to ﬁll up that silence with words, words I didn’t have
then, words that I have since come to by reﬂecting on my earlier experience as a student in China and my recent experience as a composition teacher in the United
States. (437)

Note that time and additional experiences also enable her reﬂection. In
other words, by looking back and putting into words from a new perspective,
she gave a shape to that experience, made an understanding of her memories,
memories that included a mix of images and feelings. She also creates a tie
with her past that helps her understand her future. In “Life History among the
Elderly: Performance, Visibility, and Re-Membering,” Barbara Myerhoff writes
of the purpose such writing and oral telling of past experiences can have for
giving shape to one’s life, “a shape that extends back in the past and forward
into the future” (111). Myerhoff, a cultural anthropologist, is writing of her
study of elderly survivors of the Holocaust. She uses the term “re-membering”
to signify this kind of focused rendering that re-animates the past and connects one with a past self and others.
This giving shape by connecting across time is also evident in the following
excerpt from Yeon Mi Kwon’s “Between Mountain Ranges.” This essay was
written for a research project where students were to inquire into some aspect
of their culture or family history by interviewing a family member and doing
library research. Kwon, wanting to understand more about her cultural and
ethnic identity, focused on the small village where her mother grew up in
Korea, studying something of Korean history, folk myths, and everyday life in
the village for her grandparents and mother. In the introduction to “Between
Mountain Ranges,” Kwon, like Lu, indicates the personal purposes this project
also served:
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I have found there is a rich culture and history that has gone unacknowledged, yet
has been a part of me since my birth. Across vast oceans that separate East from
West and across the millennium of time, I have a history, deeply embedded within
me. My link is through my mother who traces her life to a small village sheltered by
the mountain ranges of Korea. . . . Initially, I was not in search of my identity, but as
research progressed and associations were made, it gradually unfolded. It is as if I
have tapped a part of my memory I knew not existed.

In this essay, Kwon’s tapping of her memory included rendering some of her
own experiences as well as her mother’s and, in so doing, creating a link across
oceans and time. The following passage includes some of that rendering:
I visited my mother’s childhood home once, and there is a kind of simplicity there
that does not exist anywhere else I have been. I dyed my nails using crushed ﬂower
petals, just as my mother had done decades before me. It was only a taste of my
mother’s past, yet her ways of Pochun life have sifted its way into the American present. She has a passion for the outdoors and ﬁnds joy in working with the soil. If
offered help when she toils over weeds, she refuses. She responds that it is her time
to remember the past and reﬂect on the present. Sometimes, I watch her from my
bedroom window and I wonder how she works so silently and steadily, what
thoughts go through her head?

In rendering these moments, Kwon is creating this tie for herself and shaping an understanding. Here is how Kwon concludes:
My mother and I share a common view of what the mountain’s mysteries are, and a
common love of them. We share a link that threads through time and distance, a history that can be identiﬁed in generations before us. Somewhere between America and
Korea is where I ﬁnd my identity. But, I don’t think my mother has ever been in this
confusion, because she knows where her identity lies. It is somewhere between the
misty mountain ranges of Korea, where ghostly laughter of children’s play can be heard
and whispering voices recounting ancient folktales spread its truth to the keen listener.

While some might say that Kwon creates an idealized, even sentimentalized,
picture, this closing leaves me with the sense that she recognizes that some of
“this confusion” to which she refers still remains for her. While her rendering
may not evidence the same reﬂexivity as Lu’s, it still evidences a conscious and
thoughtful attempt to compose a coherence for herself, however provisional,
and also offer something to readers.
Kwon’s essay was published with three other students’ in a minipublication
that they entitled, Voices of our Past: Unfolding our Cultural History. The preface they wrote speaks to the purposes they believe these essays serve both for
the writers and their readers:
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This collection of essays spans great distances between the shores of Puerto Rico and
the mountains of Korea, traverses time from the immigration of Italians to America
to Hitler’s reign during the Holocaust. Through the voices of our relatives, a cultural
history is unfolded to us. These stories and remembrances have more relevance on
our present lives than we may assume. It is a key to the understanding of what is
past, present, and future. We are all tied to history, the history that lies in books and
the oral history passed on by our relatives. Listen carefully to these stories, you may
ﬁnd an answer that you seek.

In this passage, they echo Myerhoff ’s point about the function of rendering
of past experiences to give shape to one’s life, “a shape that extends back in the
past and forward into the future” (111) and of doing so publicly, making oneself visible. And they point to the function and attraction of such writings for
readers, offering them a way to pursue such self-searching and shaping for
their own lives.
The quality of “re-membering” that Myerhoff writes of is also evident in
Linda Brodkey’s essay, “Writing on the Bias,” even though she minimizes a personal function for the essay. Brodkey introduces this essay as an experiment
with “autoethnography” (27). As she explains autoethnography, while it
resembles personal narrative, it differs “to the extent that personal histories
ground cultural analysis and criticism” (xv). What she means by this and how
it differs from “rendering” as Elbow presents it is evident in the following
excerpts that both render experience and analyze it. In the ﬁrst, Brodkey tells
us of her ﬁrst trips to the town library, marking her telling as a recollection,
not a present experience:
I am sometimes reminded that I nearly became a reader rather than a writer in a
vivid memory of myself as a young girl slowly picking her way down the stairs of the
Quincy Public Library. I know I am leaving the children’s library and am en route to
the rooms reserved below for adults. The scene is lit from above and behind by a window, through which the sun shines down on the child whose ﬁrst trip to the adult
library saddens me. On mornings when I wake with this memory, I am overcome by
sorrow even though I know the actual trip to have been a triumph of sorts. (34)

This passage renders for me both the feel of that moment from childhood
and the moment of remembering with its sorrow. Brodkey goes on to “read”
this moment, that is, to use it as the basis for her cultural analysis of literacy. In
doing so, she is also explicitly reminding us in that the memory is a creation of
the experience, not a representation of it:
This memory of myself is carefully staged. I can be looking only at the loss of innocence. A young girl. A descent. Away from the light. That I set the scene in a library
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suggests a loss speciﬁc to literacy. Yet here is a child who read so much that the
librarians have declared her an honorary adult. (35)

In this passage, Brodkey can talk of this “young girl,” in the third person,
trying to understand her as would an ethnographer. And that is what Brodkey
is consciously attempting in this “autoethnography”—to read her own literacy from a social-cultural perspective. I believe that it is through the rendering, an involved perspective, that Brodkey gets back into the memory enough
to evoke the feelings—the sorrow felt at a moment of triumph—she needs to
understand in relation to literacy. In other words, involvement is necessary to
access and recreate the experience that one will attempt to read from a distanced perspective.
There are also sections in Brodkey’s essay where she does not make the
move to distance as much from the memory, from the girl of the past. For
instance, she does not read her connection to her mother—something fundamental to her way of thinking, that is, seeing on the bias—with the same cultural lens and third person perspective as she does such literacy experiences as
going to the library. In a closing section of the essay, Brodkey recalls her
mother taking her and her sisters “shopping” for school clothes, except they
were shopping just to try on and decide what they’d like, so their mother could
then make those clothes for them. Her telling of this memory renders as much
the feel of the moment of remembering as the past moment:
Yet even now I can see my mother examining garments, turning them inside and
out to scrutinize the mysteries of design, before bustling off to buy fabric. . . .
I lack the skill, the capital, and even the patience to clothe myself with the rigorous attention to detail I learned from my mother. Yet I am never more conﬁdent
than when I am wearing something I believe she would admire. It is less a particular
style of clothing than a certitude that my mother could tell just from the hang of it
that I had not forgotten how much depends on the bias. (48)

“Yet I am never more conﬁdent than when I am wearing something I
believe she would admire.” In these ﬁnal lines, I feel the emotion of a tie
renewed and the implicit statement, “This is what it’s like to be me”—without
a move to analyze that self from a cultural perspective. These reﬂections on her
connection to her mother demonstrate how, even in an essay whose primary
purpose is cultural analysis, rendering for the purpose of self-afﬁrmation can
be present, whether that is the author’s intention or not.
Reading this memory evokes my own memories of similar “shopping trips”
with my mother and her then making the skirts, dresses, slacks, suits that I
chose. I remember hours standing for ﬁttings in our front room with Mom pinning a hemline, taking a tuck, fussing over the lie of a lapel. I remember other
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ﬁtting sessions: Mom ﬁtting sixty plus high school band members for our uniforms each year and ﬁtting wealthy women of town to tailor something or create a dress from a picture they would bring in. I sketch these experiences now
with feelings of pride and love, and sadness, sadness at her advanced age with
dimmed vision and ﬁngers that no longer work so ably. And I take from this
memory a respect for the skills and art of work done by hand, creating a kilt for
me, a silk suit for another, a well ﬁtted slipcover for our living room; an appreciation of the creative intelligence of mind, eyes, and hands. My hands do not create in these ways, but they do feel fabric with the intelligence I learned from my
mother and when I walk through stores, feeling fabric to decide whether to look
more closely, I renew this tie with my mother, just as I am renewing it now.
In starting to render this memory, I am drawn into feeling those past
moments with the emotions of the present. In renewing my connection to my
mother and a shared past, I am creating a sense of stability for myself. Yet, this
writing also evokes a sense of uncertainty as I wonder about what I truly do
bring into the present from my past. In other words, the rendering serves to
prompt reﬂection by being the means of recalling some of that experience. As I
reread what I have written, I also see that I am idealizing these moments, representing them selectively as I attempt to create a present “truth” of that past
and my mother. This is reﬂexive writing where I am conscious of creating a
meaning, one where my frame of reference is personal relations and where I
suspend a cultural frame of analysis.
Still, looking back at what I have written, I also wonder how my mother
experienced her work as a seamstress, ﬁtting band uniforms and sewing them
late into the evening, ﬁtting dresses for wealthier women. This is a direction
my reﬂection and further shaping of these memories could—but need not—
take, viewing my memories with a focus on class and attempting to understand my mother’s as well as my own perspective. Both framings of these
memories of the past would be equally valid. Further, I do not believe I would
have arrived at either possibility had I represented these memories as only a
sketchy example. It is only the close evocation of experience that elicits the
feelings as well as details that prompt questioning and further reﬂection.
Brodkey’s reﬂection on her tie with her mother is but one part of “Writing
on the Bias,” and it is one I am obviously reading as serving a personal purpose—whether intentional or not—for Linda Brodkey, as does the writing I
began for me. But that is not Brodkey’s primary purpose and elsewhere she
writes that for her the value of autoethnographies is “the potential for social
change rather than any psychological beneﬁts that may accrue” (28). By focusing on personal purposes, I do not mean to minimize the social purposes
served by Brodkey’s critique of the literacy values she encountered in school—
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just to stress that it is equally important that the personal purposes that may
enter in, whether intentionally or no, not be dismissed. And, more generally,
that the presence and function of rendering in these academic essays of cultural analysis not be eclipsed. Failing to recognize the presence of rendering in
some academic writing—including writing within Composition Studies—
contributes to dismissing its value in undergraduate writing.
When we render experiences—even for ends of cultural analysis—we tap
into emotions that we may be unable or unwilling to analyze objectively. That
does not lessen the value of the cultural analysis, but it should serve to remind
us of the limits of our own analytic control and the powerful pull to create our
own “reality,” provisional as it may be and sentimental as it may sometimes
seem to others. Paradoxically, though, as I have tried to illustrate, rendering of
experience, while it can sometimes sidestep analysis, can also be the opening
for analysis and interpretation. For Brodkey, the sorrow that she feels recalling
her childhood visits to the library prompt her reﬂections on the relations
between class, schooling, and literacy.
Lu’s and Brodkey’s essays underscore that our renderings themselves are
creations. As Lu argues in much of her work, experience is created in the
telling, by the words we use. In “Redeﬁning the Literate Self: The Politics of
Critical Afﬁrmation,” Lu is critical of approaches that treat “‘personal experience’. . . as a self-evident thing existing prior to and outside of discursive practices” (174). Instead, discursive practices shape how we know experience.
While I am reluctant to grant that all knowing is discursive or that all knowing
is shaped predominantly by discursive practices, I do accept that to access
experience is to create it. On this ground alone, Lu’s argument is persuasive: we
should stress “revision” instead of “recitation and revelation of the personal”
(174). In this essay, Lu’s argument is couched in terms of a sociocultural
approach to reading “the formation of one’s self and the material conditions of
one’s life” (174). Drawing on Cornel West’s ethic of “critical afﬁrmation,” she
poses a kind of self-examination of our literacy practices as scholars that asks
us to “grapple with our own privileges as well as experiences of exclusion” and
“to approach more respectfully and responsibly those histories and experiences which appear different from what one calls one’s own” (173). In the
essay, she models this dual act of reading one’s self and reading others for the
aim of understanding and joining cause across differences to realize the ultimate goal of social justice, of “hanging together as we work to end oppression
in the twenty-ﬁrst century” (193).
In “After Words: A Choice of Words Remains,” Lynn Worsham demonstrates
the power of such revising, or rewording, of renderings of past experiences. In
the essay, she revisits a story she had heard many times from her mother. The
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core of the story is that when the two- or three-year-old Worsham was told by
her mother that a “colored” woman named Betty was going to come to care for
her, Worsham referred to her as “Blue Betty,” reﬂecting her childhood understanding of what “colored” must mean. Worsham works through the story as
her mother told it successive times and then attempts to reword it from the perspective of race and gender, moving, as she writes, from “seeing blue to seeing
red” (340). Worsham writes that her aim is to “educate myself ﬁrst by working
theory close to the bone” (335). To work close to the bone requires the kind of
rendering that touches emotions as well. Like Lu, Worsham believes such an
approach—an open-minded and reﬂexive reviewing of stories we tell about
who we are, coupled with open-minded listening—offers a way to work across
lines that divide people, such as lines of race, class, gender, culture.

Autobiographical rendering that prompts revision, not solely recitation and
revelation, is valuable in its own right for writers, but also for readers.
Commenting retrospectively on two autobiographical essays written during a
ﬁrst- year writing course, Abigail Ferrer wrote, “As a writer, I’ve allowed myself
to explore the questions I have.” She went on to comment on purposes she had
for writers with the ﬁnal drafts of those essays: “I didn’t want to just state what
I felt, but try to have the reader feel it as well. To have them realize something
about their lives as they read of mine.” Such writing is valuable also for developing conﬁdence in what one experiences as one’s “own ideas” and the conﬁdence to include those ideas and experiences in writing about public issues, as
Min-Zhan Lu is doing when she brings in personal experience in her article.
The relation of writing that renders experience to developing conﬁdence is
evident in the comments many students include in end-of-semester reﬂective
essays. Here is one such comment:
Another characteristic of my writing that I’ve seen develop over the semester is
my exploratory voice. I’m always questioning why? Why do I have stage fright? Why
are children so violent? . . . When I was ﬁrst asked to write about myself in our ﬁrst
essay, it made me scared. I had always shied away from writing about personal experiences. I have always loved writing ﬁction so that’s what I wrote for pleasure. Then
in high school, all I ever wrote were documented papers, so my ﬁrst thoughts of
writing something personal made me skeptical and frightened. I don’t have that fear
anymore, because by writing my essays this semester, I have learned how to write
about my personal feelings.
Laurel Swetland

Two things interest me about this comment: Swetland links developing an
“exploratory voice”—her term, not one I introduced—with gaining experience
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with writing about personal experience; she also represents that false
dichotomy that is ingrained in so many students: ﬁction and other creative
writing where one’s imagination can come in versus “documented papers” and
reports where one’s thoughts, let alone personal experience, are not to be
included.
A student we wrote of in Persons in Process struggled with a variation of this
dichotomy: the split created between writing that includes personal experience
and academic writing; and, coupled with that split, the difference between
everyday language and more specialized language of an academic discipline.
Rachel was in another ﬁrst-year writing course where “rendering” of experience was also valued. She chose to write a research essay on child abuse, an
issue about which she had personal experience. In an early draft of the essay,
she included reference to her own experience and that of a friend:
In none of our cases did we report our sufferings. We were scared, frighten, and petriﬁed of our abusers. We were afraid that if we told we would not be helped, but
only hurt more. Pushing our pain deep inside where no one can see it is a common
defense mechanism. Why didn’t any of us run for help? There are many reasons. The
bottom line is it hurts. It hurts unbelievably bad. . . . I think the part about being
abused that hurts the most is that it came from people who said they loved me.

As she revised, Rachel wrote that section out of the essay and did not identify
herself as one who had experienced abuse. Here Rachel is rendering her feelings
as much as actual experiences: this is what it feels like to be me, and by implication, anyone who is abused. In another section that she deleted from the ﬁnal
draft, she renders more vividly experiences of her abuse. As she said in interview, writing about an issue that’s painful “is just another step in the process of
understanding something that you want to understand” (267). When asked
about including herself, she said, “I don’t know why I did that. That’s what
made me want to write about it.” And she had authoritative knowledge about
abuse. In the ﬁnal draft, she omits direct references to herself but does write of
her friend’s experiences, along with published scholarship on child abuse. In her
end-of-semester portfolio review, Rachel comments about this essay:
I noticed that the sections of this essay that I added my own thoughts or explanations ﬂowed better and were easily understood. When the time came to be factual, I
had trouble incorporating my style and the information on psychological abuse. . . .
The facts seemed to overshadow the point I was trying to make. (234)

In interview, Rachel added, “It was after that paper that I realized that I
needed to change my style, and that I needed to learn how to incorporate the
two. I think that’s something that’s going to have to come with time” (234).
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In talking of style and “incorporating the two,” I believe Rachel is referring
both to language and to a style of including personal knowledge and information from published research. I doubt she would have come to this realization
had she not had the experience of being encouraged to try to bring the “two”
together, to try to bridge that gap that is falsely created between personal and
academic knowledge. It is signiﬁcant to me that in her drafts she was not representing her experiences as detached examples, she was rendering them.
Evoking the feel of those experiences in words helped her formulate her desire
to be able to incorporate that knowledge.
And why does that matter in other than a psychological sense? Here’s what
Rachel said her senior year:
Sometimes the way we experience things in the world isn’t exactly how theories
explain things or how something you learn in class explains things. I think because
we experience life differently, writing it down and saying “look, this is what the
majority of people say, but this is what I found and this is maybe what people I have
spoken to have found.”—even though that’s not written down anywhere, you can
certainly make some valid points. (268–69)

In some instances, that may mean bringing in experiences and perspectives
that have not been represented in academic writing. In “Telling Stories,
Speaking Personally: Reconsidering the Place of Lived Experience in Writing,”
Mahala and Swilky argue for a kind of storytelling that gives a “sociohistorical
sense of experience,” particularly because it can serve to represent perspectives
and “contextual conditions” that have often been suppressed (365). Mahala and
Swilky also validate storytelling, speciﬁcally storytelling that aims to “write the
self reﬂexively,” as an important starting point for fostering critical agency. “We
contend that valuing stories as possible starting points for knowledge is more
likely to foster critical agency of students than situating stories as cases awaiting
critical ‘demystiﬁcation’” (365, 377; see also Curtis et al. for a pedagogy that
takes this approach). In this comment, they are distinguishing themselves from
some sociocritical approaches that they see as placing experience in a subordinate or inferior position to an academic methodology or theory. Perhaps here is
my reply to those who challenged the opening to Urban’s “Gone Fishin’” essay.

I thought of closing this essay by writing, as did the author of “Gone Fishin’,”
that I’ve “made a great catch,” but that phrase feels a bit too exuberant (academic
that I am) and also gives a mistaken impression that I’ve selected one thing instead
of another. I do not mean to champion rendering experience as the sole focus of a
composition course, but I do mean to argue against those who would make no
room for it. Further, I aim to make a place for rendering of experience for personal
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purposes, not solely for sociocultural critique or analysis and not always to view
oneself as a product of cultural forces and discourses. I want to stress that I ﬁnd
both purposes equally viable, I am not valorizing one over the other.
As I hope the examples I have used have demonstrated, rendering of experience can be evident in an extended narrative or a few phrases of description:
what is key is that a writer evoke an experience and the feel of being in it. This
ﬁshing expedition has led me to be more conscious than I was before of my
purposes in designing exploratory writing and essay prompts that encourage
rendering, whether for a personal essay, an autoethnography, or a research
essay. I have two purposes in mind. One is to heighten students’ awareness that,
in the act of writing, one is creating the experience, shaping it for present purposes under the inﬂuences of present perspectives. The second is to present rendering as an effort to achieve some understanding. That effort requires a
reﬂexive and questioning stance, where one can trust in oneself: that is, trust in
one’s ability to shape a provisional truth, not in one’s ability to uncover self-evident truths. Rendering fuels this questioning stance. Through rendering, one
gets back into one’s memory enough to evoke feelings and complexities that
prompt questioning and reﬂection. Those complexities are often ones that work
not so much to conﬁrm a static individual self as they do to open up instabilities and questions that prompt reﬂection, including cultural analysis.
In “Traditions and Professionalization: Reconceiving Work in Composition,”
Bruce Horner argues against a utilitarian view of the aims of a composition
course. Part of his argument includes arguing against the course as being
deﬁned solely in terms of service to academic courses. Citing Anne Gere’s study
of writing in community-based writing workshops, including the Tenderloin
Women’s Writing Workshop, he stresses the value of writing for “critical rethinking of one’s life experience and the culture at large” (392). Caroline Heller’s
ethnography of the Tenderloin workshop, Until We Are Strong Together, shows
the range of writing done by these women that renders their experiences: autobiographical writing, poetry, and ﬁction for intertwined purposes of afﬁrming
self, of commenting on social forces that shape lives, and of advocating for social
change on such issues as homelessness, poor medical care, and racism. Through
the many excerpts of their writing that she includes, Heller demonstrates her
point that the power of their writing comes through the “worldviews” they
express, “complete with ambiguity, conﬂict, and change, that held the life experience that could penetrate the surface of the institutionally known” (151).
Mahala and Swilky make a similar point about the value of academic storytelling for bringing “what seems ‘outside’ into the academic game” (372).
For these reasons and others, writing to render one’s experience has a place
in undergraduate education. Surely, many of us believe with Horner that an
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undergraduate education should contribute to students’ developing understandings of themselves in relation to their past, their cultures, and in ways
that tie past with present and future. We believe also in cultivating inclinations
to reﬂecting, revising, viewing from multiple perspectives, and developing an
“exploratory voice.” And, we should value students being able to bring their
own authoritative knowledge from personal experience into academic writing,
not as inferior to formalized theory and knowledge, but as equal; not as selfevident, but as partial and provisional and subject to critical reﬂection and
revision, just as is formalized theory and knowledge.
I am working indirectly into an answer to those who questioned the “Gone
Fishin’” essay at the writing-across-the-curriculum workshop. Instead of being
defensive, I might have initiated a discussion of the role of personal experience,
including writing that renders, in academic writing for professional work and
undergraduate learning in disciplines across the curriculum. To launch the discussion, I might have mentioned the spiritual autobiography written in the
Comparative Literature class. I might also have mentioned an assignment made
in an Art History course to write about the art work in a medieval church as if
one were living in that time and entering the church: in other words to render
vicariously (Herrington and Curtis 240–41). Given discussions I’ve since had
with other cross-disciplinary groups, I am conﬁdent other examples would
arise from the group, as well as discussion and debate over the role of such writing for learning and professional work. Such discussions can only serve to
widen understanding of purposes and limits of writing of personal experience,
as well as of our disciplinary and personal perspectives. I do not feel that “rendering” of experience has a special purchase on knowledge, but it is a valid and
important means of knowing, within and without academe. “When students
leave the university unable to ﬁnd words to render their experience, they are
radically impoverished” (Elbow, “Reﬂections” 137).
They are radically impoverished while at the university as well, if they are cut
off from a powerful way of continuing the ongoing work of composing themselves and, in relation to others, of bringing their knowledge to bear on topics
pursued in their course work across disciplines and of affecting readers—
entertaining, evoking those readers’ own self-reﬂections, prompting their
thinking regarding issues of the world. I would like for all students who ﬁnish
one of my writing courses to say, as one has said of her writing course, “You’re
going to learn how to write. I think you learn about yourself too. And I think
this all goes into the whole idea of college to broaden your mind” (Herrington
and Curtis 220).

16 M Y F AVO R I T E B A L A N C I N G A C T
Wendy Bishop

“The thing of it is,” each time I begin, I wander off into the reaches of the Web
to ﬁnd out more about the Chinese plate spinners on The Ed Sullivan Show.
When I was growing up, Ed Sullivan on Sunday night was the world written
large. Snuggled down in hiding under a coffee table where I couldn’t easily be
found and sent to bed, I watched the TV shows my parents watched on the
very few channels available to us. Few, but to my mind fabulous; on Sunday
night at 8 o’clock, after Disneyland at 7, (for more than a thousand shows, I
learn) Ed Sullivan introduced what now seems a crazy hodgepodge of talents
but then seemed simply like consecutive exhibitions of pure magic: “The
Rolling Stones, then a trained bear act, Robert Goulet and then Joan Rivers, a
plate spinner, a ﬁlm clip, Red Skelton and then a closing number by the Rolling
Stones” (http://www.edsullivan.com/facts.html).
“You want to know something?” Oddly, I don’t remember the Rolling Stones,
but I do remember being frightened rather than entertained by Red Skelton.
And what comes back to me most often when I think of dour and grimacesmiling Ed are those plate spinners.
Don’t let beginnings be a problem. Write through them by brute force. I often have
to use all-purpose beginnings: “And another thing . . .”; “The thing of it is . . .”;
“What I want to talk about is”. . . ; “You want to know something?” At the end you
can write better beginnings” (Elbow, Writing 74)

“What I want to talk about is this”: Peter Elbow reminds me of those
Chinese acrobats who got their plates spinning on the end of long sticks—ﬁrst
one, then two, then three, ten, twenty—an impossible display, all done so
pleasantly, always a smile on the face and a difﬁdent bow when Ed gave them a
hand at the end of that brow-wiping performance of dexterity. While no
reader surely always agrees with Peter, many of us are often smiling happily
back and clapping for the way his ideas spin and wobble above our heads in a
way that gets our own ideas spinning.
“The thing of it is,” I want to honor not just his ideas—the ones that recur to
me with the persistence of that image of Chinese plate spinners—but the quality of his approach, at once tenacious and gentle, slow but sure, rigorous and
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sometimes wacky, as oxymoronic in person and in his thinking as in the methods he advocates.
Once you have gradually grown your meaning and speciﬁed it to yourself clearly,
you will have an easier time ﬁnding the best language for it. (21)

So let me grow my meaning by putting several Elbowian plates in the air for
a short demonstration of what I ﬁnd has brought me back to his work, repeatedly, across the years.
F I R S T P L AT E : P E T E R A N D T H E ( U S E F U L ) D A N G E R O F A P H O R I S M S ,
O P P O S I T E S , A N D OX Y M O R O N S

In my mind, several things happened when Peter Elbow published Writing
Without Teachers, the little trade book that could. It was admittedly unacademic in the way the term was accepted then and still holds true today: a book
that is popular cannot be very deep and certainly not scholarly. A Harvard graduate student, then Brandeis graduate, steps from high art (Chaucer) to low art
(writing for the common person; though surely Chaucer would have been
interested in that common person) and does so in a voice that was and remains
slow, thoughtful, and friendly. A book that is encouraging to the readers it was
intended for, blocked writers, about the most discouraging of activities for
them: writing. Also, it was often aphoristic and pithy.
Still, pith—no matter the friendly voice—often carries a terse and implicit
critique, due, no doubt, to the autobiographical pain that Peter returns to about
failing at writing, at the Ivy League academic game. Subtextually, there is perhaps even a quiet howl. Writing Without Teachers was a dark horse that rubbed
against the grain in so many ways. No wonder it was embraced by the relatively
disenfranchised—blocked writers, just writers, teacher-educators, students of
writing—who may have felt they never before had a such spokesperson.
And it still holds up, only recently going into a second edition because the
ﬁrst continued to sell so well for so many years. Writing Without Teachers offers
useful metaphors of growing and cooking. It offers a solution—yes: freewriting. It offers an explanation: writers can write without teachers. But not an
overly simplistic one: writers must write and must have readers. It is direct,
detailed, sympathetic. For instance, on readers:
Don’t reject what readers tell you. Listen to what they say as though it were all true.
The way an owl eats a mouse. He takes it all in. He doesn’t try to sort out the good
parts from the bad. He trusts his organism to make use of what’s good and get rid of
what isn’t. There are various ways in which a reader can be wrong in what he tells
you; but it still pays you to accept it all. (102–3).
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In fact, this little book provided a strong attack on the status quo, couched
in a disconcertingly brave language that was very much I/you, student-writerfriendly (in a way that seemed to strike fear in certain teachers and academics),
ﬁlled with analogies to psychology and self-help, urging introspection and
empowerment for all. In his most recent collection Everyone Can Write, Elbow
notes this himself: “So my deepest theoretical foundations are probably psychological rather than philosophical” (3). Such a stance was received, I believe,
as a deep criticism of (literature) teacher dominated communities. Because of
this, critics and Elbow did exactly what Elbow suggests they do when they play
the doubting game. They dug in. And he dug in also, standing by his book but
reaching out over the years to work to explain it.
Sometimes the doubting game works just the way it’s supposed to: I believe
something I shouldn’t; someone argues against it; this serves as a booster shot of
critical thinking, I realize I shouldn’t have believed it, and I stop. But actually it seldom works so nicely for me or for others.
In many cases the doubting game has the opposite effect: I experience it as a
strong attack and I dig in my heels the harder. (Writing 184)

Exit a benchmark 1973, and years later, the doubting of the dominant academic community has made the believing Elbow that much more pithy. In 1986,
he shakes a stick at naysayers who claim the moves advised can’t be integrated
into institutional constraints: “A teacher can give meaningful freedom even if
he works within a very tightly constrained system” (“Exploring” 77). In 1993,
he provides a sharp reminder from one who has been there—and who refused
to stay there: “Teachers who are most critical and sour about student writing
are often having trouble with their own writing. They are bitter or unforgiving
or hurting toward their own works” (“Ranking” 204). And of course, as we all
do, he complains about large scale systems that mis-schedule our lives:
“Writing wasn’t meant to be read in stacks of twenty-ﬁve, ﬁfty, or seventy-ﬁve”
(204). In 2000, he provides a reminder about why his earliest book was successful when much of our academic writing isn’t: “It strikes me that academic
discourse is one of the least powerful discourses in our culture—especially
recently. Many academics are strikingly unsuccessful in writing for a larger
audience. If we were better at it, we might see less bashing of academics”
(“Discourses” 232).
It seems natural that Elbow takes these at first tacit and later more explicit
(pot)shots at a composition establishment that continues to suggest his work
is less than mainstream and scholarly. My own observation in teaching
teachers and in becoming a long-lived teacher of writing has been that many
of us are motivated to teach from extreme experiences: we hated our teachers
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and hope to be better, or we loved our teachers and hope to be like them. It’s
rare that I run into a teacher with an unpolarized teaching path; those who
landed in the experiential middle most often seem to be in teaching writing
on the way to going somewhere else: law school, literature, the corporate
world.
For Elbow, the position of guru-gadﬂy has come about for clearly psychological reasons:
I realize now that much of the texture of my academic career has been based in an
oddly positive way on this experience of complete shame and failure. In the end,
failing led me to have the following powerful but tacit feeling: “There’s nothing else
they can do to me. They can’t make me feel any worse than they’ve already done. I
tried as hard as I could to be the way they wanted me to be, and I couldn’t do it. I
really wanted to be good, and I was bad.” These feelings created an oddly solid
grounding for my future conduct in the academic world. They made it easier for me
to take my own path and say whatever I wanted. (“Premises” 7)

That Elbow’s sense of his own bad boy behavior represents a very mild form
of what we’d term bad in today’s culture has led to some interesting responses,
to be discussed when I get another plate or two spinning. He’s certainly not
bad as in James Dean (though that’s fun to imagine), though he did feel badly
in school, as in not good enough. Others have termed his pedagogy, as they
understood it, bad or apolitical; that is, lacking enough social contexts. But for
now, it’s important to see that the oxymoronic gestalt of Elbow’s learning,
teaching, and publishing history led him to undertake a public enactment of
the very doubting and believing mode of being that he advocates: he is what he
preaches, for he invites us into his position via images (the failed student done
good), models (freewriting as a base for freeing our writing), metaphors
(cooking and growing writing; the owl eating the mouse), and narratives
(Chaucer scholar turned writing teacher turned senior composition scholar
who battles the stronger forces of academic discourse advocates). Given his
belief in belief, this is not surprising.
Methodological doubt is the rhetoric of propositions; methodological belief is the
rhetoric of experience. Putting our understanding into propositional form helps us
extricate ourselves and see contradictions better; trying to experience our understandings helps us see as someone else sees. Thus believing invites images, models,
metaphors, and even narratives. (“Methodological” 264)

For this version of Elbow, doubt is rhetoric and belief is action. The acrobat
is center stage, the pole is up, the plate is spinning. What then are the implications for viewers of the performance?
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N E X T P L AT E : P E T E R A S P R O C E S S P O E T

Walking back to dorms from a WPA reception at Saratoga Springs some
years ago with a group of friends, Peter mentioned to me that he admired my
poetry writing. I said then, and I would say to him again, that everyone can be
a poet. In fact, I think Peter is a poet plying prose. His composing process, lifelong, as he has described it, is very poet-like. He’s a process poet in two ways—
his process is poet-like, and he’s given life, metaphor, image to our discussions
of composing processes. The former has been relatively unremarked upon; the
latter has been in some ways harmful since he has been frozen in amber, as
have his metaphors, as the arch incarnation of expressivism when that is a title
he would not claim for himself.
From the scraps of thought-pieces that became Writing Without Teachers to
the way he worries a text, an idea, a position, over and over, I detect an engagement with language and thought that seems most similar to that of the practicing
poets I know and admire. Peter says some of this comes from the way he thinks
and speaks; he knows he’s a slow, patient student—and it is true that a careful
reader can see that the basic “poetic vision” of his work was set out in 1973 and
then theorized since: he works at his vision and version. Like many poets, Peter
puts theory into practice (as the poet constructs a lived moment after the fact).
And isn’t much, or even most, poetry an attempt, in a way, to slow down comprehension? (The poet Richard Hugo famously remarked, “If I wanted to communicate, I’d pick up the telephone.”) Almost everyone loves riddles, which are a central
art form in most oral cultures. In short, humans naturally use language to make
their meaning more clear and striking; but they also like to use language to make
their meaning less clear to use language as a kind of ﬁlter or puzzle or game to distinguish among receivers. (“Illiteracy” 16)

It is this puzzling-through-a-problem that most distinguishes the style of
Peter’s writings.
Personally, I don’t think I would have turned to prose—scholarly, essayistic,
academic—without the advent of the word processor that allowed me to write
long enough to appreciate my mistakes, which were legion (like Peter, I teach out
of failure, failed qualifying exams, failure to match up to the dominant model of
white male poets). When writing poems, I could nibble at a text again and again,
in ways that remind me of the way Peter nibbles at his ideas. Many literaturetrained academics, I ﬁnd, don’t feel free to doubt and believe with poetry since
they’ve been trained to revere, maybe even fear the genre. But poetry writing and
essay writing have much in common. The doubting and believing game, for
instance, shows up as epistemology but also as action. So many Elbow essays
move this way and that way and then this way and then that way—nudging the
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author and the reader to their own best resting place. And that place is usually
taken up in the next piece and then advanced in more detail, before it, in turn,
leads to the next essay. It’s a one step backwards, two steps forward way of working. It’s tortoise and the hare. It’s sometimes tiring—when read as a collection—
but it’s also often astonishingly instructive (particularly for this hare) to observe
such a ﬂexible determined march. This method honors antecedents and the
ancestry of an idea by returning to them and moving on again, often.
This vision of composing is similar to that of the poet who ﬁnds her poem’s
frame and then fusses with it—changing one word, then the next, going back
to the middle stanza like a terrier, moving down, returning to reopen, fussing
with drafts, with scraps of paper in a pocket. Peter’s description of his writing
hearkens, then, to poetic processes in that the poet’s task is try to explain his
certain slant of insight:
Throughout my life I’ve found myself characteristically ineffective in speaking. Not
only do I tend to bumble and stumble at the level of syntax, but I also can never
even get my thoughts straight. Over and over I have had the experience of trying to
explain or persuade people about something that seemed palpably true to me, only
to have them not understand me or think my thinking was foolish or useless. This
has been a big incentive for me to use writing. I have had more success speaking my
mind on paper. (“Discourses” 232–33)

I’d extend my comparison: scratch many a contemporary poet; and you’ll
ﬁnd an aspiring song writer, rock and roll wannabe, abjectly shy performer,
introvert who has more success speaking his mind on paper.
Having been immersed during the writing of this chapter in Elbowese, I’d
love to see Peter move beyond his familiar style when advocating for other
genres. While “Your Cheatin’ Art” valorizes and enacts collage, it still joins texts
together via traditional Elbowian moves. I’d like to see the Elbow of other genres, the multigenre Elbow. In fact, I suspect there may already be a ﬁle folder of
poetic scraps or ﬁctional fragments hiding on some Peter Elbow desk or in a
pocket somewhere. It might take his arguments down, shall we say, different
paths, but always, I trust, back again. This, after all, is the writing teacherreader who, in three consecutive pages, mentions Dickinson, Shakespeare,
Wright, Frost, Roethke, Koch, Hugo, and Blake as structural or linguistic inspirations for students’ own work (“Breathing” 368–70).
A N O T H E R P L AT E : P E T E R A N D S Y N E C D O C H E : W H Y PA R T D O E S N ’ T
( A LWAY S ) S TA N D F O R T H E W H O L E

“You want to know something?” I’m baffled, really, by the cultural critique
of process-oriented classrooms. How can a theory and practice of writing
instruction be deemed apolitical when it grows out of resistance to the
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Vietnam War; when it advocates a democratic care for all writers, particularly
those most disenfranchised in the academy—basic and first-year writers;
when it toys (nearly ad nauseam) with issues of evaluation, fairness, and
access; when it is grounded in understandings of language and how language
cocreates culture? Well, perhaps because the words race, class, gender are not
foregrounded. Absence of those code words does not, however, mean that
what those words stand for is absent. The same issues are named and
addressed in similar and different ways within a pedagogy of action; in such a
class students are always writing themselves into, around, and against culture
contexts.
Here is where Peter Elbow’s able metaphor making doesn’t serve him. The
success of the seriohumorous teacherless classroom trope was to make readers
assume that it’s actually so; I’ve never seen a process-oriented classroom without a teacher—and often a fairly structured and controlling one. And freewriting is of course a pragmatic concept, not a pure possibility; when assigned in
school it is not free, it is an attempt to create space for other angles of vision as
pointed out by David Bartholomae:
To say this another way, there is no writing that is writing without teachers. I think I
would state this as a general truth, but for today let me say that there is no writing
done in the academy that is not academic writing. To hide the teacher is to hide the
traces of power, tradition and authority present at the scene of writing (present in
allusions to previous work, in necessary work with sources, in collaboration with
powerful theories and ﬁgures, in footnotes and quotations and the messy business
of doing your work in the shadow of others). (“Writing With Teachers” 63)

To which I want to say: exactly. There is no sense of a hidden teacher in
Elbow’s work. He is, if anything, omnipresent in a way that allows us to make
fun of his work, to evoke a caricatured version of him, often instead of taking
on his (slowly) evolving discussions (for more, see Bishop “Places”). Although
the origins of his subsequent work are clear in Writing Without Teachers, the
later work is not mere ampliﬁcation. Synecdoche—assuming Elbow is and
always will be early Elbow—just doesn’t do these twenty-eight years justice.
For me, the much repeated triad of race, class, gender works as cliches do.
Cliches are useful placeholders in an initial draft, standing for something we
need better to articulate as we reﬁne a text. So too the call to concern ourselves
with the material existence of our students. Those so often calling, though,
seem to me mostly to move these place holders around from one philosophical-theoretical-based discussion to another without specifying who they are
really talking about and what life experiences really inform their own discourse. Here you can see why I appreciate the constant self-interrogation that
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Elbow undertakes. Otherwise, what actual students and classrooms are lost in
parallel sentences that doubt students have agency?
At worst, the “democratic” classroom becomes the sleight of hand we perfect in
order to divert attention for the unequal distribution of power that is inherent in
our positions as teachers, as ﬁgures of institutional/disciplinary authority, and
inherent in the practice of writing, where one is always second, derivative, positioned, etc. (Bartholomae “Writing With Teachers” 66)

David Bartholomae points out an “at worst.” What, I wonder, would create
an “at best”? It seems as if those holding a primarily critical position don’t
often enough focus on what works and what will work even better. At best, a
democratic classroom respects student users of language, starts where they
start, and helps them accomplish as much (writing) learning as can be accomplished in the artiﬁcial space of a term or a quarter. Yet so often these issues
aren’t discussed. At the same time, many social-based discussions seem to
ignore the failures of socialism and communism and other isms of the last half
of the century and neglect to explore what such failures really say to us about
putting writing students in critical dialogue with powerful texts. What is
accomplished, then, by social pedagogies that is distinct from what is accomplished in student-centered pedagogies? For writing teachers, what is provably
more important than the acts of putting writers in active dialogue with each
other and with each other’s texts?
Certainly I am touchy about this issue because I’m in the Elbow-like camp
and because that apparently situates me as resisting what is currently cool.
Certainly I am liable in my work to the same critique, as in this one offered by
Pat Belanoff:
There will be those who criticize on the basis of philosophies that advocate attention
to the social, economic, political, and cultural as primary inﬂuences in the classroom. In particular, a number of the exercises outlined in the Bishop collection
indicate no awareness that students come into the classroom with cultural baggage
that includes, but is not limited to, their gender and ethnic background. (400)

Often my response to this type of statement is the ﬂippant “Well, duh. Of
course I’m aware of this” (But I like and respect Pat too well to respond that
way, and I also realize she is playing devil’s advocate from a book reviewer’s
stance.) I can’t look at a class of students and read their writing without being
aware of the many cultural bags they’ve packed and brought along. But is this
the central issue for the classroom? Well, for me, no: my primary considerations include improving writers and their written texts and of letting student
writers experience themselves in the role of writer/author. A part of this role,
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of course, includes, but is not limited to, exploring their cultures. Such explorations are the inevitable and desirable outcomes of sharing writing in a community of readers and writers.
What about another way of looking at the issue?
I think my teaching beneﬁts when I recognize that I am faced with conﬂicting goals:
helping students ﬁnd ways to comply, yet still maintain their independence and
autonomy; and ways to resist, yet still be productive. We can’t remove the conﬂict,
but we can at least understand it. . . . Resistance gives us our own thinking and the
ownership over ourselves that permit us to do the giving in we need for learning;
compliance fuels resistance and gives us the skills we need for better resistance.
(“Illiteracy” 22)

Certainly Peter is arguing here for dialectic, a democratic stance, minority
and majority positions respected and regularly voted in or out, depending on
the times, on the context. Understanding conﬂict requires an investigation of
and suggests the possibility of compromise. Often he is looking for a new place
to stand, an unexpected and productive view.
Peter Elbow is part trickster. Dreamer and diagrammer. Deﬁner and
detailer. Outsider and insider. Coiner and confuser. Subdivider and classiﬁer.
Reluctant arch academic. He begins at one side of the equation and arrives
there again by taking excursions to the other side of the equation: he enjoys
seeing everything along the way. Indeed, he embodies the dichotomies by taking us to several extremes in his explorations until we give up, nibbled to death
sometimes, so that the centrist position does look darn inviting.
Because synecdoche doesn’t work here—part doesn’t stand for whole—it’s
instructive to consider where nondichotomous investigations take us. When
thinking is not on the run (under attack), looking at a combinatory set of positions can yield insights. In fact, that may be part of what encourages Peter to
work so earnestly to consider all the angles of his assumptions. Like many of us,
he has used theory, of course, but has placed it in the service of making his practice more understandable, acceptable, and accessible to both critics and consumers. It seems relevant here to mention that Writing Without Teachers, that
intentional trade book, did not leave the presses without a theoretical appendix;
that Elbow as a certiﬁed academic is not just testiﬁed to by a dissertation and a
book on Chaucer but by his determination to defend his position(s). He was
not trained in the literary tradition for nothing. The traditional literary
scholar’s lifetime devoted to a century, an author, a genre is not in that sense
very different from a lifetime devoted to proposing, investigating, and defending a theorized approach that results in a particular stance toward writing
instruction. Some of his tenacity, then, is bred in the English Department bone.
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O N E M O R E P L AT E : P E T E R A S P R A C T I C E D T H E O R I S T

As an untrained teaching assistant in 1975, I was offered a section of ESL
freshman composition and another of basic writing. For preparation, I was
told to read Writing Without Teachers by a Subject A director who didn’t have
time to train me. I was learning to teach without teachers. I read and much of
what I read seemed sensible to me and provided a welcome change from the
less generously run writing workshops of my master of arts in poetry program.
That was all.
One has to be open and accept bad writing now—meaning this year, this decade—
in order to get good writing. I can now see that a lot of my stuck situations in writing come from trying to write something that I won’t be able to write for another
ten years: trying to avoid the voice and self I now have. (WWT 47)

As that little book faded from consciousness, I was more inﬂuenced by newteacher terror; I checked handbooks for advice, talked to a few shadowy teaching assistants in the program, pored over stacks of student papers, and listened
to and watched my students. I didn’t really re-meet Peter Elbow until I met him
in person in 1987 after his and Pat Belanoff ’s article on portfolio proﬁciency
exams in CCC let me see how the University of Alaska English Department,
where I was training writing tutors and helping with issues of writing assessment, could use his advice.
Well, I lied. I did re-meet him in graduate school when I returned to work on
an doctorate in Linguistics and Rhetoric from 1985 to 1989 at Indiana
University of Pennsylvania. Peter Elbow was one of the few names I brought
with me—he was my luggage as well as my baggage. Freewriting and other
Elbow inﬂuences ﬁlled the adjunct’s assigned writing textbooks I had been
using, and I actually probably thought I’d start with him in my coursework. But
he was not in favor, or much favor. He was not a compositionist, exactly. He
hadn’t conducted the type of research (empirical) that I was being trained to
conduct, which was busy taking me a far cry from my creative writing and ESL
instruction roots (little roots, but my own). Whenever I encountered Peter’s
work, it was a breath of fresh air: not relentlessly constructionist, not heavily
linguistic, not mystifyingly lit-critical. And the more I entered the working
realm of evaluation—teacher of student, student of teacher, programs of curriculum, and so on—the more I valued the type of careful thinking-through
stances and positions that his work on evaluation offered me. It was his voice
that made what I was already reading more readable because his examinations
of deﬁnitions and issues let me work out those deﬁnitions and issues with him.
It was around this time, after having met Peter in person in Alaska and after
that at conferences and having seen how closely he listened, that I understood
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what I hadn’t before, just why he was so valued as a person and so studied as a
writer. There were also a number of theorists he was inviting me to join him in
exploring. For instance, in Embracing Contraries we ﬁnd (along with rhetoricians, literary critics, and churchmen) J. L. Austin, Bruner, Booth, Dewey,
Erikson, Freire, Habermas, Ong, Perry, Piaget, Polanyi, Popper, Rogers, Rorty.
These were not the French feminists, the Foucault and Bakhtin and Barthes,
who had perplexed me in my ﬁrst round of graduate school. Those he offered
were joined later by a range of compositionists and by Kuhn, Lakoff and
Johnson, Graff, Chomsky, Vygotsky, Bakhtin, Geertz, Hirsch, Mead, Gates,
hooks, Ohmann, Kristeva, Smitherman. In those days, I was self-teaching
myself critical theory in order to be able to talk to my colleagues in my ﬁrst
tenure-line position. I had to have a bit of Bakhtin in my bag to go with the
feminist critics I had by afﬁnity begun with.
We might indeed call Elbow a late-adopter, as I was. But that semi-denigrating term does not allow for the way his thinking appears to take place so ruminatively. Not surprisingly, he mentions loving two-stomached animals. In his
work, a theorist is encountered and studied, absorbed, considered, looked at
up and down. The progress is scholarly, in the best sense of the word, in a manner that allows a seeming leisure to . . . think. Thinking, for Elbow, is a serious
business and a developmental journey. And everywhere his readers are witnesses to the terms of travel.
As intellectuals we need to learn to doubt things by weaning ourselves from
naive belief: we need to learn the inner act of extricating ourselves from ideas, particularly our own. We need to learn how to cease experiencing an idea while still
holding it, that is, to drain the experience from an idea and see it in its pure propositionality. That’s why learning to doubt goes hand in hand with structured uses of
language and logic such as syllogisms and symbolic logic.
By championing methodological belief, I might seem to be inviting us to turn
back to natural credulity. But of course I am not. Methodological doubt represents
the human struggle to free ourselves from parochial closed-mindedness, but it doesn’t go far enough. Methodological doubt caters too comfortably to our natural
impulse to protect and retain the views we already hold. Methodological belief
comes to the rescue at this point by forcing us genuinely to enter into unfamiliar or
threatening ideas instead of just arguing against them without experiencing them or
feeling their force. It thus carries us further in our developmental journey away
from mere credulity. (“Methodological” 263)

It’s easy to dismiss the tortoise, especially if you’re a hare like I am. It’s easy
to say, I agree with you but what’s the big fuss? To ask, Why does he keep at it,
keep those plates spinning? He’s had success. He’s made his way. He has the
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platform from which to refute and rebut, the position that allows the time for
percolation and an assured and interested audience. Does he really need to
keep taking that show on the road?
Well, yes, because that’s what is truly interesting: how unpopular the pace,
the position really is. But is what is maddening to some (sometimes even to
me) about our pilgrim’s progress primarily his pace? The way early success led
to long years of responding to that success? Do we want to speed him up or
move him along? I don’t think so, exactly, or merely. As I’ve tried to point out
elsewhere, often his intellectual positions are simply dismissed. Treated as “Oh,
that’s Peter. Doing his thing.” As in, isn’t that precious or quaint. It’s an easy
way not to engage with him, with his texts. And the toll of such dismissals is
mentioned in Elbow’s new collection. Where he says—rightly, I believe—but
with the pain of someone not really invited to the party,
But now, in writing this introduction, I am looking for people in the ﬁeld of composition and rhetoric to engage me at the theoretical level too. In twenty-ﬁve years, I don’t
know anyone who has ever really done so despite an incredible ﬂowering of theory,
much of it epistemological, and despite plenty of criticism of me. . . . I don’t know anyone in my ﬁeld who has actually engaged the substance of the argument about the
epistemological strengths of the doubting and believing games. (“The Believing” 79)

We could say that the list of linguists and theorists I’ve set out above are
simply not important. Simply not the folks with the answers and insights for
our complicated multicultural classrooms today. But might we also say that—
to a degree—they’re just not the most hip? And that with a limited reading
time in a turbulent new century, like will follow like. We’ll pursue Bakhtin (I
know I did—wouldn’t be caught dead not trying to understand him) or the
next newly discovered person, instead of wandering off on our own to contemplate those less usual voices that speak to the problems we’re wrestling with.
Which leads me to question: who is really wrestling with what?
Y E T A N O T H E R P L AT E : P E T E R A S G A D F LY — G O O F Y, G E N E R O U S , A N D
T E X T UA L LY G R E G A R I O U S

In talking to a very good teacher of writing the other day about the difﬁculty
I was having with her dissertation prospectus, I found myself a little ashamed of
the observation that escaped me after an hour of trying to explain why the
prospectus draft I had was to a ﬁnished draft what her ﬁrst-year writing students’ research paper topics on ﬁrst class sharing were to their ﬁnal papers. I
didn’t feel anywhere in the text that she was passionately engaged with an issue
or topic. Perhaps it was partly the cover letter that said she hoped I would
approve it because she really wanted to be done? Perhaps it was my providing
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her with a teacherless learning environment? Perhaps it was because she really
doesn’t yet care enough about academic discourse? My biggest sense though is
that she hasn’t spent much quality time with the text, and the act of writing has
yet to turn into the act of learning. I don’t think she does (or dares) yet trust her
own investment in the project.
Nevertheless, if I want to help my students experience themselves as writers, I ﬁnd I
must help them trust language—not question it—or at least not question it for long
stretches of the writing process till they have managed to generate large structures of
language and thinking. Some people say this is good advice only for inexperienced
and blocked writers, but I think I see it enormously helpful to myself and to other
adult, skilled, and professional writers. Too much distrust often stops people from
coming up with interesting hypotheses and from getting things written. Striking
beneﬁts usually result when people learn that decidedly unacademic capacity to
turn off distrust of language and instead not to see it, to look through it as through a
clear window, and focus all attention on the objects or experiences one is trying to
articulate. (“The War” 9)

I think Peter Elbow has been an academic gadﬂy. For me, he illustrates
Norman Holland’s theory that we have a writerly identity theme (though I don’t
think the theme is set and that’s ever all we are or want to be). From 1973 to today,
Elbow has come at the same subjects with a gadﬂy’s tenacity. Sure, some might
wish he would get it said once and for all, though that assumes there is a single
thing to be said—which is the synecdochic assumption. And, as surely, he’d point
out that he’s more diversiﬁed in his writing portfolio than such a characterization
of him allows. Sometimes he’s goofy: he talks to himself in texts, and, when he
does, Peter Elbow risks becoming an unbelievable alter ego to Peter Elbow. I’ve
seen him go out on a limb for the unknown, for psychology, for belief, for writing
and drama and movement (were you in those workshops where we did improv?
meditation? partner exercises?), but I’ve also seen most of his think-throughs
done with a great generosity and ageless curiosity about what makes what work.
As shy and inarticulate as he may see himself to be, I dare say I can call him
textually gregarious: he can worry an idea to death and just when you want to say,
drop, or bury that bone, he’ll have run to the far side of the yard and picked up
another artifact of intense interest and take you (or at least me) along with him.
You can’t edit till you have something to edit. If you have written a lot, if you have
digressed and wandered into some interesting areas and accumulated some interesting material (more than you can see any unity in) and if, at last, a center of gravity
has emerged and you ﬁnd yourself ﬁnally saying to yourself, ‘Yes, now I see what I’m
driving at, now I see what I’ve been stumbling around trying to say,’ you are ﬁnally in
a position to start mopping up—to start editing. (Writing Without Teachers 38)
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F I N A L P L AT E ( F O R N O W ) : P E T E R A S P E R S I S T E N T A C R O B AT

Yes, now I see what I’m driving at. Peter keeps all the plates spinning at
once. To do that—as the Ed Sullivan plate spinners did—he has cautiously to
launch one into the air. We watch. And for some that one plate would be
enough, thank you. Then he sets the rod down to balance on a tabletop and
goes for a second plate, gets that one going and almost takes our full attention
with him. Wait, we see the ﬁrst plate is slowing and threatening to crash down,
so he goes back to it and gets it in motion again. But that action has brought to
light another idea. Time for a third plate. Somehow, he juggles plate one and
plate two. Looks like he almost just stumbled getting back to that one, but ah,
up, aloft with plate three. Now he’s busy—a new plan, moving from one to the
other to the other. But maybe, greedily, just one more plate, there’s still something to be said, to be learned.
We can end the show. Ask him to pack his bag of sticks and plates. Tell him
Ed Sullivan wants to shake his hand and send him backstage. But darn if he
doesn’t seem to discover and have to try out a ﬁfth plate and a stick that he’s
pulling out even as he moves to keep the ﬁrst four going. Peter returns to ideas
(plates) over time and reinvestigates and connects and uses this rethinking to
produce richer thinking. To risk a cooking metaphor, the longer the stock simmers and reduces, the more it continues to improve in taste and quality. This is
a model of productive habits-of-mind that many of his readers beneﬁt from.
I’ve long found it proﬁtable to join Peter Elbow when he thinks aloud
because I’ve come to trust his acrobatic integrity:
Because human functioning is organic and developmental, because for example you
cannot learn to be a cut-throat editor till you learn to be a proliﬁc producer, so too
people cannot learn to play well either the doubting game or the believing game till
they also learn to play the other one well. (WWT 191)

Without the gift of belief that believing in his work has given me, my own
critical endeavors would be lopsided and half-baked at best. I would take only
one side (mine). I would spend less time than I should in reﬂection. I would
forgo the long term for the short term. As a teacher, as a writer, as an administrator, as a member of composition discussions, I often ﬁnd myself giving a little nod to this image I have of Peter Elbow, plate spinner, for it’s one that
reminds me that it’s not only what I’m learning, writing, or teaching but also
how I’m doing so that’s important. And luckily, Peter has been here all along,
providing me with a useful model for persistence and inviting me to join in his
thought-provoking games as I go about my own tasks.

17 D E A R P E T E R
A Collage in Several Voices
Sondra Perl

Peter Elbow writes. He writes to himself, to ﬁgure things out, but also to us, his
colleagues, students, and friends, to those he’s met and to so many others he
may never meet. And even in the ﬁguring out, in the sharing of his struggles, his
words speak in uncanny ways. They reach and grab and hold. I wonder if he
knows their weight and heft.
Peter the writer and Peter the man are not separate for me. Since the time I
ﬁrst met him in 1979, at a small conference in southern California, I felt a kinship. Something in his quiet manner, his unassuming way, struck me, and we
began a friendship. Sometimes over the years we’d write or call, but more often
than not, my half of the conversation occurred silently. It would happen as I read
his latest article or book. Frequently I’d ﬁnd myself nodding, marking passages,
usually agreeing. In these pages I take my private musings and make them public.
Roland Barthes writes that reading happens when we look up from the page.
Here are some traces, then, of what I pictured, the responses evoked in me, as I
paused over Peter’s words. They serve as my anchor. They weigh in without
weighing down.
P E T E R ’ S P U B L I S H E D WO R D S

Process
I’ve always been drawn to the question of what really happens when we learn or
teach: What goes on inside the mind? Behind appearances? What’s the process?
There is a mystery here. (Embracing Contraries ix)

Dear Peter,
How is it you ask precisely the same questions I ask? I, too, wonder, “What
really happens when we learn or teach? . . . What’s the process?” Only now, in
response to you, I’d say, there is not one process—but many. Remember the days
when we used to talk about ‘the composing process’? It seemed then as if there
were one process we might describe and come to understand. But now of course
we know there are many—there are processes of taking in and absorbing . . .
processes involving patience, periods of not-knowing, of groping, of letting
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words come . . . processes over which we may ultimately have little control and
even less understanding.
And if this is true for writing, how much more is it true for teaching and
learning? After spending our lives in classrooms, what do we really know about
what happens there? What are the occasions for learning? What really happens
when we sit among students and write and read with them? We can enact
processes, put actions into motion, but can we ever fully, ﬁnally, say what leads
to knowing?
Through years of such questioning, reﬂecting on countless hours spent
inside classrooms (as a teacher and an observer), I know this much: there are
moments when a class comes together . . . when people are awake . . . when the
questions come alive. But how do I know this? What tells me? It seems, now,
that I am reading the class the way I read a text I am in the process of drafting.
I listen carefully to what is being said, to how people are saying what they have
to say, to where their comments or questions are pointing . . . and I look to
gather it all together in such a way that I can hand it (our evolving text) back to
the class so that together we can take it further. It occurs to me now to point
out the recursive nature of this process. Like composing a piece of writing,
teaching and learning have a rhythm, a going back and a moving forward. In
each, we (the teachers, the learners, the writers) go back to what is there (in the
evolving text of the classroom) so that what has been said and thought can
lead us to what we can next say and think.
This seems to be a way to capture what happens when we are composing a
class . . . to talk about the process of teaching . . . and yet, I know, even here
there is not one process but many. I know these processes emerge in different
ways on different days. And yet when I teach, as when I compose a text, I often
pay special attention to what is still inchoate: to what lies at the edge of my
thinking . . . to what is not yet in words so that I can take what is beginning to
emerge, what is implicit in the classroom discourse, and make it explicit.
You write, Peter, about “a mystery.” What is it, you seem to be asking, that
cannot be seen and yet is often, nonetheless, felt when teaching is working?
What, for example, makes one class come alive while another doesn’t? Is it the
serendipitous mix of students in the room? Or the sort of presence we bring to
bear? Does it have to do with how open we are to inviting our students to
speak and write? Whether we do actually evince an interest in them? Whether
we allow our own passion about the subject we are teaching to emerge?
We may never be able to answer these questions fully or to describe completely what comes into play when teaching is at its best . . . in fact, I hope we
never will . . . I hope we always leave room for what cannot be put into words,
for what lies beyond language . . . and yet, I hope we never exhaust our desire
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to keep trying . . . to keep understanding . . . to keep looking. Clearly you don’t.
Your work over the years has focused often and well on what happens in the
classroom, on staying close to the phenomenon . . . of exploring its intricacies.
And if nothing else, you have shown us that the teaching is approachable,
apprehendable, and endlessly intriguing.
Sexuality
The one thing sure is that teaching is sexual. What is uncertain is which practices
are natural and which unnatural, which fruitful and which barren, which legal and
which illegal. When the sexuality of teaching is more generally felt and admitted, we
may ﬁnally draw the obvious moral: it is a practice that should only be performed
upon the persons of consenting adults. . . . [This] is not a trivial point since so many
teachers share these feelings but scarcely entertain them because they feel them
unspeakable. (“Exploring My Teaching” 70)

How much I love this passage, Peter. Because I know you are an ethical
man, I know (read, interpret) that these statements (taken out of context, yes)
are not about manipulating or abusing students. You are pointing us in
another direction. You are inviting us to consider what actually comes into
play in any authentic encounter between people. But before I describe my own
response to these words, let me add a bit of context around yours.
Your tone here is humorous. You are writing about two impulses in college
teaching: giving and withholding. In one way, you suggest, we all want to tell,
to impart what we know, to make full use of the expertise we have gained over
many years. Yet we don’t want to squander our knowledge (or affection). We
want to know that our students want what we are offering. And so we may
choose to withhold our thoughts and ideas until students express some desire
to hear them. At least, that is the scenario you are depicting in this article. You
are describing a kind of dance that seems to go like this: we want our students
to want what we have to give them. We want them to taste, to feel, their own
desire. We want them to receive us wholeheartedly, to take what we are prepared to give and to make it their own. Sometimes, often, we don’t stop to
check. We just forge ahead . . . telling them everything even when they seem
bored, disinterested. But, if we are wise, you seem to be saying, we just might
hold back. Hold out for something larger. Let them contact their own desires
(for learning, for writing, for knowing). If we do, something will happen
among us. Pleasure. Openness. Receptivity. It won’t be work anymore.
You ﬁrst wrote the article in which this statement appears, Peter, in 1968.
Maybe you meant something other than what I have glossed your words to
mean in the year 2002, but even so, from this vantage point, I marvel at your
prescience. For since that time, the notion of sexuality, of what is unspoken
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and unacknowledged in teaching, has moved from the margins to the center of
our professional discourse. Conversations about sexuality, liminal boundaries,
the body, the erotic, and even love have emerged in the pages of our journals
and in the books we read. But we still don’t have adequate responses. Yes, we
have policies outlining which boundaries may not be crossed, guidelines
regarding the abuse of power in student-teacher relationships, but I do not
think we have actually taken in the question underlying your statement: What
does it mean to claim, “Teaching is sexual”? What comes into play here? Aren’t
you asking us to consider the nature of classroom discourse, writ large? Aren’t
you asking how such ideas live in our bodies? What do we do with the desire to
learn and the desire to teach? What happens every time we enter our classrooms and look at the students who have come to study with us? What is alive
here? What needs to be attended to?
And so, while we are on the subject, how do I deal with it? What are the erotics
of my classroom? Let me explain by borrowing a metaphor from Roland Barthes,
who likens his seminars to a children’s ring game. On the surface, he claims, the
game has to do with passing the ring from person to person, but underneath it
has to do with touching hands. It seems to me that in the writing classroom, a
similar scenario occurs. What we pass from person to person are not rings but
words and what touches are not hands but human beings in all their humanness.
For I am often, almost always, touched by what my students write. I see,
appreciate, admire, am at times confused or distressed, but more often moved,
by how they present themselves in writing and certainly by their struggles . . . I
hear voices desiring to speak, voices desiring to be heard . . . I see so often that
what has been lacking is any sense on my students’ parts that they are entitled
to speak. Not just the undergraduates I meet at CUNY . . . but the many graduate students I’ve taught, the hundreds of teachers both here and abroad, those
who have, to one degree or another, successfully negotiated the system . . . they,
too, are shaky when it comes to writing . . . when it comes to trusting their own
voices, their own thinking, their own insights.
If there is an erotics to my classroom, I’d say it is more underlyingly sensual
than overtly sexual. It has to do with a warmth I both experience and extend,
one from which I welcome my students and their words. I am less concerned
with their desiring my knowledge and than I am with their accepting my invitation to participate in the shaping of the work we will do together. My desire,
then, is to set up a situation where giving and receiving seem natural and come
to be expected, a situation in which I withhold judgment, welcome risk, watch
with great delight as playfulness and pleasure begin to emerge, and together
my students and I explore and enjoy the texts we create in response to the subject matter we are studying.
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And as I think back over the many classes and many groups, I think of how
often my students and I laugh, how I welcome the moments that are humorous,
how important it is to me to feel pleasure in the company and fellowship of
others. I enjoy listening . . . that may be a large part of what attracts me to this
way of teaching . . . I like the interplay of ideas as my students speak and write to
one another . . . and I like that I can feel all of this in a bodily way . . . that my
body responds to words and to images and to the presence of others. So just as I
sense my body when I write, I am equally sensing my classroom . . . sensing
where we are heading . . . noting when we seem to be wandering or losing our
focus . . . paying attention to what I want to call a felt sense of the classroom.
So (enough of this happy scene of turned on people acting responsibly and
being fully present in the moment), aren’t there moments when my teaching
fails? When we don’t reach a climax? When pleasure becomes gratuitous or conﬂict leads nowhere . . . or even worse to impotence? Well, of course. Someone goes
on for too long . . . students condescend to one another . . . form cliques . . . won’t
listen well or compassionately . . . miss the point . . . don’t do the reading or the
writing. There are times when expectations are unmet, desires thwarted, warmth
withdrawn, when boredom settles in and rejection makes itself felt. Surely at such
times I watch my watch and beat a hasty exit at the end of our allotted time.
But neither failure nor success is what I am after here. Your words, Peter,
make me think about all we have never said about teaching. All we tend to shy
away from. All that remains, as you say, “unspeakable.” And what emerges to
me as the hardest thing to talk about is our passion . . . what drew us to teach in
the ﬁrst place. Can we talk with each other about what we most care about?
Have we lost our purpose along the way? Have too many years in the classroom
left too many of us unsatisﬁed? Surely, burnout must be an instance of people
going through the motions without the requisite passion . . . putting the body
through its paces without connecting to the heart.
You say, Peter, that like sex, college teaching should only be performed on
consenting adults. Yes, education really only works when those giving it and
receiving it are thrilled, engaged, turned on. When we seek it out . . . for we
know we are after something. When we can contact our own hunger to know, to
read, to write, to express, to learn. The classes that work best are those in which
students can contact such desires for themselves . . . and then, of course teaching
becomes what it is at its best: a shared endeavor where participants emerge
more fully themselves for having been there. Having taken. Having given.
Agency
[Some people] said that when I talk about”meaning making” and “active learning,”
my language “carried the freight of the free, autonomous subject.” I stress too much
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that students write and not enough that they are written, that we construct and not
enough that we are constructed. . . . Critical analysis can show us ways in which our
thoughts and feelings are written for us by our culture or background. But I’m more
interested in the analysis of people like Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr., and even
the existentialists, who point out the actuality of full choice even in the most constrained circumstances. This reﬂects my bias, then, but I’m more worried about us and
our students thinking we are stuck when in truth we can act. (What is English? 83–84.)

Dear Peter,
How fully I resonate with the dilemma you pose here: it is theoretically
naive to assume we are free. Such a position is easily critiqued by postmodernists, by poststructuralists, by deconstructionists. Autonomy. Identity. All
constructs, they say. And yet, in how many writing classes over three decades
have I seen them prevail? In how many writing classes have I seen my students
take steps toward claiming their own full places in the world? Their emergence
did not happen through a critique of the languages in which they (and all of
us) are written. They became people who have something to say, subjects acting on their own and others’ behalf, through the act of writing, through telling
and shaping and claiming their own stories, through active participation in
creating the classroom and the meaning it would hold for them. A bias toward
agency? You bet. How could a writing teacher see it any differently?
Sometimes I wonder about people who write theory. I wonder what their
lives are like. Of course, I realize I’m being cavalier here . . . one cannot lump all
theorists together . . . theory, as a tool, is, in fact, often quite useful. But when
theories become substitutes for experiencing, when ideologies replace the complexities of lived experience, I become annoyed, even angry. Too many theorists
privilege their own thinking . . . placing people and ideas into categories without addressing the thorny question of what lies outside . . . what can’t be
accounted for by the theory. And yet in a writing classroom, what counts most
(at least in my mind) is each person’s encounter with language. I want theory
that helps me make sense of my students’ wonderful uniqueness, of the richness
and variety of their individual life experiences, of their marvelous singularity. I
want theory that leads me to act in ways I consider ethical. I want theory that
addresses me in relation to others. I do not want theory that reduces me to a
sign in a signifying system. Signs don’t act. Signs don’t protest. Signs don’t love.
Or cry. Or give birth. Or die. Signs don’t teach. Or write. People do.
Condescension
I have had an interesting glimpse at how the literature profession somehow
encourages its members to internalize an attitude of ironic condescension toward
writing. When I teach a practicum or any graduate course in writing, I ask students to
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write case studies of themselves as writers: to look back through their lives at what
they’ve written and to ﬁgure out as much as they can about how they went about
writing and what was going on—all the forces at play. I’ve noticed a striking feature
that is common in English PhD students that I don’t much see in graduate students
from other disciplines in my course: a wry and sometimes witty but always condescending tone they take toward their younger selves, who were usually excited with
writing and eager to be great writers. Behind this urbanity, I often see a good deal of
disappointment and even pain at not being able to keep on writing those stories and
poems that were so exciting to write. But instead of acknowledging this disappointment, these students tend to betray a frightening lack of kindness or charity—most
of all a lack of understanding—toward that younger self who wanted to grow up to be
Yeats. Instead, I see either amused condescension or downright ridicule at their former idealism and visionary zeal. My point is that people cannot continue to engage
in writing without granting themselves some vision and idealism and even naive
grandstanding—yet these literature students, now that they see themselves on the
path to being professors of literature, seem to need to squelch that side of themselves,
however urbanely. (What is English? 129)

Peter . . . The ﬁrst time I read this passage, about ten years ago, I marked it,
and it stops me every time I return to it. It strikes me as such a sad statement. I
have no desire to place the blame only at the feet of graduate professors of literature . . . nor do you, I am sure. This attitude pervades more than English departments. It has to do, I think, with the sad fact that so few people truly understand
what it means to be a writer in one’s own right . . . with so few people in and outside of the academy having had the opportunity to cultivate the writer within
themselves. It is a sad state of affairs that so few truly enjoy writing . . . truly trust
themselves as writers . . . will risk allowing their thoughts to emerge on the page.
How often, I wonder, were their attempts to write squelched by teachers or parents who did not know how to care for the writers in front of them?
My sense of your work is that it has always been and continues to be directed
toward seeing the writer in each person who enters your classroom . . . toward
releasing and cultivating the writer in whoever sits before you . . . toward teaching others (students, us) to listen carefully and appreciatively to colleagues and
peers as they (we) put words on paper. And yet, even with your many years of
staying this course, with all those you have inﬂuenced, those of us who share
your vision remain a minority. And naturally, it is vision you mention here. Of
course. One cannot teach writing well or write well (convincingly, passionately,
thoughtfully, intelligently) without vision. Without a sense of what is at stake.
Without a conviction regarding one’s right to speak and to be heard. It’s such
hard work, isn’t it? Not so much the teaching of writing—the setting up of routines and rhythms that support a workshop oriented classroom—that comes
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easily enough once the ground is prepared. But the laying of the ground?
Instilling the belief that each person has a right to write, a right to be heard, a
voice that matters? If we could do that well, wouldn’t we all—future teachers of
literature included—honor that childhood self who yearned to express what lay
within?
F R O M P R I VAT E C O R R E S P O N D E N C E

On Felt Sense and Teaching
Dear Sondra,
You’ll see that your putting me on to Gendlin has been fruitful. It’s lodged in one
of those little transistors in my tooth cavity (do you remember stories about that?)
so I keep hearing messages now and then in my head and talking back and chewing
on things. Rich stuff. The following is a kind of freewriting to my Practicum . . .
thought you might be interested.


(Someone wrote me a note after Wednesday’s class, being troubled about what
s/he had said. I said I thought what s/he said was ﬁne. . . .)
But in so far as your statement led you to go through this restatement I’m very
glad you were troubled. For it was a wonderful set of perceptions and afﬁrmations
about where you are at and how you are doing. And a great pleasure to read. Notice,
by the way, how that sequence of utterances by you—ﬁrst in class and then in the
letter—represents exactly what Perl/Gendlin are talking about in ”felt sense.” . . .
That is, you have an intention to say something and you say it; but then having said
it, you consult your felt sense of what you meant to say—or in this case your felt
sense came out and consulted you—and you realized that what you said didn’t really
represent your felt sense and so you made another utterance—this time closer to
what you want to say. . . .
So Gendlin is talking about a basic process that is very natural: making an utterance and then noticing a slight lack of synch between that utterance and what you
really felt/feel—what you wanted to say; and therefore making another utterance
that tries to get closer to it. We do it all the time—naturally, spontaneously. But of
course the trouble is that (especially in writing) we also don’t do it enough. We get in
the habit of saying things which aren’t quite in synch with the feeling/intention that
gave rise to the words. But we feel, ”You can never really say what you really mean, so
why try.” And after enough of this, you stop feeling the lack of ﬁt between your
words and what you mean/intend/feel. . . .
How messy and slippery a phenomenological issue this is—but wonderfully central it is to the main thing about speaking and writing and making meaning.
Perl/Gendlin/felt sense is all about ﬁguring out what you “really mean.” And there is
the tricky business about whether you adjust/revise what you say or write—did you

D ear Pe ter

261

change your intention of what to say, or was the intention there all the time but you
missed it the ﬁrst time and got it the second time (or 50th time.) I guess both
processes must occur. . . .The matter is slippery because I suspect that if we want to
speak accurately about what happens in people we also have to talk about deeper
and more superﬁcial intentions. . . .
This transaction . . . at the deepest level is often only possible, I think, if the person has a trust that all her meaning and intelligence is there, available; that all
humans have rich complex meanings available to them at all times: as in a restaurant, they are not quite cooked yet—they still need more time in the oven—but they
are nevertheless genuinely there and available and ready to be ﬁnished.

Dear Peter,
Your letter makes me smile. I’m glad I saved it in a ﬁle, labeled simply
“Elbow.” It reminds me of talks we’ve had—mostly about Gene Gendlin’s
work—and how eager you have been to explore what is central to composing,
even when it is different, not quite in the language of “our ﬁeld,” even when it
leads to what you later call “the suspiciously ‘touchy-feely’ aspects of the
Perl/Gendlin thing.”
I have always been uncomfortable with the “touchy-feely” aspects too . . .
and yet your encouragement always helped me. You made me feel less alone
when claiming that writing is anchored in our bodies as well as our minds, that
it is not only cognitive—that language and meaning arise together by paying
attention to felt sense.
And here you are, exploring, writing, attempting to say just what this means
to you . . . experientially. Again the focus on process . . . on what happens as we
think and speak and write. On what happens as we make meaning. It is interesting to see you struggle with a dilemma that I don’t much explore: the question of order or timing or what comes ﬁrst. You are intrigued, almost appear
compelled, to pin down this question of what changes as we speak and write,
the words or the intention.
In some ways, I think you are correct when you say both options must be
true . . . sometimes the intention was there all along, and the writer just didn’t
ﬁnd the right words . . . other times the words may have been on the right track,
but the intention itself changed in the saying of it. But I want to quarrel with
you about your use of the word intention. It sounds too set . . . as if we have
intentions sitting around inside of us waiting to be discovered. The process
Gene is pointing to is more open-ended . . . more malleable and intricate. With
more give and take . . . more trying on and checking . . . and often the “rightness” of the words comes as a surprise . . . a kind of “Oh, that’s what I meant . . .
I see now . . .” but it isn’t something we know prior to the saying of it. And in my
understanding, it seems as if we only know if we’ve adequately captured our felt
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sense by consulting (here we go again—that place) the location in our bodies
where we experience ourselves directly.
Frequently, in the years since 1980, when I ﬁrst introduced the idea of felt
sense to our ﬁeld, people have used it to refer to feelings. But Gene makes a
clear distinction here. Felt sense is not an already constellated or identiﬁable
emotion . . . it is just what it says . . . something felt but not yet articulated or
identiﬁed as any one thing. It is only in turning towards a felt sense and bringing words to it that we come to see what is there . . . and in this way of thinking,
it is never really set. It does shift and change. I have often thought of it as an
internal criterion I use when writing (or teaching). I sense something larger
than words . . . I ask myself, what is this? What is going on? What’s right here
on the edge of my thinking? And then, if I can bear to sit still and wait, if I have
patience and don’t jump up too quickly or grasp at the ﬁrst formulation, words
come that I recognize as right, as capturing the sense I am experiencing. It does
take slowing down and paying attention to what is not yet in words . . . to what
lies beneath the words, to a felt sense.
In this way I’ve often thought that using felt sense as a guide while writing is
the opposite of what happens when I engage in freewriting. In freewriting, I
move along like a train gathering speed, letting words come as quickly as possible, not censoring anything, putting down on paper whatever I can catch of
what is crossing my mind. When I use felt sense or the exercise you have called
the Perl Guidelines, I enact a very different process. I begin slowly, easily,
accepting whatever words come to me, but I also cultivate an attentiveness and
a deliberate waiting and pausing. In other words, I pay attention not just to the
words that are emerging but also to the location in my body where I am able to
sense, feel, intuit something. In this way, felt sense has more of a backward and
inward motion than a forward and outer one. It holds an implicit invitation: to
pay attention to what can be directly sensed but is not yet “in words.”
You come closer to this formulation of felt sense, Peter, in a second letter you
wrote to your students in 1984, which (since you are talking about my use of felt
sense in the classroom) you kindly forwarded to me. Here you ask the following:
What does it mean to have something “in mind”?—What is it that is in mind?
Even though we don’t know the precise answer to that question, we can discover by
practice that we can experience a sense of that something-we-want-to-say-but-it’snot-yet-clear-what-it-is.
Most people when they ﬁrst try to attend to that “in mindedness” can only be clear
about it in retrospect: after they’ve said or written something they can stop and ask
themselves, “was that it?” and oddly enough usually know the answer without doubt.
Thus, the point is that people do have available to them—even if they are not in the
habit of noticing it—a “felt sense” of what they sort-of-intend to say or “have in mind.”
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What Perl’s discovered and I’ve been able to reafﬁrm with myself and some
teachers I’ve worked with is that though people often ignore that “felt sense” and
just proceed with their thinking and writing, they can learn to attend to it more: to
value and take more seriously their own inchoate intentions—vague feelings that
they might have something to say about something. They can learn to pause and go
back more often to this felt sense and see whether what they have written ﬁts.
If you do this—go back and quietly, openmindedly check—you are often led to a
“shift” or “adjustment” in direction: “no, that’s not quite it, what I really want to say
is. . . .” It turns out that even experienced writers (I use my own experience here) seldom ﬁnd words on the ﬁrst try which match one’s felt sense. And so, interestingly,
the process tends to lead one on a curving or jagged or surprising path of discovery
rather than a straight one—yet a path that feels to the writer as though it is getting
closer to what was wanted all along but not quite known.
It is important, by the way, that this going back and checking be, in fact, quiet
and charitable. I.e., this process of checking the felt sense or intention should not be
confused with revision or editing—which indeed must be done in a noncharitable
critical consciousness. Checking with felt sense is very liable to make one move away
from something that is well written to something that is more messy and inchoate—
but closer to where one at the deepest level was trying to go.
It is Perl’s sense—though this comes out of Eugene Gendlin—that we do well to
look to our physical selves in trying to attend more sensitively to this felt sense. This
will seem offensively “touchy-feely” to some. I believe she is absolutely right on this,
still the notion of some kind of felt sense or not-yet-articulated-intention is more
important and universally valid than any linking of it to bodily sensation. . . .

I love how closely you attend to the process here. How well you have articulated what it means to have something in mind . . . shying away a bit from
the fact that having something in mind is also having something in body . . .
These days we may be more comfortable talking about the body as a site of
knowing . . . where desires, intentions, and meanings coalesce and make
themselves felt than we were in 1984, but it’s not yet easy or straightforward.
Not coincidentally, Peter, in the years that you have been exploring this
concept and these processes with your students, I have been doing the same.
A few years ago, one of my graduate students in the master’s program at
Lehman, elaborated on the concept of felt sense in a way that enlarged my
understanding of the relationship between the body and writing. Writing in
1996, Danielle brings to bear a more body-centered thinking, a freer way of
approaching the physicality of writing, than was available to us in the early
1980s. And not surprisingly her words link us to the sexuality connected to
language you sensed years ago too. Addressing me in a journal entry,
Danielle writes,
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There are times when we come across an articulation of what we have always
known, but did not know we knew it, because it had never been spoken in our
presence by us or anyone else. The “felt sense” notion, even though it was kept
particularly loose in definition by you, is one of those moments of articulation
for me.
I love writing. This is not to say that I do very much of it, but when I am doing it,
I love it. It is like sex in that way: long anticipated, short lived and puzzled about in
the long time in between. And more than that, I have always been a little bit confused by the fact that the physical sensation of writing for me feels like, well, like
something kind of stimulating. That is to say that when I really get down to writing
something—anything—I have a series of physical responses that are virtually indistinguishable from what I experience when sexually attracted to someone. These sensations (in this order) are as follows:
Breath. My awareness of it in these two situations. I never think about breathing except when doing these things. All of a sudden, in the midst, I will notice that
my lungs are almost too full, and I will hear the music of my own breath. For me
this is a moment of authenticity, the breathlessness, the sound of me trying to
breathe.
Heartbeat. More like a crash than a beat, except that “beat” connotes the rhythmic, which I am sure is the true basis for the resemblance between writing and other
pleasures of the body. At times when I am making any sort of progress with my writing I feel my heart knocking at the door of my rib cage, a strong-armed angry prisoner who wants to see the guard, and who won’t be ignored. When the writing, or
whatever it is I have thrown myself into, is working, my chest beats in my ears, my
stomach, my teeth.
Tingling ﬂuids. Need I say more? When things are ﬂowing, they are ﬂowing.
Indulging in such pleasures means wet hands, moist face, water everywhere. But it
all has that electrical charge on the skin that is strong enough to frighten, yet mild
enough to allow me to continue.

I ﬁnd Danielle’s description both powerful and evocative. A poet, she writes
in metaphors. It is unlikely that she has captured how composing occurs for all
people. But if Danielle’s description does anything, I’d say that it alerts us to
the ways we may have ignored or been made uncomfortable by the power of
bodily experience in writing—and teaching.
Finally, what strikes me in these letters, Peter, is your writing about trust.
Not unlike the sense of entitlement I wrote about earlier. To trust that one is
intelligent . . . that one can and will make meaning of even the most difﬁcult
and confusing of experiences or texts . . . that being human means nothing less
. . . To teach writing well, mustn’t we all (in whatever settings, with whatever
students) ﬁnd a way to convey this message?
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Christmas Greetings
December 17, 1980
Dear friends,
By procrastinating I have found a memorable day on which to write to you.
Abby’s ﬁfth birthday. Cami, Abby, and Benjy are downstairs blowing up balloons
and hiding little packs of raisins around the livingroom for a treasure hunt. I have
escaped to my study, my state-owned electric typewriter, and the view over a grey
and foggy Olympia harbor—to engage in the important work of communication
with the outside world.
Till now we have used birthday parties as occasions for getting together with
grown-ups we wanted to see, who happened to have children. We would all stand
around our diningroom with its window seats and large plywood inclined plane, eating sweets and having a nice visit, as kids crawled among each other and made a mess.
But this time Abby gets to decide who comes, and Cami consulted carefully with her on
all the details of the party. The stakes are higher. Perhaps I’ll have a draft of this letter
ﬁnished by 4:30 when the party begins and I descend to help Heather, Lissa, Matthew,
Megan, Abby and Benjy roll cans of baked beans at 9-pins of stacked milk cartons . . . .
Our ﬁve month trip was the highlight of the year. . . . the most exciting time
started in May: six weeks in England and a month in France. . . . Cami and I learned
not to hurry and to treat foreign worms and foreign sidewalks as no less interesting
or important than old buildings and museums. Our trip was really a tour of playgrounds, but that turns out to be a good way to visit foreign lands. England, by the
way, is terriﬁc on that score, France pretty bad. . . .

Dear Peter,
How pleased I was to be included in your Christmas list. But now I ask
myself, what prompted me to save your Christmas letters? I think it was
because I enjoyed them so much . . . because I was beginning to learn about
you not only as a colleague but also as a person, a husband, and a father. I loved
the stories about the kids, the birthday parties, and the family trips. They were
reassuring to someone who treasured her professional life and wasn’t yet convinced it was possible to combine a full work life with parenting. Your letters
began to convince me that a professional life could include, could in fact be
enriched by, a family life. I loved, too, the sense that you were accessible, that
you invited your world of friends into the fabric of your life . . . that you actually wrote to us. In any event, I found that after reading your (or Cami’s) yearly
letter, I could not nonchalantly toss it away. It seemed more respectful somehow to save each one, to let them accumulate.
In 1984, I gave birth to my daughter and in 1987, to identical twin boys.
(You wrote a hastily scribbled note: “Congratulations on babies.”) I smile at
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that now too. Your Christmas letters did not prepare me for life with twins and
a toddler. The only trips we took were to the pediatrician’s ofﬁce. But in 1992,
Cami’s Christmas letter prepares me for what is now (in the year 2000) quite
familiar to me. She writes,
Life with two teenagers is about what you’d expect. The phone rings constantly—
we’ve sunk to having Call Waiting. We overhear conversations which go: “S’up?”
“S’up?” “Fly.” “Dope.” We haven’t a clue what they’re talking about, though at least
they do still seem to talk to us, when there’s no one younger about.

But Cami also describes your life at this time:
Peter tells me he is more relaxed this year, though I don’t see it—he turns on his
computer even before he gets dressed in the morning. He’s been writing essays this
year instead of books, and still travels quite a bit. He’s enjoying teaching a graduate
seminar called “Language as Performance”, in which the students make noises and
move around a lot—Peter says he’s trying to “get the body attached to the writing.”
He moved the class to the Physics building for fear others in the English Dept would
peek. He has gone high-tech for his once a week cooking responsibilities, with a
bread machine that looks like R2D2. Unfortunately, he tends to fall for the more
exotic recipes, like chocolate chip bread. . . .

How much I enjoy these stories from your shared life. Some things have
changed from the 1980 letter: you have moved east, the kids are older, you
write now on a computer, not an electric typewriter. But some things remain
the same: here you are again, pushing the boundaries, looking to discover connections (again) between our bodies and our language . . . experimenting, cautiously, carefully, with students. I enjoy, too, seeing you through Cami’s
eyes—chocolate chip bread. My kids would love it.
Your letter from 1993 is reminiscent of the ﬁrst one I received and then, of
course, moves on to professional concerns that will dominate the 1990s:
Tonight, as I write, Abby is having a party here for her eighteenth birthday. I sit at
my computer in my study above the living room hearing bursts of talk, music,
laughter—and marvel at the benign scene. A score of them sit around, mostly on the
ﬂoor, talking, listening, an occasional back rub. Free-ﬂoating, good-spirited presence and sociability. . . . Certainly we are aware that our days with Abby and Ben at
home are numbered. We see everything through this bitter-sweet lens and appreciate them all the more. . . . I also get sucked into writing about assessment and grading of writing—trying to persuade people to do less of it. The schools and culture
seem preoccupied with testing, ranking, measuring. Perhaps I could have skipped
writing this year-end evaluation and just given us an “A-minus.”
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Dear Peter,
As I sit in my study in front of my computer, Sara can be found, as your
children often were, on the phone. Josh and Sam sit for hours (if we let them)
in front of the TV, playing video games. They still need rides to basketball
practice or soccer games. Their friends don’t yet come and go with quite the
ease you describe. But you do, once again, hint at what lies ahead . . . their
maturing and their eventual moving out and away.
I warm to the humor in your family’s grade for the year’s progress. I wish, as
we enter the age of high-stakes testing, that the situation were not so dire. No
grade or test can inform us about the richness of life in your house, just as no
grade or test can ever tell us about the ways students learn and grow in our
classrooms. I know you know this. You’ve engaged the battle far more intensely
than I. But I worry, that at least for now, we are on the losing end. Those who
think raising standards means standardizing what happens in classrooms are
setting policies that undermine the kind of teaching and learning we value. It is
a discouraging time for many of us who entered the profession when research
about composing was young and offered the promise of something bright and
new. I imagine you feel this too . . . but you’ve managed to stay the course. To
persevere. To keep writing and listening.
So, Peter, I’ve known you for twenty years. When I pause over those words
and ask what else there is to say, what comes is a realization I’m not sure I’ve
ever put into words. I realize that in addition to your being thoughtful and
inquiring in your work, you are also thoughtful and inquiring about your
life—and that underlying whatever you do is a particular playfulness and a
generosity of spirit. Whether you are parenting or teaching, thinking about
testing or theorizing about meaning—or writing about any of the above—
these same qualities shine through. When I look for colleagues, then, whose
words and actions are consistent with their vision of the world, I ﬁnd you. It is,
I think, this seamlessness that I admire most.
Your words, Peter, have been a bridge, a way to connect worlds, a way to
hold on to a vision of what it means to be a teacher, a friend, a parent, and a
writer. It is a rich world for me: a world of connection, dialogue, and shared
values. A world that, like a collage, is layered, circles back on itself, picks up a
thread, and weaves it for a time. One that has no formal ending, only the possibility of continuing. Thank you for all of that.
Write soon,
Sondra

18 C O L L A G E
A Coda

The best advice I ever got came during a presentation Peter was giving on levels of assessment—low stakes vs. high stakes. The ﬁrst level, he said, was liking
writing—not marking it, not grading it, just liking it. What a simple but extraordinary insight—that our ﬁrst job as teachers of writing is to enjoy what our
students produce! I never fail to think of that idea when I sit down to read a set
of papers. It doesn’t make the pile any smaller, but it certainly improves my
outlook. It reminds me of why I became a writing teacher in the ﬁrst place.
Bruce Penniman, Amherst Regional High School
Christmas Break, 1975, University of Hawaii, Manoa. Peter Elbow’s ﬁrst
workshop to promote Writing without Teachers. Never heard of Peter Elbow or
his book; I attend with the vague hope of keeping up on professional developments. Without Teachers? Will I be Elbowed out of a job?
No preconceptions = no misconceptions. I like young Dr. Elbow’s low-key
delivery. I especially like freewriting and the conversational way it reads. In ten
quick minutes I write more than I usually do in an hour. How easy to just pour
words onto paper!
Although he doesn’t present it quite this way, I conceive of freewriting as
calisthenics and am fascinated by the possibilities. Athletes run windsprints.
Musicians play scales. Artists draw sketches. Shouldn’t writers freewrite? I walk
two miles home, sucking tamarind seeds and wondering what would happen if
my students freewrote for ﬁve minutes every day. Universal ﬂuency? Greater
creativity? Conﬁdent, natural-sounding prose?
We write The Journal Freewriting Handbook, begin The Read-Along
Handbook, name The Golden Triangle and show it to other schools. We must
be having fun because before we know it, it’s 1995, twenty years after Peter
Elbow’s workshop. I’ve read and admired his follow up Writing with Power but
never attempted to contact him.
The University of Hawaii English Department sponsors a Citizens’ Chair to
lure distinguished faculty from other campuses for a year. For 1995 it snares
internationally known writing guru Peter Elbow from Umass-Amherst. It’s
bad luck to ignore serendipity; I send Professor Elbow a description of The
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Performance English Program-in-progress and explain how its seed was sown
by his 1975 workshop. I invite him to lunch with us in our ofﬁce. He calls,
accepts, and later pedals over from Kuykendall Hall on a bicycle.
James Harstad, University of Hawaii, Manoa
I remember being on dish duty at the Amherst soup kitchen when two men
burst through the double-swinging doors from the dining room, crashed to
the ﬂoor, and proceeded to pummel one another violently. I was happy to have
a series of sinks between me and them and everyone else in the kitchen quickly
backed away. All except Peter. He moved in directly and put himself between
them, forcing them to stop.
Later, when we all exclaimed at his bravery, he shrugged it off and said only,
“the interesting thing is, they were ﬁghting about language.”
Erika Scheurer, University of St. Thomas
In class recently an undergraduate student questioned me about the
assignment to bring “one page of freewriting about their topic” to class.
“What,” she wanted to know, “do you want? What should we include?” I give a
little laugh, a kind one, and say as I have a thousand times in the past, “It’s
freewriting. You know, you’re free to say anything you want. It has to be about
the topic, but that’s the only limit. With freewriting, you can’t do it the wrong
way. Everyone’s page of freewriting will be a success.” She replies that she’s
“just checking,” implying that she can’t really believe what I’m saying is true.
It’s early in the semester without enough time for her to psyche me out as a
teacher. She’s looking for the catch and the trick. It makes me sad that students have been so thoroughly, yet necessarily, taught to distrust, to be suspicious and doubtful. I hope freewriting will stand up to the test. Not only do I
intend for it as a strategy to affect her writing process, but I hope its practice,
her writing and my acceptance of what she brings, will shape the relationship
between us as student and teacher.
Jane Danielewicz, University of North Carolina
I was pleasantly surprised recently to overhear a group of students in a
British Literature course exclaiming in a discussion group that they liked
the word “ambiguity,” a word and concept that I interject quite frequently
in my courses and that I have relished since my initial reading of Peter
Elbow’s Embracing Contraries: Explorations in Learning and Teaching
(1986). Since then, I have gently, at times, and not so gently at other times,
urged students to consider the literary selections we are studying from a
multivalent perspective.
For example, in discussing the title character in Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s
“Rime of the Ancient Mariner,” our discussion initially took a traditional—a
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“safe”—slant by considering the Ancient Mariner from the mythological
perspective. We embraced Elbow’s “defending attorney” position as the students and I argued in support of the Mariner, underscoring the universal
role of the storyteller, the Mariner as the wisdom figure and prophetic voice,
the “wanderer” who seeks forgiveness for committing a reprehensible deed
and reintegration into the community who alienated him, the “teacher” or
“mentor,” if you will, who serves as a disturbing voice at times but who ultimately alerts the “audience” to the need for confession and regeneration.
But knowing that Peter Elbow also invites the instructor and students to be
tugged in a seemingly opposite or contrary manner enabled me to become
simultaneously the prosecuting attorney just at the moment when students
seemed comfortable and smug with the wind-down to the discussion.
Students soon discussed the role of the Ancient Mariner as interrupter and as
the catalyst who forces the audience to confront demons that render us sad
and immobilized. Thus, we embraced both aspects of the Ancient Mariner.
Elbow’s view of the instructor as both prosecuting and defending attorney was
well enacted during that discussion. Such divergent viewpoints, based on textual proofs, provide a perspective on ambiguity that anticipates, welcomes, and
balances the healthy tension that comprises so much of life, whose preparation, ultimately, is the goal of education.
Mary Theresa Hall, Thiel College
Dhira Mahoney, a colleague, conducted a workshop focusing on “The
Open-Ended Writing Process” (50–58). She opened the session by paraphrasing Elbow’s advice: “When you’re freewriting, the editor should be out of the
room.” After writing the guidelines for open-ended writing on the board, she
noted that its goal was to help “in the search for the as yet unthought thought.”
To get everyone in the room started on the voyage out, she offered the following statement: “The heresy of heresies is common sense.” My own voyage out,
not so surprisingly, looked like this:
Yes. That is it. I know this well. This is the aphorism that all academics should
keep in mind—if they are to please P&T committees. Write about basic research,
and for Pete’s sake, don’t ever write about classroom practice. What happens in the
classroom will do nothing for you. You will never get tenure that way. Write about
that which is of no use to anyone. Be esoteric, arcane. Don’t be practical. Do exercises that demonstrate your mind’s ability to do mental gymnastics. Do those difﬁcult gymnastic moves. Impress the judges. Above all—impress the judges.
Much of what I publish must be considered heresy among literary folks.
Composition? That’s too practical. You can be esoteric, arcane, impractical. I wonder how people like Linda Flower, Peter Elbow, Nancy Sommers, and Sondra Perl
are viewed by colleagues (literary folks in their departments?
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For my focus or voyage in, I asked the naive question: “Why do literary folks
have such low regard for composition scholarship?” Then on my new voyage
out, I pondered:
Perhaps this is a silly question. It all relates to the history of the profession.
Until 100 years ago there was little literary scholarship, and rhetoricians had little respect for literary scholarship because literature seemed to have no structure,
no discipline. As literary folks rose to power, they maintained a protective paranoia, which later turned to smugness. Interesting. Very interesting. Will the pendulum swing back? I see signs that it might be beginning to do so, but it’s too
early to tell.
Duane Roen, Arizona State University
December, 1984. In the newly formed Writing Programs at Stony Brook,
where Peter was Director, he talked about a whole new way of thinking about
the teaching of writing: process pedagogy. Freewriting, multiple drafts, collaborative writing groups, and the like. At one of the meetings, he noted that publishing student writing often resulted in improved texts, since the students
knew the work would be made public.
Taking Peter’s words to heart, at the end of the first semester, I published
an anthology of writing by students in several classes of EGC 100, a pre-freshman composition course for mostly non-native speakers with little experience
in writing in English. I gave a copy to Peter to look at. He returned it to me
with a note. It read, “I (and Cami) were so touched by your books of writing
from 100. Lovely. That piece about parting from the stone-faced grandmother: what a knockout. And even the illiteracies, rare, are touching. I’m
very pleased that you have made such a spirit in your classes. Thanks for all
you are doing.”
I stared at it and reread it several times, almost in disbelief. Thanks for all
you are doing? I was confused. Finally, I understood. It occurred to me that in
the twenty-ﬁve years I had been teaching, no one in any school, from junior
high to high school to the community colleges I worked at, no one, other than
my students, had ever thanked me, for anything.
Peter’s note exempliﬁed how much he honored, respected, and valued these
students and their writing, the teachers and the teaching of writing. He continued to notice and express his appreciation for the work I and others were
doing, and it was not long before my teaching practice was transformed.
Peter used to say “a happy teacher is a better teacher.” A simple statement,
but oh, how profound. His ongoing appreciation of our work provided the
support and motivation for ﬁve of his seven original faculty to continue working together in the Writing Program for the next ﬁfteen years.
Fran Zak, State University of New York at Stony Brook
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Somewhere in the recesses of the 1980s, when Peter was director of the
writing program here at Stony Brook, I recall feeling very much burned out
teaching—semester after semester—the basic comp requirement, EGC 101. It
had begun to feel as though I was processing students, rather than encouraging
process in their writing. An assembly line. With Peter, a casual “How’s it
going?” in the hallway could be answered honestly. The idea of being collaborators was more than just talk.
“Not great,” was my reaction one particularly dispiriting day. “I feel like I
need to change something.”
“Why don’t you try EGC 100?” This was then largely, unofﬁcially, an ESL
course. Territory I was unprepared to explore.
“I don’t have any training, any experience with ESL students,” was my reﬂex
reaction.
“Just get them to do a lot of writing,” was Peter’s parry to my caution.
I did, I loved the course, and that simple sentence has resonated in my writing head ever since. Skeptical at ﬁrst, I soon found that the freewriting, the
loopwriting, the emphasis on deferring the impulse toward “correctness,”
toward separating the generative process from the editing process, was exactly
what these students needed—so bent on grammar, vocabulary, so afraid of
making surface mistakes long before they even had a surface. At semester’s end,
their course evaluations became pleasantly predictable. Asked what had
changed the most, I would see again and again, “I’m not afraid to write anymore,” “I feel less tension,” “I don’t have that anxiety when I start writing.” Of
course. It made perfect sense. What held these writers back was the stark fear of
making mistakes. They all could recite deﬁning moments of embarrassment, of
humiliation in their writing histories. Remove that pressure (not always easy),
and there’s the possibility for richness and voice in the writing. It wasn’t, of
course, a universal response. Just those who were willing “to do a lot of writing.”
Ron Overton, SUNY—Stony Brook
Journal entry 4-1-85 (My second semester in the doctoral program at Stony
Brook).
The Writing and Thinking Institute at Bard College [this past weekend] was
a tremendous reinforcement for both my teaching and writing. I was familiar
with most of the techniques and strategies of “the Elbow method,” but my participation in the workshop showed me that periodic “practice” of the strategies
can be very helpful. The workshop participants were mostly secondary and
middle school teachers, some of whom were attending for the second or third
time, reinforcing what they had learned at previous workshops. Their interest
and enthusiasm about writing and the workshop was contagious. There was a
strong sense of community and involvement in all the sessions.
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Participants were divided into three groups—two social science groups and
one English group. In the English group, we were introduced to freewriting,
loopwriting, reader-based and criterion-based feedback, process writing,
focused freewriting, and text-rendering. . . . Everybody actively participated in
all the activities. In fact, we all become so immersed in what we were doing and
in our own writing that questions about classroom implementation became
secondary. . . . On Sunday, Leon Botstein, the president of Bard spoke to the
group. His commitment to the Writing and Thinking Institute and to getting
students involved in their education was inspiring. He explained that Peter
Elbow had started the Institute four years before and how it has continued in
its commitment to help both students and teachers in the areas of thinking
and writing. Botstein and the faculty have high regard and respect for Peter’s
work, something that was evident throughout the institute. I was so proud that
I had him as a teacher and that I was working with the “demi-god” that they
were all worshiping.
Pat Perry, Virginia Commonwealth University
Peter’s stubbornness: I show up to Peter’s ofﬁce and we sit side by side,
looking out at the tennis ﬁelds and the hills beyond. I say something despairing: “I can’t write—I’ll never get this chapter done” or “I’ll never ﬁnish by
June” or “If I do ﬁnish it’ll be crap” or “I don’t belong in the academy” or “The
people who hired me must have made a mistake.” With extreme patience (only
now do I realize how much patience!) and allowing no contradiction, Peter
ﬁrmly insists: “No, you can write—you will get this chapter done” and “Yes,
you will ﬁnish” and “No, it will be great” and “Yes, you do belong” and “No,
they made the right choice.” Somehow his willing it makes it so.
Erika Scheurer, University of St. Thomas
When Elbow ﬁrst came to Stony Brook, his idea was to hire writers to teach
writing . . . not PhD’s in English but writers, those who practiced what they
were to teach. Others said to me, “You don’t have a chance of getting that job,”
but to their surprise Peter hired me, a ﬁction writer, to teach freshman composition, and I’ve continued for eighteen years. In Peter’s program I found myself
immersed in a community of talkers. In those ﬁrst years, led by Elbow, we
turned inside out a subject that we’d always taken for granted, posing epistemological questions about the nature of writing, becoming better writers and
applying this thinking to teaching. Far from seeking the one true way to teach
composition, Peter created a group of experimentalists willing to engage students in a messy and variable process, stressing the importance of this process
more than the students’ actual written product. Elbow is a true revolutionary.
Carolyn McGrath, SUNY—Stony Brook
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One day I’m worrying a lot about voice and off the shelf I slide Writing With
Power. Peter opens the voice chapter by talking about being in a men’s bathroom,
how the echo in the marble stalls (he had been humming) makes him think
about resonance. The black box seems to him like a violin, and violins must be
broken in by frequent playing before they resonate richly. This leads him to
thinking about voice and writing. I read on, caught by the idea of resonance.
But later, much later, I get to thinking about the bathroom part, about how
odd and at the same time how remarkable yet unremarked upon it was. In the
essay “Me and My Shadow,” Jane Tompkins became notorious for mentioning
in mid-text that she had to pee. I found it rather intriguing, though I didn’t
(and don’t) know what to make of the fact that Writing with Power appeared in
1981 long before Jane Tompkins produced the essay “Me and My Shadow,”
published originally in 1987 (and reprinted frequently thereafter).
In Voice Lessons, Nancy Mairs talks about the feminine, being female, language, the body (French stuff), and how she is a female writer, not the male
academic sort. With academic irony, I’m anticipating the day when Peter gets
dismissed because he’s a feminist; perhaps the connection might explain the
rancor I’ve heard directed against him in professional circles, a subconscious
backlash against feminism. On the other hand, maybe being interested in personal writing is damning enough.
The body, voice, authority, being female, giving way to voice, to the pleasures of making text that connects me with others—and I found myself (some
ﬁve years after reading the bathroom sentence) writing a book about identity
and pedagogy that included sections of autobiography about my life as a
teacher and teaching a new course on women’s personal writing. I ﬁnally recognized that for those of us who write it’s permissible (maybe even necessary,
if we wish to make things happen), although it goes against all our academic
training, to try things we’re not sure about, to have conﬂicting views, to work
with stuff that slides around, to get personal.
Jane Danielewicz, University of North Carolina
Elbowing the EGC 100 class at Stony Brook produced dividends I could
never have anticipated. It was easy travel to distant places, a primer in the various ways a language could be constructed, it was my education in cultural
difference. I learned not to take personally the silence-instead-of-classdiscussion. I learned not to force small group readers and listeners closer than
their index for personal space allowed. That “thumbs up” was not globally positive. That speakers of Mandarin may sit together, and speakers of Cantonese
will muster on the other side of the room. And, for the ﬁrst time, I realized to
what extent contemporary American English now depends on idioms, catchphrases, buzzwords, slang. Cool can mean hot, bad can mean good. Is the
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antecedent for “it” in “Go for it!” (Thank you, Rocky) the same as the one in
“Just do it!” (Thank you, Nike)? We still drive on parkways and park in driveways. Can we say, “It goes without saying”? Can an amateur be proactive? “It’s
as easy as a piece of pie” is close, but no cigar.
Peter’s challenge to open up the writing workshop, to (ﬁrst) write with
abandon after kicking the editor out of the room, to understand the process of
composition as something far richer and more mysterious than templates like
the Baker Essay, than strategically placed thesis statements and well-behaved
conclusions—all this made language come alive, made curiosity and discovery
possible for all of us and our clashing languages. Moving to the margins of the
class, away from the center—writing without teachers—I had more time, a
better perspective, to notice, to listen to their language, to mine. As a poet, I
became fascinated by how close the twist (the “English”?) some students put
on expressions resembled the defamiliarizing work of poetry. A writer
describes how she left her elders at the dinner table as “I walked out of their
conversation,” and you want to know why that sounds right, sounds even better because it’s “wrong.” Another reﬂects back on his football mentor: “Coach
was an angry man with a Jeep,” and you want to know why that bluntness
works so well. “We ran under the raining day.” Do you correct that? Steal it for
a poem? (Finally, I stole it.)
EGC 100

At the end
of the story about letting go
the giver of feedback
sternly writes:
You are crazy
You ran under the raining day
You will get cold
I have nothing to teach
either of you.
The words are good,
the concern is right,
as is the pleasure
to be taken from the raining day.
And who am I
to correct Li Ming
who begins:
Time ﬂies fast away
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It is the unexpected syntax
of truth,
of poems.

Ron Overton, SUNY—Stony Brook
Peter often talked with some urgency about his desire to help students see
themselves as writers. Of all the things we do as teachers, perhaps this—the
cultivation of our students’ identities, and they of ours—is most central and
sustaining. Writing and the teaching of writing are identity-making processes,
acts that lead to becoming (not only writers, but any persona or self we can
imagine). Few of my students have become writers (the published kind), but
all have become someone. Writing and writing teachers have nudged this
development along.
The January day I write this it is raining, a freezing rain that minute by
minute coats every branch and leaf, every house and car, every rock and streetlight pole. The accretion of ice, glitter, beauty, is slow, almost imperceptible,
like the growth of these pieces, another word or phrase, another idea, and the
shape appears, an outline against the page, the way the dark branches are illuminated by the thin, silvery cover that makes each one distinctive and dimensional. Their shape and meaning emerge in the process of raining and writing.
Jane Danielewicz, University of North Carolina
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